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
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THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

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XIX- -XX

A MONTHLY REVIEW

FOUNDED BY JAMES KNOWLES

VOL. CXX

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THE

NINETEENTH

CENTURY

AND AFTER

No. DCCXIII—July 1936

ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS[1]

By Emile Mireaux, Editor of the *Temps*

It would be idle to deny that Anglo-French relations are passing through a grave crisis. On two separate occasions, within the space of a few months, in the matter of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, and then of the German remilitarisation of the Rhineland zone, it was borne in on the peoples of the two countries that they were divided by a profound difference of opinion. This feeling was all the more painful in that officially the policies of the two Governments had not ceased to be harmonious and co-operant. Indeed, in each of the two countries in turn, public opinion has been convinced that the action of its own Government has been paralysed by the hesitation, the reserve, the suspicion, and the lack of understanding—if not actually by the ill-will—of the Government of the other.

In the case of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, the majority of Frenchmen are firmly persuaded that their country has

[1] Translated by Randolph Hughes.

performed all the gestures which the English Government has demanded of it. France was asked to declare that Italy was the aggressor: it did so. It was asked to apply financial and economic sanctions to Italy: it applied them. England requested it to undertake to place its Mediterranean bases at the disposal of the English naval forces in case of an aggression on the part of Italy: it gave this undertaking. Of a truth—and it is no use denying it—France has performed all these gestures without any great enthusiasm, but she has performed them all the same. What charge can be brought against her? English opinion, however, is none the less unshakably convinced that, if Italy has been able to embark so resolutely upon her Abyssinian adventure and to bring it to a successful conclusion, it has only been possible on account of the secret connivance of France, or at least of the latter's reluctance to lend her support in the long run to a more vigorous means of coercing Italy.

Let us now consider the occupation of the Rhineland by the armed forces of Germany. It is manifest that in this case French public opinion was no less acutely disappointed than was British in the months preceding that incident. Those Frenchmen who stood for close collaboration between England and France in the Abyssinian affair—and their number was large—had been using the following argument to their fellow-countrymen: we must follow England to-day if we do not wish to remain isolated later, on the day—and perhaps it is not distant—when a quarrel will arise between France and Germany. And this argument had seemed to be so cogent that it sufficed to suppress the friendly sentiments unquestionably felt by so many Frenchmen for Italy. Now, the average Frenchman is to-day convinced that in March and April last he did not find forthcoming from the British Government and people all the assistance which he believed he had a right to expect. And yet the average Englishman can assure himself to-day, not without a show of reason, that France has received from England all the help she demanded. France, as a matter of fact, asked England to condemn the violation by Germany of undertakings to which the latter had attached her signature: England condemned Germany as requested. Again, France asked England to guarantee the integrity of her frontiers in

case of aggression on the part of Germany: England gave the required guarantee, and, as a pledge of good faith, consented to a preliminary consultation between the General Staffs of the two countries. She has, therefore, answered the call of France.

Thus each of the two countries remains convinced that it has fulfilled its obligations with respect to the other. Each of the two, in believing this, is beyond any doubt acting in good faith, and, what is more, facts at least appear to be on the side of the one no less than of the other. Deep down, however, each rests persuaded that, with regard to himself, his collaborator has failed to fulfil, if not all his promises, at least his duty in all its implications. Both, in short, are firmly persuaded that the other, more or less consciously, has, if not betrayed, at least acted to the detriment of the cause of peace. Every people, of course, is only too naturally inclined to imagine that the cause of peace and its own cause are one and the same thing.

Such then are the facts. It is not my purpose, I need hardly say, to open up a debate on them now that they belong to the past. Not only are such polemical discussions always futile, but it is infinitely better to face events in a spirit of sincerity and to try to understand them in order to derive from them such instruction as may be implicit in them. England and, almost immediately after, France have recently had inflicted upon them setbacks that it would be idle to deny. Since we are investigating the relations between the two countries, the first question we should ask is this: did France desire the setback inflicted on England and can she derive any satisfaction from it? Did England, on her side, desire the setback inflicted on France, and can she find in it any reason for rejoicing?

The question is no sooner put than it is answered. No, beyond all possible doubt, neither of the two nations, which remain united in friendship in spite of everything, has gained anything from the setback suffered by the other. The very opposite, indeed, is the case. France, for example, makes the security of her Eastern frontier her chief preoccupation. Moreover, she has the conviction that this security is in large part bound up with the security of the British Isles (has not Mr. Stanley Baldwin declared that the Rhine is the

ilitary frontier of Great Britain ?), and that, consequently, could only be firmly assured by sincere and honest co-opera-ion between the two countries. Corollary: every inter-ational event, every international complication which is kely to divert the attention of England from the problem of he Rhine, and which leads it to concentrate its attention and 's efforts in another part of the globe, or which even results a diminution of its authority, inevitably brings about a reakening of the position of France. Contrariwise, England quite rightly concerned to ensure in all circumstances the eedom of the great sea-route which, including as it does ibraltar, the Mediterranean, Suez and Aden, is indispensable the very life of its vast Empire. Now the freedom of this oute depends in large measure upon a good understanding ith France, nay more, upon active collaboration with rance in Mediterranean waters. The request addressed by ie English Government to the French Government last utumn would be an irresistible proof of this fact, were any roof necessary. It is to the interest of England that France iould as far as possible have her hands free in Europe, and iould not be exclusively obsessed by the threat from the hine. If therefore this threat becomes more clearly defined id looms larger—as it has recently done—who would venture deny that it must affect England's position in the world?

To sum up: it is not reasons of interest, that is to say ermanent interest, which have made the paths of England id France diverge in the course of the past few months. n the contrary, if one considers recent happenings dispas-onately and without prejudice, one cannot help being con-nced of the solidarity of the enduring interests of the two untries—and these interests are all the more enduring cause they are complementary. It remains true, however, at the consciousness of this permanent solidarity seems to ve been temporarily weakened. The vision of the two oples and the two Governments has been warped by con-igent and passing things. We have not been able to see e wood for the trees.

The present crisis in Anglo-French relations, therefore, simply, and cannot but be, the result of a misunderstanding, d we must now seek to get at the reasons for this mis-derstanding.

These reasons have their origin in a somewhat distant past.

The *entente cordiale* has already been in existence for a third of a century. This understanding between the two countries was manifested by a very friendly collaboration during the ten years preceding the Great War, and by a fraternal association during the years 1914–1918. This has already become past history, but time has not weakened the feeling of affectionate gratitude which these events left in the heart of the French people. It is assuredly not in the domain of feeling that we must seek the causes of the present division. These causes lie elsewhere. In my humble opinion, we shall find them if we examine the methods adopted on both sides of the Channel for the past fifteen years in order to settle the problems arising out of the conclusion of the war and the ensuing organisation of peace.

The war and the peace settlement left Europe with no small number of problems. To name only the major ones: reparations, naval ratios, inter-allied debts, military disarmament and the constitution of the League of Nations. Beyond any question, with regard to all these problems England and France have not been able to reach a common point of view, and in the circumstances could not hope to do so. And yet none of these problems was of a kind to arouse and foster rivalry between the two countries. When all is said, it was simply a matter of adjusting different interests, of harmonising different points of view, of bringing different attitudes into line. It was possible that discussion of the problems would not be smooth—and indeed it was not smooth. But no discussion could lead to any real conflict between the two countries. Was that a reason, however, for embarking on each discussion without any general plan, as if all these questions were independent of one another, and as if the solutions hit upon occasionally for some of them would not necessarily have an effect upon the others?

We may agree to pass over problems of an economic and financial order: disasters in this sphere are not irreparable or fatal. Anyhow, the inescapable exigencies of economic life could not but bring about sooner or later a settlement of war debts and reparations, even if statesmen proved unequal to this task. But in the strictly political sphere, it is the very

life of nations, their future, and the future peace of the world which are at stake. England and France, to mention no other countries, realise this fact to-day.

Let us then consider the three big political problems faced by English and French statesmen in the course of the past fifteen years: naval ratios, disarmament, and the constitution of the League of Nations. It is perfectly obvious that these three problems are all bound up one with the others. On their solution inevitably depended the definition of the rights and the obligations of the various nations concerned, and the reaching a decision—at least provisionally—as to the balance of the forces responsible for the safeguarding of these rights and the fulfilment of these obligations. Of course—and I hope that what I say in this connexion will not be misinterpreted—the settlement of these three problems is not confined within the limits of Anglo-French relations, since in varying degrees it is of moment to all nations. But it is none the less plain that this settlement presupposed co-operation between England and France.

Has there been any real co-operation between our two countries? In actual fact, no. Never, at any time in history, even at the most fortunate moments of the *entente cordiale*, have the statesmen of the two nations so often visited one another, met one another, and put their heads together. Whenever circumstances have appeared to call for it, meeting after meeting has been arranged, and points of view have been compared and contrasted. Such was the outward seeming of things. But in reality there has been no true co-operation. Even an unbroken series of conferences does not amount to collaboration, any more than a collection of stones makes a house.

Any genuine process of co-operation would have begun with the idea that the different questions confronting statesmen were, as I have already indicated, intimately bound up with one another and constituted a whole; that the solution found for one would determine in large measure the solution which would later be found for the others, or, to be more precise, that the partial solutions, if they were to be effective and lasting, must be linked up with and proceed from a general policy upon which agreement had been reached at the outset.

Now what has actually taken place? The problems have been tackled one by one, as if they were so many States within a State. At the suggestion of England, it was thought possible to settle at Washington the naval ratios of the world, and English statesmen, in 1922, were able to feel that they had succeeded in their task. As a matter of fact, this so-called settlement, arrived at independently of the other problems, proved in the event an insurmountable obstacle to the solution of these other problems. It gave England, the party chiefly interested, a feeling of personal security that was ill-founded, and thus led her to stand all too long aloof from the organisation of collective security. It is impossible to forget, indeed—however short the memory of nations may be—that the idea of collective security, under the ægis of the League of Nations, was for many years advocated by France and met with nothing but a benevolent but unshakable indifference where British opinion was concerned.

Now why did France espouse so insistently the idea of collective security? In great part, of a surety, because she thought that she was entitled to receive in her turn with regard to her land forces the assurances which England had recently received with regard to her naval forces. But it was too late: naval ratios having been settled, the question of collective security no longer had any great interest for the English public and the English Government. Rather, this question disquieted them at the moment, for it made them suspect that they might eventually have to undertake immense responsibilities. And so, when, in 1924, M. Herriot's Government presented for the approval of the Assembly of the League of Nations the plan for security comprised in the 'Geneva Protocol,' Great Britain, who was perhaps being invited to undertake liabilities at once too vast and too vague, had this plan rejected. That day, the fate of collective security and maybe the fate of the League of Nations itself, conceived as an active force making for peace, was sealed for many years to come.

Therewith also was settled in advance the fate of disarmament on land. This latter could only be a corollary of collective security. Certain impenitent idealists, however, tried to convince themselves, in all good faith, that collective security could on the contrary be ensured by disarmament.

But what is the use of dwelling any longer on the lamentable fate of the Disarmament Conference?

Et nunc erudimini. Yes, in the days following the war, English and French diplomacy had the fortunes of peace in their keeping. It was in their power to organise peace for many years to come with the collaboration of all the nations of good-will. But because they failed to understand that the problem of peace is an indivisible whole, that it must be looked upon as a unity, they have allowed Europe to lapse into the startling anarchy in which we are struggling to-day.

What is the cause of this failure? A difference of ideals? No. A divergence of interests? Even more emphatically no. It is nothing more than a mistake in the method of handling the problems.

And now what should be done to restore vigour and efficiency to the co-operation between the two nations? For no one, I imagine, can doubt that optimistic co-operation between the two liberal peoples of the West remains one of the central factors of peace in Europe.

All that has been said in what precedes dictates a reply to this question. We must without hesitation or flinching adopt a new method. Instead of acting in a piecemeal way, as we have done for the past fifteen years, instead of waiting for problems to arise and for difficulties to appear, we must anticipate them and confront them in their divers connexions and relationships. In a word, we must do what Delcassé and the British statesmen did at the beginning of the century, when they undertook to put a term to a long past of rivalry and collision. Instead of examining separately and successively the Egyptian question, the Moroccan question, and the numerous colonial and maritime subjects of dispute which divided the two countries, they made up their minds to take stock of them as a whole, and to bring them to a conclusion as a whole, in a spirit of good-will and friendship. The result was one of the most magnificent political achievements recorded in history. The task, one may add, would be infinitely easier to-day than it was a third of a century ago, for in no part of the globe is there any serious divergence between English and French interests.

Without in any wise presuming to elaborate any sort of plan, let us just take a bird's eye and comprehensive view of the big questions which are awaiting solution, or which may demand the attention of French and English diplomacy.

Whether it is a matter of the security of Western Europe, a consideration of capital importance for the French; of the freedom of the Mediterranean, a consideration of vital importance for the British Empire; of the policy of the Moslem and the Arab world, which interests France and England equally; of Central Europe, whose fate is so closely bound up with that of the League of Nations; of the *rôle* and the organisation of the League of Nations itself—on none of these points is there any fundamental opposition between the policy of England and that of France. But on none of these points, either, can it be taken for granted that the policies of the two countries will harmonise all along the line. In other words, the identity of the ideals and the interests of the two countries stands out with sufficient clearness if the problems and the general situation are considered *as a whole*. But, as is only inevitable and natural, this identity, this harmony resolves itself into a series of small difficulties, nay more, of divergences on piecemeal issues, when the problems are examined one by one, and not in the light of their relationship within a unity.

Is not this exactly what has recently happened, first in the matter of Abyssinia, and then in that of the Rhineland? And this example alone should be enough to convince the two peoples and the two Governments of the urgent necessity of instituting immediately a comprehensive examination of all the big problems which, according as they are considered separately or as a whole, may divide or unite them.

Let there be no misunderstanding. There can be no question, in the present circumstances, of this joint examination resulting in an alliance, nor in anything like an alliance. Still less can we think of working out together solutions which we should attempt to get the other Powers to agree to: even united, the two countries, in the present condition of Europe, would not in any event be in a position to assume that *rôle*. Once again, it is simply a matter of organising Anglo-French co-operation, which it is admitted is one of the vital factors of peace. Collaboration between the two coun-

tries, carried on as it has been since the end of the war, has only too often, in spite of appearances to the contrary and of official declarations, been nothing but a word empty of all meaning. In any case—the facts are there to prove it—it has resulted in the most formidable and perhaps the most unwarrantable of misunderstandings. Is it our intention to make this collaboration a living reality, or to allow our two countries and all Europe with them to collapse into chaos? That, and that alone, is the question we have to face.

EMILE MIREAUX.

THE POSITION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

By Sir Charles Petrie, Bt.

Not many years ago a certain school of historians never tired of assuring us that human history could be divided into three periods—the potamic, the thalassic, and the oceanic—and that the modern world was living in the third of these periods. The events of the past twelve months have given the lie to such arbitrary distinctions, and it is several centuries since the Mediterranean has assumed the importance it at present enjoys in the counsels of mankind. The tension between Great Britain and Italy resulted last autumn in a concentration of force, almost without precedent, in its waters. Since that date one event after another has called public attention to an area which statesmen had come to leave out of their calculations. The restoration of the monarchy in Greece, the relapse of Spain into barbarism, the spread of disaffection in North Africa and Palestine, and the proposed remilitarisation of the Straits have all contributed to render the future of the Mediterranean area one of the most serious problems of the day.

It is clear that the cumulative effect of these various factors must be to change a situation which had remained substantially unaltered since the end of the war; but before considering the problem in its wider implications it is first of all necessary to examine in some detail the position in the various countries most concerned.

Spain is an Atlantic as well as a Mediterranean Power, but since the loss of her American possessions she has concentrated her energies upon maintaining her position in the inland sea: indeed, during the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, it appeared that she might be able to hold the balance of power at sea between France and Italy. Since the advent of the Second Republic in 1931 the decline of

Spain has been rapid, until to-day her chaotic condition has become a source of disquiet to her neighbours. The Arabs introduced an anarchic element into the Peninsula which has never been eliminated, and which has always indulged in the most revolting excesses whenever the Government of the day showed itself weak. At the present time the country is a prey to every sort of disorder, human life is of little account, and there is a real danger that Spain may break up altogether unless some man arrives upon the scene capable of stopping the rot. In the meantime Spain is a happy hunting-ground for every Communist agitator, and the poison of unrest is being disseminated from there all over the Mediterranean. Nor is this all, for there is serious danger of a revolt in Spanish Morocco, now that the authority of Madrid has been weakened, and there is already far too much inflammable material lying about the Islamic world to allow of such a possibility being regarded with equanimity.

At the same time the fear that Spain may become another Russia would appear to be exaggerated. The Spaniard, however far to the Left he may be, is too much of an individualist to submit easily to the discipline of a Soviet *régime*, so that Anarchism, rather than Communism, is the form which extremism is likely to take. No inconsiderable portion of the blame for this state of affairs must be borne by Señor Gil Robles and his supporters of *Acción Popular*. At the elections of November 1933 he was returned to the Cortes at the head of nearly 100 deputies, while many more were prepared to follow his lead. He was in a position to dictate his own terms, but he did nothing. One of the most remarkable features of post-war politics in all parts of Europe has been the failure of the Moderate Right to hold its ground. In one country after another it has compromised on its principles, flirted with the Left, and finally been swept away to leave the field clear for the battle between Communism and Fascism. This is what appears to be happening in Spain, with Señor Gil Robles in the part that once was that of Dr. Brüning. In the end there can be little doubt but that some form of Fascism will triumph, but in the meantime Spain will suffer severely, and a disruptive force will be at work in Southern Europe.

The unrest in North Africa and the Near East is due to

various causes. In Algeria it is mainly economic, while in Tunis, Egypt, and Syria it is largely political: in Palestine both economic and political factors are at work. To what extent Communist influences are operative it is not easy to say, and one has to guard against attributing every disturbance to the agents of Moscow: such facile explanations of unrest are usually untrue, and, on the whole, Islam views Bolshevism with undisguised suspicion. Frenchmen who are well qualified to express an opinion hold the view that so far as Tunis and Algeria are concerned the root of the trouble lies in Cairo, and that the effect of a firm hand in Egypt is immediately felt as far afield as Syria and Morocco. The Italians in Libya seem, alone among the Colonial Powers, to be free from this disaffection, but whether this immunity is due to the skilful administration of Marshal Balbo, or to the presence of late of an exceptionally large force of Italian troops in the province, it is impossible to say. Elsewhere there is a discontent which, if not dangerous in itself, might easily become so were it to suit the purpose of some third party to fan the flame, or were the predominant Power concerned either at war or enfeebled at home. In these circumstances it is impossible not to be apprehensive as to the effect of a prolonged crisis in France upon the possessions of that country in North Africa and the Near East.

The riots in Palestine are particularly unfortunate from every point of view, and the story of British troops in considerable numbers being continually ambushed is too reminiscent of Ireland in 1919–1921 to be pleasant reading. It is also far from reassuring that the soldiers of the greatest Mohammedan Power should be compelled to open fire on Moslems. There can be no question but that order must be restored before any negotiations are opened with the Arabs, but when this has been done it is to be hoped that there will be an impartial review of the whole situation, which is by no means creditable to Great Britain. There should be room in Palestine for Arabs and Jews, and it is the duty of the Mandatory Power to see that neither is in a position to oppress the other. In the meantime the Holy Land can only be considered another of those centres of unrest in which the Mediterranean unhappily abounds.

The restoration of the monarchy in Greece last November

has, on the other hand, introduced a new element of stability into the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. That this has been the case is entirely due to King George II., for General Condylis had no other end in view when he restored the throne but to strengthen his own position. When the King insisted on a complete amnesty the Greeks were incredulous, but as they realised that he was determined to be King of all the Hellenes, not of one faction alone, their incredulity turned to enthusiasm, and the affection which his subjects feel for their sovereign is manifested on every possible occasion. He stands above the parties, and that appeals to a nation whose interests have been the sport of party warfare for twenty years. His task is not an easy one, for the machinery of government in Greece leaves much to be desired, and the King has to attend to a mass of detail. The country is poor, and Communist agitators are active, if not as yet dangerous, while there is a lack of political leaders who inspire confidence. At the same time, the Greek, for all his occasional ebullience, is thrifty and hard-headed, if a trifle prone, like his ancestors, to excessive individualism. One cannot but be optimistic about the future of a people who have dealt with the problem of the refugees from Turkey in so practical a manner, and who have for their monarch one with the wide knowledge of men and of affairs possessed by King George II.

The recent conference in Belgrade of the signatories of the Balkan Pact did much to clear the air, for the Greeks made it quite plain that they were not going to be committed to any anti-Italian or Central European adventures in which their associates might be tempted to indulge. In the past there has been a tendency to regard the Balkan Pact as an appendix to the articles of association of the Little Entente, and it is well for the peace of Europe that the situation should have been clarified in this way. Actually, the Balkan Pact is not what it pretends to be, for the only purely Balkan Power —namely, Bulgaria—is not a party to it. Greece has performed a valuable service in making a stand at Belgrade, for if one regional pact were to be successfully twisted to serve purposes for which it was never intended the precedent would soon be followed elsewhere. The Balkan Pact has now been defined as an essentially defensive instrument, and

in no way aimed at Italy or any of her allies. As for Greece herself, she is rightly taking the view that she is a Mediterranean, not a Balkan, Power.

The proposal to remilitarise the Straits has further complicated the position in the Near East, not least because there is much speculation as to whose interests this is likely to serve. Demilitarisation is clearly out of fashion, in the West as in the East, and on the score of national prestige alone the Turks could make out an excellent case for the step they have taken. On the other hand, if Turkey comes within the orbit of Russia, the fortification of the Straits will close the latter's backdoor, while providing her with a sally-port whenever she requires one. Those who would question on historical grounds the possibility of an arrangement between Russia and Turkey would do well to remember that adversity makes strange bedfellows. If that eventuality is not to be ruled out, and it is impossible to dismiss it offhand, then Greece becomes of special importance as the bulwark of the West against the East: in short, she is in her traditional *rôle*. It must not be forgotten that the laicised nationalistic Turkey of to-day has nothing in common with the Ottoman Empire that our fathers knew and, if they were Conservatives, supported. Whether she will survive the death of her creator, Mustapha Kemal, is another matter; but Ismet may well prove a capable successor, provided that the Turkish race is not itself moribund. In any event, the possibility of a Turco-Russian alliance must be kept in mind, and the future of the Straits must therefore be considered in its light.

Such in its main outlines is the background against which the policy of Great Britain, France, and Italy is set, and it is now time to turn to this aspect of the problem.

For Great Britain the primary importance of the Mediterranean is as a line of communication with India and the East, and for the purpose of keeping that line open we have possessed ourselves of Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt. Recent events and discoveries have largely nullified the advantage to be derived from these acquisitions. The strategic value of Gibraltar is highly doubtful, while the development of the aeroplane has converted Malta from an asset into a liability. In proportion as these facts have become known, British

prestige has declined, and the blunders committed by Ministers with regard to the Italo-Abyssinian War have not helped to restore it. When the Fleet was sent to Alexandria there was a murmur of respectful astonishment, but this soon changed to derision when it proved unable to check the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, and when Mr. Baldwin assured the House of Commons that if his lips were unsealed he could tell them the depths to which the British Navy had sunk. Nor was the situation improved when the Foreign Office went cap in hand to all the Mediterranean Powers to ask for their support in the event of war with Italy. Why, if Great Britain was only acting as a member of the League of Nations, this request was made by British diplomats, and not by M. Avenol, has never been explained. In any event, British prestige in the Mediterranean is as low as it well could be, and it will not be restored by a policy of bluff which can be called with the greatest ease.

The future of France is perhaps the outstanding enigma of international politics. The Third Republic has survived so many crises that prophecy is dangerous, but the parting of the ways seems at last to have been reached. M. Blum, like Signor Giolitti and Dr. Brüning before him, is trying to conciliate the Left by concessions, and to obtain its support by proclaiming himself the last rampart against Fascism. It is a dangerous manœuvre, and it has never yet succeeded. Until now the *bourgeoisie* has eyed the semi-military organisations of the Right with suspicion, but if the Government becomes the mere tool of the extremists it will be the story of the Second Republic over again, and France will go the way of Germany and Italy. At first M. Blum will probably endeavour to confine the application of his Socialist principles to domestic affairs, but he may well be forced in the long run to extend it to foreign policy. When that point has been reached Italy and Germany will be thrown into one another's arms, while Great Britain, unless she has seen the error of her ways, will be dragged at the tail of the French Left. The next step will be the inevitable reaction in France, a reconciliation with Rome and Berlin, and a Britain isolated in face of a Fascist Europe. A weak and divided France has always been a source of danger to her neighbours: to-day she is a positive menace.

The only stable factor in the Mediterranean is Italy. A recent journey through that country from the French frontier to Apulia has convinced me that the Fascist *régime* is stronger at the present time than ever before. The impudent attempt, as Italians consider it, of the League and Great Britain to prevent the country's expansion in East Africa has rallied the whole nation behind Signor Mussolini, and, even in those aristocratic circles where there was much grumbling in the past, the voice of criticism is silent. It is a common joke this summer to ascribe the making of United Italy to Cavour, Mussolini, and Eden. Foreign journalists waste much of their employers' money and their own time in endeavouring to get in touch with what they term 'the other point of view,' and when they do not find it they ascribe their failure to Fascist tyranny, which renders people frightened to speak. The fact is that so far as the Abyssinian question is concerned there is no difference of opinion in Italy, and the people are solidly behind the Government. That this state of affairs is largely due to the tactics of Geneva is an undoubted fact. The imposition of Sanctions has consolidated Fascist Italy in the same way, and for the same reason, that the cannonade of Valmy consolidated revolutionary France.

Another fallacy prevalent in foreign countries, particularly in Great Britain, is the belief that Italy is anxiously waiting for the lifting of Sanctions, and that she trembles at every word of criticism levelled against her in England. Italians of all classes are quite indifferent to what is said of their country either in Fleet Street or at Westminster: they feel that the British Government has done everything in its power to obstruct their conquest of Abyssinia, and has failed; they therefore consider that for the future Great Britain can safely be ignored. As for Sanctions, they at first caused some inconvenience, but they were never a serious handicap. Many of the nations which so joyously voted for their imposition at Geneva have never made the slightest effort to apply them. No country in the Americas has put them into force except Canada, Mexico, and Colombia; while Germany, Austria, Hungary, Iceland, Switzerland, and Albania have likewise refrained from their application; in Asia the same observation applies to Afghanistan, Arabia, China, Japan,

Manchukuo, and Yemen. Even those Governments which have applied Sanctions have in many instances winked at their evasion. Perhaps the Italian point of view is best expressed in the report of the Bank of Naples: 'Far from weakening the economic structure of the nation, Sanctions seem to have acted as a stimulant, which has hastened the process of renewal of all our productive activities.' The surrender of the wedding-rings brought in two milliards of lire. During the first five months of the current year savings deposits have risen and the note circulation has declined, while at no time has there been any evidence of panic, or attempts to hoard gold, notes, or commodities. Italy has also punctually met all her foreign liabilities.

Had Sanctions been applied to a Liberal State it is more than likely that they would have proved effective, but it was precisely to avoid this sort of pressure that the Corporate System was designed. Indeed, one wonders whether those who voted for the imposition of Sanctions had taken the trouble to acquaint themselves with the details of the Italian economic system. At the present time Sanctions are regarded in Italy as an insult, but certainly not as a danger. In many quarters they are coming to be welcomed as a form of Protection, and more than one manufacturer will regret their disappearance. Nothing has been more calculated to convey to the British public a false impression of the situation than the repeated statements of Ministers that Sanctions were having their effect. Such an attitude recalls the mistaken assumption of the Younger Pitt, to which he gave expression on many occasions, that France could not continue the struggle against Great Britain and the allies because her finances were in disorder. English statesmen have rarely understood the revolutionary psychology, and the Fascist Revolution has proved no exception. Italy is victorious, united, and confident, and those who ignore this will do so at their own peril, and at that of the peace of the world.

The situation, then, in the Mediterranean is that there are several centres of unrest which may easily spread chaos throughout the whole area, and even where, as in Greece, the outlook is promising, it will not remain so unless the stable elements receive at least moral support from without. The only way to ensure an amelioration of the present position

is to secure the close collaboration of Italy and Great Britain in all the problems in which they are interested.

That curious medley of Pacifists, Liberals, Socialists, and sentimental Conservatives who have spent the last twelve months industriously embittering the relations between London and Rome have convinced a section of the British public that the Italian conquest of Abyssinia constitutes a threat of the first magnitude to the integrity of the Empire. At this point one is tempted to ask why these people who now display such a touching concern for the safety of the Empire never before gave it a thought, and to ask whether they would have been so concerned had it been Russia, not Italy, who had hurled the Negus from his throne. However this may be, it is difficult to see how the situation in East Africa or in the Mediterranean has been changed to Britain's disadvantage. Italy has been on the Red Sea for more than a generation, and her recent victories have not given her an extra yard of territory upon its shores. As for the threat to Egypt and the Sudan which is said to have arisen owing to the conquest of Abyssinia, those who entertain such fears would do well to look at the map, and then ask themselves whether it would really be practicable for an army to march from Lake Tsana to Khartum and Cairo. Why Italy should covet Egypt it is not easy to understand. If it is for the sake of cotton, she can grow all she wants in Abyssinia. Those who take this view forget that the great need of Italy is territory into which to expand, and Egypt is over-populated already.

When Charles X. of France commenced the conquest of Algeria in 1830 every obstacle was placed in his way by this country; yet the passage of time has shown that there is room in Africa for both the French and ourselves. Upon reflection, the same will be found to be the case with the Italians. The Abyssinians were bad neighbours both in the Sudan and Kenya, and a considerable amount of money will be saved now that there is no longer any need to protect those territories from slave-raids. Nor is this all, for the presence of Italy in Abyssinia will, in due course, create fresh ties between her and Britain. She, too, now has a vital interest in safeguarding the route to the East, and she will have to join hands with England in keeping open the

Suez Canal, a task which the latter can no longer perform alone. Italy is now a great colonial Power, and she has a community of interests with the other colonial Powers, especially with the greatest of them all, Great Britain. By the victories of Marshal Badoglio his country has passed from the ranks of the 'have-nots' to those of the 'haves,' and it is the duty of British diplomacy to make the most of the change.

An Anglo-Italian *entente* is the crying need of modern Europe, and a continuance of the existing friction between the two countries can benefit nobody except the common enemies of both and of Western civilisation. The closing of the Straits creates a potential Russian threat in the Near East, just as the chaotic condition of Spain is a menace in the Western Mediterranean and North Africa. There is little in the state of Germany to reassure those who fear a revival of the old *Drang nach Osten* policy, and if Hitler does decide to march south it will be useless to rely upon the Little Entente to stop him. Czechoslovakia has too large, and too well-organised, a German minority to be capable of effective opposition; Yugoslavia has probably been won over already; and Rumania is too divided and too distant to be of any use. Italy alone can stop the *Anschluss*, as she proved on the morrow of the murder of Dr. Dollfuss. To delay an agreement between Great Britain and Italy is to risk a conflict which may well be the Peloponnesian War of European civilisation.

The first step must be the lifting of Sanctions, for until that has been done Italy will not participate in any discussions regarding the general international situation. It is not, as has been shown, that they constitute in any degree a menace to Italy, but they are regarded as an affront, save by those who profit by them. Once that has been done, it will be possible to examine in detail the points at issue between the two countries. No responsible Italian expects that the annexation of Abyssinia will be accepted by the rest of the world without discussion, and Italy is quite ready to negotiate, always provided that Sanctions are first of all lifted. It is sincerely to be hoped that the same blunder will not be committed that was made in the case of Manchukuo. Two years ago Japan would have paid a high price for its recognition, but Great

Britain held back out of a mistaken sense of duty towards Geneva; to-day Japan does not care whether we recognise Manchukuo or not, and there is no possibility of obtaining anything in exchange. Mr. Baldwin, in another connexion, has announced his intention not to miss any more buses: one trusts that this resolution also applies to the field of international politics.

The terms of such an agreement would necessarily depend upon the Italian plans for the future development of Ethiopia, which have not yet been fully disclosed. There is, however, one point which might well be considered, and it is the recruitment of black troops for service in Europe. In this matter there has been a definite lowering of standards of recent years. In the South African War we scrupulously refrained from employing the Indian Army against the Boers, but in the late war such chivalry was thrown to the winds by ourselves and the French. The time would seem ripe to revert to the earlier and healthier tradition, and for Great Britain, France, and Italy to make a self-denying ordinance by which they promise to refrain from employing coloured troops in Europe. Not only would this allay the suspicion that the Italians contemplate raising a vast native army for service outside Abyssinia, but it should have a most reassuring effect upon German opinion, for it would render impossible such horrors as those of the Ruhr occupation. A Mediterranean Pact would also in all probability prove advisable, but, as in the case of all regional understandings, it would have to be so devised as to be incapable of being utilised for purposes for which it was not originally intended.

An essential corollary to any such agreement is that Great Britain should be armed in a manner and to an extent commensurate with her responsibilities. Collective security sounds very well as a phrase in a speech or a leading article, but in practice it amounts to nothing more than a confession of the Empire's weakness. That Britain is not as defenceless as is generally supposed is certainly true, but the necessity of painting the picture in the most sombre colours is not the least of the flaws in the modern parliamentary system. To persuade the electorate of the need for rearmament statesmen are compelled to describe an Empire so helpless as to be the prey of any aggressor, and this description is accepted by

foreigners as the truth. As if this were not enough, Ministers are so apologetic for raising the matter of defence at all, and so deferential to pacifist views, that it is little wonder that on the Continent it is generally supposed that they are not in earnest. Free speech may be all very well in theory, but it has been so exploited in England by cranks and faddists that their voices are often the only ones that are heard. Indeed, one is being driven to the conclusion that a revival of British prestige is impossible without drastic changes in the conduct of affairs at home.

In fine, if the Mediterranean situation is to be retrieved, the present *dolce far niente* attitude of Whitehall must be terminated. British interests in that area demand a peaceful littoral where there is no threat to the line of communication with the East, but this state of affairs will only be reached if a constructive policy is pursued. Friendship with Islam as the best means of protection against Russian intrigues in Palestine and Irak, and close co-operation with Italy and Greece: these are the only sure foundations upon which British policy can be based.

CHARLES PETRIE.

MINING LAW REFORM

By John Henry Cockburn, O.B.E.

The time is ripe for amending mining law, and all the more so if the Legislature decides that mining royalties shall be acquired by the State; for in that event carefully framed provisions will be necessary in regard to underground way-leaves, letting down, and compensation for damage resulting from subsidence.

Where the surface is owned by the same person as is entitled to the mining royalties, fairly simple provisions can be made; but serious difficulties will have to be surmounted in respect to the numerous areas in which surface now belongs to one owner and the minerals belong to another person.

In showing the desirability for amendment of mining law, it is best to consider the position as though there were no pending proposal for acquisition of mining royalties by the State.

The anomalies calling for redress mainly exist in relation to areas until recently of copyhold tenure, underground wayleaves, severed ownerships, and properties of statutory undertakers.

The way for legislative reform has been paved by Reports of Royal Commissions in reference to mining royalties,[1] underground wayleaves,[2] and severed ownerships.[3]

Copyholds

Generally speaking, copyhold tenure was abolished as from January 1, 1926, and manorial incidents were finally

[1] Cmd. 6980 of 1893 (chairman, Earl of Northbrook).

[2] Ministry of Reconstruction, Third Report: Cmd. 156 of 1919 (chairman, Sir Leslie Scott). Coal Industry Commission Report: Cmd. 210 of 1919, pp. 9, 42 and 44 (chairman, Viscount Sankey). Coal Industry (1925): Cmd. 2600 of 1926, p. 84 (chairman, Sir H. Samuel).

[3] Cmd. 2899 of 1927 (chairman, Lord Blanesburgh).

extinguished on January 1, 1936; but such abolition and extinguishment do not apply to the mineral rights of lords of manors or tenants in lands which were formerly copyhold.

The Copyhold Act, 1894, section 23, and the Law of Property Act, 1922, section 128, Schedule XII. (5), are so framed that the law laid down by Sir George Jessel in 1876 [4] is still existent, that is to say, the *property* in mines and minerals belongs to the lord of the manor; but he cannot enter for the purpose of working, nor bring non-manorial minerals through the excavated space, nor lower the level of the overlying surface, without the consent of the surface owner. On the other hand, the surface owner, although in possession of the minerals, cannot appropriate them.

Before the passing of the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923, this difficulty was often overcome by the royalty being divided in agreed proportions between the lord and the copyholder, sometimes so much as 50 per cent. being made payable to the copyholder. He was enabled to obtain that percentage because of his old power to obtain an injunction restraining the lord or the lord's licensee from entering upon the copyhold tenement or letting down the surface.

The Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923, virtually destroyed this power of obtaining an injunction; and when the Railway and Canal Commission have dealt with copyholds they have directed that one-third of the adjusted royalty fixed in their Order shall be paid to the quondam copyholder. In 1925 the Commissioners declared that this proportion was not to be regarded as a permanent determination of the Court. On that occasion I gave evidence that in my opinion 20 to 25 per cent. would be a fair proportion to the copyholder, seeing that injunction had gone and that under the order of the Court the colliery company would be under obligation to make good any damage resulting from subsidence.

UNDERGROUND WAYLEAVES

occasion much trouble, because sometimes it happens that coal on its way to the pit's mouth has to pass underneath as many separate properties as there are counties between Newcastle and Newbury. One of the most remarkable cases in

[4] *Eardley* v. *Granville*, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 826.

which the celebrated real-property lawyer Joshua Williams was engaged was where one Seddon for more than twenty years grew cabbages and potatoes on a small strip of occupation road, and a strong Court held that he thereby became entitled to the fee simple of the underlying seams of coal and could claim not only for coal extracted but also for wayleave rent on the whole output of a colliery passing underneath this squatter's freehold.[5]

The 1925 Commission on the Coal Industry reported that the right to impose a charge for underground wayleaves where no service is rendered, or detriment suffered, should be abolished for the future. The proposal is proper. In many instances where coal passes through an excavated space underground, the coal from that space has, by way of necessity, passed through other freeholds on its way to the winding shaft.

SEVERED OWNERSHIPS

There are extensive tracts of country which were inclosed under local or private Acts mostly passed between 1760 and 1840.[6] In many of these Inclosure Acts minerals were saved in favour of the lord of the manor with power to work them by surface and by underground operations. In most cases the saving clause enacts that compensation shall be paid to the surface owner for damage resulting from the mining operations. A few Acts declare that the surface owners shall not be entitled to compensation; and here and there an Act is met with under which surface damage is to be paid for by the owners of the surface allotments. Each Inclosure Act embodied a parliamentary bargain made between the lord of the manor and the allottees, the presumption being that if the latter are disentitled from compensation they receive a corresponding benefit in some other form.

Again, there have been thousands of sales and severances in which the instrument transfers surface to one owner and the underlying minerals go to, or are retained by, another owner.

Owing to the Diesel engine, and greater facilities for

[5] *Seddon* v. *Smith* (1877), 36 Law Times, 168.

[6] Some are specified in House of Commons (Commons Inclosure Awards) Return: Cmd. 50 of 1904.

transport, large numbers of houses have been and are being erected in all directions throughout mining districts; and in many cases colliery companies are perplexed as to whether or not coal is to be left unworked for support of these dispersed buildings. Generally speaking, it is not fitting that support should be left.

The Royal Commission on Coal Supplies (1903–5) estimated that not less than 6,000,000,000 tons of coal is sterilised by being left unworked for support of surface and buildings,[7] though that is not wholly underneath severed ownerships.

Up to the accession of Queen Victoria hundreds of Inclosure Acts were passed and thousands of instruments of severance were executed granting or retaining mines and minerals with power to work, and so expressed as to lead ninety-nine people in a hundred to suppose that the ownership of the minerals carried with it the right to let down the overlying and surrounding surface with or without compensation as stipulated in the document.

But, little by little, judicial decisions established the rule that 'in order to exclude a right of support, the language used must unequivocally convey that intention, either by express words or by necessary implication. If the compensation clause is capable of being satisfied by reference to acts done *on* the surface, then, though it may be wide enough to cover also damage done *to* the surface by taking away the support, still it must be confined to damage done *on* the surface, and the inference that support may be taken away on payment of compensation will not be drawn.'[8] This reasoning is worthy of the schoolmen at their worst. It makes the pyramid stand on its apex rather than on its base, and Lord Macnaghten expressed surprise at the strange conclusions to which Courts of law had arrived.

One explanation is that up to 1908 judges were under the erroneous impression that a bed of coal could be wholly extracted without letting down the surface, or that it was commercially practicable so to work coal as not to cause subsidence of the surface. Lord Justice Fletcher Moulton dispelled that illusion in *Butterley* v. *New Hucknall* (1908), and in 1920 Mr. Justice Astbury decided that power to let

[7] Cmd. 9084 of 1918, Appendix IV., pp. 55, 57.

[8] *Butterknowle Colliery* v. *Bishop Auckland*, [1906] Appeal Cases, 309.

down was implied where an Inclosure Act saved minerals to the lord of the manor with power to work *as fully and amply as before the Act*, and there was evidence that, antecedently, minerals had been worked in the district by a method which let down the surface.[9]

It is regrettable that in the days when law was plastic the law of neighbours [10] was not made to harmonise with the presumption of ancillary rights,[11] so as to give effect to manifest intention, consistently with reasonable compensation being payable, unless clearly bargained against.

Real-property lawyers did not contrive to mould mining law in the way that was done in relation to commercial law as far back as 1669, when it was decided that where no price is fixed on a sale of goods the buyer must pay a reasonable price dependent on the circumstances of each particular case.[12]

The reform needed can now only be made by Act of Parliament. Where Inclosure Acts or instruments of severance clearly stipulate that compensation shall not be payable for subsidence damage, it is just and proper that this status should continue.

So where there is an express bargain for support, as, for instance, in the Aire and Calder Navigation Act, 1829, which qualifies the saving of minerals by saying 'Provided that in working them no injury shall be done to the canal.' Clearly expressed bargains of this kind should be recognised by compensation being payable for subsidence damage.

If the right to support has not been abrogated, the surface owner can justly claim, not only that subsidence damage to his buildings shall be made good, but also that he shall have a share of royalty by reason of his absolute right of support being diminished or prejudicially affected. As, however, the surface owner is only master of the right of support and cannot treat the colliery company as being a trespasser on working the minerals or on conveying foreign minerals through the excavated space below, the surface owner is not

[9] *Welldon* v. *Butterley*, [1920] 1 Ch. 130. *Warwickshire Coal Co.* v. *Coventry Corporation*, [1934] 1 Ch. 516, turned on section 80 of the Land Tax Redemption Act, 1802, which does not contain the words 'as fully and amply as before.'

[10] '*Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.*'

[11] '*Quando aliquis aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res uti non potest.*'

[12] Sale of Goods Act, 1893, section 8.

entitled to so much as can be claimed by an ex-copyholder; and in respect of the interference with his notional right of support it seems fair that the surface owner should be content with, say, one-sixth or one-eighth of the royalty; but in addition to that solatium the company getting the minerals should (on condition of having a corresponding right of debit against royalty) pay compensation for any damage actually caused to surface or buildings thereon consequent on the working of underlying and neighbouring minerals.

In this way the lessee of the minerals will be free to work them as in the vast majority of cases was originally intended, the status of the surface owner is recognised, and the well-being of the community is regarded, in that it is in the national interest that minerals should be gotten when the working face reaches them.

In enacting that a right to work minerals automatically carries with it an ancillary right to let down it is not necessary to make exceptions in favour of any specific building—first, because it is rare that there is any *bonâ fide* necessity for coal to be left unworked for this purpose, and, secondly, because section 8 of the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923, already provides a way for effectuating this object. Generally the matter will be capable of adjustment through the Mines Department of the Board of Trade, without recourse to the Court of Railway and Canal Commission.

If in an urban area there be a number of exceptionally important buildings, or a number of works each of a net annual value exceeding £500, then there could be a condition that not more than 50 per cent. of each seam of coal should be worked, the remaining 50 per cent. being left as pillars, any question being referable to the tribunal acting under the Mines (Working Facilities) Acts.

The memorable Report of the Ministry of Reconstruction Committee[18] presided over by Sir Leslie Scott (now Lord Justice Scott) considered that an **Insurance Fund** should be set up under State supervision and control for meeting claims for surface damage. That view has not prevailed; and such a plan is not necessary. Experience shows that, with rare exceptions, colliery companies are able to meet their liabilities, and they can employ their resources more usefully than by paying

[18] Cmd. 156 of 1919.

to an insurance fund. In order to meet the exceedingly rare cases of damages not being forthcoming, colliery companies will doubtless agree to its being enacted that in the event of the bankruptcy or liquidation of a colliery owner, and as against debenture holders, compensation payable in respect of subsidence damage shall be a preferential payment, as is now the law in regard to rates, taxes, and workmen's compensation. Such a provision would remove a conceivable hardship, and would not seriously interfere with other creditors; particularly when it is borne in mind that the proceeds of sale of the coal, the working out of which has caused the damage, have gone into the banking account of the worker, and the general right to let down is a valuable enhancement of the colliery security held by debenture holders.

Statutory Undertakers

are a numerous and varied class of owners of surface whose position in regard to mines and minerals and support therefrom is in many cases defective, debatable, or undesirable. For instance, the mining code contained in the Railways Clauses Act, 1845, sections 77 to 85 (not including the alterations made by Part II. of the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923), is incorporated in the following statutes, namely:

- Small Holdings and Allotments Act, 1908, section 39; 1926, section 4.
- Development and Road Improvement Act, 1909, sections 5, 11.
- Public Libraries Act, 1919, section 6.
- Forestry Act, 1919, section 7.
- Education Act, 1921, section 111.
- Public Works Facilities Act, 1930, section 2.
- Housing Act, 1930, sections 10, 23, 50; 1935, section 15.
- Town and Country Planning Act, 1932, section 25.
- Local Government Act, 1933, sections 160, 161, 168.
- Restriction of Ribbon Development Act, 1935, section 13.

With reference to these enactments, it is not satisfactory that the mining code extends only to the adjoining or surrounding 40 yards. That is not enough where the minerals

lie at a greater depth than 150 or 200 yards below the surface. Moreover, the incorporating Acts only apply to lands *compulsorily* acquired. The code ought to apply also to land acquired by agreement; subject to the proviso 'excepting where otherwise provided for by agreement.' The local authorities will thus know that in all cases the question of payment for support is deferred until minerals are about to be worked.

The Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, code is defective in that it does not apply to minerals beyond 40 yards, and this leaves proprietary waterworks companies liable to pay compensation for injurious affection for the reasons explained later on.

It is generally considered that the same difficulty does not exist in relation to the sewerage, lighting and water-supply works, mains and cables of local authorities governed by the Public Health (Support of Sewers) Act, 1883, for the reason that that Act empowers the local authority to call for the leaving of minerals unworked beyond the limit of 40 yards.[14] That position should be strengthened by express language, particularly in the interest of local authorities; and all codes should provide that they apply to joint boards and not merely to single authorities. The 1883 Act needs amendment so as to apply to gas and electricity used for heat and power as well as lighting.

The Royal Commission on Mining Subsidence in 1927 advised that, with a view to remove existing anomalies, the mining code should be extended so as to cover public buildings, public baths, recreation grounds, cemeteries, etc., to which the code does not now apply, the prescribed distance for the purpose of notice to be one half the depth of the seam instead of the obsolete and insufficient 40 yards of 1845–47.[15]

In this connexion land acquired by Catchment and Drainage Boards acting under the Land Drainage Act, 1930, should not be forgotten. As a matter of practical business there must be power to lower the level of the drains by working underlying and neighbouring minerals. Greater

[14] See the learned opinion of Mr. Upjohn, K.C., given to the Municipal and Urban Councils Association, March 19, 1950.
[15] Cmd. 2899 of 1927, p. 58.

damage would be caused by leaving humps than by working out by the long-wall method.

Section 13 of the Mines (Working Facilities) Act, 1923, ought to be amended so as to allow of headings being made for access, ventilation, and drainage through pillars and minerals owned or controlled by any statutory undertakers whomsoever; because those headings will not hurt the statutory undertakers, and yet may be necessary for the proper working of neighbouring minerals. They are provided for by paragraph 80 of the same Act as regards railway tunnels and viaducts.

By way of equivalent for this amendment of section 13, it will be fair to alter its concluding words so as to empower statutory undertakers to apply for support under section 8, or to get it in some other easy way.

Gas Mains

of proprietary companies should be assimilated to mains and pipes of local authorities. At present, a proprietary company for supply of gas is subject to the Gas Works Clauses Acts, 1847 and 1871, and entitled to have its mains supported so that it can discharge its statutory obligation to supply gas. But this very circumstance enables owners and lessees of minerals to institute arbitration proceedings for recovery of compensation for leaving the supporting minerals unworked.[16] In practice, this unsatisfactory position is often rectified by a mutual release being entered into, whereby on the one hand the gas company relinquishes its claims for damage, and on the other hand the colliery company renounces its statutory right to compensation. On one occasion a gas company supplying gas in a mining village refused to enter into this arrangement, whereupon they were served with a notice for arbitration claiming £224,155. This greatly exceeded the value of the gas undertaking, and the gas company promptly retreated from its untenable position and executed the release.

Electricity Cables and Telegraph and Telephone Poles

The Electric Lighting Act, 1882, section 33, saves the working rights of owners, lessees and occupiers of mines or

[16] *Normanton Gas Co.* v. *Pope and Pearson* (1883), 22 Q. B. D. 555; 52 L. J. (Q. B.) 629.

minerals under or adjacent to any *road*; but there is no similar enactment in regard to cables carried over private lands; nor is there any Act defining the position in respect to telegraph and telephone poles installed in private lands.

As, however, electric cables and standards, telegraph and telephone poles have been erected under statutory powers, and the Acts allow compensation to be claimed for injurious affection of private property, mining lessees might put in heavy claims if they were so minded, on the principle laid down in *Re Dudley Corporation* (1882).

It is desirable that these matters should be dealt with by a mining code similar to that applicable in regard to standards and cables for lighting under the control of municipal and urban councils.

As regards surface lands heretofore acquired on which gas or electricity is made or stored, and surface works of other public utility bodies not already governed by any mining code, they are generally in such a situation as not to interfere with mining; and on the whole it will not be unfair that existing works should continue their present common law status; but with reference to sites hereafter acquired it is fitting that a mining code should apply, for the mutual advantage of statutory undertakers and mining companies.

The code in relation to Aerodromes provided under the Public Works Facilities Act, 1930, should also be applied to aerodrome and other sites taken under the Defence Acts, 1842 to 1935, so as to lessen the cost of acquisition. It is always competent for the Departments concerned to require minerals to be left unworked on statutory terms, whenever that is deemed necessary.

With few exceptions, statutory incorporations of mining codes operate only in regard to future acquisitions of surface. But Part II. of the Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923, was by section 16 made applicable to railways previously constructed where 40 yards was the prescribed limit of lateral support. Colliery companies and royalty owners were made liable to contribute towards the cost of making good subsidence damage; but it should be borne in mind that, in the case of ante-1923 railways, the statutory undertakers had paid purchase-money for the surface taken, and they had the benefit of a House of Lords decision to the effect that (where

lands are not taken) no action can be maintained (if the statutory powers are exercised without negligence) for injurious affection *after construction of the railway.*[17]

This principle was not adopted when the Public Health (Support of Sewers) Act, 1883, applied the waterworks mining code to existing as well as future works, mains, pipes and apparatus of local authorities. So far as concerns mains and pipes, the local authorities had never paid any purchase money for the roads and streets in which the pipes are laid; and under section 6 of the Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, compensation for **Injurious Affection** may be recovered in relation not only to construction but also to maintenance of waterworks and water mains.[18]

Inasmuch as compensation for injurious affection is not recoverable by action, and only after an award is made in a statutory arbitration, the period of limitation of action runs only from the date of the arbitration award.[19]

The question whether railway companies were liable to pay for injurious affection by reason of their acquiring support beyond 40 yards was never tried out. It was not raised in the *Howley Park* decision (1912), the only points in that case being confined to damages and injunction. No counterclaim was delivered by the coal company. Although it could not counterclaim for compensation (recoverable only after award in an arbitration), the coal company might have counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that an arbitrator could award them compensation for the injurious affection arising from the embargo beyond 40 yards; but this course was not taken.

To the Royal Commission on Mining Subsidence presided over by Lord Blanesburgh evidence was presented on behalf of the Association of Municipal Corporations and District Councils. These authorities suggested that mine owners should pay compensation to local authorities for damage caused by mine workings to sites, mains, pipes, and works vested in local authorities. The learned chairman pointed

[17] *Hammersmith Railway* v. *Brand* (1869), L. R. 4 H. L. 171.

[18] Waterworks Clauses Act, 1847, section 6; *Holliday* v. *Wakefield*, [1891] Appeal Cases, 81; *Fletcher* v. *Birkenhead Corporation*, [1907] 1 K. B. 205. Injurious affection can also be claimed for under section 68 of the Lands Clauses Act, 1845 (*Kirby* v. *Harrogate School Board*, [1896] 1 Ch. 437).

[19] *Turner* v. *Midland Railway*, [1911] 1 K. B. 832.

out that this proposal was somewhat revolutionary.[20] The witnesses could not give any better grounds than that local authorities are top dogs and favoured nations, and that public needs should predominate over private rights. They, however, admitted that the question was really one of money, and Lord Blanesburgh finally clinched the matter by saying:

Then the question comes to be, having regard to all the circumstances, on whose shoulders is it fairest that that expense should fall? Should it fall on the shoulders of the people [*i.e.*, the local authorities] who have sustained loss by reason of being deprived of *something they have not paid for*, or should it fall on the shoulders of those [the mine owners] who have received nothing for the support in respect of whose withdrawal the loss has been sustained?[21]

After full and fair consideration the Royal Commission reported that they were not prepared to recommend that any compensation should be paid to either local authorities or public utility companies in respect of sewers, water, gas or electricity mains, tramway lines and the like.

Waterworks and gas companies have never been accustomed to require minerals to be left unworked for support of their mains, and local authorities rarely require support to be left for their sewers and pipes, these statutory undertakers considering it to be more economical for them to submit to loss and damage than to pay for support. Hence Parliament can now reasonably and usefully enact in regard to mains, pipes, electricity and telegraph and telephone cables and standards that it shall not be necessary for mining companies to give notice of approach; but that they shall be exempt from liability for subsidence damage resulting from the working of mines in a proper and the ordinary manner; provided that the mining company shall from time to time leave minerals unworked for support of mains, pipes, cables, and standards if so directed by the statutory undertakers in whom they are vested; on condition that compensation shall be paid for the leaving of the prescribed support; any dispute on this subject being referable to arbitration if so agreed or (failing agreement) to the Railway and Canal Commission.

Now that, in practice, the limits of working of each colliery are or may be defined between it and its neighbours it will

[20] Cmd. 2899 of 1927: Evidence pp. 254, 256: Evidence, p. 288, question 3758.
[21] *Ibid.*

be an easy matter for the colliery concerned to deliver to each statutory undertaker in those limits, or lodge with the Mines Department for inspection, an ordnance map showing the external limits within which such colliery proposes to work.

Highways and Bridges

There is no necessity for legislation in reference to highways and bridges, for the reason that it has already been conclusively decided[22] that a mining company letting down a public highway is not bound to restore it to its former height above sea-level, but must make it as commodious and passable to the public as before. There is no more need to leave coal unworked for the support of a highway than for an ordinary length of railway.

Canals

The law in relation to minerals under and alongside canals is in chaotic condition, for the reason that there has never been a general code applicable to them. About sixty-three Canal Acts exist in mining districts.[23] Many Canal Acts were drawn up when deep mining was not usual, and such provisions as exist are generally cumbrous and difficult to understand and apply. In 1893 the Aire and Calder Navigation obtained an Act in reference to the Barnsley Canal, which contains a mining code resembling that contained in the Railways Clauses Act passed in 1845.

Subject to the lateral 40 yards being altered to one-half or one-third of the depth of each seam, it will be fair and reasonable to make the mining code of 1845 applicable to canals. If grounds for differentiation can be shown either by the proprietors of any particular canal or of the mines in, under and near it, suitable stipulations can doubtless be framed without much difficulty.

The subject of compensation for leaving coal unworked for the support of statutory undertakings does not concern the mining company alone. The royalty owner has an independent and concurrent right[24]; and when mining royalties are acquired by the State the Government department will

[22] *Lodge Holes Colliery Co.* v. *Wednesbury Corporation*, [1908] Appeal Cases, 323.
[23] Royal Commission on Mining Subsidence, Cmd. 2899 of 1927: Evidence, p. 3.
[24] *Smith* v. *G. W. Railway* (1877), 3 Appeal Cases, 182.

have to be reckoned with. This is an additional reason for amending and bringing up to date a mining code in relation to statutory undertakings. A very awkward situation would arise if the State department concerned with mining royalties should institute proceedings for payment down of compensation in cases where now existing royalty owners have not thought fit to enforce their claims.

Working Facilities

The Mines (Working Facilities and Support) Act, 1923, Part I., as extended by section 13 of the Mining Industry Act, 1926, has been of great advantage to mining companies and their workpeople, and to communities dependent on them. Under it, orders have been made whereby many million tons of coal are being worked which, but for the Acts, would never have been worked at all, because of the difficulty and disproportionate cost of obtaining grants from thousands of owners of small parcels of minerals. These small owners now receive mining royalties as and when the coal under their properties is worked, and the life of the neighbouring colliery is lengthened by its being enabled to get coal up to which its working faces have advanced.

The jurisdiction is exercised by the Court of Railway and Canal Commission, now composed of Mr. Justice Mackinnon, Sir Francis Taylor, K.C., and Sir Francis Dunnell. Amongst other instances, this Court has granted the right to work coal under part of industrial Sheffield, the town of Pontefract, and part of the county borough of Rotherham. In Sheffield and Pontefract substantially the prescribed method is to work half and leave half; that is, alongside every strip of coal worked to leave unworked a pillar of corresponding size. In this way the risk of subsidence damage is avoided or materially diminished.

Where the colliery company has a lease of the minerals without power to withdraw support, the Court grants right to let down subject to compensation being paid for any damage resulting from subsidence—in this way virtually and equitably adding to the instrument of severance words necessary for expressing or implying a right to let down.

These Orders under the 1923 Act are heartily welcomed in the districts in regard to which they are made. Many

freeholders receive royalty who would otherwise receive nothing at all. Indirectly, both they and shopkeepers benefit. So far as facilities and ancillary rights are concerned, the Mines Facilities Acts, 1923 to 1926, are far more comprehensive than is usually supposed,[25] and are of very great value to the mining industry. But these Acts admit of amendment. Thus, section 13 (2) of the Mining Industry Act, 1926, enacts that where the working, carrying away, treating and converting of any coal in the most efficient and economical manner is impeded by any restrictions, terms or conditions contained in a mining lease or otherwise binding, the Railway and Canal Commissioners may grant a right to work, freed wholly or partially from such restrictions or conditions, or to work on other terms and conditions. The Court of Appeal, however, has decided that section 6 of the 1923 Act curtails the generality of the 1926 enactment, and necessitates the payment of full compensation where contractual obligations exist.[26]

For reconciling the national interest with the private interests of mining companies and owners of surface and minerals statesmanship of the most skilful and judicious kind is requisite. A Round Table Conference is doubtless desirable on this subject.

There are several minor respects in which the Mines Working Facilities Acts can usefully be amended. Thus, the Railway and Canal Commission ought to have concurrent jurisdiction in regard to the **closing or diversion of public footpaths or highways** where that is urgently needed for mining purposes. In such cases it is not reasonable that mining companies should be compelled to have recourse to parish council, district council, county council, and quarter sessions, entailing a delay of at least six months.[27]

More Concise Leases

In the eighteenth century a brief for a barrister was brief; now it is one of the longest of documents. Mining leases are

[25] See a paper by myself in the *Transactions of the Institute of Mining Engineers* (1925), vol. lxix., pp. 435–535.

[26] *Consett Coal Co.*, March 15, 1935. In this case surface wayleave rents were payable at the rate of more than £140 per acre per annum. It was admitted that if wayleave powers had been newly granted under the Facilities Acts £10 per acre per annum would have been a fair rent.

[27] *Hoddesdon U.D.C. and Broxbourne Sand Co.*, *The Times*, March 19, 1936.

of great length, because of the number and importance of the points to be provided for. But they could be abbreviated by methods similar to those adopted by the Law of Property Act, the Settled Land Act, and the Trustee Act, 1925. In South Yorkshire a model form of mining lease has been prepared under a committee; and it would not be a difficult matter to draw up a set of conditions which (subject to local adaptations) would suit all the mining districts of England and Wales. As far back as 1845 Lands Clauses and Railways Clauses were enacted which materially shortened Acts of Parliament. A series of mining clauses could be drawn up so that selections could be made from them, as is often done by references to Table A of the Companies Act.

A Code of Mining Law

At the present moment it would be premature to compile a code of mining law. Before that is done, and before mining royalties are acquired by the State, it is desirable to amend mining law and simplify the relations of persons possessed of surface rights.

Whenever a code is prepared, it is to be hoped that it will be as clear and understandable as is the Sale of Goods Act, 1893.

Before drafting a code of mining law it will be wise to follow the course taken in reference to the Law of Property Act, 1925. This was preceded by an Act of 1922, confined to needed amendments.

State Acquisition of Mining Royalties

Having shown that it is practicable and desirable to amend mining law independently of the acquisition of mining royalties by the State, it only remains to point out that preliminary amendment of the law will facilitate the transfer of mining royalties to the State. Thus, in regard to areas formerly of copyhold tenure, the share of the ex-copyholder can be fixed by statute, and there should be statutory right of entry for working the minerals and of conveying non-manorial minerals through the excavated spaces, and of lowering the level of the surface.

In regard to lands formerly wastes and commons which

have been inclosed by statute, and in reference to areas as to which the owner of the minerals is not now entitled to withdraw support, there should be statutory power to lower the level of the surface, subject or not subject to compensation being paid for subsidence damage and the right to let down, according as that status has or has not been contracted for by Inclosure Act, deed or other instrument of severance.

Where the former copyholds or the blocks of minerals owned separately from the surface are small, or other circumstances exist, making the compensation less than £50 (or other stated sum), the Act can provide that such compensation need not be paid at the initial stage of State acquisition; but may be paid (on the statutory basis) as and when the minerals under the small parcels are worked out or up to, and shall be debited by the mining company against royalties payable to the Department of State. In this way, an enormous amount of trouble and expense will be saved in having to fix, commute and ascertain a single sum for compensation at the outset. By this method, it will be possible to pay the surface owner the exact amount to which he is entitled, worked out to four points of decimals, and the State can defer that payment until the royalties are payable by the mining company. This suggestion is made in the interests of the small owners themselves, and with a view to the avoidance of disproportionate expense and of occasions of grievance, and of subsequent applications for payments *ex gratia* for redressing hard cases. These small owners number many thousands.

The same principle can usefully be applied to the exceedingly great number of small freeholders who at present own surface and underlying minerals. In regard to those areas and to the extensive areas where the royalty owner possesses both surface and minerals, it will be necessary for the Acquisition Act to declare that the underlying and neighbouring minerals may be worked, gotten, carried away and removed without leaving or providing any vertical or lateral support, subject or not subject (according to provisos) to the payment of compensation for damage caused to the surface and works and buildings for the time being thereon consequent upon the working, getting, carrying away and removal of mines and minerals.

The Act will also give wayleave powers in all cases under-

ground; and (where requisite) above ground, subject to payment of compensation wherever surface is used for conveyance, or for dumping spoil.

As a matter of practical wisdom, it is desirable that any statute for amending mining law should precede the Act for acquisition of mining royalties by the State. A two-fold stage was adopted in 1928, when a preliminary Act was passed for amending the Law Relating to Companies; and in the following year these amendments were incorporated with the consolidated Companies Act, 1929.

It is highly desirable to avoid the letting loose of a hornets' nest of legal problems, such as had to be dealt with by special legislation in the case of the European Assurance Society Arbitration Acts, 1872 to 1875, under the first of which Lord Westbury (former Lord Chancellor) was appointed arbitrator for determining novation and other questions in relation to the affairs of certain assurance companies.

Ever since the General Strike of 1926 royalty owners (with few exceptions) have been very considerate towards their mining lessees. In order that the acquisition of mining royalties may not hurt struggling collieries and the workers and tradespeople dependent on them, it is highly important that the State department shall possess wide discretionary powers, and that it shall not be given the opportunity of acting oppressively, as was done in connexion with the War Losses Commission, and was attempted in the case of de Keyser's Hotel a few years ago.[28]

J. H. Cockburn.

[28] [1920] Appeal Cases, 508.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN GENIUS

By A. Wyatt Tilby

I

The civilisation of Europe is younger and more dynamic, more varied and on the whole more individual, than those of Asia and Africa. If dominance is a test of success, and imitation by others a proof of superiority, it has outclassed as well as outpaced its older and in some cases decadent competitors; while so far from becoming decadent itself—as some recent critics have asserted—it appears to be facing the problems of the future with the confident feeling that progress is still possible in many if not in most of the fields open to human endeavour.

Progress is made by the few for the benefit of the many; and that being so, a study of the distribution of European genius in relation to geography, climate and politics should throw some curious, and possibly important, light on the factors and forces that make for cultural change. It seemed to me that the best, though hardly the easiest, way to obtain the necessary material was to adopt the method which proved fruitful in similar studies of English genius at home and overseas,[1] and to tabulate the notable names mentioned in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* in a series of comparative lists country by country, century by century, and career by career. Inclusion in that great necropolis is, with few exceptions, an indication of national and often of international reputation in public life, and closer inspection as the lists were being compiled failed to disclose any serious bias in the selection. True, the catalogue was obviously inadequate as regards India and China, but I was not concerned with those countries. True, too, the *Britannica* naturally contains rather more English and American statesmen and authors than could be

[1] *Nineteenth Century and After*, June 1934; July 1935.

justified on the ground of pure merit *sub specie aeternitatis*; but this was of no consequence to me, for all English and American names were automatically excluded.

My list did not, indeed, contain all, or anything like all, the foreign names in the *Britannica*. It omitted most of the mere administrators and continuators in State and Church, many forgotten Byzantine and mediæval emperors and minor popes. A whole tribe of industrious scholars, annotators and commentators who edited everything and originated nothing were incontinently rejected. Actors and actresses, however famous in their lifetime, were too ephemeral for my purpose; and the queer company of charlatans and freaks like the Chevalier D'Eon and other flotsam and jetsam of European notoriety were similarly ignored. Apart from this *olla podrida* the list as finally passed was complete—indeed, if anything it was too complete. Unless we accept the melancholy proverb that the world knows nothing of its greatest men, it omits no name of first-class importance. But it does still contain a few whose inclusion could only be defended by a little ingenious special pleading. Those who got in by the skin of their teeth were not sufficiently numerous, however, to make any serious difference to the whole or the proportions of the parts, and the grand total numbered altogether 4252. This great company are the over-souls of Nietzschean theory, the supermen who have made, or at least led, European civilisation for 2500 years.

Before we discuss their distribution in place and time, it will be convenient to dispose of two minor points of controversial interest: the proportion of the sexes, and the ratio of Jews to Gentiles.

Proportion of the Sexes.—The famous women numbered no more than 131, which is virtually 1 in 33—a figure which compares very badly with the English proportion of 1 in 18, and the 1 in 19 of the United States and British Dominions. Now with every respect for my own countrywomen, I doubt if they are twice as intellectual as their sisters on the Continent, and one must therefore assume that conditions abroad are only half as favourable to feminine ambition as at home. France easily heads the list, with 53 famous women—1 in 22 of the French total, which is not far behind the English ratio; Germany, on the other hand, with only 19, has no more than

1 famous woman to every 54 men. In other countries the totals were too small to furnish a basis of calculation. Perhaps I should add that the grand feminine total included 18 queens, distinguished for force of character and not merely partakers of their husbands' glory [2]; 13 saints, ranging from Joan of Arc and Teresa of Spain to the two Catherines of Italy. There were 13 novelists, 11 poets, 5 painters, only 1 musician —Chaminade—and (contrary to the popular opinion that women cannot get beyond simple arithmetic) 3 mathematicians and astronomers. But, speaking broadly, the list was disappointing both in quantity and quality.

Proportion of Jews.—Famous Jews numbered 115, or 1 in 37 of the total—which seemed to me at first a surprisingly small proportion. It is true I may have failed to identify two or three individuals, though hardly more, on my lists as being Jews.[3] But if we take the number of Jews in continental Europe as being about 9,000,000, and the total population of the Continent as about 420,000,000, we shall see that the proportion of Jewish distinction is in fact slightly higher than among Christians; and this despite the fact that the Jews are ineligible for the Church, and are at least not encouraged to serve the State in many European countries. The geographical distribution of the distinguished Jews in these lists raises interesting problems. Russia and Poland have 6 each, Italy 7, France 12, Spain and Portugal 23, and Germany 41. In other words, the proportion of famous Jews to famous Christians worked out as 1 to 100 in France and Italy, 1 to 10 in Spain, and 1 to 20 in Germany. The two countries, therefore, to which the Jews have contributed the most are precisely those which have dealt with them most severely.

In these anomalous circumstances the actual fields in which the Jews have distinguished themselves is a matter of considerable interest.[4] Philosophy and religion head the list, with 13 eminent Jews in each category, among whom Spinoza

[2] My lists excluded the large (and in other respects not uninteresting) category of kings' mistresses.

[3] There were also some half-dozen semi-Jews, the offspring of mixed marriages, who were not included. The number was too small for any deductions as to the results of mixed marriages to be possible; but the mixed marriages are also not very numerous.

[4] Jewish scholars, or Talmudists, distinguished within their own communion but hardly more than a name outside, were omitted; perhaps a score altogether. But Christian scholars who were merely eminent commentators were also excluded.

is supreme; poetry is second, with 12, chief of whom is Heine with his immortal bittersweet. Nine Jews were reformers or revolutionaries, with Trotsky at the head; but on the other hand 6 served the State in more conservative capacities. Six became eminent in science, a somewhat smaller proportion than I expected; and there were 5 great musicians, among whom Mendelssohn ranks first. The 3 famous dramatists seemed surprisingly few, in view of the known interest of the Jews in the stage; but the most curious fact was that there was only 1 great painter—Israels of Holland. I had not expected to find the second commandment so literally obeyed.

These secondary points being set on record, let us turn to the main tables which contrast one country with another. Here France quite definitely heads the list, with 1203 great names; that is to say, more than 1 distinguished European in every 4 is born in France. Actually a few Frenchmen who have attained national or international fame have been born outside their own country—in South America, Africa, the West Indies, and elsewhere. But these only amount to about a dozen in all—a considerably smaller number than the distinguished Englishmen of overseas birth. The glory of France is deeply rooted in her own soil.

Germany comes second, with 852—of whom 51 were born in Austria, and 3 or 4 in the Baltic Provinces or Transylvania. That is to say, 1 great name in every 5 in Europe is German. It is to be added that the German total would have been considerably higher but for two factors. In the first place, her civilisation is of later date than that of France, Italy, or Spain; it was essentially a new development in virgin soil, whereas the Latin countries carried on and modified the Roman tradition which they had inherited. In the second place, German culture suffered a violent set-back, if not an actual breach, through the Thirty Years' War. The seventeenth century, which reaped the harvest of the Renascence and Reformation, was intellectually a fertile period in which art, letters and thought flourished, and it was in that great age that France produced some of her most outstanding men and achievements. But Germany was impoverished and depopu-

lated for at least thirty years after the war, and sixty years of potential achievement were thus lost to Central Europe. Neither the Fronde nor the French Revolution, nor the Napoleonic Wars, had any such devitalising effect on her neighbour; nor the Civil War in England.

These two great rival civilisations, each of which has contributed something to the other, have an outcrop or overhang south and north of their main territories in Switzerland and Belgium—both countries with a mixed population, whose political independence does not disguise their cultural allegiance. German Switzerland has produced 32 against the French-Swiss total of 29 famous men, a virtual equality; in Belgium, where the line is not so distinctly drawn between Fleming and French, my figures award a somewhat conjectural 49 to the former against 32 to the latter. Here also we may include Holland, physically an extension of Germany but culturally (as shown by its rejection of Luther and acceptance of Calvin) more in sympathy with France. The Dutch are historically a combination of adventurer abroad and bourgeois at home, which has produced great explorers and artists and scholars, but has been deficient in the more speculative and imaginative fields of philosophy and music. Even so, however, they have made the respectable contribution of 123 to the grand total of European fame. So much for the bare Franco-German totals, which, with their collaterals in Switzerland, Belgium and Holland, provide 2321 names out of 4252, or rather more than half my whole catalogue of European genius.

The contrast between the three great centres of civilisation in the geographical tripod that forms the south of Europe is more complicated. Greece, Italy, and Spain have produced three successive cultures, each of which was sufficiently vigorous to establish colonies and impose its empire on others. How, then, do they come out on these lists with their long retrospects of twenty-five centuries? To answer that I drew a chronological line between the classic Attic-Alexandrian Greek culture and the Christian-Byzantine empire of Constantine and Justinian. The former list is obviously incomplete, and many names worthy of record in the island civilisations of the Levant must have passed into complete oblivion. On the other hand, several names in the later Constantinopolitan

list were not particularly noteworthy, but could hardly be excluded. Yet the earlier inadequate catalogue contains 299 names, most of which should be familiar to anybody who has even a nodding acquaintance with ancient history; whereas the later and longer period provides no more than 65. The bare quantitative figures alone, even without the qualitative fall revealed by detailed inspection, are sufficiently poignant evidence of the melancholy decline which may overtake the most splendid human effort. Comparisons of this kind between, say, Plato and Athanasius, or between Thucydides and Eusebius, lead straight to mechanical and determinist interpretations of history. The best reply to that is the evidence from Italy, where the position is exactly reversed.

The Roman Empire contributes 121 names to the general list, and the Roman imperial colonies in Africa another 24 of Latin descent: 145 in all. This list, no doubt, could easily have been extended had I added the laborious Lempriére to the *Britannica*. But in one respect at least its enlargement would have made little difference; for even casual inspection showed that a far larger proportion of the Latins were statesmen and men of action than among the Greeks, and a far smaller proportion artists and poets; although these latter are always given a little preference by the compilers of biographical dictionaries. If, then, politicians outnumbered poets and philosophers in Rome, it was because the practical Latin mind was more interested in politics than philosophy or poetry, and neither extension nor diminution of my lists would have made any difference to that proportion. But whereas the Greek mind lost its vigour and originality after the classic period, the Latin mind increased its range and depth, and by contrast with the 65 Byzantines (half of whom were reluctantly included) mediæval and modern Italy added 566 names to the list. Many of these were stars of the first magnitude, and indeed quality matched quantity throughout the whole of this impressive catalogue of poets and artists, saints and scientists and thinkers—a splendid demonstration of the sustained vigour and variety of the human mind over twenty-five centuries. Faced with that, the mechanical-determinist theory of human history becomes not so much an interpretation as an impertinence.

Spain, the third leg of the South European tripod, is

historically a Latin colony whose basic culture derives from Rome. But geography has made the whole Iberian peninsula susceptible to African influence and invasion, with marked effect on the character and content of its civilisation. The Moorish kingdom delayed and hampered the Christian States south of the Pyrenees, with the result that though the Spanish mind retained the strength and consistency of its Latin texture, it developed some centuries later in point of time than the Italian, and has shown itself throughout more limited in scope and range. Simplicity of purpose and directness of aim rather than subtlety and comprehensiveness have been the characteristics of Iberian intellect. Some of the more fruitful avenues of human inquiry have been virtually ignored, with the result that the peninsula counts only 240 great names, of which 44 come from Portugal.

Turn now from the Mediterranean to the Baltic. The civilisation of Scandinavia has been handicapped from the start by sterile soil rather than rigorous climate, with the result that a population of exceptional vigour and intelligence has been too small to carry out its soaring political ambitions, and, as in the case of Germany, suffered heavily in consequence during the Thirty Years' War. This northern culture is naturally of Germanic rather than Gallic cast, but it wears its Teutonism with an emphasised local difference. There is a touch of clarity and precision in Scandinavian mentality which we often miss in the German, who sometimes loses in vagueness what he gains in comprehensiveness; and it is this preference for exactness which makes the Scandinavian better at mathematics than metaphysics, and a systematist rather than a discoverer in the sciences. Humanity migrates from north to south, but culture travels from south to north, with the result that civilisation develops late in northern latitudes. For all that, Scandinavia has contributed 144 names to my European total, of which Sweden is responsible for 69, Denmark for 51, and Norway for 24. If we include Iceland as part of Europe (as I have in fact done for convenience), the Scandinavian tally should be increased by 8.

There remain finally the great plains of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea and beyond—vast stretches of arable and forest land whose soil and climate are at least as well suited for high civilisation as the rolling downs of

Picardy and Normandy, or flat Brandenburg and Pomerania. But beyond the Oder and down the Danube the mental air becomes increasingly rarefied, with the result that Poland has no more than 33 great names, Russia 87, and Hungary 61, while the Balkan States have no more than a bare score between them. More detailed analysis shows that in each case there is a higher proportion of soldiers to the total than in any western country—including France and Germany, which are not notoriously pacific States; and another table shows that while several of the great emperors and conquerors of Greece and Rome came from the Balkans and Macedonia, those districts made no intellectual contribution of any note to ancient civilisation. The reason is clear—they had none to make, for Greece and Rome were inclusive, not exclusive, in their mental sympathies, and their annals contain several eminent immigrants from Cappadocia and Armenia and Syria, but none from the Danubian countries. On the other hand, the Russian contribution to modern civilisation, despite its paucity of numbers—to some extent the result of youth—is by no means negligible. But a detailed analysis of its character discloses such important differences between the Slavonic mind and that of Western States that it must be left to the second portion of this paper.[5]

II

There remains now the question of the actual differences of character and content between these local varieties of European genius. We are faced at the start with a contrast, almost a contradiction, between the Greek and Latin mind. It will be sufficient simply to state this without attempting any explanation. The primitive Latin mind was interested in

[5] The relative distinction of the Continental capitals may be briefly summarised. Paris is easily ahead of all the rest put together, with 257 great names—a unique and incomparable record. Berlin, a much younger rival, comes second with 52. Then follow Rome 36, Amsterdam 23, Madrid 22, Lisbon and Vienna 19 each, Moscow 17, Copenhagen 16, and Stockholm 13.

Of the great cities Florence is easily first with 70 names; then Venice (which Macaulay absurdly said had produced nothing worthy of note) has 43. After that Naples and Lyons have 27 each, Geneva 26, Bologna and Antwerp 25 each, Milan 20, Hamburg and Frankfurt 18 each, Marseilles, Dijon and Leipzig 15 each, Zurich and Orleans 14 each, Dresden and Breslau 13 each. Five cities—Munich, Brussels, Genoa, Siena, and Verona—have 12 each: and the smaller fry would form a large catalogue.

persons, the Greek in principles. The Greek was always inquiring into causes, more especially into cosmic and general causes; the Latin, on the other hand, was satisfied with effects, more especially social effects. The Greek, in short, was a philosopher, the Latin a politician; with the result that Greek politics were admirable on paper and contemptible in practice, while Latin polity was calculated and superb. The Greek Empire fell, but Greek philosophy survives to this day. The time came when the Latin Empire also fell as a political unit, but its tradition survives in the Roman Church and the Latin States. Meanwhile the Greek mind lost itself in theological subtleties that usurped the place of philosophical speculation, and, indeed, of philosophical reality; while the Latin mind, on the contrary, broadened and deepened and mellowed, but retained throughout its close touch with the practical everyday world.[6]

The result was that the Italian civilisation which came to lead Europe through the Middle Ages relied more on mental and less on physical or political superiority than the Roman Empire which it succeeded. The Italian intellect led the West for a thousand years in commerce and exploration, in art and literature; it ruled the West in religion. But what was gained to the Church was lost to the State, and political and military leadership passed eventually from Italy to Spain and France. All three countries had a large number of German immigrants, but in all three the Latin type of civilisation survived and dominated the new culture, which emerged with characteristic local varieties. Of the three, the Spanish mind was most like the original Roman, the Italian the least, and the French midway between the two.

The Spanish mind is simple, direct, and purposeful: it lacks subtlety and scope rather than depth, and is at once powerful and limited. The Italian mind is more subtle but more superficial; more sympathetic than the Spanish but less sincere. Its sunny nature seeks beauty rather than truth, whereas the more sombre Spaniard seeks truth rather than beauty. Less gay than the Italian, less grave than the Spaniard, the mind of France comes midway between the two.

[6] It is difficult to read the story of the Church Councils and the great heresies and Byzantine schism without feeling that Christianity had a definitely evil effect on the Greek mind. On the other hand, it is equally difficult to read the story of the Papacy without feeling that it had a definitely good effect on the Latin mind.

At one time simple, at another subtle, at once powerful and profound, it always sees its purpose clearly and pursues it with cool objective logic; but the purpose has usually been wider and more varied than that of Spain, and the pursuit more potent and calculated than that of Italy. France has sometimes suffered a political tyranny, but her free intellect has never fallen under a tyranny of the mind, with the result that she has often sought, and sometimes found, that cold and cruel virgin which men call truth as well as her more seductive sister beauty.[7]

As regards the individual contribution of the three Latin countries, Spain is a land of great artists but hardly any musicians; of many poets, a superabundance of dramatists, Cervantes and a few other novelists of lesser and local fame.[8] It has produced several mystics—including St. John of the Cross, one of the major ornaments of Western Christianity; but these lack something of the sweet humanity of the Italians, and their rugged strength has perhaps hardly the profundity of insight of Eckhart and the greater Germans. On the whole the religion of Spain, though utterly sincere and even fanatical, has tended to the practical administrative and evangelistic rather than the other-worldly type. It can boast two of the greatest missionaries of the Catholic Church in St. Francis Xavier and Las Casas; but against these we have to set the notorious Torquemada of the Spanish Inquisition, who would have rebuked Christ himself for laxity and would probably have condemned him for heresy had they been contemporaries; and, although the Church has recruited several eminent scholars and the founders of two of her great orders—Dominic and Loyola—from the peninsula, the Spanish contribution to Catholic theology has been small, and less important than that of Italy or France. In religion as in secular affairs Spain is all of a piece—all through history it has been a country of action, not thought; like ancient Rome, a State which has produced many conquerors, but no philosophy and no science.

[7] Buckle makes the point in *The History of Civilisation* that French intellect declined under the personal rule of Louis XV. I can see no evidence whatever of this in my lists. But even if it were true, it was only a case of *reculer pour mieux sauter* in the nineteenth century.

[8] Portugal has many poets and a few historians; but is sharply distinguished from Spain in having produced neither novelists, dramatists, nor painters. This last deficiency in so close a neighbour puzzles me.

Turn now to Italy, where painting and music seem to have become national industries, where every little town (at any rate, north of Rome) has its celebrated master in one if not both arts. The poets also are more numerous, and no longer of merely national fame, as in Spain, but are household words wherever European literature is known. Only the novelists and dramatists are fewer; in spite of the *Decameron* and Alfieri, Italy has produced few masters of fiction either on the stage or off. The Italian list contains also great theologians like Aquinas, and a few recognised philosophers of perhaps lesser calibre; and in modern times some scientists and inventors of repute, though these seem but a beggarly array beside the long roll of artists. This greater variety of mental interests shows that the Italian intellect is not only more fertile than the Spanish, but also is more receptive and more tolerant of new ideas. Perhaps the difference is best indicated by the sharp contrast between the sunny sympathy of St. Francis of Assisi, who loved every living thing, and the dour rigidity of Spanish Dominic, who loved God but would have harried every heretic to hell.

French civilisation derives directly from Latin sources, but in some respects the daughter has outdistanced the mother. France is physically a richer and more varied country than Italy, and Gallic genius has been more prolific in quantity and more varied in quality. French art has not indeed surpassed that of her neighbour; but in the sphere of science and thought there is a clarity and precision in the French mind, a swiftness and boldness of generalisation, a catholicity of range combined with complete fearlessness in following an intellectual process to its logical conclusion, which has given France the mental leadership of the Continent. French genius is spread through the country, but there are significant differences of expression and direction in the various provinces. The painters and novelists and the mocking wits of Paris, the poets of Provence, and the saints and sailors of Brittany are indeed proverbial. But there is also the mathematical mind of Normandy which stands revealed in the astronomical work of La Place and Leverrier [9]; the ruthless

[9] Normandy was largely populated from Scandinavia. It is at least an interesting parallel that Scandinavia and Schleswig have produced more astronomers than almost any part of Europe.

reasoning of Picardy which shows in Calvin and Condorcet and Lamarck, to say nothing of Robespierre; the large humanity of Touraine that comes out in the boisterous wit of Rabelais and the vast imagination of Balzac; the heavier type of mind, as of wine, that Burgundy has produced in St. Bernard and Bossuet and Lamartine[10]; and the sweet reasonableness of those level-headed sons of Bordeaux, Montaigne and Montesquieu, fit forerunners of the ill-fated moderates of the Gironde.

Unlike Spain, Italy and France, the main German territories were never conquered by Rome. Latin settlement east of the Rhine and north of the Alps has always been negligible, whereas German emigration west of the Rhine and south of the Alps has been considerable. The influence of Latin culture upon the German tribes has therefore always, or almost always, been through voluntary adoption or imitation by the Germans themselves, hardly ever through enforced conquest. Consequently the differences between the native German culture and the Latin civilisation which it has alternately accepted and resented as an alien culture are likely to be marked. Actually the distinction is in the main one of timbre and temperament, of expression and emotion rather than character and content. The German mind is slower and more deliberate than the Latin, less sure of itself in action and thought, more patient and more cautious of generalisation in groping towards its conclusions, and therefore more tenacious of an idea once formed or formulated. It lacks something of the extraordinary clarity and precision of the French mind, but is more open and receptive than the Spanish, and less prone to facile superficiality than the Italian. On the whole the German mind is less original and less inventive than the Latin, and more ready to adopt an idea presented to it from outside and to expand it than to discover a new thing. It is because it is less quick at the uptake that it has a constant sense of inferiority to the Latin, and it is because it is more thorough in approach and research that it often makes discoveries which the other has missed, and thus has the occasional compensation of superiority over its neighbour and rival.

[10] Burgundy is famous in France for a distinctive type of sardonic and even sour humour. But there is nothing of this in the work of its greatest men, which, like its noblest wine, is full and strong without a trace of bitterness.

German painting is heavier in touch and brush, and German music deeper, more serene but less vivacious, than that of the Latins—in both cases an accurate reflection of the differences in timbre and temperament on the two sides of the Rhine. But the most significant differences are in the sphere of thought rather than art. It might be an exaggeration to say that Germany has produced more theologians and theological scholars than all the rest of Europe put together; but it is a fact that my German list shows a superabundance of labourers in this field, and, since doctrinal theology began to diminish in interest, an unusual proportion of philosophers whose interests were in fact largely theological—compared with a relative paucity of political and social philosophers, which (taken in conjunction with a deficiency of statesmen in the German list) clearly shows that Germany is a less politically minded country than France. In addition, the religious cast of the German mind is shown by a large number of mystics, several of whom have become classics in a field where the claim to admission is easy and the attainment of permanent fame difficult.

An analysis of German genius on geographical lines shows that it is on the whole more evenly distributed than in Italy and Spain, though not France. There are no intellectual deserts, but a few regions of relatively high fertility; and there is some slight tendency towards specialisation in districts. The areas of high mental fertility are four: the Rhineland, the Schleswig-Holstein district with Hamburg as its capital, Saxony and Thuringia. In the first two the population is mixed, in the third and fourth it is not; and no particular deductions are therefore possible on that score. As to local differences, it is to be noted that Bavaria produces painters, but not musicians, poets or philosophers; Austria dramatists and musicians, but few painters or poets, and no philosophers; Silesia much poetry, but little music. Würtemburg (with which I included Baden) is rich in such different fields as poetry, philosophy, theology and science, but deficient in music and the drama; the Schleswig-Holstein district is fertile in everything except theology and philosophy, but more particularly prolific in the sciences, and among these most successful at astronomy; while the solid Saxon mind is peculiarly apt at philosophy and the sciences, excellent at

music, but deficient at painting. The divines—dogmatic, doctrinal, and devotional—spring up everywhere that German is spoken.

There can be no question that the Slav mind differs substantially from the Latin both in character and content. Sluggish in the mass, whereas the Latin is quick and vivacious, it has never been disciplined by the rules and conventions in which Western action and thought have slowly set; and the passionate motions and emotions of individual Russian genius, and in less degree the Pole (whose conversion to Catholicism is a westernising influence), have therefore an intellectual bias and an originality of their own. An analysis of mental distinction in Eastern Europe shows how markedly the Slav mind differs in product as well as process from the West. In every Latin list famous painters outnumber the musicians by more than 2 to 1. In Germany and Austria, where Slav influence is strong, the lists are approximately equal. But in Slav countries proper the Latin order is reversed, and the musicians not only outnumber the painters but rank higher in the quality of their work.

This is a highly significant fact. Indeed, with the possible exception of the Jews, this is, so far as I know, a unique national or racial trait. The Latins, like the Chinese and English, are emphatically visualist rather than auditive. The Germans are slightly more visual than auditive. But the Slavs are decisively more auditive than visual. They live, therefore, in a different world of the senses, a world in which sound must seem more important than substance, and rhythm than reason; and you cannot live in a different world without acting and thinking differently.

It is a fact that this different world which the Slav mind inhabits does not contain, or at least has not so far produced, any consistent or considered philosophy in the Western European sense of the term. There are many saints but few sages in the Russian Church. There are good poets and great novelists in the sweet Russian tongue, but metaphysicians and logicians are as lacking as men of science. The Slav soul is in its music, and the character of that music is not joyous like the Latin, or serene like the German, but alternately a

passionate revolt and pessimistic acquiescence. And this is a true reflection of the typical Russian mental attitude, of ineffective protest against the tragic futility of human life and fate.

Is life futile? Are the limits of human understanding and achievement ultimately fixed and inalterable? It may indeed be so. But if so, this is the one thing that man cannot admit and dare not believe, lest by believing he bring it about, and so despair altogether of the future.

A. WYATT TILBY.

REVISITING THE FAR EAST

II. Manchukuo and Japan

By E. M. Gull

The Japan which I knew when I left the Far East in 1926 was a member of the League of Nations. She was the Japan who had promised to 'respect the sovereignty and administrative integrity of China,' and whose representatives had collaborated with those of Great Britain and other signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty at the Peking Tariff Conference. The 'keynote' of her policy towards China was 'a deliberate reversal of the aggressive policy which had been pursued by the Japanese Government from the presentation of the Twenty-one Demands in 1915 until after the close of the General War.'[1] She had increased her electorate from 3,000,000 to 13,000,000 by the passage of a universal manhood suffrage law, and appeared, notwithstanding the known limitations placed by the Constitution upon the powers of the Diet, to be showing an increasing respect for parliamentary principles and methods. Her recent industrial development had 'proved to be a mushroom growth stimulated by abnormal war conditions.'[2] And she was apparently willing to abide by a 5–5–3 ratio between her fleet and those of Great Britain and the United States.

The Japan which I revisited last summer had ceased to be a member of the League of Nations, had denounced the 5–5–3 ratio, had wrested Manchuria and Jehol from China, and, having incorporated both in Manchukuo, was proclaiming openly that North China had become essential to that camouflaged State. Moreover, she had declared (on April 17, 1933) her opposition to 'any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers, even in the name of technical or financial assistance,'

[1] *Survey of International Affairs*, 1926 (Chatham House).
[2] *Ibid.*

in regard to China. Of her domestic politics Dr. Takeuchi, of Kwansei Gakuin University, had just written that 'after forty years of parliamentary experience the prestige and integrity of the Diet have greatly decreased.' And of her industry Sir George Sansom, Commercial Counsellor at the British Embassy in Tokyo, had just said that 'during a period of world depression production has shown a remarkable increase. . . . No really satisfactory statistics are available, but it seems to be established that the volume of industrial production has advanced by at least 35 per cent. since 1930.' His report also stated that during the same period exports from Japan proper had increased from 1470 to 2172 million yen. As they consisted almost entirely (nearly 90 per cent. in 1934) of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods, assuming that exports of manufactured goods are about one-third of total world exports, Japan's share of the trade in which she is an active competitor is about 10 per cent. Some twenty countries had resorted to tariff increases or other measures to hold this competition in check.

While some of these changes are not attributable to Japan's conversion from an island into a continental Power, all of them have been affected by that transformation; the Japan with which we have to deal to-day is Manchukuoan, not pre-Manchukuoan, Japan. The adjective is clumsy, but its connotations are clear. One is that Japan is now openly aggressive, whereas hitherto she had, at most times, acted on the advice given her by Count Hayashi in 1895—namely,

> to lull suspicions that have arisen against her, and to wait, meanwhile strengthening the foundations of her national power, watching and waiting for the opportunity which must one day surely come in the Orient. When that day arrives she will be able to follow her own course, not only to put meddling Powers in their places, but even, as necessity arises, meddling with the affairs of other Powers. Then truly will she be able to reap advantage for herself.

At the time of writing, this aggressiveness is displaying itself, as far as East Asia is concerned, mainly in the north. It is historically linked, however, with the acquisition of Formosa in 1895, prior to which the Bonin and Liuchiu islands had been acquired. A second connotation, accordingly, is that, having established herself on the mainland in the north, Japan will proceed, probably in the near future, to impose,

or to attempt to impose, control over the southern Chinese province of Fukien. The special significance to us of this is that a coastal strip some 29 square miles in area of the adjoining province of Kwangtung—the tongue of land known as Kowloon—forms, with the island of Hongkong, one of the largest centres of shipping in the British Empire. Encompassing it are some 376 square miles of mainland and islands, leased by Great Britain from the Chinese Government for ninety-nine years in 1898.

Japan's aggressiveness, however, is not to be explained on the easy (and to some minds attractive) hypothesis of a double dose of original sin, though the recently repentant and reformed may be allowed the belief that the dose was a strong one. It is the expression of a psychological, political and economic fusion, the elements of which must be studied separately if they are to be understood collectively. This fusion is a third connotation of the term 'Manchukuoan.' A fourth is the predominant importance in Japanese life of the army and navy, which constitute the crucible in which the fusion is being effected; the army being, at the moment, particularly active. So closely related with this connotation as to be, at first sight, indistinguishable from it is a fifth, namely, that Japan's domestic affairs, while in the first instance largely responsible for Manchukuo—an area nearly as large as France and Germany combined—are now dominated by it.

Before entering the new State let me amplify part of the historical background of these connotations. Britain's acquisition of Hongkong in 1842, of Kowloon in 1860, and of the Leased Territory—the two first by force and the third in circumstances in which its use was implicit—represents in Japanese, as in Chinese, history the aggression of the West upon the East. It is part of the chapter recording the creation of Treaty Ports in both countries and the circumstances in which, at the end of the Sino-Japanese War, Russia, with the help of France and Germany, supplanted Japan in the Liaotung Peninsula. In the article already quoted Count Hayashi said:

> During the war with China feelings in Japan were by no means friendly to England. Her arbitrary limitation of the area of hostilities was strongly felt by our military men, and it was on account of this that our plan for an attack on Nanking had to be based on Shantung.

Count Hayashi, as most people are aware, was, with Lord Lansdowne, the creator of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Those who have read his memoirs can be under no illusions as to the motives which inspired either statesman. The sentimental attributes of the alliance were of later growth. To-day they survive much more in English than in Japanese consciousness. Indeed, as a result of my visit I doubt whether they survive in the latter at all. Much more prevalent, at all events, is dislike of Great Britain. On the other hand, the feeling of hostility to Russia which gave birth to the alliance remains acute—partly on account of Russia's ability to attack her by air from Vladivostok, partly because Japan's new continental frontiers march with Russia's and are thought to be specially vulnerable through Mongolia. A change of policy towards Russia on the part of the United States and other Powers is also a factor of importance. Accordingly, the army, and, when it wishes, the Foreign Office too, can strike with assurance popular chords which evoke instantaneously not only heroic memories of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, but a tradition and instincts much older than that—older than ours in respect of that portion of the Low Countries now called Belgium. Just as we, from the time of the Peace of Vervins at the end of the sixteenth century down to and including the Great War, have sought to provide against, and have reacted immediately to, the danger of that area coming under the control of a great Power, so since the days of Kublai Khan's invasion of Kyushu—memory of which had not been forgotten when Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea met with disaster—have the Japanese reacted to any danger, real or imaginary, threatening them from the north-eastern mainland of Asia. A mixture of such dangers, in which the real elements were considerable, threatened her increasingly for some five or six years before 1931. The Chinese were skilfully weakening some of her chief entrenchments in Manchuria, their actions, especially after 1927, being inspired by the nationalism referred to in a previous article, which Great Britain recognised and met with wise and timely concessions, notably at Hankow. Japan was faced with a choice between the employment of force and sacrifices which meant a great deal to her. As force had proved successful before, and was in accordance both with the tradition and the

instincts referred to above, she decided to have recourse to it again, notwithstanding the Kellogg Pact and other agreements.

Let us now enter Manchukuo. Amongst old photographs is one showing in course of construction the bridge over the Yalu River, which forms part of the boundary between Korea and southern Manchuria. From a photographic point of view the picture is uninteresting—just five or six squarish-looking pillars advancing across an entirely characterless sheet of placid water. Upon its back is written 'Japan's Giant's-stride,' a simile considered at the time, 1910, a little extravagant. For what more natural, asked sensible persons, than that Japan should want to replace the narrow-gauge military railway between Mukden and Antung by one of standard gauge and link Mukden with Fusan at the tip of Korea? Travel by the narrow-gauge line was both pretty and amusing, for the little train puffed its way adventurously round charming corners and skirted the precipitous rims of wooded valleys, its head frequently bent round as though to see how its tail was faring. Passengers took two days to reach Mukden from Antung, and stopped for the night at a pleasantly situated, round, wooden rest-house, where they were shown with pride the room in which the late Lord Kitchener had slept the year before.

To-day the same journey is accomplished in five hours and twenty minutes in as up-to-date a train as can be found anywhere, and, with one exception, in more comfortable conditions than prevailed in 1926. The exception is the behaviour of the soldiers, shopkeepers and commercial travellers who form the bulk of one's fellow-travellers. Their manners may be described as a Japanised expression of the qualities depicted in Continental cartoons of the Englishman abroad, with aggressiveness substituted for nonchalance, a substitution demanding a much richer possession of nonchalance than the most successful of such cartoons suggest. Especially is patience taxed in Mukden, where the imperturbable dignity of the Chinese city makes the visitor all the more conscious of the arrogant self-assertiveness which he meets in the Japanised districts. These are expanding at once methodically and rapidly, with admirable regard for efficiency and durability, qualities all too

visibly lacking in much of the construction one had seen in China.

In Hsinching, the capital of Manchukuo, where there is relatively little to stimulate one of the chief causes of Japanese self-assertiveness—the inferiority complex engendered by centuries of conscious borrowing from Chinese conceptions—the atmosphere seems less inimical. Here energies are absorbed creatively in a relatively free field, and again the visitor is impressed by the thoroughness and efficiency with which a new town is being brought into existence. He cannot but be conscious, however, of its military regimentation, for the army is much in evidence. A drive out into the plains, in some respects comparable with those of Canada, was made memorable by encountering a long transport column winding its way dustily, and camouflaged with the branches of trees, from the unruly country round Kirin. On my journey to Harbin the railway was heavily guarded. Rails of Japanese standard gauge had been substituted overnight for those of Russian gauge, so as to admit of through traffic from Harbin to Dairen, and preparations were in progress for an official visit of the Emperor Pu Yi to Harbin to review his fleet of gunboats on the Sungari. Armed guards were posted every few hundred yards; every large patch of *kaoliang* (sorghum)—which in summer provides excellent cover because it grows thickly to a height of 8 to 10 feet—was surrounded by and interspersed with sentries; all the villages near the line were in military occupation; every approach was patrolled, while at several sidings were armoured cars. Harbin itself was experiencing a reign of terrorism. Arrests were arbitrary and numerous. British and other residents were being held up and searched from head to foot. Privately owned arms were being commandeered, while incoming and outgoing hand baggage was examined thoroughly and roughly. A visitor ignorant of the Emperor's plans might reasonably have assumed that an attack in force was contemplated.

There can be no doubt that the easy-going, ill-disciplined, and in many respects ill-administered, Manchuria of the Changs—Chang Tso-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang, his son—is learning the meaning of resolute government and is better off than it was in respect of currency, communications, and,

as far as the big centres are concerned, municipal administration. Nor can there be any doubt that the country's natural resources are being more energetically and scientifically developed than they were before. The Japanese themselves told me, however, that it will take them another ten years to pacify its inhabitants, of whom by far the largest number, some 30,000,000, are Chinese. Since then, owing to the high-handedness which their military men display on most occasions, they have incurred the hostility of the Mongol inhabitants, a people with a fighting spirit equal to their own and possessing a much greater sense and love of freedom. In these circumstances it is impossible to say that Manchukuo is happier or more contented than Manchuria was. Moreover, to the extent that the prosperity of the country depends upon its bean trade, it is less well off than it was before 1931, a fact directly affecting the relation of its economy to that of Japan.

Prior to 1931 Manchuria's exports, of which beans and bean products formed the bulk, considerably exceeded her imports. In 1933 Manchukuo's imports exceeded exports by yuan 91,000,000,[3] in 1934 by yuan 145,000,000, and in 1935 by yuan 173,000,000, a change largely due to a decline in the value of beans, which in 1930 was £12 and during part of last year was £4 10*s.* a ton. Official Japanese figures do not indicate that exports either of beans, bean-cake or bean-oil have diminished much in quantity. Germany, the chief European buyer, had purchased, at the time of my visit, considerably less than usual, but this was said to be due to large imports of Russian sunflower and cotton seed at prices about £1 a ton cheaper than soya beans. Nor do the Japanese evince much anxiety regarding the trade's outlook. They have just concluded an agreement with Germany which should stimulate it and other exports. It is clear, however, that, failing a restoration of its former prosperity, an event which may be governed by increased production elsewhere or by the use of substitutes, and an increase of other exports, imports of Japanese manufacture cannot continue to expand.

The next most important exports at the present time are coal, millet, groundnuts, pig iron, wild silk, kaoliang, cotton

[3] The yuan, which contains 23·91 grammes of pure silver, is worth about 1*s.* 2*d.* and exchanges at par with the yen.

yarn, maize, buckwheat and sesamum seed. But most of these hitherto have been sold to Japan, who herself produces several of them. Pulp, it has been suggested somewhat doubtfully, might be utilised in large quantities, but there is no evidence so far of this or any other commodity being either available, or wanted, in large amounts, though allowance must be made for the fact that experimental work, for instance in cotton-growing, is as yet in its early stages. Japanese in Japan proper might be persuaded to eat less rice and more flour, while the market for Manchukuoan cereals and flour in North China might, the Japanese think, be extended. Japan is importing from Manchukuo more coal and pig iron than she was taking from Manchuria, but demand on the part of domestic producers for restriction of importation is inconsistent with the prospect held out to industrialists in Japan of having an expanding market there for their manufactures. Moreover, while the new State may absorb fairly large numbers of Koreans, and is providing a numerically modest outlet for Japanese civil servants, skilled workmen, school-teachers and shopkeepers, it offers no scope for emigration from Japan on a large scale.

Let us now survey conditions in Japan. Seoul, the Korean capital, used to be a place where one could dream days or weeks away, according to one's leisure and capacity for dreaming. Some, but not much, of its sleepy charm, tinged with the Tennysonian sadness of 'tears, idle tears,' has survived the processes of Japanese modernisation. On the eight-hour crossing to Shimonoseki, however, given fine weather, one forgets that in the shimmer of far islands and the colours of sea and sky.

To what extent are the changes of the last ten years in Japan due to the creation of Manchukuo? First let me take two changes not attributable *au fond* to that event—the increase of her industrial production and the expansion of her export trade. These are to be ascribed to internal and external causes. Amongst the former the chief, as I think, have been the necessity of finding employment for a rapidly increasing population which cannot be absorbed by agriculture; low production costs; rationalisation and a policy of State expenditure financed by State borrowing; armaments; depreciation of the yen and the psychological effect of the

determination of other countries to exclude her emigrants. Ten years ago an official spokesman, repeating what Baron Shidehara had said, declared:

> Instead of sending emigrants to Australia and the United States and Canada, it is intended in future to concentrate upon encouraging migration to Hokkaido, Formosa and other possessions, and special legislation to that end is being planned. The present policy is to increase export trade to foreign countries, especially in the South Pacific, whilst achieving a better distribution of population by filing up the less crowded spaces in Japan's own possessions.

Nevertheless, Manchukuo has intensified Japan's industrialisation in two ways—by providing it with the prospect of a widened outlook for exports (a prospect now considered doubtful unless North China can be included in its scope), and by creating an increased demand for armaments. Upon this latter point there is the authority of Sir George Sansom for saying that the growth of industrial activity depends, and therefore, presumably, has depended, to a great extent on the manufacture of military and naval equipment and supplies. The statistical relations since 1931 between military supplies for Manchukuo and for Japan's army and navy as a whole are probably not ascertainable with exactitude. Much more important than those relations, however, is the connexion between her evaluation of her total military and naval needs (and of the soldiers and sailors who are their primary assessors) and the complex of economic facts in which Manchukuo occupies a central position.

It has been shown that the offensive element in Japan's continental policy can be traced back at least to the seventies of last century. Notwithstanding this, some students of Japanese affairs think that had the Manchurian ' incident '—which began with a railway-line explosion very similar to the one which occurred in North China at the end of May—been handled differently, Japan, while taking measures to safeguard her interests in Manchuria, would not have determined upon the creation of Manchukuo. However that may be, there can be little doubt that the development of the doctrine of sanctions, without correspondingly clear evidence of intention to inquire into existing relations between political sovereignty and natural resources, has greatly sharpened Japan's consciousness of her poverty in respect of raw materials. This consciousness was one of her reasons

for fearing the gradual strengthening of Chinese control over Manchuria. It has been further increased by the erection of obstacles to her export trade, notably by Great Britain, which controls politically a large area of markets requiring cheap goods and has instituted preferential, and to that extent discriminatory, arrangements with other areas, governed autonomously, but constituting with herself a political and military unit.

It is only by reference to the primary needs of Japan's population, and to certain other outstanding features of her economic life, that the significance in Japanese eyes of these facts can be appreciated. Half the working population is engaged in agriculture, mainly in the production of rice and silk, in circumstances which, in Japan as elsewhere, entail under-employment and great hardship. In these and other respects conditions are comparable with those in China. Thus a survey of forty typical villages taken some years ago disclosed that the average peasant was spending only 15·9 sen (= 4*d.*) a day on food. Only one family in ten enjoyed a full diet of rice of poor quality. Moreover, of the 5,500,000 families then engaged in agriculture 35 per cent. tilled less than 1½ acres. A 1928 estimate for 36 per cent. of the farms in China was 1·5 acres and for 26 per cent. 4·3 acres. Things are no better to-day. The peasant in Japan is desperately poor. The industrial worker is little better off.[4]

But while the standard of life in rural districts is stationary or declining, the village birth rate is higher than in the towns, which, owing to industrial rationalisation and mechanisation, can absorb fewer persons than formerly. Accordingly, in addition to under-employment there is unemployment, the two together providing a reservoir of surplus labour upon which manufacturers can, and do, draw without offering any advance upon prevailing wage rates. These, on the basis of 1926 = 100, stood at the time of my visit at 81 and towards the end of the year at 80·9, real wages, in terms of commodities, calculated with reference to the retail price index, having also fallen. In most factories employing ten or more

[4] Of three investigations quoted in the last report of the Commercial Counsellor at our Embassy in Tokyo one for 1934 puts men's average daily wages at yen 1·96, or 2*s.* 1*d.*, one for 1933 at yen 2·62, or 3*s.* 2*d.*, and one for 1930 at yen 2·05, or 4*s.* 1*d.* Yet such rewards, says Sir George Sansom, are 'amply sufficient to attract male workers from rural to urban employment.'

persons the working day is one of ten hours, and two or three extra hours are usual in times of pressure. Strikes occur—in 1933 there were 1880 disputes involving a loss of 380,000 working days—but few have any chance of success. The trade unions, with a total membership of under half a million, are to all intents and purposes powerless. One reason for this is that of Japan's total production half, according to one estimate, is achieved in workshops employing less than seventy-five workers, the textile industry being practically the only really large-scale industry. Some of the capital needed by small-scale industries comes from co-operative societies, but more comes from capitalists who are interested in their work either as manufacturers or as traders. The concentration of capital is stupendous.

> One enormous concern handles one half of Japan's exports. Its share in Japan's imports is not much smaller, and it is said that 60–70 per cent. of Japan's total trade with the new State of Manchukuo passes through its hands. . . . Mitsui buys and sells for its own concern, for competitors, for export associations and for the Government. Mitsui is everywhere.[5]

It has a counterpart in Mitsubishi, the former being associated with the Seiyukai, the latter with the second largest political party, the Minseito. Together with lesser family concerns, also powerful, are Sumitomo and Yasada; these four groups control four out of the five big banks of Japan. The degree of corruption which has for years past characterised political life can be computed easily from a variety of sources, foreign and Japanese. The extent and depth of proletarian discontent is less easy to assess.

Such is the complex in the centre of which stands Manchukuo. In conjunction with the other circumstances reviewed in this article, it explains, I think, why the army, having with the full support of public opinion created Manchukuo, retains its leadership in respect of such steps as it considers necessary for the maintenance and development of the new State; why the navy, with the full support of public opinion, has denounced the 5–5–3 ratio; why the army, since it gets its recruits in the main from the peasantry, is dissatisfied with the existing economic order; why the capitalists, remembering their past and anxious about their future profits,

[5] Guenther Stein, *Made in Japan*.

fear, yet dare not oppose, the army; why the political parties, which have to a large extent been controlled by the capitalists, can offer no resistance to the restoration of bureaucratic government upon the army's terms; why the estimated expenditure for 1935–36 of the Ministries of War and Marine amounted to 1023 million yen, or 46 per cent. of total expenditure and 70 per cent. of total revenue other than loans (the latter totalling about 2200 million yen during the past three years); and why, to complete the vicious circle, money is not available in adequate sums for the relief of agrarian distress—another feature in which conditions in Japan resemble those in China.

I have purposely stated the results of my investigations as objectively as possible, but it should be realised that beneath the surface, in both countries, national passions are growing in strength and in heat.

E. M. Gull.

A MODERN IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY

By Rushton Coulborn, Ph.D.

> If I had to choose between a so-called University which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence, and gave its degree to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects, and a university which had no professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years, and then sent them away as the University of Oxford is said to have done some sixty years since, if I were asked which of these two methods was the better discipline of the intellect—mind, I do not say *morally* the better, for it is plain that compulsory study must be a good and idleness an intolerable mischief—but if I must determine which of the two courses was more successful in training, moulding, enlarging the mind, which sent out men the more fitted for their secular duties, which produced better public men, men of the world, men whose names would descend to posterity, I have no hesitation in giving preference to that University which did nothing, over that which exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the Sun.

Thus Cardinal Newman in his famous work on Universities, whose title I have borrowed in humility and modified in deep respect. This celebrated passage is quoted once again in the *Report of the University Grants Committee for the Period 1929–30 to 1934–35.*[1] The entire Report bears witness to the authority Newman's view has obtained, for an insistent, measured emphasis is laid throughout upon this function of academic life. No reasonable person can disagree with the view that there should occur in universities

> informal discussions of a few friends about all things in heaven and earth up to all hours of the night or morning, . . . the clash of mind between youthful historian, medical student, chemist, theologian, and engineer, . . . the exhilarating sense of intellectual daring and adventure. . . .

The Committee discovers that these things exist at Oxford and Cambridge and in a measure in the 'provincial' universities, where four-fifths of the students are to be found. It

[1] London, 1936: H.M. Stationery Office, 4s.

urges in favour of the ambitious building plans of London University that they will create a university centre where the atmosphere conducive to the 'clash of minds' will develop.

Yet in spite of this in all our universities, including Oxford and Cambridge,

> there appears to be much confusion of belief in regard to fundamental issues, and too often an apathy or absence of any conviction, arising from failure to think seriously about these issues, a failure due sometimes to an inner inhibition, an unconfessed fear of the possible consequences of such thinking.

It seems a strange thing that this should be the case in universities where the true atmosphere has been attained. The explanation lies in the fact that Newman, like most prophets, has been misinterpreted. What he actually said was that the teaching function of a university is less important than its function as a meeting-place. It would seem that he has been taken as saying that so long as a university serves as a meeting-place its function of teaching does not matter. To-day teaching has become definitely subsidiary to research, and it is the purpose of this article to show that the dominion of research over teaching is the chief cause of the intellectual anæmia of the universities.

The research tide began to flow in the later seventeenth century, when first it was recognised in England and France that the collection of information about natural phenomena was of national importance. From that moment quantitative criteria have been steadily displacing qualitative criteria, not only in the sphere of learning, but in every sphere of life. The first influence of this process upon the ancient universities of England was paralytic. They entered upon a decline from which they scarcely showed signs of emergence until the nineteenth century. As they emerged their reviving energies were directed progressively more and more toward the development of the sciences, with their characteristic method of quantitative research. This not to the exclusion of the humanities, but ultimately toward a great advancement of the place of the sciences in learning.

This impressive change has by no means proceeded in isolation in the universities; what has happened in the universities has been in some measure a result of pressure upon them by the outside world. In the mechanical and

physical sciences the specialist researcher is valuable to the industrialist; in biology and allied subjects he may serve the purpose of the physician. It is not surprising that chemical and metallurgical businesses have been generous with gifts to universities to promote research especially interesting to their industries. Buying and selling between universities and industry has undoubtedly promoted the study of the sciences and at the same time contributed toward yet greater specialisation of scientific research.

It is no doubt true that in history, economics, even in literature, research may help the politician, the administrator and the journalist. It would, however, be absurd to suggest that extension of research in the humanities also results from sale of the university product in the markets of the outer world. Obviously it arises out of a deeper stratum of the *Zeitgeist.* The great reputation won by the sciences has attached itself to their method as well as to their substance, and it is natural enough that their method should at least be tried in the humanities. Imitation alone, however, can scarcely explain the great increase of quantitative research in such subjects as history and literature, or the appearance of semi-sciences such as philology and psychology, using research methods, within a portion of the sphere of literature and philosophy.

These portents can be explained by direct reference to the mental processes of the researcher, which, indeed, reveal the fundamental factor in the growth of research both in the humanities and in the sciences. Creative thought is difficult, and, to the great majority of humanity, impossible. Research, however, in a very real sense, is easy. The choice of direction for research *can* be an act of genius if it consist in the creation of an imaginative hypothesis, to be tested thereafter by the research itself. But the actual research, in whatsoever field, requires only patience, dexterity and exactness. And it is lamentably true that research *may* be undertaken without any preceding act of creation. No genius is required to perceive merely where there lies something unknown. In an age when the frontiers of knowledge are being advanced in all directions, every student, by placing himself for a moment upon the frontier, can look out into an uncharted area. But it remains true that only an able man can divine, from his frontier

station, whether he is gazing into a land of promise or merely into the back of beyond. Such men, however, are seldom more successful as researchers than the ordinary run of humanity; the very patience which research demands is usually lacking in them. The ordinary, undistinguished individual can, on the other hand, usually be trained to patience, dexterity and exactness in early education, and, in an age whose criteria are mainly quantitative, these virtues are customarily instilled at school. Hence a very large number of ordinary people are available to do research. In this sense research is easy.

It almost appears that research has made the academic world safe for democracy. It is very certainly the vehicle of equalitarianism in learning; he who denies this is surely a fool. To-day the preceding act of creation before research is a rare thing indeed. An army of excellent but very ordinary persons is carrying research further and further into the pettifogging and unimportant. The greatest calamity of all is that their work, being that of a majority in an age of *vote par tête*, has come to set a standard to which even those capable of philosophic creation must conform. And the process is cumulative: the researcher comes to know steadily more and more about less and less. And the lesser his pursuits, the greater must be his patience, dexterity, exactness: the lesser, therefore, his enthusiasm, imagination, perception. He must become a machine, warp his mind, annihilate his humanity.

The vast majority of university teachers are to-day primarily researchers, and the havoc they have wrought in undergraduate studies is widespread. In the first place, the personal relation between teacher and student, an all-pervading factor in university education, has been much damaged. It is the function of the teacher to interest and to inspire, but the numbing influence of research upon character is the very thing to destroy the teacher's ability to discharge this function. Indeed, the self-immolation demanded by research turns many men into very unpleasant creatures, whose personal influence upon their students is bad. The cruel words of Leslie Stephen about Bishop Hurd are true of more professors to-day than they were in Stephen's time: 'He was a typical specimen of the offensive variety of university don; narrow-

minded, formal, peevish, cold-blooded, and intolerably conceited.'

These are the men who have turned lectures into an annual repetition of deceased ideas, or into a cold compound of trivialities drawn from their own and their colleagues' research. As a result much disgraceful cant is talked nowadays in depreciation of lectures as a medium of instruction. The fact remains that Nature designed the lecture to be the most direct stimulus to thought, since it is eminently the *milieu* in which emotion enters into and illuminates understanding. To the lecturer the audience performs an invaluable service, galvanising his mind to vigorous thought by its silent demand. If the Bishop Hurds are insensible to this demand, it is they who should be damned, not the lecture system. The student can learn facts and some ideas from books, but his mind has not the opportunity to grapple closely to itself a full understanding unless he is also given rhetorical inspiration. Much of the hollowness of 'the clash of minds' to-day is attributable to the drying up of the rhetorical, inspirational side of academic education.

Research has not only invaded the lecture-room ; it is in occupation of most of the territory of the academic curriculum, and as a result undergraduate studies are now usually planned on a basis of progressive narrowing down toward research minutiæ. Undergraduate studies ought, in fact, to be planned in such a way as to offer the student the deepest understanding of his subject, the special relevance of the matter studied being to the student's sense of proportion. To this the specialist's minutiæ are almost wholly irrelevant. The more important facts and ideas, and especially their relation to one another, should compose the subject-matter of the undergraduate course. There ought to be a sensible distribution of emphasis throughout the subject, though it is not clear that the course which gives mathematically equal attention to all parts of the subject offers the fullest understanding. The 'pass degree' course, consisting of a hotchpotch of several different subjects, is indeed merely superficial and its results often ridiculous ; a course in, say, English literature, beginning with Beowulf and ending with Dr. Cronin, distributing itself evenly throughout, might also be expected to be somewhat superficial. There is obviously an argument in favour of combining 'outlines'

with closer examination of limited periods—not of one limited period, but of several limited periods—say, for English literature, the Chaucer and Shakespeare periods, Restoration drama and the Romantic poets. What is absolutely essential, however, is that special study of limited periods should not degenerate into mere indiscriminate accumulation of information. The object must remain the attainment of the truest, most evenly balanced understanding of the whole. Not for a moment should the general study of the whole period be regarded as subsidiary to special understanding of the limited fields—the reverse is the case: specialisation is of value to thought in so far as it illumines the whole and no further.

I now venture upon prophecy. If the undergraduate curriculum were recast upon these lines, if good lecturing were to be recognised as the chief duty of the teaching staff, then anxiety for the other function of a university, its function as a meeting-ground, would not arise. There would in such circumstances be no preventing the informal discussions between friends, the clash of minds between men of various types and ages, which are assumed to be a necessary feature of the education of youth. Newman would not have had to make the embarrassing choice of the university which was morally the worse; there would be no failure to 'think seriously about fundamental issues.' But since the universities have become the preserve of the Fulgence Tapir's of learning there has been a calamitous failure of vitality, an absence of σπουδαιότης, that quality conceived by the Greeks, which so inspired Matthew Arnold. It is a lamentable fact that many students to-day emerge from universities with an established habit of indolence, but this is not surprising if they are given nothing worth while to do. To what end all the building which the Grants Committee praises? If it really be thought that this will make London University, or any other university, something different intellectually from what it was before, then let us lie down quietly and die, or fiddle cheerfully while Rome burns. If life is in a university, no man can prevent it functioning as Newman desired; buildings are a mere incident. The most vigorous period of intellectual life in universities was the Middle Ages, when they had hardly any buildings and

students and teachers foregathered wherever they might. And in that period teachers lived on the fees their students paid them and lecturing was good. For subject-matter the ultimate purpose was the solution of the problem of universals, or, in other words, the nature of the universe—a fundamental issue.

The predominating influence of research over undergraduate studies is usually justified by its apologists on the ground that an undergraduate course must contain preparation for 'higher studies' to enable students to proceed further with their academic training. This is merely a variation upon the theme that academic training should be 'practical,' training students for a profession. In answer to this latter it may properly be asked whether the outside world does in fact accept an academic training as a qualification for practice. In fact, neither the medical profession, the legal profession, nor business institutions do anything of the kind: all have their various forms of direct apprenticeship. The setting up of research as the object of academic training is an attempt to equip the student for a career of research in default of a career outside the university; but the plain fact is that the vast majority of students do not intend to seek an academic career. Hence for these a course consisting of the first stage in annihilation of their humanity is little short of criminal folly. For the others, those who intend to teach in universities, a course containing examples of the best teaching would seem to be reasonable. For those who are to do research—and somebody must do research—an undergraduate course is not considered a sufficient training by the researchers themselves. The truth is that for all those who are to follow the more soul-destroying occupations of the modern world, including research, an undergraduate course should be the precise opposite of a professional training. It should so establish the student's mind and character as to enable him to save his soul from destruction by the professional training he must subsequently undergo.

It is nevertheless a wretched defeatism to propose that all research should be banished from universities. It is only too obvious that its presence has proved an irresistible temptation to the weak, but the remedy for that is to put the universities into the hands of the strong, not to make them safe for the weak. The fact that research is useful to industrialists and

others is not to be forgotten, though a people whose universities are enslaved to industry, medicine, politics and the Press is weak in the head. It is become sociologically an idiot, whose brain is at the mercy of its appetites. To give a man a teaching degree because he has discovered a new cough mixture or a tougher steel is an imbecile proceeding and the very process by which the researcher has ousted the teacher from university posts. In principle it is immaterial whether scientific research for the benefit of the professions takes place in universities or elsewhere, except in so far as such work may be of use to thinkers. In the humanities the researcher is essentially the thinker's devil, and, provided he does not step outside this function, he should remain in the universities. There are also many reasons of practical, especially financial, convenience for which the displacement of research from the universities might be damaging to both.

The Grants Committee here proposes a mild half-measure, to discourage research which 'does not necessarily advance knowledge.' This is a highly doubtful proposition. How effective could discouragement be? Who would do it? Who is to establish a criterion of the advancement of knowledge, and how is the criterion to be formed? There is no practical answer to any of these questions. What indeed, in the last analysis, is the advancement of knowledge? Is it not true that the very smallest trifles are, in their humble way, an advancement of knowledge? It may not be worth knowing that there was an Usher of Parliament in the reign of Richard II., but, if it be a fact, its discovery was an advancement of knowledge. It is impracticable to set artificial limits to research. Research has developed by a natural process, and it is no more sensible to try to make rules to resist its further development than it would be to legislate against the increasing use of cosmetics. Research, in spite of all the damage it has done, has its value. When accumulated into an ordered mass these innumerable trifles, which are contemptible individually, do in fact contribute largely to knowledge, and the research champions who defend the infinitesimal have at least as much on their side as the Grants Committee in their gentle disapproval.

The danger is that research should be considered to be the business of the leaders of thought. For the second-class

scientist, economist, or historian research offers a living. There should be properly equipped laboratories for research both in the humanities and in the sciences. They should be equipped with permanent, full-time staffs, conducting themselves entirely as clerks—since the work is essentially clerical—and not partly as teachers. If research were thus to be put upon an entirely separate footing it would be a pure gain to learning. University teachers themselves should be asked to make recommendations to the research directors, indicating the subjects upon which they desire information. The researchers, in turn, should make reports to the teachers of the material they think to be available, but here the connexion should cease. That this is not a wholly unreasonable proposal is supported by certain small moves in the direction of separation of function which have appeared spontaneously even in the humanities. Free-lance researchers already exist in London, hiring out their services in reading documents, transcribing, making abstracts, etc. But their position is most insecure, and many of them retain the hope of a teaching post in the future. The 'Study Groups' of the Royal Institute of International Affairs are another example. There the actual research is done by one individual whose activities are directed by a committee of scholars.

Separation of function between teachers and researchers is now an essential prerequisite to the improvement of teaching personnel, but there is need for direct measures as well. It would be ridiculously pessimistic to think that there is not to be found in this country an adequate supply of able men to staff the universities; there is an abundance of talent, but not enough of it seeks careers in university teaching. It may safely be assumed that, if academic salaries were substantially higher, a large number of able men who at present do not consider a university career would then do so. There is no dearth of competition for university posts at present, but the competitors do not include a sufficient proportion of the best men. The increase in salaries, to be effective, must be on a heroic scale—of the order which would be possible if the parliamentary grant to the universities were doubled. It is better to invest money in the future leadership of the nation than to be forced, as we are now, to spend it upon armaments owing to the failure of our foreign policy, or upon un-

employment pay because we cannot or dare not devise a policy of industrial reorganisation.

The available statistics concerning university posts unfortunately do not give the numbers of part-time teachers nor any indication of the sort of salaries they receive. There were in the year 1934–5 over 3700 full-time teachers, who earned in all about £2,100,000. Since the total expenditure on academic salaries was just over £3,000,000, it must be assumed that about £1,000,000 was expended on part-time teaching. The salaries of the full-time teachers ranged from £150 to £2000. It is proposed here to leave the part-time staff out of the reckoning and to put forward a suggestion for a division of function between research and teaching applying only to the full-time staff.

Two thousand three hundred persons could probably, if occupied upon it exclusively, do the research now done by 3700 in their spare time. If the figure 2300 appears a high one, it must be remembered that a 'full-time' academic teaching post is a figure of speech; the amount of spare time at present left for research to holders of full-time posts is considerable. I suggest that 2000 of these researchers should be paid salaries between £150 and £500, averaging about £350. (There are, in fact, about 2000 junior teachers paid at about this rate at present.) The total payment for these would amount to £700,000 a year. The remaining 300 researchers are to be more highly paid and to be occupied with the organisation and direction of research; their salaries should be between £500 and £1000, averaging about £650, which gives a total of £195,000. As a grand total for research, say £900,000 a year.

Full-time teachers whose lives were not consumed by the crushing demands of research could undoubtedly do more teaching than they do at present, and it is hoped that they would be ready to do so, if entirely relieved of research. At the same time, reading takes time also (it is far too much sacrificed to research at present), and some would wish to write and ought to have the leisure to do so. Possibly 2700 teachers could do the work now done by 3700. It is proposed that no university teacher should in any circumstances be paid less than £500. If he is not worth this figure, he should not be teaching in a university. Those paid as low as £150

to-day are very few, but a substantial number begin with salaries between £250 and £350, which is disgraceful. About 2000 out of the present 3700 odd full-time teachers are paid between £150 and £500, and rather less than 900 are paid between £500 and £1000. These two groups, preponderating enormously over those who are more highly paid, may be looked upon as the ordinary, undistinguished teachers, who are in any system bound to constitute the majority. In their place I propose to pay at the new rates one group of about 1700 persons. These, being less than two-thirds of the total personnel, preponderate less than do the 2900 in the present 3700; the reason for this proposal is the assumption that the new personnel is to be superior to the old, and a larger proportion of them will deserve promotion. For the 1700 it is proposed to give salaries between £500 and £1250, averaging about £750. The average is kept low, since this group will contain a number of young, unmarried men, whose needs are not great. The total annual income of this group is about £1,275,000.

Although, no doubt, many teachers will end their days in the 1700 group, a substantial number should be able to earn more, and a middle group of about 700 persons, earning between £1250 and £2000, is proposed, with an average salary of about £1650. The average is here kept high in order to bring the salaries nearer to those of the highest group of all, making these posts a real object of attraction to able men. To-day there is a small group of under 500 persons earning between £1000 and £1500; they correspond roughly to the proposed 700 group, whose total income is £1,155,000.

There are to-day only twenty-four individuals earning over £1500 in university teaching posts, the maximum salary being £2000. This means that only one man in every 150 can hope to secure a 'plum.' In the light of the current cost of living such salaries are about the minimum on which a man with a family can hope to live in any measure of real comfort. If only one in every 150 can reach this standard, the academic profession is very unlikely to attract the men it needs. In place of this group, therefore, we suggest a much larger one of about 300 persons, earning between £2000 and £3000, averaging £2400. These figures are not just within the 'comfort' line, but well within it, while they do not reach

unnecessary luxury. Many a doctor or barrister will scorn them. One man in every nine will be able to reach this status, and that, in all probability, will supply a real incentive to bring able men into academic teaching. The total income of this group is £720,000.

The grand total for full-time teachers under these proposals is over £3,000,000; the researchers and the part-time teachers add another £2,000,000, so that the combined figure is about £5,000,000. The present expenditure upon academic salaries is a little over £3,000,000 and the parliamentary grant to the universities rather over £2,000,000. If, then, the latter were doubled, the reform could be financed.

These proposals are intended to describe a state of perfection and the additional cost to the country which such a state would involve after the entire reform had been accomplished. For the moment what is needed is a first step in the direction of separation of function. If a small institution could take the lead in an experiment, very useful data could be accumulated over a period of a few years. No such experiment could possibly be successful unless a large amount of extra money were available for the purpose. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that this country need not hope to revive its universities unless it is prepared to spend money for the purpose. Is it too much to ask that the Treasury find a special grant to finance an experiment?

RUSHTON COULBORN.

MAKING A WILL IN INDIA

By Cornelia Sorabji

It's a great undertaking when an Orthodox Hindu *purdah-nashin*, sonless and widowed, settles to the making of her will. That she may make one at all is due to enactments of British rule; but these enactments simply give sanction to disposal by testament of that over which she would ordinarily have control in dispositions known to the law of her race and her religion. So she is absolutely free to make her will in the vernacular—in every sense.

She arrives at the decision then that a will must be made. 'I have lived thirty years: this is old age. I may die any moment, and my gods would be unprotected if I did not make provision.' Relations are a secondary consideration, but not unimportant, since, if her will did not make declaration to the contrary, they might believe themselves to have an interest in her death, and might hasten that event. To provide against this possibility she gives them as much as she can while still alive, trying to emphasise the importance of a *living* donor. But they do not always, those countless relations, interpret her actions aright. It is therefore necessary that the important document should be made and registered *and broadcast to the family*.

So it is indicated that a will shall be made. The next step is to find an auspicious day on which to visit Benares and assure herself of the needs and condition of the family idols: do they get enough to eat in the temples already dedicated to them? Are the pilgrims who visit these temples sufficiently cared for? Should her benefactions be for these or for other gods and goddesses? . . . And when she does get to Benares, more delays. The auspicious moment for investigation has to be found: the priest, who alone knows the wishes of the gods in question, may be ill or on a journey.

But at long last that stage is overpast, and the possibilities, duly listed, are carried back home to the Raj, for submission to her personal spiritual adviser.

Meantime, he also has been holding durbars. The whole district knows that the Rani is making a will: and applicants besiege him. Next in importance to the gods come worthy charities: 'The diseased cows in a certain *taluka*, fed hitherto by a pious Hindu, are without a patron. The Hindu has died, and his bounty with him.' Or (from the more enlightened): 'The village where the Rani was born has no school for boys and girls.' Or, again, from social organisations and English foundations: 'The town in which the Rani lives has no hospital for women, and the general hospital lacks an X-ray department, and a maternity ward'—thus and thus might the Rani do, and make her name great!

Her entourage for miles is interested in the will, and travels to headquarters with suggestions. Nor is this resented or deemed impertinent. The making of a will is a family (in the feudal sense) concern. Not to be interested would be a mark of unfriendliness, even of hostility. 'All contact between us is severed. I have not asked to whom she means to marry her niece, and I have made no suggestions about the disposal of her property,' would be almost a declaration of war. It would cut the gentle Rani to the heart; and she would send discreet emissaries to discover how she had offended. No! the suggestions are 'common form'; and, the claims of the gods having been dealt with, as has been said, in the Sacred City, the Rani returns to tackle the domestic items.

Funeral obsequies. 'Set down that my father-in-law's *shradh* (death ceremonies) must be commemorated by the feeding of twelve priests at Gaya, on the anniversary of his death—the priests to be paid according to the amount they consume.'

I have seen such a feeding. The priests fast for days beforehand, and sit cross-legged on one of the stone platforms at the beautiful and ancient city of Buddh-Gaya, overlooking the ruins and the great-leaved tree under which Buddha, the conqueror of the flesh and all fleshly impulse, attained Buddhahood. In the near distance is the monastery of the caste Hindus, who through this *shradh* ceremony have acquired

rights, at the Buddhist stronghold of the men who deny caste. The pink-robed priests go in and out through the curved white arches, and the little green paraquets stagger in and out of the eaves, having buried themselves in the cup of the blood-red flowers of the cotton tree and drunk to intoxication. . . . It all comes back to mind, with talk of a *shradh* at Buddh-Gaya.

'For my mother-in-law there must be *shradhs* at Benares, in the temple she has founded. So many priests must be fed, and so many pilgrims also; and so many cows, and the pigeons who frequent the courtyard.' Here the Personal Spiritual Adviser intervenes: 'Is it remembered by the Presence that it is unlucky to turn away any who come to a *shradh* festival? May it not be as well to say, "Spend so much money on feeding priests and pilgrims, cows and pigeons," rather than to limit the number?'

And it is thus that the clause gets written: 'For my lord (husband) there must be a seven years' *shradh*, and then a fourteen, and then a twenty-one years' *shradh*, the duration of the *shradh* increased by seven years, upon expiration of each term.'

This rather staggers the P.S.A. '*Huzur*,' he says gently, 'have you considered about the money needed to carry out this command? We have only that which will be left by yourself. No son is there who will see to it that these wishes are fulfilled, and will add to the money left by you when it is exhausted. The heirs of "*the 8-anna share*,"[1] the heartless ones, will think of their ancestors alone, and of their own "brother-ties," and will give never a pice to us and our needs.'

'Well! set it down for now,' says the Rani, 'and tell the *vakil* [lawyer] to find a way.'

With her own *shradh* she deals summarily: 'Five thousand rupees are to be spent annually upon my own *shradh* on the anniversaries of my death; and better write also that no more than ten thousand rupees may be spent on my funeral ceremonies. You must take me to Benares to die, or if the gods are an-angered with me, and I die before I

[1] All originally joint property in India is treated by Hindus as representing a rupee—16 annas. The shares are cited as proportions of that. An 8-anna share is a half-share.

get there, I must be taken to *Kashi* (Benares) to be burnt. Jagdish Babu will know about arranging for a special train.' . . .

The 'worthy charities' take months for consideration. But before she arrives at these some family friction has made the Rani remember that family expectations must be slain forthwith. So, the brothers and nephews and nieces and cousin-brothers (especially the cousin-brothers of the third and fourth remove) are summoned to a *Bhojan*—a feast in the Raj palace. The Rani, being *purdah* (secluded), may not be present at the feast; her guests are fed in her name, and at her expense. The morning after the feast, the Rani, having bathed and worshipped and consulted her astrologer about the exact hour when she should meet her relatives, comes to the house-of-reception in her palace and sits behind the *purdah* (curtain): her mother and sisters, her brothers and maternal uncles may be in the reception-house beside her; but the others—the remoter relations, her brothers-in-law or nephews-in-law, all the relations of her husband—must be in the outer room. They may neither see her face nor hear her voice. The P.S.A. sits beside her. The officers of her household and her men lawyers sit in the outer room with what an English-knowing member of the family describes as 'the homœopathic relationships.'

The P.S.A. opens the proceedings: 'The Rani Sahiba has summoned you together because, as you know, she is making her will; and she would take you into her confidence. The will is not yet complete; many clauses remain to be written, and the god-clauses and *shradh*-clauses are not yet formulated. But she would have you hear one clause which is complete and unchangeable.' And he reads: 'For my relations in whatever degree I have made provision and will continue to make provision during my life. They are to get nothing in any shape or form whatsoever under this will. I lay this command upon my trustees.' 'Now,' said the Rani Sahiba to one who sat beside her, as the depressed family members shuffled away—'now is my mind easier. I shall be allowed to live!'

It was four years from the date when the will was first taken in hand that the lawyers were told to put it into legal form, and yet another year before it got any further. From

the *vakils* it went to the barristers to be 'settled,' then back again to Benares to an Orthodox Hindu barrister who had retired to the Holy City in expectation of death. Many changes did he make, each change having been made on an appropriately auspicious day, and each change in turn being submitted to the testator on a day which had to be equally propitious. When complete the draft was a most diverting document—a delightful mixture of legal formality, of Hindu orthodoxy and of the mannerisms of my *purdahnashin*.

The appointment of executors and trustees was a shrewd and cautious proceeding. It included the priesthood for administration of the temple lands and direction of the temple services: it included the least obnoxious of the 'family members,' the head of a collateral branch who was sufficiently rigid in orthodoxy to fear disaster from outraged or hungry idols; and finally (this by the Rani's express command) it included the representative of an English firm of chartered accountants, whose duty it would be to check accounts and to see that the priests and 'family member' applied her money to the appointed uses. All trustees were removable upon the vote of the majority—all except the chartered accountant. 'For of course,' said the Rani, 'if I did not so provide, they would remove him and defeat my precaution.'

In final shape the 'god-provisions' were most elaborate, etiquette being carefully observed as to the numbers of *shris* (a term of respect) preceding the name of any particular god—'*Shri, Shri, Ramji*' or *Shri, Shri, Shri, Shri, Shri Kaliji* (her particular goddess). Provision was made for installation of new gods and goddesses, for repair and upkeep of temples, of temple precincts and priestly dwellings; for feasts to pilgrims and *Kashi-bashis*—men and women who had come to live in *Kashi* (Benares) in expectation of death; first-aid was to be given to sick or moribund temple-goers; schools were to be provided for young children accompanying them. All was carefully regulated and prescribed to the minutest detail, even to the number of temple beneficiaries who were to be of any particular Brahmin sub-caste: '24 *Mithila* Brahmins,' '12 *Buhiyar* Brahmins,' and so on. The pilgrim's ration of rice and grain was set down; *and his thumb impression was to be taken as a receipt for the 2 annas per head* which was given to this fugitive journeyman to the gates of Death!

And now the draft, finally settled, was ready for engrossment. But an unexpected hitch occurred. The P.S.A. advised that upon consultation of the astrologers he had discovered that the will as drafted was unlucky: the last clause represented an even number; that could not be allowed. The lawyers obligingly readjusted the numbering of clauses. The P.S.A. then declared that, upon like consultation, it was obligatory that the will should be in manuscript, written by a man who had two thumbs to his right hand: if one could be found with double thumbs on both hands, the auspices would be the more favourable. By great good luck a maternal uncle could answer the 'most favourable' requisition, and was set to copying the will under the eye of the private secretary and the family *vakil*.

It was now time to warn the lawyers and witnesses that a certain month would be appropriate for the execution of the will. The actual day could not be announced until the family astrologer returned from a tour upon which he had most inconsiderately set forth, without revealing either his route or the auspicious day. As will be imagined, sorrowful chances such as these are most hazardous to the punctilious legal adviser, who realises all that may be at stake in disappointing his client. In this respect the *kashi-bashi* legal adviser is best off. For once a *kashi-bashi*, always a *kashi-bashi*. You may never leave Benares once you have entered that sacred city *with intent* to await death: not even the most prematurely depressed victim of influenza may claim exemption from this rule. There is no exit door to the theatre of the *kashi-bashi*. So the *kashi-bashi* of my *purdahashin's* will escaped hustling. I myself (not being a *kashi-bashi*) was not so fortunate. At the moment of the astrologer's return and disclosure of a date I was at a place five days' distance by rail from the maker of the will: I had to travel post-haste in response to a telegram which said that a day—the sixth from the receipt of the telegram by myself—was declared to be the *only* auspicious day for execution within the next twelvemonth! I arrived in time, breathless, to be met by a further shock: and the only fortunate hour on that day was—the hour of my arrival! . . . All necessary parties had been collected, save a doctor. Would I collect the English civil surgeon and ask him to be present at the execu-

tion, and to certify to the soundness of mind of the executant. This was duly arranged, and the great moment arrived. I sat beside my *purdahnashin* in the inner chamber. In the outer sat a large company of lawyers, officials, the civil surgeon, and material witnesses.

Let no one imagine that a will rightly executed is the secret and almost clandestine proceeding which we make of it in the West. What is there to hide, if intentions are honourable? The will was read aloud to the Rani by the scribe, sitting close up against the *purdah* so that the company in the outer room might also hear. I was then asked to explain the will clause by clause to my *purdahnashin* in language which she could understand, and clause by clause to ask her if her wishes were therein embodied—explanation, question and answer to be audible, in like manner, to 'the outside.' Then the four-thumbed man wrote at the foot of the will once more that that paper represented the last will and testament of the Rani Sahiba. It was peremptory that the document, and his hand as he wrote upon it, should be visible to the men in the outer room—though *no more than that* was to be visible.

I had then formally to identify my *purdahnashin*, who affixed her signature to the *first* page of the will. She was also required to sign every other page, but the first signature was the validating one. As she signed, her hand and the document had, as with the scribe, to be visible to the group of people in the outer room. The civil surgeon was the first witness. He was admitted to the inner room, where he examined the lady, discreetly veiled, as to her mental capacity, the independence of her action, etc. Followed the signatures of other witnesses; and we breathed freely when 'The-Keeper-of-Right-Action' declared that all had been concluded within the time required by the horoscope.

The final formality was registration. The registrar of wills came to the house: identification, signatures and thumb marks, a new catechism to elicit how far the lady was a free agent—all this had to be faced over again. And a will which had been five years in the making was carried away to safe custody.

CORNELIA SORABJI.

THE SECOND EXAMINATION[1]

By Terry Thomas, LL.B., Ph.D.

In recent years the educational limelight has been focussed upon the Second, better known as the Higher School Certificate, Examination. Pressure from the schools, the more liberal tendencies displayed in sixth-form organisation, and the enlightened policy of the Northern Universities Joint Matriculation Board, have all accelerated the reform of this examination, which is taken at the end of the second year in the sixth form. Normally a candidate would offer three principal or two principal and two subsidiary subjects, the subsidiary standard being roughly half the work content of a principal subject. Generally the work is specialised in groups, so that a candidate offers one group from the following: Classics, Modern Studies, Science, Mathematics, though a four-subject candidate would require to take one subject outside his main group.

The Higher School Certificate Examination was devised to be a test of two years' sound sixth-form work, but owing to various factors the original purpose has been largely lost, or perhaps merged, in a composite test which serves to test the ordinary candidate, to act as a scholarship examination, and to qualify for certain exemptions given by university and professional bodies. The main criticism has been directed against the dual purpose of the examination. It is said that the examination is attempting to perform two functions—to act as a qualifying examination and as a competitive test—and falling between two stools. For on the one hand the presence of questions for and answers from scholarship candidates raises the standard against the ordinary or pedestrian candidate. The result is that the work of the

[1] In the *Nineteenth Century and After* for May 1929 I wrote on the First Examination commonly called the School Certificate Examination.

latter in the examination is scrappy and poor compared with the answers of his scholarship brother.

Further, whereas the Higher School Certificate Examination formerly might have been suitable for potential university students, the position has radically changed owing to the great growth of secondary education and the consequent increasing percentage of pupils in the sixth forms who are not of a university type and not going to the university. To put it briefly, the examination is becoming too hard and specialised. On the other hand, the critics complain that the examination is not serving its purpose as a scholarship examination, as it often does not discriminate between the good and the very good candidates. Obviously the type of question and the standard of marking required in a competitive examination must be different from that obtaining in a qualifying examination. Cases are recorded where candidates who obtained open university scholarships between a first and second attempt at the Higher School Certificate Examination showed little or no improvement in their marks at the second Higher School Certificate Examination, though it was well known to their teachers that their work had improved considerably both in depth and range. The competition for scholarships is also producing intense specialisation and over-pressure, not only on the scholarship candidate, but also on the ordinary candidates who, unfortunately, are dragged along in the wake.

Apart from the fact that the examination is becoming too academic, another insidious peril has arisen. The ordinary non-examination subjects are being pushed out of the curriculum or being reduced to a relative state of unimportance measured in terms of the time allotted. Now this is a serious matter, especially as the universities are criticising the powers of expression of their recruits who often hold good Higher School certificates. It is common ground with all educationists that the power of using the English language—written or spoken—is fundamental and more important than an assorted knowledge of facts which can often only be repeated in gramophonic style. The schools and the universities are therefore at one in their desire to maintain the cultural side of sixth-form work for university entrants, whilst the schools are only too conscious that the specialised

courses necessary for success in the competitive Higher School Certificate Examination are not the most suitable for the ordinary non-university entrant. Over and above this the schools are determined not to become examination preparation machines pure and simple, and are further determined, as far as it lies in their power, to preserve their freedom to do general educational work which might have little examination significance but be real education in the truest sense. Such work varies from school to school, and many useful experiments are being made in this so-called free time. Nobody would under-value the importance of lessons on Literary Appreciation, Music, Art and Architecture, Economics, Our Social System, Government, Law, Biology and Mankind—all treated in a general humane way, with opportunities for discussion by the pupils themselves. Unfortunately, the pupils think that such subjects are of no importance because they do not count for examination marks, and this feeling is accentuated by the remorseless competition for scholarships which is getting a grip of the schools. Schools are judged by the number of scholarships they win rather than by the general cultural standard of the boys turned out.

Enough has been said to show that there is solid ground for the serious concern which is felt for the welfare of sixth-form work. Probably the main factor is the scholarship question. The examination is trying to serve a dual purpose, and some attempt has therefore to be made to separate these distinct functions of the Higher School Certificate Examination into qualifying and scholarship parts. A proposal for reform on these lines has been put forward by the Northern Universities Joint Matriculation Board. Briefly the proposals are that special scholarship papers shall be instituted and that scholarships shall be awarded on the aggregate marks obtained in the qualifying and scholarship papers. The ordinary candidate would take the qualifying examination only and would obtain his Higher School certificate by passing in three or four subjects. Further, to meet his case some reduction in the syllabus content is to be made so that he can cover a limited ground more thoroughly. The question of the syllabus for the scholarship papers has been much debated, and on this there are two schools of thought. Some think

that the syllabus for the qualifying examination will be sufficient and that harder and more exacting questions can be set on it which will sufficiently differentiate the scholarship candidates. In fact, for the scholarship paper, implications will be read into the syllabus—which, after all, is only a brief indication of the ground to be covered, and not an exclusive list of topics.

The other school of thought feels that the scholarship syllabus should be more closely defined so that the schools may know what preparation is required instead of having to learn, after the event, from the examination papers. It is argued against this that a special scholarship syllabus would give an advantage to the bigger and better equipped school, and so react unfairly on the able pupil from a school not so generously endowed with facilities. However that may be, one thing clearly emerges—the scholarship candidates would now compete amongst themselves and not thereby raise the standard against their colleagues less well mentally endowed. Thus the pernicious reactions of scholarship work on the qualifying examinations should be eliminated. It should be stated, in passing, that the scholar will only be allowed to offer two scholarship papers in addition to his three qualifying ones, so that there is here a little safeguard against over-pressure.

On the face of it the new suggestions seem to meet the situation, but there are some who still feel that the new scholarship system is not trustworthy. Such criticism is necessarily detailed and technical and concerns marking systems. One query is this. Is the aggregate mark obtained a trustworthy guide ? It is pleaded that one candidate may pick up marks here and there for parts of questions and may get a total exceeding that of the boy who has spent all his time doing some questions thoroughly and well. Some feel that boys of the first type are not the real stuff of which scholars are made, and that their knowledge is superficial and their ability a form of slickness rather than the profoundness which one associates with real scholarly work. It is essential that the examiners should protect themselves against this danger. How can this be done ? One way is for bonus marks or alpha marks to be given for distinguished work. Then the aggregate as well as the alpha marks would be taken

into consideration in arranging the final order of merit. Possibly there would be a temptation to reduce the alpha marks to numerical marks. This should be resisted, as it would be safer to allow qualification by means of an aggregate and then settle the final order by means of the special alpha marks awarded.

One of the grievous problems at present is the fact that too many candidates who are below standard offer themselves for scholarships. This is a very human failing, and one can appreciate the temptation to the school and to the boy to have a shot at it. Also, as these scholarships come from public funds which all feel entitled to draw upon, it is a little difficult to put any bar in the way of a candidate trying his luck. Hope springs eternal in the candidate's breast. 'You never know what might happen,' he reasons. Most schools will tell him what will happen; but that is a far cry from taking such a serious step as debarring him from entering. The result is that examiners are glutted with papers which have no serious claims for consideration. How can this be averted? One suggestion is that only those who obtain a certain standard in the qualifying papers should be allowed to take the further scholarship papers. This would be excellent if there were time to carry it into effect. It would mean that the qualifying examination would have to be taken near the end of the Lent Term, or at the beginning of the Summer Term, in order that the qualifying results could be obtained in time to admit the successful candidates to the scholarship examination in July. Such a scheme would have serious repercussions on the school arrangements. For instance, it would mean that the sixth-form work would be reduced to five terms, or, alternatively, the school year would have to commence at Easter.

Further, the Lent Term is the period when the incidence of sickness is heaviest, and a candidate's preparation might be seriously impeded by his own absence or even by the absence of his teacher. The effects of these absences tend to be smoothed out by July, which is therefore a more suitable time for the examination, except for the fact that the traditional English week of summer usually falls in the examination period, and also that the candidate has to beat down the English instinctive call to play ball. His thoughts wander to

the cricket field or tennis court; yet the examination has to be taken, and he turns to his work with a sigh. Another suggestion is that there should be an entry fee for scholarship candidates to prevent frivolous entries. The responsibility of deciding is then thrown back on the school, or parent, or local authority. It does not give any sort of guarantee that the competition is restricted to the best candidates. Rather it limits the entries to the candidates with the wealthiest backers.

So far the discussion has been largely confined to the scholarship candidates. We must not forget the ordinary boy. What is to be done for him? It is proposed to reduce pressure by a reduction of syllabus and to reduce specialisation by increasing the number of subjects to be taken, with a greater emphasis on subsidiary subjects. Schools favour a reduction of syllabus but not an increase of subjects. For one thing, there is a danger of the group system rearing its maligned head in the Higher School Certificate Examination, and, secondly, extra subjects will encroach on the free time of the school for general work. There is no guarantee that a better education will be provided by *examining* in another subject. The schools maintain that easier questions marked at a higher standard with a larger number of passes would be the ideal. It is wrong that after two years' sound work only 70 per cent. get Higher School certificates. It should be nearer 90 per cent. Boys should leave with a Higher School certificate of self-respect as much as with one of certified knowledge.

It cannot be too strongly stressed that the examination is a school examination and not a university examination. Further, the examination does not, and cannot, test the whole work of the school. Many of the intangible things taught by a good school are not susceptible to examination—at any rate, on this side of the Atlantic. It is an article of faith of the schools that the general education of the boy is the business of the school, and that neither the responsibility for this nor the direction of this can belong to an outside examining body. The schools want to retain the little freedom they have left or, better still, increase the time for general education. They have, therefore, welcomed the recent relaxation of the Advanced Course Regulations by the

Board of Education. Whereas formerly there were certain standardised hidebound courses of subjects, now schools are free to choose and experiment without being penalised under the grant regulations. This is a wise and significant move. The advanced course regulations have served their time and generation and have helped to build up a high standard of sixth-form work. The time has come to release the leading-strings, and there seems no doubt that this new freedom will be well used. By implication the new move means a recognition of the fact that the secondary schools are no longer purely preparatory institutions for the universities. The vista is now much wider and sixth-form boys are being accepted in a much greater range of occupations, which is all to the good of the boys and of the occupations.

Nevertheless, the schools still in part have to serve the universities, and it is necessary to maintain a friendly and efficient co-operation between them. It is therefore pertinent to inquire what respect the universities pay to the Higher School certificate. They are largely represented on the bodies awarding these certificates, and therefore should take some account of them. The position at present varies from university to university, and in most cases seems in a rather fluid state. In some universities the holder of a Higher School certificate is exempted from the first year's work of the honours course or from the first M.B. In others this is not granted at all, or only grudgingly. We are now touching on a difficult problem—the overlap between sixth-form work and university first-year work. The organisation at the universities is complicated by the fact that they receive recruits from the schools who range from those who have just scraped through the matriculation to those who may have spent three or four years in a sixth form and have won scholarships. Obviously there is some need for the universities to differentiate between these groups, or otherwise the first-year classes must be very heterogeneous. From the university point of view the question appears to be one of staffing, or sub-division of classes, or in some way making allowances for the better prepared entrant. Some university professors maintain that all students should pass through the first-year course, or they will lose something unique. The schools, however, naturally feel concerned to hear that

an ex-fifth-former and a sixth-form scholar may be grouped for instruction in the same class. The problem is a difficult one, and does not concern us here except to point out that a part of this overlap difficulty would be met by making allowances to the holder of a Higher School certificate. It is not suggested that the time spent for a degree should be reduced, but that the time of the first year might be more profitably used. It is a problem which will be settled in time. Meanwhile, it is good to note that reform is in the air. The broad general lines already seem evident, and we can look forward in the near future to modifications which will protect the ordinary and the scholarship candidate, will minimise over-pressure and over-specialisation, will reduce the overlap between the secondary schools and the universities, and yet allow the schools to retain that freedom which has been claimed as an outstanding feature of the English Public School tradition.

TERRY THOMAS.

COLLECTING, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

By Professor W. G. Constable

'Self and Partners, being the Reminiscences of Sir Charles Holmes'[1]

Most men (and women) are magpies by instinct. Earpicks or elephants come alike to them as collectors; and of all collectors, the English have proved themselves the most determined and insatiable. Yet almost unrecognised, certainly unrecorded, a profound change has come during the last fifty years over the way this collector's passion has exercised itself.

In those mighty progenitors of a long line—Arundel and Charles I.—the business of collecting was inextricably mixed with that of patronage of contemporary art, and so it was throughout the eighteenth century. Also, the collector himself was very much concerned with the collecting. He might, and did, press into service all kinds of agents, from ambassadors and artists downward, according to his wealth and social position; but he collected mainly because he was interested in the objects themselves, and those objects he treated very much as his private property. Brother collectors would be admitted to view and discuss them; and, as part of the business of patronage, artists might be allowed to study or copy them. But the idea of holding a collection as a trust, and of making it accessible to a considerable public, was apparently unknown. Then, at the end of the eighteenth century, with the French wars, and later the coming of the Industrial Revolution, methods and ideas began to change. English collectors fished in the troubled waters of Italy and elsewhere, where owners of works of art were anxious to sell in order to meet the exactions of Napoleon. Syndicates including eminent persons were formed to acquire whole collections, from which a selection would be made, and the

[1] Constable, 18s.

remainder sold; and from among the members of these syndicates and their agents emerged the dealer in works of art as we know him to-day, financing his purchases with his own or borrowed capital, and selling in the best market he can find. At the same time, a new type of collector emerged in whom desire to acquire works of art for their own sake was mingled with or supplanted by the wish to enjoy the social prestige their possession brought or to make an investment of capital. In such hands, collecting and patronage began to part company. To acquire contemporary work required a judgment and knowledge of one's own mind which the new race of collectors lacked; and might be financially risky.

Inevitably, to serve the new types of dealer and collector, the professional expert began to appear of the type of W. Y. Ottley, many of them remarkably ignorant and ill-equipped, but justifying themselves by keeping a chapter ahead of their employers. More important, the idea of forming public collections of antiquities and works of art took definite shape. The British Museum had been founded in 1753, but remained a collection of books until the acquisition early in the nineteenth century of the Towneley marbles and the Egyptian antiquities captured from the French opened a new epoch. Meanwhile Desenfans was forming a collection for a National Gallery in Poland, which the disappearance of that country as a political entity ultimately brought to the Dulwich Gallery; and in 1824 the National Gallery crept into existence. The controversy over its foundation showed that the idea of collecting as a means of patronage was still alive. Farington, for example, thought that the Gallery would provide a useful customer for the work of Royal Academicians.

Probably these developments in public collecting owed much to Napoleon, the exhibition of whose artistic gatherings in Paris thrilled cultivated Europe. But that anybody should want to look at public collections occurred to comparatively few. Certainly, the behaviour of those in charge of museums and galleries did not favour the idea. That a few privileged connoisseurs should be admitted, perhaps; but the great unwashed, no. In fact, a public museum or gallery was (and in certain quarters still is) regarded as a storehouse to which entrance is to be jealously guarded.

So things remained for some half a century with changes

here and there, but with basic conditions and ideas unchanged. But during the 'eighties came a stir, and another epoch opened; and it is one of the fascinations of Sir Charles Holmes's book that not only has he seen from the inside almost every change in the collector's world since those days, but has himself been the means of bringing many of them about. If ever the history of collecting and connoisseurship in England comes to be written, his book will be one of the most valuable sources of information for the historian. But though it is history, it is history without tears. The great events, the broad movements, are seen as a background to a most candid and lively account of the author's own personal struggles (there is singularly little about his triumphs, except quite excusably as a fisherman), told with a characteristic lightness and precision of touch. So, the book is a human as well as a social document; and one that young artists (to whom the social significance of events ought to matter nothing) should study, to realise how determination and ordered concentration of energy can enable a painter to triumph over difficulties of lack of time and lack of money.

As a contribution to history the story told opens with the author's association with Ricketts and Shannon in 1896. At the Vale Press, by skill in handling the financial and commercial side of the business, he helped materially in that revival of good printing in England which lies behind English supremacy in printing to-day. More important, however, he was introduced into the world of collectors, connoisseurs and dealers, in which the greater part of his time was henceforward to be spent.

In the art market two new and powerful forces had recently appeared. The American millionaire had discovered works of art as a means of enhancing social prestige, and was willing to pay for them sums regarded as wantonly extravagant. It is said that the standing order of one eminent buyer to his agent and adviser was 'Double the highest offer.' On the other side, Bode of Berlin, with fewer resources, but unrivalled knowledge and courage, was at work. So the cry went up that England was being despoiled of her masterpieces, many of them, incidentally, the result of earlier English raids on Continental collections. The tables were indeed turned, and remained so until a few years ago.

After the war, competition from the Continent ceased to be serious; but the *Drang nach Amerika* continued until the 1931 slump. English collectors have not been able to resist the pressure. Here and there new collections of importance have been formed; but the drain on the older ones has continued. To this the death duties have largely contributed. It is no lack of patriotism or failure to appreciate their possessions, but sheer economic necessity, which has driven many owners to part with works of art.

Thus, inevitably, two ideas developed: that the possessor of a work of art is to be regarded in a measure as a trustee thereof for the community as a whole; and that the State must on occasion step into the breach and itself become, on an increasingly large scale, a collector. These two ideas have been worked out in several directions. One is through those provisions of the Finance Acts by which under certain conditions the owner of a work of art does not pay death duties thereon, provided it is not sold. In 1921 it was further laid down that death duties should not be payable in the case of a sale to a national institution; a provision with whose drafting Sir Charles Holmes was closely associated, whose effect, in his own words, was that 'owners at last had a substantial inducement to give the nation the first refusal of anything which they wished to sell.' Another development, in which Sir Charles also played a large part, was an undertaking given, also in 1921, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and renewed by subsequent Chancellors, that the Treasury would give substantial help towards purchasing certain works of the highest importance in English private collections, should they ever come into the market. Without these arrangements the acquisition of the Wilton Diptych and the Cornaro Titian would scarcely have been possible.

Another sign of the times has been the formation and phenomenal growth of the National Art Collections Fund, whose *raison d'être* is to come to the help of public museums and galleries throughout the country, to enlarge and enrich their collections.

But the extension of the State's activity as a collector has produced even more important consequences, since it has effectually killed the conception of a museum or gallery as mainly a storehouse, and stimulated the idea of its being a

collection belonging to the public as a whole, for whose instruction and pleasure it exists. As never before, problems of the decoration of galleries, the arrangement and framing of exhibits, the issue of suitable catalogues and guides, the giving of public lectures, and above all the provision of adequate staff to carry on all these activities, have become pressing.

In many of these matters museums in the United States have been pioneers, and we have still something to learn from them. But recent progress in English museums and gallery administration has been rapid; and in that progress the National Portrait Gallery and the National Gallery under Sir Charles Holmes have been particularly prominent. The rehanging and redecoration of the National Portrait Gallery, so that the finer portraits should be shown to advantage, while preserving historic continuity, was a notable feat, and laid an indispensable foundation for the admirable work of later directors. The driving force behind the reorganisation was not primarily æsthetic, but the desire that those who owned the Gallery should use it more freely and profitably. In Sir Charles Holmes's own words: 'I have always had a fanatic belief in the potential value of the National Portrait Gallery, as a living adjunct and illustration to our national history. . . . As an essential feature in our national education, the National Portrait Gallery, even now, is greatly undervalued.'

The rehanging and redecoration of the National Gallery after the war was a bolder step still. Following American precedent, the better pictures only were hung in the main galleries, the remainder being organised as a reference section, freely accessible on request, on the ground floor (*not* the basement, as it is often erroneously called).

This principle of organisation, in which the National Gallery was a pioneer in this country, has been accepted by succeeding directors and applied even more drastically; while the finest museum buildings of our day, the National Museum of Wales, and the extension of the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, have accepted it as a fundamental necessity in their planning. The decoration of the galleries was frankly experimental in certain cases, and provoked some criticism. But the fact remains that the general scheme of using cool, light backgrounds for primitives, and richer tones,

with gold, silver or another colour broken over them, for later masters, has been widely followed, not only in England, but in certain great foreign galleries, notably the Prado. In any case, the net result was to make the Gallery livelier, more agreeable, more comprehensible: and the public showed their appreciation by increased attendance.

But reorganisation and rehanging of museums and galleries is not enough by itself to enable their owners to understand and to enjoy them. To Lord Sudeley chiefly we owe the appointment of guide-lecturers in the national museums, whose services are free to the public; and the system is now being adopted in many other places. Up-to-date catalogues and guides, together with photographs and postcards, are also needed, not only for the public, but for students; and improvement in these has been rapid. But the National Gallery still stands alone in aiming at having every one of its possessions photographed, and in being prepared to supply, at the price of a print alone (and that a very moderate price), a photograph of anything not yet taken. The photograph and publication department of the National Gallery, moreover, as organised by Sir Charles Holmes, yielded enough profit considerably to increase the Gallery funds for purchase. To him also the interesting experiment of organising concerts in the Gallery is due—a precedent which has been followed by other institutions more recently.

But this increase in activities had made increased staff a necessity; and over this the battle has been long and severe, The old-time Treasury arguments that (*a*) a director of a museum has merely to walk round occasionally, counting the objects under his care to see that they are all there, and (*b*) that, anyhow, the work is so delightful that nobody needs to be paid for doing it, have had to yield to facts. The creation at short notice of a trained museum personnel has been, however, no easy task. There are two schools of thought: those who believe in the museum doing its own training, at a risk of narrowness and one-sidedness, and those who advocate some preliminary study of art history or archæology, as is usual in Germany. It is a little disappointing that Sir Charles, with his experience as a Gallery Director and as Slade Professor at Oxford, says nothing on this point. But one gathers that he thought his work at Oxford worth doing

in arousing interest in the arts, and perhaps in shaping future collectors—a view which has not, however, been taken by all his successors.

The question of training gallery and museum staffs is only one side of a more complicated situation that has developed in the world of collectors and collecting. With its main roots in the work of Giovanni Morelli, a science of connoisseurship has developed, in connexion with works of art, of a highly technical character. Questions of date, place of origin and authorship are now a matter for expert and specialist investigation, employing an elaborate apparatus of literary and photographic material, and often also the resources of the scientific laboratory. In this development Sir Charles Holmes has likewise taken his share, especially through his editorship of the *Burlington Magazine*. The importance of the *Burlington* is that, alone among English art magazines, it has opened, and still opens, its pages to articles dealing primarily with the date, provenance, and attribution of works of art. The story of how the magazine nearly foundered early in its career, and how it was saved, is an exciting one; and describes a welcome triumph for exact and honest scholarship.

But this increased precision and elaboration of learning has brought dangers, since collector and dealer alike are apt to be at the mercy of the trained specialist. The collector has the obvious way out of buying what he likes, irrespective of date, whether it comes from A. or B., or is the work of X. or Y. That would have been the eighteenth-century method; but modern collectors rarely have that courage. So has arisen a regular race of advisers to collectors; and also the practice of giving certificates of authorship and even of merit, often in exchange for considerable sums, which are obtained by the dealer and sold with the work of art to the client. Obviously, such a system is liable to gross abuse, and has, in fact, resulted in the exchange of large sums of money for merely a piece of paper, quite irrespective of the merits of the work of art concerned. Fortunately, collectors and dealers are in revolt, especially as forged certificates are now drifting about the art market. But the basic fact remains, that to tell 'undoubted Raphaels from Gerard Dou's and Zoffany's' is a highly technical matter, and complicates the

question of museum staffs, who must clearly have adequate training, knowledge and experience if they are to collect wisely for their masters, the public, and to deal with the collections under their charge so that they best serve their purpose.

Even more does this matter of expert knowledge complicate the question of gallery government. The long and sad story of the relations of Sir Charles Holmes with the Trustees of the National Gallery illustrates this only too well. Conflict is liable to arise between great personages interested in the arts, themselves perhaps collectors, and the expert. Neither side is certain to be always right; but with whom is the final decision on any technical matter to rest? The question is most acute in the case of pictures. No one is likely to dispute seriously the expert's views on the authenticity of a fragment of a Coptic textile, or of a Carolingian ivory. But everybody considers he has the ability and right to deliver judgment on a picture. One thing is tolerably certain: that the appointment of other experts as members of a governing body of a museum or gallery will not *per se* overcome the difficulty. Rather, a solution seems to lie in a stricter and more precise definition of function as between governing body and administrative official. But no rules and regulations will work without frank recognition of the fact that conditions have changed, and that collecting to-day is a different business from collecting in the eighteenth century; and that collections owned by the public must be organised and directed to serve public needs, from that of the schoolchild to that of the specialised scholar.

W. G. CONSTABLE.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HORROR-FICTION

By E. H. Visiak

'As I emerge on deck the ordered arrangement of the stars meets my eye, unclouded, infinitely wearisome.

'There they are: stars, sun, sea, light, darkness, space, great waters; the formidable Work of the Seven Days, into which mankind seems to have blundered, unbidden. Or else decoyed . . .'

Thus the young captain, who could not get his ship out of the seemingly bewitched latitude in Conrad's *Shadow Line*, expressed not only his weariness but his horror; and, regarded from one aspect, the materiality of things is dreadful to the imagination. Physicists tell us that it has no real existence. They compare the solar system to the arrangement of electrons about their central proton that constitutes every atom of matter. The spaces between, they explain, are equivalent to the spaces between the planets and the sun, and the very proton and electrons themselves are immaterial. Even normally it is impossible to identify oneself with matter; while it has been logically demonstrated that we are really outside space and time. Nor is the essential immateriality of things merely theoretical. In one of the abnormal states that are as rare as they are significant it is possible, after abstractedly observing some solid substance, to realise this fact, with amazement and terror.

The effect would be as if a solid body should appear in the domain of spirits. That would indeed be an *apparition*, in the eerie sense of the word—a mask of the unknown, or not understood, and thence frightening; and, as everybody is a spirit essentially, we may be said to haunt one another with our corporeal spectres. Our streets are full of phantoms, with which—fortunately for our nerves—we have grown familiar. Eternity is haunted by time, which Plato has called

its 'moving shadow.' Plato, indeed, realised his phenomenal aspect no less than Blake when he spoke of his 'spectre.' In such an experience as I have described, the mind is consciously —or, rather, subconsciously—in its appropriate element.

On the other hand, it is possible intuitively to see material things transcended into indescribable vibrations—that ethereal rhythm propounded by Lord Kelvin, or Prospero's 'insubstantial pageant faded.' The 'formidable work of the Seven Days,' as the captain in *The Shadow Line* described the material universe (though the number of the 'days,' accurately, should be *six*), would seem, accordingly, to be a sort of magical structure, of which the senses are windows. They may also be termed lenses, which it is the function of art to intensify. The art of horror-fiction not only intensifies impressions of external scenes and objects, but presents all things as if they were seen in a distorting mirror. At the same time, it lends them a more than ordinary realism; to beguile the reader's credulity in an eerie, mysterious story it makes the actual environment appear the more convincing, or matter-of-fact. Apart, however, from supernatural mystery, the evocation of horror in fiction depends upon the same graphic—though subtly modified—realism.

Nothing could be more starkly matter-of-fact, for example, than the description of the bedroom where Maud is awaiting her unknown fate in *Uncle Silas*:

> The room was large and lofty, but shabby and dismal. There was a tall, four-post bed, with its foot beside the window, hung with dark-green curtains, of some plush or velvet texture, that looked like a dusty pall. The remaining furniture was scant and old, and a ravelled square of threadbare carpet covered a patch of floor at the bedside.

The location of the room in the huge dilapidated mansion is obscure; hidden away amid interminable passages and galleries, its very outlook is sinisterly closed in; and in it—in the 'imperfect light of one mutton-fat candle'—Maud's dreadful governess, Madame de la Rougière, skips and flounces about in her sluttish finery, or ogles gauntly to herself in the square of mirror; while she seems to inhale the cold, vault-like atmosphere as her natural element, exhaling, at the same time, a subtle suggestion of ghoulish malignity which is even more horrifying.

Still more realistic, perhaps, in this sense, is the appalling trepanning scene in Le Fanu's *House by the Churchyard*, which is described through the sensations of the listeners crouching outside the door. The operation is being performed, late at night, by the depraved, brutalised surgeon-genius Dillon, who had previously arrived, with a violent pealing at the bell, 'in dingy splendours and a great draggled wig, with a gold-headed cane in his bony hand . . . diffusing a reek of whisky-punch, and with a case of instruments under his arm.' It is, indeed, a 'sure and firm-set earth,' on which the master of horror 'moves like a ghost.'

In poetry, no less than in prose, the sense of mystery and horror is evoked by realistic imagery. Instances of this are the precise enumeration of the strokes of the clock and the responses of the barking dog in *Christabel*, and the 'silken sad uncertain rustling of each purple curtain' in *The Raven*. How horribly realistic, also, are those lines in *The Ancient Mariner*:

> Yea, slimy things did crawl *with legs*
> Upon the slimy sea.

With regard to the mere qualities of thickness and hardness, these appurtenances of horror are strikingly illustrated in the works of Poe and Joseph Conrad. In Conrad's *Victory*, hard sheens of sea, or river, with foliage glinting like metal, and massed glooms, are shifted across the stage, with occasional bursts of thunder; and these subtropical effects enforce the horrific scenes. Sometimes the world grows hard indeed; as when:

> The sun, touching the water, was like a disc of iron cooled to a dull red glow, ready to start rolling round the circular steel plate of the sea. . . . The forceful stream from the pipe broke like shattered glass.

Night, before the murder in *Macbeth*, thickens. Darkness, in the culminating horror of Conrad's *Shadow Line*, seems actually to materialise:

> The impenetrable blackness beset the ship so close that it seemed that by thrusting one's hand over the side one could touch some unearthly substance. There was in it an effect of inconceivable terror and of inexpressible mystery. The few stars overhead shed a dim light upon the ship alone; with no gleams of any kind upon the water, in detached shafts piercing an atmosphere which had turned to soot. . . . If the air had turned black, the sea, for all I knew, might have turned solid.

This may be compared with a passage in Poe's *MS. Found in a Bottle*, which concludes: 'All around were horror, and thick gloom, and a black sweltering desert of ebony.' One is obviously reminded of that Egyptian darkness in the Bible—a 'darkness that could be felt.'

Instances of the evocation of horror in fiction by means of distortion are the incongruous presentations of the smile, whiteness, and old age. Thus, the smile—the symbol of sweetness and innocence—is represented as the rictus, or death-smile. Of this Poe's *Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym* affords a striking illustration. It is contained in the episode of the ghastly disappointment that befell the famished men in the derelict when the ship they saw apparently hastening to their succour came near; when one of the figures leaning over the starboard bow seemed 'to be encouraging us to have patience, nodding to us in a cheerful although rather odd way, and smiling constantly so as to display a set of the most brilliantly white teeth.' It was the smile not merely of death: the ship's decks were littered with corpses in advanced stages of decomposition! This is a sort of materialistic parallel with the approach in *The Ancient Mariner* of the 'spectre bark.'

Poe exhibits what he calls 'the conqueror worm' in things. Death grins in his stories, and horror smiles; though in his *Haunted Palace* the 'hideous throng'

> . . . rush out forever
> And laugh—but smile no more.

Conrad, however, produces horror from the living, as in the 'smile of ghastly amiability' on the face of his grotesque and horrible 'Plain Mr. Jones' in *Victory*. Sometimes he suggests a daunting sense of vacuity, as if the universe were a hollow shell. In *The Shadow Line* the 'brooding stillness of the world seemed sensitive to the slightest sound like a whispering gallery.' In Bram Stoker's *Dracula*, for all the crudity of the book, the reader sustains a real *grue* when the mouth of the vampire, instead of smiling horrifically, 'made a square,' like some lugubrious classical mask. In this case there seems to be a kind of distortion of a distortion.

In his chapter on the 'Whiteness of the Whale' in *Moby Dick*, Herman Melville comments upon the association of whiteness with various forms of sublimity and horror. He

finds it shocking that the symbol of purity, holiness, and gladness, elevated in the vision of St. John to the highest arc of sublimity, should characterise, not only loathsome diseases, death-shrouds, and sepulchres, but such creatures as the 'white bear of the poles and the white shark of the tropics':

> What but their smooth, flaky whiteness makes them the transcendent horrors they are? That ghastly whiteness it is which imparts such an abhorrent mildness, even more loathsome than terrific, to the dumb gloating of their aspect.

It is not merely the 'bringing together two such opposite emotions in our minds' that 'heightens the intolerable hideousness' of polar bears, sharks, the horrible squid, and all the whited sepulchres and white cowled horrors in existence, but an 'elusive something in the innermost idea of this hue.'

The horror of whiteness, also, is the very *motif* of Poe's *Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym*; while a still greater—at least, more realistic—master of horror, J. Sheridan Le Fanu, exploited it even more strikingly. His 'silvery white gentleman' in *The House by the Churchyard*, and Uncle Silas, with his saintly, venerable, silky white hair, are surely the most horrific figures in literature. In the figure of Uncle Silas, apparently so gentle and venerable, the quality of whiteness in its sinister significance is combined with the symbol of ancientry. This is but a step to the feelings of horror with which De Quincey, in his *English Opium Eater*, associated the antiquity of Asia:

> Southern Asia, in general, is the seat of awful images and associations. As the cradle of the human race, it would alone have a dim and reverential feeling connected with it. But there are other reasons. No man can pretend that the wild, barbarous, and capricious superstitions of Africa, or of savage tribes elsewhere, affect him in the way that he is affected by the ancient, monumental, cruel, and elaborate religions of Indostan.

Horror, like absurdity, is grotesque, being dependent upon an impression of derangement in external aspects. The grotesquely horrible and the weird are related to beauty as the nonsense of a Lewis Carroll is related to philosophical knowledge. They have their basis in reality, or what the Greeks called 'the first philosophy'—*the knowledge of that which really is*. Thus merely morbid horror is as distressing

to a cultured mind as is facetiousness or crudely irrational nonsense.

If the evocation of horror in fiction is dependent, as it seems to be, upon the presentation of a more than ordinary realism, or impression of solidity—and if, as physicists and metaphysicians assure us, the phenomenon of solidity itself is an illusion, or phantasm conjured by our senses—the masters of the horrific art may be said to exploit this material ghost by means of their intensifying and distorting devices. By making it appear abnormally solid they paradoxically give us an uncanny inkling of its insubstantial nature, suggesting a feeling akin to that of Conrad's young sea-captain, that it is a kind of magical trap, into which 'mankind seems to have blundered, unbidden. Or else decoyed . . .'

The foregoing observations, however, suggest a very sinister view of material phenomena; and, in fact, there is an altogether different connotation. Solidity, condensation, mass are characteristics not only of horror but also of sublimity, as in the compressed, monumental qualities of bronze or marble sculptures: emblems of eternity. Matter, in this sense, is an attribute of the preternatural no less than of the unnatural. In the continuation of the passage that I have quoted from *The English Opium Eater*, De Quincey relates both aspects when he speaks of the 'mystic sublimity' of 'immemorial castes, in vast empires, and in the mere names of the Ganges and the Euphrates.'

The Semitic imagination, the main source of sublime feeling, abounded with conceptions of the massive and immense, like the huge twin-dragons in the Babylonian story of the Creation. The Hebrew poet imagined the Deity as holding the sea in the hollow of his hand. Dante and Milton, inspired by the Bible, conceived massive immensities. Dante gives stupendous measurements of the infernal gates; the stature of Milton's Satan reached the sky. Corresponding to this in the domain of horror there is the gigantic Antarctic figure in Poe's *Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym* and the huge swollen ship in his *MS. Found in a Bottle*, Hawthorne's *Great Stone Face*, and the passages on hugeness in *Moby Dick*.

There is, in fact, a real relation between horror and sublimity. The faculty of evoking horror in fiction is allied to the power of sublime creation. The one is the other in a

modified form. It is significant, in this connexion, that Poe manifests other characteristics of the sublime genius than that of a proclivity for material mass. His characters are as abstract and subjective as Milton's, and his work shows a similar deficiency in a sense of humour; while personally—at least, on one occasion—he is said to have manifested the pride of the Miltonic Satan.

Darkness, in particular aspects, is an attribute of sublimity as it is of horror. The difference of the effect produced is due to the treatment, or disposition, of the darkness. Sublimity is dynamic; horror is static. Milton's fiends are energetic; they react powerfully against the gloom of their background, and against its very profundity appear the more brilliantly conspicuous. They may be said to be *in*, but not *of*, hell. In the psychological horror of Hawthorne the gloom has penetrated the foreground; so that in his *Scarlet Letter* he achieves, what Milton attempted in vain, a convincing imagination of hell. His guilty Minister lies passively at the mercy of the ghoulish creature who is battening on his conscience. Hawthorne's morbid genius sees all things, like his 'veiled Minister,' through black gauze; and the subtle blight that he disseminates infects the very sunshine with a gloom which in the Saturnalia of his Black Sabbath condenses and breaks into essential horror.

In his *Haunted Palace* Poe betrays regret for ruined beauty, faded glory:

> But evil things, in robes of sorrow,
>   Assailed the monarch's high estate.
> (Ah, let us mourn!—for never morrow
>   Shall dawn upon him desolate!)
> And round about his home the glory
>   That blushed and bloomed,
> Is but a dim-remembered story
>   Of the old time entombed.

But the 'monarch' was 'Thought.' He was, thus, himself his own enemy; himself the source of the evil assailants of his 'high estate.' In Poe's *Raven*, however, the cause of the haunting 'horror' is sentiment—*romantic love*; as it is also the *motif* in his horrible short story *Berenice*, in which a man becomes obsessed with his wife's teeth, which he afterwards extracts as she lies in her coffin. In *Ligeia*, however

—another of his more morbid, or pathological, short stories—the cause of horror is the will. In this story the spirit of a dead wife becomes metamorphosed in the person of her successor. These diverse, yet interrelated, causes of horror in Poe's imagination are significant. In each case they are effected by the operation of *excess*. A psychological division has taken place. The nature of this division is graphically illustrated in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, in the fate of the wretched idealist whose intellect became 'preternaturally clear'—a kind of lucent frost—while his emotional faculties sank into a sensual hell, generating flames which produced, indeed, 'no light, but rather darkness visible.' All this is symbolic of the psychological dichotomy that eventually produced horror, in the subsequent meaning of the word—which in Milton signified extreme *terror*. The division seems to have been precipitated by Thought, or the analytic spirit.

In early poetry and drama sublimity and humanism were fused, as—in the most obvious instance—they function together in the Bible; while in Shakespeare—for example, in the 'naked new-born babe' passage in *Macbeth*—they together constitute such a paradox as 'pity' appearing before the terrified Macbeth as the avenger in the shape of innocence and harmlessness. The synthetic genius of Shakespeare combined not only sublimity and humanism, but even the tragic and the comic, which in classical drama had been separated. Yet in Shakespeare there occur the first signs of disruption in the psychological mould: the crystallisation of Thought in the surprisingly modern, morbid introspection of *Hamlet*—which, by the way, presents one of the most materialistic ghosts that have ever been conceived. Thus the Shakespearean synthesis of sublimity and humanism was already tending towards change; the scientific genius of Bacon having provided the *élan*. In *Paradise Lost* Thought was precipitated in disembodied sublimity. After Milton came the sentimental conceits of the Restoration lyrists. The subconscious mould, already in process of division, had been jarred and distempered by the sensual inundation of that period, and the rift between intellect and sensibility widened. There followed the frigid and formal compositions of the Queen Anne period, a period of imaginative atrophy.

Sublimity reappeared in various modified forms in the

Romantic Revival. It was involved, notably, in the strange genius of Hardenberg and Tieck, by whom, as Coleridge shows, Scott was inspired, as also was Coleridge himself; while humanism was born again in the sentimental novel.

Coleridge, no less than Poe, betrays the effects of the strange transmutation of sublimity in ruin. Thus *The Ancient Mariner* is suffused with sultry colours and phosphorescent tints; while *Kubla Khan* contains such a morbid oxymoron as 'holy and enchanted' to describe the trysting-place of a woman and her demon lover. The process continued, becoming more and more subtle and recondite. The sublime imagination—manifested, on its purely abstract side, in the Idealistic and Absolutist systems of philosophy, and in German music—was modified into fiction of weird or realistic horror; while humanism evolved—or, rather, devolved—towards the psychological novel, with its preoccupation with sentiment in its most sexual form.

As has been observed, the story of horror depends very largely for its effect upon the author's treatment of material phenomena; the sex-novel also, in its different *métier*, is concerned with materialistic aspects: there is an essential relation between horror and passion. Novel and horror-story are therefore, in this sense, upon the same terrain, as were the original sources of their inspiration: humanism and sublimity. It would seem that in literature, at any rate, there has occurred something in the nature of a theological 'fall.' But to consider the story of horror in this light of its exalted origin is to be lifted up above daunting imaginations; is to look upon the material universe, not, indeed, as a sinister phantasm, but as a revelation of supernal reality.

E. H. Visiak.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Marxists and Literature

Literature, by Philip Henderson (Bodley Head, 3*s*. 6*d*.).
Shakespeare, by Middleton Murry (Cape, 12*s*. 6*d*.).

As the object of the writer is to make the nature of things clearer both to himself and to others, and as the object of the social order is to suppress any truths which may prejudice its well-being, writers, unless they use their gifts exclusively in the interests of society, have a difficult time of it, whatever the form of society in which they live. In the aristocratic England of Queen Elizabeth, Shakespeare, whose plays were rigorously censored by the Lord Chamberlain, complained of 'Art made tongue-tied by authority, and folly, doctor-like, controlling skill.' He was forced to make many compromises with his conscience, and when he lost his temper, as in *Troilus and Cressida*, with its realistic portraits of the soldiers and statesmen of the Elizabethan age, he could not get the play staged. In the relatively democratic England of Queen Victoria, Charles Dickens was so greatly chafed by the limits within which he had to work that he wrote to Forster: 'Don't think it a part of my despondency about public affairs, and my fear that our national glory is on the decline, when I say that mere form and conventionalities usurp, in English art, as in English government and social relations, the place of living force and truth.'

Shakespeare had to propitiate royalty, Dickens had to propitiate the middle classes. Since the death of Dickens, nearly seventy years ago, the mass of the nation has been elevated into the power which the writer must serve, and an anxious concern about the social system is now looked upon as the sign by which one may distinguish a great writer from a wanton trifler. Shortly after the war this view, which before the war had been propagated by a line of writers from

William Morris through Shaw and Wells to Chesterton and the Guild Socialists, seemed to be losing ground. But the increasing prestige of Russia in English intellectual circles has revived it, and it appears at the moment to be stronger than ever.

In a pamphlet on Literature Mr. Philip Henderson expounds this view in a simple, direct style which invites an equally simple and direct criticism. 'The object of this book,' he writes, 'is to trace the development of literature . . . in relation to the social order of which it is always and everywhere the outcome.' The social order to Mr. Henderson is synonymous with an abstraction which he calls the economic system. His religious sense, in default of any other form of religion congenial to it, has made him turn the economic system into a First Cause. Everything, according to Mr. Henderson, is due to the economic system, and the economic system is not due to anything. Here, on the one side, is mankind; there, on the other, is the economic system. If the economic system is in a bad way, men are unhappy. If it is functioning satisfactorily, as in Russia, they are contented. This curious philosophy of cause and effect comes out vividly in his treatment of William Langland's *Vision of Piers Plowman*. Up to a point he approves of Langland. It was, he writes, Langland's concern to give a true picture of the broad bases of economic misery upon which the impressive structure of the Catholic Middle Ages was reared. 'But,' he adds, chidingly, 'Langland, though he recognised all this, was before everything a moralist and concluded, according to the theology of his time, that social evils were not so much the result of the economic system itself, as the obscuring of Holy Truth by such vices as covetousness, gluttony, pride and so on.'

A sensible person does not go to a tailor for a perfect figure, but for a suit to fit the figure he possesses. Langland did not look round for a mediæval Marx to graft a perfect economic system on to an imperfect world. He tried to persuade his fellow-countrymen to go through the preliminaries of self-discipline necessary before they could attain a just relation to one another. What Mr. Henderson calls 'the theology of his time' was that part of the Christian religion which is common to all profound religious and ethical systems—namely, the recognition of the inherent imperfection of human nature, and the necessity to discipline the will instead of indulging it.

As a materialist, Mr. Henderson believes in human perfectibility and regards the belief in a perfection beyond this world as a denial of life. 'It is,' he says, 'the common ground of all the great ascetic religions of the world,' and he dismisses it as 'the age-old pursuit of a non-existent Absolute.' Speaking of Buddhism, he says that such a teaching 'could only have arisen in a world-weary

civilisation and would have been impossible among a young and militantly progressive people like the Greeks.' It is 'a doctrine born of satiety and extreme sensibility.'

To explain the circumstances in which a doctrine arises is not to disprove its truth. Mr. Henderson is too easily content with any hackneyed formula which seems to support his argument. The question he neglected to put to himself is whether truth is more accessible in a nation asserting its will, or in a nation reflecting on the consequences of asserting its will. *Don Quixote* was not written until Spain was in decline. *King Lear* was written during the exhaustion and disillusionment which followed the triumphs of Elizabethan imperialism. Buddha had tested life thoroughly before he formulated his philosophy. To go to 'a young and militantly progressive people' for wisdom is as sensible as to go to a lover for an impartial estimate of his beloved. This is not to say that the true wisdom of life consists in avoiding experience, but that it consists in learning from experience, and in ultimately transcending it.

The Marxist believes as completely as the imperialist in the assertion of the will. His quarrel with the imperialist is merely because he resents the assertion of the will being confined to the wealthy and privileged. The Greeks in their early piratical stage are pleasing to Mr. Henderson, who calls them 'a frank and fearless people, who for the first time faced the world in its objective reality.' But when these vigorous freebooters in due course become full-blown imperialists, the Marxist moralist in Mr. Henderson is shocked. 'A selfish and often brutal imperial policy,' he laments, 'was the ruin of the Athenian state.' Mr. Henderson, in short, approves the assertion of the will in a primitive people because he sees them as what might be termed Nature's proletarians. But when they begin to assert their will through the forms of a more civilised state of society they become selfish and brutal.

From the occasional comments on writers with which this survey of literature is sprinkled it appears that Mr. Henderson, when his eyes are not fixed on the Absolute of a perfect economic system, regards human nature with disgust. Swift is one of the few writers he cares for. 'The great and terrible mind of Swift,' he says, '. . . his terrifying revelation of the bestial absurdity of human nature.' It is because Mr. Henderson feels human nature to be bestially absurd that he looks for a miracle (the descent from the clouds of Marx's prose style of a perfect economic system) to save humanity from itself.

The aversion from other human beings which drives a man into collectivism is naturally accompanied by an aversion from literature, which expresses what single minds of unusual power have felt and

thought about life. Throughout this book Mr. Henderson tries to discredit literature as a parlour game of the well-to-do. 'To-day,' he writes, 'the world must renew itself with a new form of society. . . . Then the conception of literature as an elegant accomplishment of the leisured class and art as "fine art" will disappear. . . .'

To condemn literature because it occupies the spare time of persons who, like Mr. Henderson himself, regard Virginia Woolf and D. H. Lawrence as great writers is as sensible as to condemn Christ because an Anglican church emptying itself at 12.30 on a Sunday morning is not an inspiriting spectacle. The great writers of the world have, with very few exceptions, lived lives which were anything but elegant and leisured. Hampered by the common weaknesses of humanity, they have allowed the cares and privations of their harassed existence to impair their happiness, but in their best moments they have shown the relative unimportance of that material order which for the Marxist fills the whole horizon of life.

Mr. Middleton Murry is not a Marxist of the pure stamp of Mr. Henderson. 'Murry,' Mr. Henderson writes, 'adopts the role of the spiritual saviour, the man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, publicly shouldering the cross of his generation.' His Marxism, Mr. Henderson continues, is 'a mystical and purely subjective theory of social life.' Murry, he explains, recommends us to effect an inward revolution. 'Was there ever a nicer way of effecting a social revolution, changing oneself and leaving the economic system inviolate?' Clearly Mr. Henderson feels that Mr. Murry has annexed the name of Marx simply in order to recommend his own purely individualistic morality to such weak-minded persons as would like to be Marxist and up-to-date, and yet have no very urgent wish to man barricades and shoot or be shot. There can be no question that Marx would have associated himself with Mr. Henderson's protest, and have forcibly repudiated the suggestion that Stalin seated in the Kremlin realised his dreams less satisfactorily than Mr. Murry seated in an armchair meditating on Keats, Blake, and D. H. Lawrence.

There is, however, a genuine and very strong element of materialism in Mr. Murry's mixed nature. In the book on Shakespeare which he has recently brought out, Mr. Murry has the following passage:

> . . . a truth which probably Karl Marx was the first clearly to discern: the truth that, in proportion as the possibility of a satisfying material life on earth for all men began to emerge in the process of history, so the imperativeness of the need of an after-life to remedy the irremediable injustices of this one began to decline. As the expectation of life increases the demand for immortality declines.

This view, that a belief in a state of being beyond the world of the senses is an illusion bred by an empty stomach, is sound Marxist and Hyde-Park-Secularist doctrine. But in the mouth of someone who has attempted to interpret men of the highest religious and imaginative genius, Christ and Blake, Shakespeare and Keats, it is a declaration of almost complete incompetence for his task. Not quite complete incompetence, for a muddled mind may have moments of imaginative intuition, and Mr. Murry has a muddled mind. In this book on Shakespeare he makes some acute inferences from the plays about Shakespeare's own life. Particularly good is the connexion he traces between the poet in *Timon of Athens* and Shakespeare reflecting on his relations with the youth of the Sonnets. His praise of *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, a play that has been generally underrated, is also proof of a fine sensibility. But the trouble with Mr. Murry is that he has been more ambitious than his talent has warranted, and has spoilt a good critic by trying to puff him into the semblance of a great one. He reminds one of the old type of clergyman who, when preaching was still looked upon as an intellectual feat, used to spin endless profundities out of some such simple statement as 'And Absalom rode upon a *mule*,' showing how completely it was in the character of Absalom to choose a mule, not a horse or donkey, and how inevitable it was that he should ride upon it, where another might have walked by its side, or prodded it from behind with a goad. This technique for impressing the simple-minded is one which Mr. Murry adopted long ago, and he is still using it as ruthlessly as ever in this book on Shakespeare; droning through a whole chapter on the significances implicit in Desdemona's 'Sure, there's some *wonder* in this handkerchief,' and making the same ado about nothing when Macbeth, after complaining that the time has been that when the brains were out the man would die, remarks that the time has been his senses would have cooled to hear a night-shriek. 'This sense,' says Mr. Murry, 'of something strange that has happened to time itself.'

Another device which frequently leads Mr. Murry astray is a sudden resolve to startle his readers with some statement which no previous critic has thought of making. A few years ago Mr. Murry announced that the Falstaff of the second part of *Henry IV.* was not amusing, and could not be compared with the Falstaff of *The Merry Wives of Windsor*. Apparently this strange view has served its turn, for he now writes: '*The Merry Wives* is essentially inferior to the two parts of *Henry IV.*' The surprise packet this time is a jet of cold water directed on *King Lear*. 'By the conventional reckoning, *King Lear* is the warm and human, *Coriolanus* the cold and inhuman drama. I think and believe and maintain almost the

opposite.' The third of the great weaknesses which prevent Mr. Murry from doing his talent justice is the insistence on himself obvious in 'I think and believe and maintain.' His view of others is always obscured by his vision of himself. In the sentence just quoted the relative merits of *Lear* and *Coriolanus* are pushed off the stage by the Promethean figure of Mr. Murry challenging the universe to prefer *Lear* to *Coriolanus*, if it dares.

Perhaps feeling that there is not enough of himself in the book, Mr. Murry adds an epilogue in which he pictures himself in friendly chat with Shakespeare. 'Yes, they come to see me sometimes,' Shakespeare tells Mr. Murry. 'I like the young ones best—Keats and Chatterton are my favourites. I think they're happy in the garden here, above all in the evening. . . . Sometimes in May a nightingale sings. I'm glad of that, for Keats' sake.' There is nothing wrong with this epilogue, except that it occurs at the end of a book on Shakespeare, not at the end of a book on Sir James Barrie. 'Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition.' Wolsey would have proffered the same advice to Mr. Murry.

HUGH KINGSMILL.

County of Middlesex Calendar to the Sessions Records. New Series. Vol. ii., 1614–1615. Edited by W. le Hardy, M.C., F.S.A. (The Clerk of the Peace, Middlesex Guildhall, 1936, 15*s.*)

Only ten generations have lived and died since, in the city of London, within a period of nine months, three men were slowly pressed to death under a pile of stones as they lay, naked, in a dungeon, for refusing to plead. One hundred persons were hanged, of whom only four for murder. The crimes here recorded are of the same nature as those which we commit to-day and in roughly the same proportions. Men and women traded on Sunday, gambled, overcharged customers, were cruel to or neglected children, abused the police when in liquor, and played football instead of learning at the butts to defend the realm. In this Calendar of nearly 500 well-indexed pages many good English names appear; their descendants may draw their own deductions from this fascinating tale of human frailty 300 years ago. A notable feature of this and the preceding volume is the almost complete absence in the index of the names of aliens.

ARNOLD WILSON.

The Home Market, a Handbook of Statistics, by Major G. Harrison and F. C. Mitchell (London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, price 10*s.* 6*d.*).

Every manufacturer and every merchant is now aware of the necessity of planning in advance his production and sales campaign,

and has discovered that important material is lacking to enable him to gauge the probable extent of his market. For want of the necessary information many promising plans have come to ruin, and even in the apparently simple problem of estimating the increase of traffic due to increased transport facilities Mr. Frank Pick, in a foreword to this book, confesses how inadequate ascertainment of the local market for traffic facilities has on two occasions at least completely falsified the expectations of the managers of the underground railway system of London. For all sales purposes it is needful to know, first, the population of an area, its age distribution, and its occupations; secondly, the extent and probable stratification of its purchasing power; and, thirdly, the chief directions in which money is now spent. The London Press Exchange, Ltd., a well-known organisation occupied in 'business research' for advertisement purposes, has, therefore, performed a useful piece of work in bringing together a collection of important public statistics and private estimates, and this praiseworthy attempt to systematise our imperfect knowledge is worthy of high commendation.

The first part of the book is occupied with a detailed analysis of the information collected in the Census of Population for each of the fifteen large areas used by the Registrar-General; for each area the number of families, their sizes, and their age and sex distribution are shown and the trends of population between areas are indicated. Those statistics are set out very clearly, and (here as elsewhere in the book) those persons who are puzzled even by the simplest tables are catered for by pictorial representations which, at least, have the merit of being far less wooden than most similar delineations. In dealing with the approach to a stationary or declining population reference should have been made to Dr. Snow's paper on the subject (*Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1935, Part II.).

The second part of the book is occupied with calculations of the national income for 1934 and its distribution between three social grades in each of the areas. The methods adopted are highly ingenious, and the results may well give a broad indication of the actual condition of things, but they cannot be taken as absolute measures without many reservations. The starting-point is Mr. Colin Clark's estimate of £3,655,000,000 for the national income of the United Kingdom in 1931, and students of his work are aware of the unavoidable extent to which the deficiency of facts has to be made good. The authors of this book calculate the national income of Great Britain as £3,700,000,000 in 1934, an increase of under 4 per cent. over 1931 after allowing 2½ per cent. for the income of Northern Ireland, but, as the Board of Trade Index of Production

showed an increase of nearly 18 per cent. in 1934 over 1931, it would appear that there is some reason for doubting the accuracy of the estimates of income for 1931 and for 1934. The fact is that the problem has got beyond the power of the private investigator to handle, and the sociological and economic importance of the issues involved demands that the Government should take the matter in hand. We need a new inquiry like that of 1906 into the amount of the national wage bill and the number of persons paid at each specific rate, and the inquiry should be extended to cover transport and black-coated workers; calculation of earnings on wage rates is too hazardous. Further, we pay such a large share of our incomes in income tax that we are entitled to demand that the Commissioners of Inland Revenue should give us information regarding the whole 8,000,000 persons above the exemption limit similar to that which they give (in seventeen classes) for the 81,562 payers of sur-tax. If the information collected regarding wages and income was classified in suitable areas, the needs of the business planners would be met.

The pages dealing with national expenditure and family budgets might well have been expanded, and the total expenditure of £4,094,000,000 in 1934 (apparently for the United Kingdom) sits uneasily beside an income of £3,700,000,000 for Great Britain, and will puzzle those who do not reflect that income from the national debt is not included in the 'national income.' If we deduct the 10 per cent. paid in direct taxation, it is interesting to note that liquor, smoking, entertainments, and sport account for £459,000,000, or nearly 12½ per cent. of the remaining expenditure. The allocation of £230,000,000 for liquor appears to be that of the United Kingdom Alliance; that of £85,000,000 for entertainments and sport would seem to be an underestimate, seeing that we now know from Mr. Rowson's calculations (*Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1936, Part I.) that over £41,000,000 was paid in 1934 for admission to cinemas. More use might have been made of the Reports of the Census of Production Act and of the inquiries made under the Import Duties Act.

HENRY W. MACROSTY.

A Woman at the Abyssinian War, by Muriel Currey, O.B.E. (Hutchinsons, 18*s*.).

Between 1915 and 1919 the armed forces of the Crown in Eastern and Western Arabia were fighting the Turks and at the same time 'liberating' from the Ottoman yoke the tribesmen and peasants, who generally welcomed, or affected to welcome, their

new masters. The front line was a scene of carnage and horror, or remorseless bombardments of helpless Turks and pack animals pent up in ravines or streaming hopelessly over desert paths and unable to reply to high explosives dropped on them by the ton.

Yet behind the advancing armies our political officers were busy picking up the broken threads and repairing the social fabric. Within a week or so of the occupation of a burned-out village, looted and wrecked by Turkish regulars or Arab irregulars, seed grain was being distributed (rendered unfit for food by suitable treatment) and medical aid, where needed, and food were being given. Within three months, schools and courts of justice were established; within a year, horse races and a totalisator, agricultural shows and baby weeks. The contrast was extraordinarily vivid: those at home heard only of war and blood, of advances and defeats, of courage and death. Yet to the local population the war bore another aspect: it brought prosperity and an element of freedom; new ideas and welcome opportunities. Disillusionment came, as it was bound to come, later, but of the good intentions of those who strove to improve the lot of the inhabitants of the newly occupied territories there was no doubt, and, on balance, the inhabitants have gained much from the new *régime* which they could not have hoped to secure from the old.

Miss Currey's experience has been behind the lines. She has seen the Italian political officers at work, following policies not unlike our own in similar circumstances; she notes with observant eye and a sharp pen the loyalty of Eritrean troops to their Italian officers. She hears the talk of officers and men, turning mainly on food and roads, as in every other campaign. She finds the local population well content to take what Providence has sent them. The narrative is of importance: it is the first of its kind; it implies a point of view which is unpopular to-day, but it should not be ignored on that account. It is now clear that the future of Ethiopia lies in Italy's hands. The immense amount of scientific and sociological work that has been done by Italians in Ethiopia during the past forty years, and the considerable success of Italy, in most unfavourable circumstances, in developing and administering Libya, augurs well for the future. The problem of Africa is so vast that no one nation in Europe can hope to approach it with success, except in concert with other interested Powers. A standing commission of all colonial Powers in Africa collating information, translating and exchanging opinions, and stimulating experiments of every kind is urgently needed, and perhaps offers the best hope for the welfare of the 'Dark Continent.'

ARNOLD WILSON.

WALKS AND TALKS

Kerry Revisited

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

As the Dáil Eireann in Dublin was making known to the world its decision to abolish the Senate and, with it, one of the few remaining 'safeguards' in the Constitution of 1922, I took a last moment decision to spend Whitsuntide in Kerry. In the dining-car between Paddington and Newport I found myself facing two young men, whose talk made it clear that they, too, were 'getting away.' They were juniors in the office of one of Greater London's boroughs—one an accountant, the other specialising on rating. The talk turned to the value of a university education. They were glad that it had not been forced on them; it was no help to most men. In the council's offices only two men, both juniors, were graduates; they were 'not much good' and would never get to the top. The clerk to the borough council, the surveyor, the medical officer, and so on, none had been to a university. If a boy was to be any good he must start, as they did, at seventeen: they agreed, however, that he might perhaps gain by going to a university after two years' work in workshop or office. University graduates, they declared, need a clerk to prevent them from making simple mistakes: they are careless, not methodical. Accuracy was what most mattered.

One of them was aggrieved that he could not get a Territorial commission, since he had never been in an O.T.C. He believed that it would be good policy to give commissions to men like himself who could bring twenty or thirty men with him. What he clearly did not realise was the amount of hard work, training and experience that goes to make a competent officer, and the heavy responsibility that lies on a subaltern in time of war. 'The men will be ready to do their

share before you,' I said. 'Are you good enough? Are you fit to lead them? Are you worthy of them?'

They left at Newport and I was free to watch, through the windows, the succession of busy industrial towns that lie between Newport and Carmarthen. A Welshman at the next table, seeing my interest, told me exactly what each works was doing, and who were the owners. We stopped opposite a slowly-moving goods train; he told me whence came each truckload of tubes and bars, joints and plates, billets and coals, and discussed the bearing on the future of South Wales of what Sir William Firth had been saying. We protected Great Britain against the Dominions and India: should we not protect Wales against England? Was it not better to bring the steel to the plateworks than to depopulate Wales? Was it not cheaper to move material than men?

He left the train at Swansea. The only occupant left in the compartment was a young clerk from London taking a holiday with relations in Cork, a city of which he was scornful. He said he was half Irish: his soul was 100 per cent. Cockney. He was not a Territorial: he played a little tennis at the country club. He would not leave London for anything short of a good rise of pay and would never be happy elsewhere. All Britain outside London was 'half-baked.' His recreations were the cinema and dancing. He never read a book, as, he explained, he had passed his examinations.

The *Innisfallen* left Fishguard at 12.40: at 10 next morning we stepped on to the wharf in Cork's innermost harbour, just beyond the Ford Car and Irish Dunlop factories. 'Any machine guns?' asked the examiner cheerfully—chalking my pack without waiting for my reply. A resident in and a lover of Cork insisted on showing me the town, beginning with the Grand Parade, where the motor omnibuses start for Bantry and Killarney, Cloyne and Kenmare. The inevitable Woolworth's shop was selling everything for 7*d.*—the result of tariffs, I was told; but did people object? No! The goods sold were not necessities for the most part, but fripperies. At breakfast my host drove home the moral. The bread was of flour milled in Cork; the bacon was from Tralee; the butter, with a taste which the imported article cannot acquire, was local produce. (For some unknown reason Ireland has never become famous for cheese.) The

Camp coffee was made in Dublin, the sugar in Mallow. The list of Irish-made goods was endless—thanks to tariffs. Irish cement and Irish tiles were on the market. All was well with Ireland: they had lost the Senate—it was a pity; but the more responsibility they put on the Government, the less likely they were to be foolish. I was anxious to get to my destination, and at my suggestion he found a lorry-driver ready to give me a seat as far as Killarney—a three-hour run. We stopped half way for some food and I showed him the following cutting from the local paper:

THRILL FOR PIGS

Fell One by One Out of Conveyance

While a lorry was conveying fat pigs through New Ross to Waterford Bacon Factory, the lower door at the rear flew open and the lorry began to shed pigs until about ten were lost. As each porker fell on to the road it seemed to be dazed for about two minutes. Then every pig picked itself up and ran in the wake of the lorry. When the lorry-driver saw what had happened he returned to retrieve his lost property, remarking that some of the poor brutes must have been wounded unto death as they were thick fat. They were all returned to the lorry, however, nothing the worse for having fallen out.

His comment was a counterpoise to the easy optimism of my friend in Cork: 'Aye—true Irish, those pigs; they followed the man who was taking them to their death. Even after he had let them down and given them a chance of life they got up dazed-like and went after him—true Irish, those pigs.' He would say no more.

From Killarney to Tralee my fellow-travellers were a bookmaker and his old assistant, who undid a sack to show me his signboard. We were alone in the compartment and the younger man talked freely: he was a Republican and proud of it; he had never been to England, though he liked the English well enough. It was enough for him that Ireland was better off now than in 1916—the year of the Easter rebellion. The poor were richer, the rich were poorer: on the average, perhaps Ireland was poorer; trade with England has fallen (it was £84,000,000 in 1924 and £25,000,000 in 1935), and no other country could take its place. But Ireland was no longer tied to England: if England got into another war, say with Italy or Germany, the Irish would know how to take advan-

tage of the situation. His companion, a man of sixty years, disagreed with him. Ireland could not live alone in the world: she had no friends anywhere. England was sorely weakened by the loss of Ireland; but the loss was mutual. Ireland was a great recruiting ground in the old days: the Irish had helped to win every war. Now they could only enlist in England, and might be marked men on their return if they did so. Four thousand youths, he read in the papers, had gone to England last year from Kerry alone to find employment. The national schools in the country were emptying: there were fewer pupils every year. De Valera had said that they would have to bring the Irish back from America to repeople Ireland and develop its industries afresh: he had taken two men off the land for every one he put into employment in industry. I left them to fight it out, interposing now and then to stir the embers of a conflict which they seemed to enjoy.

We parted company at Tralee, a great centre for pigs, which go as bacon to the Co-operative Wholesale Society in England, where it is sold retail, thanks to the bounty, cheaper than in Tralee. Then over the hills by a toy railway to Dingle, a distance of some 30 miles, in two and a half hours. This peninsula is one of the least visited and most striking parts of Ireland; the bays of Tralee and Brandon, separated only by a narrow spit of sand, are of great beauty: the clear, gaunt cliffs on the seaward side reminded me of South Persia. On the landward side runs a mountain range culminating to the east in Brandon Mountain—a climb of 3500 feet from the seashore. From Dingle I went by car round Slea Head, past the lofty, forbidding Blasket Islands, reaching Ballyferriter, not far from Smerwick Harbour, before sunset. I was the first visitor of the season but, having bought a pound of sausages and a Bologna in Tralee, was served with a good dinner at short notice.

Most of the people in this corner of Ireland talk nothing but Irish among themselves: the children do not talk or easily understand English as do their elders. Yet they are not of 'Irish' blood—they are as much mixed as the English. The village names refer to Danish invaders and of villages burnt by Danes, just as in my corner of Hertfordshire. 'The field of skulls' and some ruins testify to the cold-blooded

murder by Sir Walter Raleigh in 1588 of all Spanish survivors of the wrecked Armada he was able to find, in order to show that aggression did not pay, or to promote racial purity. Elsewhere they went—boy and man—to the gallows. Yet Spanish marks on the houses at Dingle, and Spanish names and traits, exist to show that they too have left their marks. They are known and hated to-day as inveterate poachers of fish and lobsters: the Free State patrols cannot stop them. There is one village with largely English names—a colony of migrants from another island; and the historians of 'the Kingdom' have evidence of far more extensive immigrations in yet earlier days.

The innkeeper urged me to call on 'the Canon,' a well-liked and much-respected man; I was fortunate to find him at home. He was a retired Army chaplain (Protestant), nearer eighty than seventy years of age, with a great record of war service in three continents. He had built himself a beautiful little cabin on the edge of the cliff overlooking the bay. There he and his wife lived with a little garden of their own making, a good library and many friends. His interest in his surroundings was as great as that of any young Irish patriot. Geology and Folklore, Public Health and Public Utility Societies, Old-Age Pensions and Blind Persons Rules, Unemployment Regulations and the like, he knew them all and could always help and advise when asked. He could speak Irish; his relations with the Catholic clergy and the Government officials were pleasant, and he had good things to say of both. He had stuck to his house during 'the troubles' and went unharmed everywhere. But his main interests were sea-fishing and gardening. A fine example of adaptability—of doing the best of things in the clear and gentle light of the sunset of life.

With him I saw the ruins of an Elizabethan fort, not yet taken over by the Free State Government, the ruins of St. Brandon's Chapel (well cared for to-day under Government control), and buildings of even earlier date connected with the Danish invasion. He found me safe lodging for the night at Fehonagh, close by Smerwick Harbour, dominated by the Martello tower on the cliffs 1000 feet above, built 120 years ago as part of our preparation against Napoleon. I climbed the hill and was joined at the top by two youths who had been cutting

turf for fuel. Ravens and jackdaws were nesting near, they said, and they spoke of a peregrine falcon's nest in the cliff 300 feet below. They had often been on watch for Spanish and French fishing-vessels who came in to poach; a few had been caught and fined heavily, but the Free State patrol was not strong enough these days effectively to control the depredations of poachers.

I was asked to sup early, for my hostess, and indeed every man, woman and child, was going to 'the mission' that evening and the house would be empty. Every five years, I was told, each parish in Ireland is visited by a group of 'redemptorist' fathers, whose task it is to quicken the faith of the flock during mission week. My hostess had given up her plans for a Whitsuntide trip to Killarney; few, she said, would leave the parish during the mission. It would not be right: after all, they only came once every five years. I walked out after supper, and saw hundreds of young men and boys on bicycles, and many more men and women of all ages in pony and donkey carts, converging on the church by every road from four or five miles around.

I was early afoot next day, and met the same impressive stream of folk going to High Mass, for it was Whit Sunday. Each successive group greeted me politely, or returned my salute with a pleasant smile and a nod. The first visitor in the season is, like the cuckoo, a sign that summer is near. From the tiny harbour creek of Coos the path began to climb steeply: it is an old pilgrim-way some hundreds of years old. At the top of the pass I was rewarded by a view as fine as any in the United Kingdom—north to the Shannon, south to the Blaskets, north-east to the hills between Cork and Killarney, south-east to Kenmare. I could see the very place where four vessels of the Armada were wrecked. On the north lay the Bay of Tralee, where Roger Casement landed: I knew the spot and could see it clearly. In the distance I identified the very field where last year I had picked up a flint axe, and sandhills where the horns of an Irish elk had been unearthed. Below me the Chapel of St. Brandon was clearly visible: a few hundred feet above me was his oratory, a famous place of pilgrimage whither some thirty years ago a bishop was carried in his chair amidst thousands of the faithful. Beyond was Dingle Bay, where in 1796 the French would have com-

menced the conquest of Ireland but for a timely gale; but *Efflavit Deus et dissipati sunt.*

I made my way down the steep slopes with regret. I would fain have feasted my eyes longer on the scene, but the hills were powdered with snow—a rare event at Whitsuntide—and the wind was cold. An hour or so later I was on the main road again, passing in review the whole population of Brandon on their way from church at Cloghane. The universal observance of the festivals of the Church and of communal Sunday worship is here part of the *tempo* of life, as it once was in England, and indeed in all Europe, where Christian missioners wisely retained and developed the rhythm of pagan worship. To worship God without admitting any relation between man and the universe—the succession of the seasons, the turn of the year, the times of sowing and reaping, and of mating and lambing—is to deprive worship of its true significance. Life in the city, which knows none of these things, breeds cranks and fanatics, starved of man's birthright.

I stopped on the road for a Guinness: the keeper of the house welcomed me as an old friend. 'London,' he said, 'is looking up. Hundreds of boys and girls have left these parts in the past twelve months to work there, and most of them have found work. They mostly go to London; it is the only place they know, and they help each other to get situations.' He mentioned some of the newer of London's mean suburbs and some of the worst of its oldest slums—they were mere names to him. 'We get letters,' he said, seeing my face clouded at his recital; 'many of them are sending money home: they all find work for themselves; they are of our best.'

My heart sank as I walked down the road: I felt sorry for de Valera and all idealists. On the wall of the national school I saw the freshly-painted slogan:

HONOUR THE PATRIOT DEAD:
RALLY TO THE CAUSE AND JOIN THE I.R.A.

On the little bridge across a trout stream was another war-cry:

WEAR AN EASTER LILY.
DEATH TO TRAITORS AND INFORMERS.

These and similar calls to action, however misguided, were the only advertisements I saw in a ten-mile walk along the main road. At the same hour the next day I was in the London 'Underground'; the placards there spoke of a lipstick, 'gloriously, thrillingly, wickedly red,' of imaginary remedies for fancied bodily ills and the toll of time and advancing age. Had the youth of Kerry made a good exchange? Had they not sold themselves into bondage? Were not the inscriptions of the school wall less harmful than those on the 'Tube.' 'Fear not them that kill the body.'

A young Irishman from Cork, making his first trip to England for a sure job, was standing by me as on deck we saw the last of the coast of Ireland. 'May I not return!' he said; 'there's nothing but miseries there for the likes of me: the curse of politics is on us, and there is nowhere to go but England these days.' 'Are you a Republican?' I asked. 'Sure I was,' he replied, 'but I'll be a loyaller subject of the King than my father ever was, now I know what's what. If the job fails on me I'll join the Navy or the Army, but return I will not.'

Arnold Wilson.

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THE

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DE LAUDE NOVAE MILITIAE

By Austin Hopkinson

And there was war in heaven: Michael and his angels fought against the dragon: and the dragon fought with his angels, and prevailed not.

Whether war shall be the destroyer of civilisation or the begetter of a fairer and a nobler race of men must ever, it would appear, depend upon the manner wherein it is waged. If victory be attainable only by the increase of conscripts, guns, and shells, then indeed it is a matter for doubt whether the victors will be those whose success can further the ascent of man to the gods, or those whose triumph can but bring him one step nearer to the beasts. For values which touch numbers only are not real values, and war waged, as it has been of late, by nations judging military strength by no gauge save that of magnitudes may well be fought out to the end, yet decide nothing of moment. Whereto our World War bears witness. Directed by politicians deprived of understanding, it quickly degenerated from a moral to a purely

material operation, so that no man now can say whether we or our enemy deserved to win.

Again, if the issue of war is to be decided by the depth of wickedness whereto the one or other combatant can sink, if victory must of necessity crown him who can devise the more subtile engines of torture for women and their babes, then war, no less surely than the incarnate state and far more swiftly, will send man reeling back to the jungle whence he came. Such war is no less futile than horrible. For it is to be observed that the cause of our gaining no peace after the late war is in large measure our failing to subdue our enemy in the field and our reducing him to subjection by the blockade, so that he deems himself unconquered still. Indeed, no nation will admit defeat if the spirit of its armed manhood be unbroken. Whence arise new wars.

These matters must needs occupy the minds of our rulers at this present time, when war and the making ready for war seem to exclude all other serious purposes from end to end of the earth and when war, as our generation knows it, is become a thing of unutterable horror and futility. It were well, therefore, that we should consider whether war may not be waged in a manner such that it shall become the noblest task whereto a man may set his hand. For my part I have an inclination to think that this may in truth be brought about, and that the warfare of the air may be the salvation rather than, as has heretofore been held, the inevitable doom of all mankind. This warfare would appear to be of a nature such that, unlike the land and sea combats of to-day, it can give victory to a nation which, though few in numbers, breeds men strong in mind and great of soul.

No other justification of war is possible. If it be not the supreme testing of the moral and spiritual qualities of the combatants, if it remain no more than a matter of cannons and cannon fodder, if, in short, man allow himself to become in war the slave of the machine as he has done in peace, then indeed it were better to curse God and die than live to witness the beginnings of the return of man to the beasts which perish. For, let there be no doubt on this matter, the human race has come to the parting of the ways. The desire for material security has served its purpose and, being the motive power of biological evolution through the ages, has

at length engendered man, conscious of himself yet doomed to perish with the physical universe unless he can bring himself to put aside things which are seen and temporal and prepare for that new stage of evolution wherein the motive power shall be the desire for things which are unseen and eternal. Man has adapted himself so skilfully to his surroundings that he may hope in due time to gain complete material security, and then most surely die with a universe whereof the inevitable end is death.

Most peoples are still drunken with the idea that material security is the supreme good and have shown themselves ready to submit to any degradation of the individual if thereby to-morrow's dinner may be more fully assured to him. Even among our own countrymen still linger relics of an atavism which cries aloud for 'safety first,' forgetful that safety is but another word for death, involving, as I have already premised, complete identification of man with a physical universe which, whatever else it be, is certainly mortal, so that he gains the whole world only to destroy his own soul and loses his life by saving it. The foxes have holes and the birds of the air have nests, but the son of man hath not where to lay his head: which is to say that material security is man's link with the doomed animal creation, and insecurity his path to life eternal.

Inasmuch, therefore, as safety is death and danger is life, it would appear that one or other among the nations taking its stand must resist even by force of arms the well-nigh universal turn toward reversion by the path of material security. That we are especially called to that great work is manifest. As a nation we have all, and more than all, that we desire. Thus beyond every other race have we the power, an we possess the will, to bring mankind to the contemplation of that life which is life indeed. Let upstart peoples of yesterday boast their numbers and their wealth. We have grown old in nationhood, and have no call to assert our importance claiming the envy or the admiration of others. Youth, with the desires and ambitions befitting that estate, is gone, and it is for us to seek that wisdom which becomes our ripened age. But let it be observed that, in the world of to-day, the art of mass-suggestion is brought to a perfection so high that those who by force have made

themselves rulers can so control the nurture of their subje
as to render them unable to think otherwise than as th
overlords command. Wherefore it would appear that c
new world can be built only by a nation holding in the
hand the trowel of true wisdom and in the other hand
blade bestowed by one who came not to bring peace bu
sword. We must, then, be prepared to fight, that those w
come after us may not be perverted to the coward cre
which threatens man with reversion at the very crisis of l
history when a new and higher stage of evolution begins
open out before him.

For my part I hold that the matter first to be put to t
gage of battle is whether gods or fiends shall rule the a
Heretofore it has been the opinion of all that the warfare
the air must needs be a war of devils, wherein either cc
batant strives to outdo the cruel wickedness of the oth
to cast more hideous forms of death upon the defencele
and by the more subtile ingenuity of his tortures the mo
surely to achieve his evil intent. We have been told,
truly told, that our enemy will fill the air above our crowc
cities with winged squadrons raining death upon us, so t
innocent children by thousands may suddenly be rent
bloody fragments or slowly burnt to death in agony befo
their mothers' eyes. We have been told, but falsely a
believe, that we have no means of averting this hell of angu
and destruction save by inventing more exquisite torme
for the unarmed population of our enemy and by train
the very flower of our youth to lay aside every restraint
honour, decency and chivalry, that they may thus make
themselves devils even fouler than their foes.

In such warfare we should manifestly be at grave c
advantage, since our great centres of population lie near
the sea, while those peoples who may become our enem
are guarded by long tracts of land affording scope for ob
vation of our invading aircraft and for their intercepti
But our chief disadvantage, may Heaven be thanked, lie
the unutterable disgust wherewith the youth of our nat
regards that cruel cowardice which war so vile deman
Happenings of late in Africa have shown that there are
Europeans who take delight in torturing the defenceless
can boast themselves heroes in that they dare to strew poi

from a safe height—as, indeed, is to be expected of Latins. Yet Teutons also have shown, and that not many years ago, that even a great martial race is not always averse from making war on the defenceless. In such a conflict we must needs fail, if by being less barbarous than our enemy we deserve success.

Let us, then, first free our minds from the opinion that war henceforward cannot be other than the attempt so to terrorise helpless peoples, by horror on horror piled, that they sue for peace. Our traditional maxim holds good for air warfare in like measure as it does for war on land or sea. To destroy the armed force of our enemy must still be our sole aim, and naught else must be permitted to turn us to the one side or the other and to waste our energies. Now, as in the past, our tactics must be devoted without respite to searching out the armed foe and destroying him, so that we win our peace, not through the agonies of murdered babes, but by breaking the spirit of their tormentors. Wherefore, when war comes upon us, let our youth

> with obscure wing
> Scout far and wide into the realm of night

to seek the devils of the air

> Hovering on wing under the cope of hell
> 'Twixt upper, nether, and surrounding fires,

and hurl them

> headlong flaming from th' ethereal sky
> With hideous ruin and combustion, down
> To bottomless perdition.

With this vision before their unseeing eyes men forsooth can bring themselves to say that war can have no glory and no loveliness, that the material must ever rule the spiritual, and that man henceforth must live by bread alone. They do not understand that, for our nation at the least, the long night of the nineteenth century reaches its end, and a new generation demands some aim in life other than to

> . . . go on from day to day
> Getting a little fatter.

For dwellers on earth night still invests the sea and wished morn delays. But we who mount up on wings as eagles already see our pinions glow, touched by the rosy fingers of

a dawn fair beyond man's imagining. It may be that the clouds beneath will burst in thunder ere the morning come, and that the secret of life and love, which seems at times about to be revealed to him who scales the skies alone, will only be made manifest in war. Above the clouds we learn in part to feel the utter loneliness of him who seeks, for love of man, to bear the sorrows and the sins of all mankind. Looking upon the sacred symbols formed by outspread wings and bodies of aerial steeds, we for the moment know that man never transcends his manhood save when crucified. The vision fades as we return in safety to the busy world, yet war may bring that vision to reality at last. For that new warfare, which I praise, will at the least enable one to give his life as ransom for many, and perchance, falling on flaming cross to earth, to know himself incarnate God indeed.

Can we conceive a higher hope than this, and is there indeed, despite the ingenious compromises of orthodoxy, any alternative for man save to become God or to perish—

> . . . swallow'd up and lost
> In the wide womb of uncreated night,
> Devoid of sense and motion ?

Now, concerning the method of our warfare, if, as I believe, there is no sure defence save in attack, it were well to consider by what means we may bring the enemy to battle and destroy him. First, we must be made aware betimes of his approach and of his numbers. This task is already undertaken by our scientists, who undoubtedly have achieved much, and may indeed by now be prepared to give us timely warning of invasion from the air. Secondly, we must be able to confine the enemy, thus found, within certain limits of space. The need to be above the target holds him bound in two dimensions. In a third he has more freedom. But, as I believe, already we have devised means whereby that liberty is becoming more and more straitened. So that, if success crowns our efforts, we may be assured that his squadrons will be found within a space whose bounds are definitely known to us.

Thus our new warfare, in whose praise I write, may well enable science, of late degraded to the service of indiscriminate and horrid murder, to regain her honour and to make her

contribution to the founding of a better and a nobler age. For upon an enemy thus marked and circumscribed we can let loose our winged avengers, hot to extirpate that monstrous vermin, happy to have a quarry for whom pity were a crime. To find, to view, and to engage the enemy, these are the aims which science has brought within reach of our achievement, and daily makes more sure. For my part I have so great a trust in our youth that I doubt not that an enemy discovered is an enemy destroyed. And if, under God's providence, no unit of any bombing squadron which reaches our shores ever returns to tell the tale, there is no need for us to make war on women and children.

It were of course foolish by writing here to tell our enemy the nature of the tactical schemes whereby in actual battle we shall destroy him. It is enough if we admit that they demand, for their success, qualities of body and soul in our young men higher than those which any former kind of warfare has required. Despite all that has been said in these latter days concerning the degeneracy of our race, we still can breed lads possessing to the full those qualities and in numbers large enough to serve our purpose. We can now mount them on winged steeds worthy of such riders and better by far than those of their enemies. All that remains, therefore, is that we older men and women shall give them the inspiration and the supreme confidence in their mission which will enable them without fear and without hate to do those deeds which will enwrap their foes in quivering, anguished, shrieking terror in the face of awful and inevitable death.

We need no symbols and no metaphors wherein to extol this our new warfare. It is in very truth the contest between light and darkness, Ormazd and Ahriman, Herakles and Death. But I would have the reader understand that I ask for no new Military Order bound by a three-fold vow of feigned poverty, slavish obedience, and soul-destroying chastity. In these matters all history warns us how surely the form killeth the spirit which should give life to such a brotherhood. To acquire the necessary skill at arms, to go straight for the enemy, and not to let the other fellow down, these are the principles of the unchartered league of youth which has long existed in our nation, and we desire no

stronger or more formal bond. It would ill become our young men with public oath and solemn ritual to pledge themselves to that great service. Better it were that each, as is the custom of our youth, should for himself in solitude decide what part shall be his in the high emprise and, by what measure of unshaken faith upheld, to what achievement he may vow himself. For here, indeed, are dragons to be slain, and here are fair ladies to be rescued. That in itself should send young champions gaily a-wooing death in aerial fight—only to find, in battle with the hosts of hell, eternal life.

Land warfare between conscript armies has become horrible and utterly irrational. Dragged, it may be, from weeping wife and child, unwillingly each combatant is forced, he knows not why, to strive to maim or kill another like himself and thus to bring sorrow untold upon some distant house. Nor, as I have already written, can any matter of real moment be decided by means thus barbarous, though the innocent be given over to starvation and, sin without pardon, organised lying breed cold hatred where no hatred should exist. Indeed, war can never be other than vile save when in arms one nation learns to hate another less, as we with our late enemy. To me it would appear better to kill a man and not to hate him than to hate a man and not to kill him. For gods may slay, but only devils hate.

In the new warfare, to which the flower of our youth is called, the matter stands far otherwise than in a war of conscripts. It is not asked that any deed be wrought for which a man need ever know remorse. Free men alone are fit to wage this war wherein there is no place for fear or hate, but only for unflinching purpose never to desist from killing till the sky, purged from pollution by that loathly brood, is clean again. Nor, as was done nine centuries ago, do we design to offer bribes of easy absolution for all enlisting in this new crusade. Men's sins should ever be their own affair, and it is for each to judge whether by service in a holy war his offence be expiated and his pardon earned. For we believe that there is no validity in any absolution save that which one after due trial may justly give himself, and that no Bishop of any Rome hath jurisdiction in this realm of a man's own soul.

Wherefore if any man among you have a son such as we need, eager to fit himself to serve in this our war against the infidel, let him think twice before with cold discouragement he quench the shy but generous ardour of the boy. For surely this is no time in which to take thought for the morrow, planning with anxious care a safe and opulent career when all mankind is trembling on the abysmal brink of war. Even if yet a few more years of peace were sure, would you have him make his world a stage, there continuing to play successive parts as infant, schoolboy, lover, soldier, justice, slippered pantaloon, up to the final scene of second childishness and mere oblivion? Would you have him grow old as we that are old grew old, whom age already withers and the years condemn? If the air calls him, were it not well that he should answer it and, borne on the wings of the morning in laughing contest with his peers, strive to be first to see the vision and to hail the dawn. For, as old Plato said,

> those who have once begun the heavenward pilgrimage may not go down again to darkness and the journey beneath the earth, but they live in light always, happy companions in their pilgrimage; and when the time comes at which they receive their wings, they have the same plumage because of their love.

When one, with heart hardened in business and his head in politics, presumes, as I have done, to take the title and the theme of great Cistercian Bernard, he must needs expect to feel the lashes laid upon him by the outraged orthodox. It will be said that I in arrogance assume the prophet's mantle impudently filched, whenas I claim no more than to have touched his garment's hem. I care not what they say; but hard indeed to bear will be the charge that, from the safe retreat which age and my infirmities afford, to others I commend dangers far greater than any encountered in those former wars wherein I took my wounds—a charge to which, alas! there is no answer.

AUSTIN HOPKINSON.

THE ITALO-ABYSSINIAN WAR

By Lieut.-Colonel H. de Watteville, C.B.E. (late R.A.)

The entire course of the Italo-Abyssinian War has been so obscured by political and other influences that a clear comprehension of the military events of the past eight months in Abyssinia has become most difficult to obtain. Even in circles that might be regarded as most competent to judge, there would seem to have prevailed some misapprehension as to the significance of the military phenomena which the conduct of this war has revealed. That circumstance, however, may not be altogether so strange, since the collapse of Abyssinia surprised even the Italian General Staff, who had estimated the duration of the campaign at a minimum of at least two years. But in England a somewhat similar and sceptical attitude had already prevailed in the case of the Japanese operations in Manchukuo, and still more during the subsequent annexation of Jehol. In a case of this nature it may be difficult indeed to stifle personal sympathy and to overcome prejudice. Nevertheless, in spite of such impediments, it seems urgent to examine this Italian enterprise in a perfectly dispassionate spirit and to discover the purely military characteristics of a truly remarkable campaign; otherwise it will never be understood how far the resources of science and industry can revolutionise the art of conducting what has been designated as 'a small war.'

In more recent times—in British military circles, at least—the conception of the 'small war' has more and more tended to be bound up with the problem of the North-West Frontier of India; and this conception has further been coloured by the varying opinions that have been put forward concerning the respective *rôles* to be allotted to ground forces and to aircraft in any undertaking of this type. Consequently it became natural for British military critics to judge the

Abyssinian campaign from the more conservative standpoint of the Frontier expert, and, in applying the lessons of the past, to stress the natural obstacles in the path of the invader without taking into sufficient account all the means now available to minimise, if not to overcome, those selfsame obstacles. Still more has it been usual to consider the combatant value of the Abyssinian warriors through Indian-coloured glasses. If such was the attitude of the military critic, what have not been the views of the Press? With one or two outstanding exceptions the tone of the daily journals has been such that any thorough analysis of the campaign has not been forthcoming. To quote but one instance: on March 30 *The Times* published a leading article which made it appear doubtful whether the Italian armies were making as much headway into Abyssinia as was being asserted in Italy. It was virtually ignored that as far back as March 4 the three main Abyssinian armies were in full flight and on the high road to dissolution. Moreover, on that identical day, March 30, an Italian column was actually entering the reputedly inaccessible town of Gondar, in northern Abyssinia. Such a misreading of the situation was not lost on the German military Press, which duly pilloried the misplaced 'derision' of the British military expert.

It is, of course, true that the actual fighting that took place during this campaign was not of a nature that could afford very many lessons of a startling nature. The Abyssinian combatant had been overestimated, and that even by the Italian General Staff. Had the Abyssinians been the Arab tribesmen of Libya, the campaign would have followed a far different course: such was the openly expressed opinion of Italian officers. The latter, however, never made the mistake of underrating their enemy. A careful study of the French and Spanish operations in the Riff and in Morocco had formed the groundwork of the preliminary study for the Abyssinian campaign. In particular, the use made by the French of armoured and unarmoured automobile vehicles, as well as of aircraft, had been analysed in detail: similarly the Japanese operations in Manchuria and in Jehol. In fact it might almost be said that Graziani's manœuvres in Somaliland had been moulded on the patterns evolved in

Morocco and the East. Consequently it is entirely fallacious to maintain that, because the Abyssinian fighting organisation and procedure proved to be of low military value, there is nothing to be learnt from the campaign. Indeed, from the purely military point of view, there is the all-important conclusion to be drawn that modern resources are capable of application to the most unpromising theatres of war with devastating effect; further, that large armies can be profitably employed in most difficult country if supported by a modern technique of transport and supply. In short, the entire art of conducting a 'small war' may, in certain circumstances, require to be drastically revised.

In order to understand the nature of the undertaking on which Italy embarked, as well as the results which she achieved, it is as well to review the salient features of the campaign, beginning with the organisation of the expeditionary force which was to be employed. Possessing no regular forces, except the small Libyan and Eritrean establishments, nor any long-service troops, the Italian General Staff was constrained to draw upon the normal army. This was done by mobilising seven regular divisions, by creating six divisions out of Fascist militia volunteers for service overseas, and eventually by the formation of one division of selected *Alpini*, or mountain troops. In addition, at least three divisions of Libyan and Eritrean troops were raised. Lastly, a vast number of special units of armoured cars, tanks, flame-throwers and such like were formed and sent overseas. Subsequently, as the campaign progressed, these forces were increased by a considerable number of Libyan and Eritrean levies, local irregulars and Somali friendly tribesmen. But these reinforcements did not enter into the original composition of the East African army, although the preliminary political work and propaganda of the Italian authorities in Abyssinia may have shown that such accretions of strength might assuredly be expected. Indeed, the combination of political and military measures proved a strong point of this campaign from the outset. But this was not all; actual military preparation in Italy went hand in hand with a most complete organisation of the port of Massowa and of the higher-lying and more salubrious town of Asmara to fulfil the function of a base for any forces invading

Abyssinia, whilst a thorough preparation of the lines of communication was taken in hand.

As early as January 1935 General dall' Ora, perhaps the most competent administrative staff officer of the Italian army, was appointed to command the base and lines of communication for any army that might be sent to Eritrea. At Massowa this officer accomplished remarkable work. The harbour was gradually transformed, and buildings, hospitals, roads, ice factories, and cable railways were all erected on a lavish scale. In one year the capacity of Massowa for dealing with armed forces was probably quadrupled, whilst chaos was ultimately reduced to something resembling order. But the process was laborious, and the beginning of hostilities found confusion still reigning at Massowa. From that moment things gradually improved, although the difficulties of the climate caused some anxiety and progress was still slow. Foreign observers, although undoubtedly correct in their appreciation of the state of affairs in the back areas during the late autumn and winter of 1935, were not making sufficient allowance for the possibility of the improvement that followed in 1936.

The first order for mobilisation was promulgated in Italy on February 10, 1935: two regular divisions were thereby called up and the formation of Fascist militia units was authorised. Other similar orders followed in March and May, whilst the last formations to be called up were summoned by the last and fifth mobilisation order issued on August 6. In addition, special units were formed; reserve officers and non-commissioned officers were recalled to the colours; special courses of instruction were instituted for all ranks. Besides the troops required for East Africa, special garrisons were despatched to the islands of the Dodecanese in order to form a medical base for the Abyssinian expedition whilst the local coast defences were strengthened and mobilised. In the Libyan colony the work of military preparation was proportionately thorough and on a large scale. Three divisions from Italy were eventually despatched across the Mediterranean, these movements being kept entirely secret, in contradistinction to the despatch of troops to East Africa; in the latter case the passage of ships through the Suez Canal rendered concealment of military intentions largely

futile. Yet even this great military manifestation was not the whole sum of Italy's effort. From the very outset of the dispute over the Walwal incident in December 1935 it had been foreseen that any Italian attempt to obtain satisfaction by force of arms might lead to European complications. In order to meet any contingency of such a nature, Italy undertook what was virtually a double mobilisation—that is, every formation sent to East Africa or out of Italy was replaced at home by a 'second-line' body of troops. This measure resembled the process whereby at the outbreak of the Great War the divisions of the Territorial Force were duplicated by the creation of second-line formations. The result of these various mobilisations in Italy was that by the end of 1935 this Power was maintaining under arms a total of at least 1,250,000 men, if not as many as 1,500,000, when the figures for navy, army, air force, native troops and labour corps serving at home or abroad are added together.

As against these manifestations of armed force, directed towards Europe no less than towards Ethiopia, the League of Nations could array little more than discussions, gestures and, in the end, the enforcement of economic sanctions. By the time that the latter came to be applied the Italians had been mobilising for nearly eight months; they had spent huge sums on military enterprises at Massowa and Asmara, in Eritrea; they had despatched nearly 400,000 men to East Africa. To wait until the 'aggressor' had committed a first act of hostilities, after having enjoyed eight months' respite during which to proceed with a large mobilisation and to initiate a huge scheme of active operations, would now appear to border on rank ineptitude. By October 1935 Italy was far too deeply committed to the Abyssinian adventure to withdraw. The development of her armed forces by these openly declared mobilisations had placed her in a very strong position as regards the rest of Europe. Her financial situation alone might have caused her anxiety. The lack of unanimity as to the imposition of sanctions and the lack of enthusiasm with which they were imposed went far to cripple any effective result they might ultimately achieve. Nevertheless, towards the turn of the year the Italian position was none too easy; only a rapidly gained success in Abyssinia could render it safe against all eventualities.

The situation was then, in fact, highly illuminating. Ever since war has been growing more costly, and ever since it has involved more far-reaching internal consequences, there has been manifest a greater disinclination for certain States to envisage any action that would seem likely to lead to war. The phenomenon is not new; it has been growing for the past sixty years; it was exemplified in the German action at Agadir in 1911, and will doubtless be seen again. That precedent is not far from amounting to a diplomatic game of poker in which one player has decided to back his own readiness for war against an opponent who has little relish for a military adventure that might in any way damage his economic position in the world. To reply to even a veiled threat of war in such a situation by an imposition of sanctions is much like the proverbial locking of the door when the horse has long left the stable. To be the winner in such a game there is only required a superior state of readiness for war. The process, which is one not far distant from political blackmail, has gained in potency in proportion as the possibility of surprise aerial attack has heightened the fear of that *attaque brusquée* from the air which is the skeleton in the cupboard of French 'security.' Superiority in the air, as the Abyssinian war has shown, is the most deadly method of winning a war in the minimum of time with the minimum of effort. How far a victory won by these means is equivalent to winning a war in the widest sense of the term is not so clear. But so long as a short and sharp campaign seems to offer some adequate return for the effort made, for the cost in life and for treasure expended, so long may that condition well seem to render war a remunerative act. Therein lies the main threat to the peace of the world. It yet remains to be seen how far the Italo-Abyssinian campaign will point the same moral as the Great War—namely, the degree to which modern States may indulge in the pastime of war without its economic or social consequences ultimately recoiling upon their own heads.

On October 3 the order was issued for the invasion of Abyssinia by the Italian armies. The first rush to Adowa had been planned long beforehand: to extinguish the memory of the defeat of 1896 had been the insistent desire of every Italian soldier and the avowed goal of Fascist policy. But

although the occupation of Adowa was effected without the encounter of any abnormal difficulty beyond such as were offered by Nature, the Italians, once in possession of the town, showed some hesitation to advance. Their situation, in fact, appeared to be none too brilliant; the Abyssinian fighting potential was as yet largely unknown; the remembrance of the defeat of 1896 brooded in the air; the lines of communication were in disorder. In spite of it, a further advance to Makale was ordered at the end of October, as soon as some progress could be made with road construction. Still the Abyssinian opposition remained intangible. In spite of disordered and incomplete communications Makale was reached and surrounded with field fortifications. But it was by now perfectly clear that Fascist enthusiasm and even an improving state of affairs was not enough to win the war. Very wisely at this juncture it was decided to replace the commander-in-chief in East Africa, General de Bono, by Marshal Badoglio. The change in command soon proved justified. General de Bono had left the regular army shortly after the Great War in order to become a leader of Fascism, a task which he had well fulfilled. But in the serious problems of a difficult campaign there could be little room for Fascist exuberance, when only a far-sighted military brain would serve. The imposition of sanctions, incomplete as it was, had greatly heightened the need for rapidity of action, even though sanctions had united Italy and strengthened the desire for victory to an unforeseen extent.

The task confronting Marshal Badoglio was far from easy. The Italian communications and supply system were still in confusion. There was discontent in the labour corps then at work on the construction of roads, whilst the calculations, on which this work was based, had not made adequate allowance for the difficulties encountered. Entire divisions of troops were turned over to road-building duties, and, to the great credit of the Italian army, the hardy peasants from Sardinia, Calabria and other mountainous agricultural parts of Italy responded in striking fashion to the calls made on them. In December, however, the Abyssinians had grown more active. At two points on the long-drawn-out Italian front they attempted to launch an attack which, in many respects, could be regarded as most menacing to the still

precarious Italian communications. Shortly before Christmas Ras Imru, perhaps the most competent Abyssinian leader, launched an attack on the Degembina Pass. This pass is situated in the province of Shire, in the north-west of Abyssinia not so far from the Sudanese frontier. The Abyssinian line of attack even threatened Aksum and pointed to a possible invasion of Eritrea. This threat caused the Italians much anxiety, but in the end, owing to the Abyssinian incapacity to conduct mobile operations, the danger passed away. Nothing serious happened, except a fierce two-day encounter in which the Italians gave up some ground and only warded off the Abyssinian blow when the latter senselessly threw themselves on the rearward line of Italian entrenchments. After that the Abyssinian stroke petered out. Similarly, and at much the same time, the Abyssinians made an attack on the Italians at Abbi Addi, some short distance north-west of Makale. Here again the Italians found themselves in an awkward position on the Wariew Pass and, after three days' fighting, withdrew to their second line of fortification. In both cases the Italian aircraft had played a considerable part in stemming the Abyssinian advance: it was probably due to their intervention in both these battles that the Abyssinians seem to have given up the desire to undertake any further offensive movements. They retired into certain well-defined strong positions and allowed the Italians free movement beyond a limited radius from those positions. Road-building by the invader went on unhindered.

Favoured by this respite, Badoglio thereupon evolved a great three-fold manœuvre by which he planned to destroy the three main Abyssinian armies. In view of the complete immobility of his enemy, he was able to act in a manner that would have been utterly misplaced in other circumstances. Although the opposition which he foresaw proved to be, in many respects, of a mediocre order, the conception of the manœuvre, and the boldness with which it was carried out in the face of enormous natural difficulties, will stamp Badoglio as a military leader of real merit. If his plan failed to mature in entirety, the ensuing aerial pursuit of the Abyssinian armies broke up their resistance so effectively that they soon ceased to exist. The eventual victory was as complete as that which Allenby gained after the battle of Megiddo in 1918.

Profiting from the large forces he had at his disposal as well as exploiting to the full the weaknesses of the Abyssinians, he grouped his divisions and army corps into three separate entities, one such entity opposing each of the three armies into which the Abyssinian forces had crystallised and lapsed into virtual immobility. The first and largest Italian force was massed due south of Makale facing the army of Ras Mulugeta that was holding the lofty flat-topped ridge of Amba Adaram (10,000 feet). Against this six-mile-long feature Badoglio massed seven divisions, supported by a considerable artillery and 200 aeroplanes. As soon as the mountain should be carried, Badoglio proposed to split the attacking force. The right-hand army corps, the third, was to wheel due west and proceed to Gela, a junction of valleys and roads where all communications from the Abyssinian forces in the Tembien passed through to reach Dessie and Addis Ababa. Once in possession of this point the third corps was again to make a right-angled wheel northwards. It would thus be facing the Eritrean army corps which should then be moving southwards. To the east the two Italian corps were to be linked by an existing line of strongly fortified posts. By this manœuvre Badoglio proposed to encircle the army of Ras Seyum and Ras Kassa in a vast net, leaving an outlet only to the west. Simultaneously in Shire a somewhat similar manœuvre was to take place whereby the second and fourth corps were to catch the third Abyssinian army, that of Ras Imru, in front and in flank; but in this case the operation necessitated a most severe march across extremely rugged country being carried out by the fourth corps. The entire scheme was dependent on an adequate supply of the troops by means of lorries working over the newly-made roads. It also depended on the large number of aircraft at Badoglio's disposal, since the supply of the troops by air when moving far from the roads was an inevitable part of the plan. Moreover, if defeated, the Abyssinian armies were to be broken up by a merciless aerial pursuit.

This great scheme worked out well, although not altogether as its contriver had hoped. On February 10 the attack on Amba Adaram began; it was slow and methodical, for, although the Abyssinians attempted two by no means

negligible counter-attacks, they allowed the Italians to improve tracks, to bring up artillery, and, generally speaking, to carry out their manœuvre at their leisure. On February 15 the Italians had occupied the ridge, but failed to encircle their enemy as they had proposed to do. As things turned out, they had greater difficulty in scaling the heights than was foreseen, while the wings closed too slowly inwards. No pursuit was attempted, but 170 aeroplanes set out next day and rained bombs on the retreating Abyssinians until they broke and ran in wild disorder for twenty-five miles. On the following days the bulk of the Italian force advanced with great circumspection, whilst the third corps carried out its difficult manœuvre. This was completed quite successfully on February 28, but the deliberation with which progress was made allowed Ras Seyum to slip out of the trap.

Ras Kassa, on the other hand, stood and fought with determination. Slowly the two Italian corps, third and Eritrean, moved towards one another. Three days' fighting ensued before the outer wings of the two corps met, with the result that a part of Ras Kassa's army was caught. Aircraft took up the pursuit of the Abyssinian forces, which gradually broke up. During this battle a group of *Alpini* and selected mountain climbers in brilliant fashion scaled the lofty crags of Amba Uork and thereby surprised the Abyssinian machine-gunners on the summit. By this feat the advance of the Eritrean corps over the Wariew Pass became possible. The third part of Badoglio's plan was carried out at the same time in Shire. Here the second and fourth corps were manœuvring to catch the army of Ras Imru in a trap. The fourth corps, moving from the north across most difficult terrain, was late. Ras Imru, showing a military capacity quite unusual among the Abyssinian commanders, judged that this Italian fourth corps could not strike him in useful time; so he threw his entire command against the left, the most remote, Italian flank, and nearly scored a success. But artillery and aeroplanes once more told their tale; the Abyssinians, unable to face modern weapons, gave way. The aeroplanes took up the pursuit, and Ras Imru's forces melted away.

The way was now everywhere clear for an Italian move. But the question of communications dominated all else. Although some 70,000 animals were being used for pack

transport, and although aircraft were employed to supply entire divisions by means of parachutes, neither field artillery nor armoured vehicles could be brought up without the construction of roads. The troops were therefore set to the task of road construction, while Badoglio himself led a column of 80,000 men along the road to Dessie. Progress was slow. By the end of March Badoglio's seven divisions, now totalling only 60,000 men, were approaching Lake Ashangi when it was reported that the last Abyssinian army, comprising the Abyssinian Guard and commanded by the Negus in person, was coming forward to meet the invader. Badoglio then had four divisions at hand, whilst three were strung out on the road behind him. With his four leading divisions he started fortifying the lofty ridge crossed by the Mecan Pass and there decided to await the Abyssinians, considering that the Negus would assuredly attack him.

This indeed came to pass on March 31. The Abyssinians attacked the whole Italian line with great gallantry. The Abyssinian Guard made straight for the Italian right, held by the division of *Alpini*. Meeting with strong resistance, they attempted again and again to break the Italian line. But their bravery only led to heavy loss. On the Italian left, held by a native Eritrean division, the Abyssinians made far more impression: in fact they penetrated into the Italian position, killing many European officers. But as the daylight faded the Abyssinians relaxed their efforts. Thankful for the respite, the Italians began strengthening their position. Not until Badoglio himself, flying his own aeroplane, discerned the nature of the Abyssinian repulse did the Italians begin to advance on April 2. They could do so in safety, for their enemy, after abandoning field guns and all other material, was retreating fast. One more half-hearted attempt to stave off total defeat was the last resistance offered by the Abyssinians. The aircraft, which, owing to the weather, had been unable to intervene in the battle of March 31 except at great risk, took up the pursuit with the inevitable end. In place of the original name of 'Mai Ceu' the Italians now gave the battle the more resounding title of 'Lake Ashangi' and moved forward again. As far as any organised opposition was to be encountered, the war was over. The Negus had lost all hold over his people and the Italians had only to fear

sporadic resistance and weather. How far military victory would be equivalent to conquest of the country was quite another question, and one which time alone will answer.

In the meantime, Badoglio decided to take full advantage of the situation. At the head of 20,000 men—half Italian, half Eritrean—he drove straight on to Addis Ababa. In two columns, with the greater part of his men carried on 1600 lorries, he pushed onwards slowly but steadily. The weather began to break and the difficulties of the road grew worse. The formidable Termaber Pass (10,000 feet) was traversed after a great struggle; the lorries had to be moved by hand for two days on end. At one spot a rough stone wall had to be built over a distance of 40 yards and to a height of 100 feet in order to carry the road. The engineers and men working at this construction were slung by ropes from above. On the far side of the pass the lorries sank into mud 2 feet deep. The entire force was at times working on the road: this was only possible because there was no opposition. It was no longer war, but a test of road-building capacity and of human endurance. Here the Italian peasant excelled. Badoglio's actual words are worth quoting:

> I followed the troops myself at every step, and I was able to see with my own eyes what every man achieved in this headlong endeavour to bring forward this huge mass of 1600 lorries on an unknown track. Thanks to their efforts, we reached our goal after a march which has no parallel in military annals. Yet it succeeded in the teeth of every expert prediction; and what is more, it succeeded with regularity and rapidity in the face of undreamed-of natural difficulties of ground and of weather. I prophesy that in history to come this march shall be known as the 'march of the will of iron.'

It was a remarkable feat, even though it is possible that, in view of the absence of resistance, a smaller column marching on foot might have reached Addis Ababa in less time, if supply by aeroplane had been practised. Throughout the Italian movements it had become clear that the hastily built roads were likely to prove more lasting wherever the traffic was reduced. It is possible that the total of 1600 lorries was the very maximum that could be profitably employed on such a task. Except for the weather, the Italians were fortunate. So Addis Ababa was occupied on May 5, and thus ended the campaign, properly speaking.

Meanwhile in Somaliland an invasion of Abyssinia in a northerly direction had been in progress since the outbreak of war. In this case the country was entirely different, so the Italians organised their forces on a different basis. Here armoured cars, tanks and motor-borne infantry, supported by numerous aircraft, formed the bulk of the invading army. These were supported by native levies and friendly tribesmen mounted on camels. The operations in Somaliland are neither so well known in detail, nor do they seem to have been productive of such decisive results excepting for the defeat of Ras Desta's forces by Graziani's motorised forces in January in the battle of the Ganale Doria. In this case the Abyssinian leader advanced along the Kenya frontier in a slow and seemingly purposeless fashion, although in his manœuvre there may have been some thought of outflanking the Italians from the west. Graziani divided his whole forces into five columns and initiated a series of operations which aimed, in the first instance, at separating as widely as possible the army of Ras Desta in the west from the remaining Abyssinian forces in the east. When this should be accomplished he proposed to allow Ras Desta to move further southward until he might launch three separate columns against his enemy from the east. The plan succeeded entirely. Graziani, himself leading his main column of 7000 men and 1100 vehicles, wheeled round into the Abyssinian army with deadly effect. The aircraft greatly facilitated the Italian success. The pursuit of the broken Abyssinians was continued by armoured cars and aeroplanes until the rugged foothills put a limit to the movement of the vehicles.

Apart from this signal success, the interest of the Somaliland operations lies chiefly in such technical questions as the best type of armoured car or tank for desert warfare, and the use of cistern-lorries for the conveyance of water or petrol. In the main, the leadership on this front never attained to the same high level as on the Eritrean side. Graziani may have carried out a well-conceived stroke against Ras Desta in January, but he never displayed the same powers of leadership as Badoglio ; neither did he convert a seemingly bad situation into one that brought decisive success in its train. His personality did not seem to impress his troops to the same degree. Still, his victory over Ras Desta in

January can be said to have marked the turning-point in the war.

The salient lessons of the campaign are less of a purely military nature than such as apply to the statesman and to other authorities charged with the planning of expeditions in backward regions. The first and the greatest of these lessons is the value of the aeroplane in operations of this type. Not until the Italian aircraft had taken the measure of their task and possessed sufficient aerodromes and landing grounds did they show their real power. It is, of course, true that there was no opposing air force and that ground defences were worse than indifferent. On the other hand, there were difficulties of altitude and of navigation across mountainous country to overcome. Still, the dissolution of the Abyssinian armies can be ascribed almost wholly to the action of the aeroplane. That chemical projectiles were employed admits of no doubt; of the ethical question that their use raises it is not proposed to speak. It will merely be suggested that high explosive missiles, particularly if fitted with delay-action fuzes, would have proved equally demoralising. The destruction of the Turkish armies after the battle of Megiddo was accomplished in this fashion. Much misunderstanding exists as to the real value of the chemical bomb. In the field there is no doubt as to its value for denying the passage of certain defiles or areas to an enemy. The modern Russian army is lavishly equipped for chemical warfare of this nature, and other nations unhesitatingly contemplate the use of the chemical weapon. But elsewhere than in field operations against troops, in the bombardment of towns it may well turn out that high explosive and, still more, incendiary bombs are far more to be feared. Such, at any rate, was the oft-repeated and considered opinion of captured German aviators during the Great War. The modern incendiary bomb is a far more formidable instrument, which, moreover, was largely unknown during the Great War. The recent bombing of Harrar, in Abyssinia, fully illustrates the danger that is inherent in that mode of attack: fire is more deadly than gas in the attack of closely packed buildings.

Secondly, this war has shown conclusively that large numbers of troops can be profitably employed in very diffi-

cult country. And their use brings new factors into play: skilful strategy begins to assume a greater *rôle* in the conduct of the 'small war'; it has always been felt that the single column advancing towards an obvious objective is at a disadvantage when faced by a nimble adversary skilled in hill warfare. That, it is true, is precisely where the Abyssinians failed. On the other hand, by having large forces at his disposal Badoglio's movements were able to threaten at several points, with the result of a complete paralysis seizing his enemy. It is clearly a question of adapting the means to the end.

This leads to the further teaching that large forces require a road system of some capacity behind them to enable mechanical transport to supply their needs. The road-building achievements of the Italians in this campaign are perhaps among the most remarkable of all time. At one moment Badoglio had no less than 125,000 of his troops employed on constructing the road leading from Makale to Dessie, in addition to numerous specially raised pioneer battalions, labour corps and civilian contractors. It is legitimate for the Italians to be as proud of this side of the war as of any other of its aspects. Still, it must be remembered that this road construction was never interrupted by aerial attack.

But above all there stands out the magnitude of the effort made by the Italian nation as a whole to obtain such a victory of their arms in Abyssinia. Even though no truly great battles were fought, although Italy enjoyed the benefit of a crushing superiority in armament and was faced by a backward, immobile, ill-led and poorly armed adversary, who relied on innate bravery and on mob-tactics alone, the greatness of the military effort admits of no doubt. Its repercussions are already making themselves felt in Europe; the stigma inflicted on Italy in 1896 at Adowa has been effaced. Even the slur of Caporetto is fading into the background. The German military world, ever critical and sceptical of Italian military worth since those fatal days of 1917, has expressed its respect for the qualities manifested by the Italian forces during the war, whilst unhesitatingly evincing its approval of the solid front turned by the Italian people towards the rest of the world. And these feelings are likely to grow.

H. de Watteville.

TYNESIDE AND SOUTH WALES

A Comparison

By John S. Morgan

'We in the "Special Areas" are unfortunate enough to enjoy special privileges, of which other more prosperous areas are at times somewhat envious.' A Tyneside politician thus summarises one side of a problem each of whose many aspects has far-reaching consequences for Britain's industrial life to-day. The Special Areas have been so often examined and reported upon by statisticians and journalists, politicians, and pamphleteers that they are no longer 'good copy'; yet much remains unknown, and therefore unattempted, in these areas, where the vitality of industry and of community existence has been lowered each successive year since the war.

The Special Areas of England and Wales contained, in December of last year, 317,574 unemployed persons aged fourteen and upwards. This represented 32·7 per cent of the insured population, and 20·3 per cent. of the total number of unemployed in England and Wales at that date, while the 1,565,236 unemployed persons in England and Wales meant only 13·9 per cent. of the insured population.[1] Two of the four Special Areas, Tyneside and South Wales, covered between them 224,392 unemployed persons, and the two areas provide a striking contrast, not only in their physical geography and their industrial geography, but also in their everyday life and their problems, human and industrial. These contrasts deserve more than the cursory examination which the general public, terrified of Blue-books, deluded by the increasing prosperity of South-Eastern England and almost

[1] Second Report of the Commissioner for Special Areas of England and Wales (Stationery Office, Cmd. paper 5090, p. 103).

inured to occasional 'human interest' stories by excitable journalists, has hitherto accorded them.

South Wales has its centre in Cardiff, itself excluded from the schedule of Special Areas,[2] and consists in the main of the 'Five Valleys' radiating northwards from the city. Its predominant industry is coal-mining, and each valley is the scene of a long string of small urban areas which have grown, mushroom-like, round the collieries, starting in the North,[3] where the coal was nearest the surface and easiest to work, and coming gradually down the valleys, bringing the unsightly appendices of the trade with them. The towns lie huddled in the bottom of steep-sided valleys, drab, ugly and unplanned. Rows of miners' houses sprawl untidily up the hillside, interspersed with the familiar pit-head gear and huge heaps of stone and waste. Between the valleys, with their grimy and now half-dead industrialism, lie the hills. They may have few trees and very little of the softer beauties of the country vales of England or Wales; but with their green grass and the bronze stretches of bracken, broken here and there by dark-green patches of gorse (in the spring aflame with yellow blossom), with their bold sweeping lines and the fresh air and sunshine that comes to lovers of hill-tops, they offer an easy escape from the apparently necessary ugliness and untidiness of industry.

Tyneside is a very different scene. The 'coaly Tyne,' the spinal cord of the area, winds between its narrow and confined banks from Blaydon to the sea at South Shields. Coals from Newcastle have been the source of warmth for homes for many centuries, and of power for industry since the Industrial Revolution. Shipbuilding and repairing, iron and steel manufacture, engineering, chemical manufactures, imports from the Baltic countries, and the subsidiaries of heavy industry and export trade, have added their quota of works and ruins. Thirteen separate townships, with scarcely a green field between each of them; 820,000 and more of a population crammed into an area of 49,659 acres ('including land and inland water')[4]: here is no small urban area with the hills behind it, for the countryside acces-

[2] Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act, 1934.
[3] The *Geographical Magazine*, March 1936: 'The Rhondda Valley,' by Miles Davies.
[4] *Industrial Tyneside*, by Henry A. Mess (Benn, 1928).

sible to the area is uninviting and uninteresting. To the south lies the flat East Durham plain, dotted with pit-heads and pit-heaps; grey-green fields, interspersed with colliery villages. The same featureless plain, broken only by colliery villages, stretches northward from the Tyne to Ashington. But Tyneside has what South Wales has not—a long stretch of sea-coast, with fine sands, cliffs and well-equipped holiday and tourist resorts, easily and cheaply accessible from all parts of the area. A shilling, or at most eighteen pence, will take any Tynesider to the sea and back for the day.

Just as South Wales has its capital at Cardiff, so the centre of Tyneside is situated in Newcastle. The two cities have many similarities and as many differences. The visitor walks out of Cardiff Station to confront a statue of the Marquis of Bute, and Cardiff seems to be full of statues of one or other of this family. Newcastle proclaims no such debt to any single family; for its one notable statue is that of Earl Grey, of the Reform Bill, perched high on a tall column in the centre of the city.

Newcastle's town-hall is a bad jest. The City Council began to talk about a new one before the war, and an inquiry which has just been held into a new scheme has once again produced a situation of stalemate. Newcastle has several historical buildings, but few fine ones. Cardiff's civic centre, boldly conceived and magnificently planned, is a model of what might have been the case in the northern city. The National Museum of Wales, the Glamorgan County Offices, the Cardiff Law Courts, and the Welsh University Buildings, laid out with avenues of trees and well-kept lawns, provide South Wales with a capital worthy of its intense national consciousness. Although it is the legal centre, the social centre, the shopping centre, the medical centre, and the educational centre, not only for Tyneside, but for a wider region embracing Northumberland and most of Durham county, Newcastle has no such dignified and spacious public buildings. If, however, it can boast of few fine public buildings, it can look back with pride to the early part of the nineteenth century, when Grainger, a far-sighted 'town-planner,' ably supported by an architect, Dobson, carried through, in spite of considerable opposition, a replanning scheme for the centre of the city.

Their work has given Newcastle a number of broad and noble thoroughfares in the heart of the city, flanked by offices and shops in the best neo-classical style. The imposition of neon signs, ugly lettering and blatant shop-fronts has robbed many of the buildings of much of their dignity, but the wide, handsome streets remain.

Behind this marked contrast between the two cities probably lies an interesting historical factor. Newcastle has grown, rather untidily and, with the one notable exception, unplanned, through long centuries, as the chief town of the North-East. Cardiff's growth is more recent and embodies the intense consciousness of individual nationality, which in the last hundred years or so has been such a notable feature of Welsh life. Behind Newcastle lie the accretions of a long history; behind Cardiff lies the wealth of the 'Coal Age.'

Newcastle seems to dominate Tyneside to an extent which those who do not know it would hardly believe. Cardiff does not appear to have for the South Wales area anything like the same grip on community life. Newcastle has tried more than once to obtain a stranglehold on the trade of the Tyne.[5] In 1256 Novocastrians appealed to the King to prohibit the people of South Shields from holding a market, and all through the centuries there has been bitter hostility between the smaller townships on Tyneside and their greedy neighbour. So closely populated is Tyneside, so much are its interests bound up together, that in modern times it has become doubtful whether one great city with Newcastle as its hub would not be a wiser and more economic form of local government.

> In hardly any of them [the thirteen local urban authorities] are there to be found the conditions generally recognised as necessary to a properly balanced local government, *i.e.* industries, shops and residential quarters for the different classes. It is within the bounds of possibility for a person to live in one town, work in another, shop in a third, and possibly have his children educated in a fourth.[6]

No one would care to suggest that South Wales should be amalgamated under one local government authority. It

[5] See *Industrial Tyneside*, H. A. Mess, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[6] Reports of Investigations into Industrial Conditions in certain 'Depressed Areas' (Stationery Office, Cmd. paper 4728).

costs 3*s.* 7*d.* (single) to travel from Brynmawr to Cardiff. The fare from Newcastle to South Shields is 1*s.* From Cardiff to Merthyr Tydfil is 3*s.* by omnibus; from Newcastle to Gateshead is 2*d.* by tram.

Newcastle is in the Special Area with 22,213 unemployed; Cardiff has 16,528 unemployed. This seems to mean something. Perhaps it is that Tyneside is so closely knit that even the residential town, the professional centre, the business centre, suffers more acutely because it is near to its prime sources of strength in the industrial towns. It is certain that the compactness of the Tyneside areas has brought with it many factors which have propagated the effects of unemployment, which are less visible in South Wales. Think of 24,100 persons on 1200 acres in Hebburn, with 35,000 people next door in Jarrow on 784 acres, and 44,500 people across the river in Wallsend on 3500 acres. Housing on Tyneside presents an urgent problem which offers itself to no easy solution. In 1921 there were thirty-eight local government areas listed in the Census as having 30 per cent. or more of overcrowded persons. Every one of the thirteen towns on Tyneside was included in the list, and, except for Finsbury and Shoreditch in London, all the remainder were in Durham or Northumberland.[7] The Housing Acts of the last decade have led to great improvements. New housing estates have grown up rapidly near to all the Tyneside towns, and the local authorities have turned to advantage every vacant plot of building land they can obtain within their boundaries, and have, in at least one case, had to go outside their own boundaries to meet this pressing need. Slum-clearance and rehousing schemes have made for a very beneficial change of housing practice and tradition.

The extent of the improvement can be judged when it is realised that, whereas in 1921 the Census gave an average percentage of overcrowding for the whole population of Tyneside of 33·4, the 1931 Census gives an average on the same basis of 21·9. But with the new Housing Acts has come a more stringent conception of overcrowding than the Census definition of 'more than two persons to a room'; and with a still very high proportion—put by some, on the new definition, as high as one-third of the population

[7] H. A. Mess, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

—living in inadequate houses, there is much that remains to be done in this direction. Here is another field, perhaps, for special Government action. Something has been done in the creation of the new North-Eastern Housing Association by the Special Areas Commissioner, but more will be needed if Tyneside's housing is to be brought up to the standard of the rest of the country.

The Welsh mining village has some bad housing; but, in the main, the miner lives in a house, and not, as the Tynesider does, in a flat. The grey stone houses of South Wales, with their red door lintels and window sills, are not themselves ugly. The village soon comes to an end, and after the pit-heaps come the rolling outlines of the hills. The miles of brick-built flats, four doors together, two windows and four more doors, characteristic of Tyneside, are dull if not squalid, and behind them lie, not hills or moors, but more rows exactly the same. The reasons for this characteristic of Tyneside are many and obscure,[8] but there can be no doubt that depression has accentuated the evils of overcrowding in a way which cannot be said of South Wales.

The Welsh mining village has its shops still open, though perhaps only the proprietor knows whether he is making or losing money. These small shops, owned by small men selling everything from bread to tin-tacks, still make a brave show in the village street. On Tyneside it is far different. One out of every two shops appears to be permanently closed. Long lines of gaunt whitewashed windows line the streets of Jarrow, Hebburn, Felling, and even parts of Newcastle. And yet it may not all be the result of depression, for the young women of Tyneside appear better dressed than their sisters in South Wales. It may be that cheap and easy transport has brought the great multiple shops nearer to the Tyneside women than will ever be the case in South Wales. It is noticeable that not only has Newcastle many fine shops and several huge multiple stores, where hats worn in Mayfair to-day are purchased for 6*s*. 11*d*. in Newcastle to-morrow, but also that these great stores flourish and extend while the smaller shops in the smaller towns become increasingly shabby and close their doors.

That the Newcastle shops do exert a powerful influence

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

on the habits of the area is shown by one very clearly marked feature. Gateshead, which is only a tram ride from Newcastle, has no very notable shops; and what shops there are cater almost entirely for the cheaper trade. South Shields, which is the town farthest from the all-powerful magnetism of the big city, has much better shops; they are more spaciously housed, their goods cover a wider price range, and they clearly cater for a broader class demand than do the Gateshead shops. Perhaps when prosperity returns to Tyneside the small shops in the working-class towns will remain closed, and Newcastle will have established another sphere of dominant influence. Only the return of prosperity can provide the answer to this point.

Another interesting difference between the shopping habits on Tyneside and in South Wales is shown in the relative importance of the Co-operative stores. Every Tyneside town has one shop, at any rate, which is housed in fine premises with sparkling areas of plate glass, and that is the 'Co-op.' With the Co-operative Wholesale Society's factory at Pelaw (in Felling-on-Tyne) and powerful local Co-operative Societies in every part of the area, the 'Co-op.' is an institution. Nowhere in the Welsh valleys is this form of trade so noticeably predominant. A suggestion put forward by an observant Welshman was that the relief scales might have some influence on the shopping habits of the people. 'The "Means Test",' he said, 'has not been so closely applied in Wales as it has on Tyneside.' Perhaps the extra shilling or two a week enables the Welsh miner to continue his patronage of the local shop. Rents are high on Tyneside as compared with South Wales. Perhaps this extra shilling (and the unemployed have to think in pence) may come from this source.

The organisation of the two principal industrial groups to which the Tynesider and the South Wales worker respectively belong seems to have had a very interesting effect on the habits of the adult worker. The miner works as a member of a small group in the pit. Natural qualities of leadership are encouraged by this fact, for a man who practises leadership first inside a small group, and among men he knows, learns readily the lessons of leadership of men. The majority of the men in the coal-mine, since leadership is so personal a

matter and so close at hand, learn, too, something of that difficult art of self-education. The shipyard or engineering worker, engaged on one section of a vast whole, has neither the same opportunities of practising, nor the same encouragement to educate himself in, matters outside his specialist trade. The thinking and the leading seem to be left much more to the professional leaders, the managers and foremen. Another interesting fact about Tyneside, which tends to discourage the development of many natural leaders, is that feudalism[9] lingers still in the North of England. In spite of industrial development, in spite of non-resident landowners, in spite of the great social changes of the last 150 years, the inhabitants of one Tyneside town still speak of the hereditary landowner as 'the squire,' and there still dwells round that feudal title something of the 'divinity that doth hedge a king.' For centuries the men of the North have looked up with reverence to their appointed leaders, and the remnants of that faith still linger. Whether it is the result of the operation of these environmental factors, whether these are the only operating influences, it is difficult to say; but it is notably true to-day that the South Wales industrial worker is at one and the same time intensely conscious of his political entity, anxious to exercise his political rights, and keenly interested in all forms of adult education. There appears to be no such notable political consciousness among the inhabitants of Tyneside, nor does there seem to be the same urge to self-education outside the technical and professional spheres.

It is not necessary to seek far for examples of the intense interest of the South Wales worker in politics and the fund of natural leadership which seems to be almost inherent in him. Most of the members of Parliament for South Wales are themselves ex-miners with strong local connexions and long histories of local political service. Tyneside's members of Parliament are nearly all 'appointed leaders'; some of them have strong local connexions, but they remain largely professional leaders of political opinion, and it is worth noting that neither of the two Socialist members is resident locally. Or again, it was in South Wales that the agitation of a year ago against the Unemployment Assistance Board's

[9] H. A. Mess, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

regulations blew hottest as a political issue, and it would seem largely because administrative government is much more a matter of politics in South Wales than it is on Tyneside. If they have a strong consciousness of their place in politics and in their own government, the South Wales people have also a strong urge to fit themselves as citizens by close study and constant use of educational facilities.

There is a revealing study, in the *Year-Book of Education* for 1935, by Sir Percy Watkins,[10] who for many years has been closely associated with education in South Wales. In 1932–3 there were 57 one-year classes, 113 terminal classes, and 34 short terminal classes, and in all over 40,000 persons took advantage of these facilities. In 1932–3 over 3000 students attended 'one-day schools' organised by the Workers Educational Association, and attendances of over 70,000 were made at public lectures on popular subjects organised by the Welsh National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s. The subjects most in demand at these popular lectures are themselves illuminating: 'The Psychological Approach to Modern Problems'; 'Our Place in the Universe' (astronomical talk); 'Germany of To-day'; 'Citizenship.'[11]

Another fact which emerges from the list of popular lectures is the strength of the church and chapel influence in Wales. It seems very probable that the intense vitality of the Nonconformist Church, in the years before the war when it permeated Welsh life, was a powerful influence in spreading the claims of self-education for the adult, and itself provided a large measure of this education. There are eleven clergymen out of sixty odd lecturers in the list, and several of them, with lectures on religious and semi-religious subjects, are among the lecturers for whom there is the greatest demand. The effect of this tradition of education among the workers in South Wales is remarkable. A conversation with a South Wales miner nearly always reveals wide, if somewhat indiscriminate, reading, a real knowledge of many subjects, and a lively interest in the affairs of the

[10] *Year-Book of Education*, 1935: 'Adult Education among the Unemployed in South Wales,' by Sir Percy Watkins, LL.D.

[11] 'Lecture Programme' prepared by the Welsh National Council of Y.M.C.A.'s in co-operation with the Educational Committee of the South Wales Council of Social Service, 1935.

day, with the inevitable interaction of the politics, not only of the locality or of this country, but of the world at large.

There are some who would claim that this very real desire for widely based knowledge is only one aspect of a much broader feature of Welsh national life. The Welsh love of music and art is traditional, they say, and inherent. There is no doubt that this belief in the special hereditary powers of the nation is widely held among the people themselves; but it is by no means certain that it is entirely the result of long tradition, and still less certain whether it has any hereditary basis. Recently twelve South Wales unemployed miners and a visitor were discussing this problem, and it was discovered that, of the twelve, only two did not trace their ancestry back to at least one English grandparent who had emigrated to the coalfields when South Wales became the miners' Mecca. General observation would seem to justify a statement that there may be a strong Welsh tradition, but that it is the result of assiduous cultivation, and that it is the environment of this cult which develops so strongly in the inhabitants—whether of Welsh extraction or not—those characteristics which are recognised as Welsh, among which must be counted a very real belief in the value of adult education.

There is very little evidence on Tyneside of any such desire. The number of adult education classes of all kinds is absurdly small beside the figures for South Wales. The demand for books to read would seem to be equally dormant. Until recently it was true to say that on the south bank of the Tyne there was no public library between Gateshead and South Shields, although there was a population of about 80,000 living in the three towns of Felling, Hebburn and Jarrow, which lie in that area. There is to-day a branch of the Durham County Library in Felling; but Jarrow and Hebburn still remain without this, almost the first, necessity of education, the provision of adequate reading material. It is true that in these times the creation and maintenance of a public library would be a burden on rates already stretched far enough to meet the necessities of local government, but there can have been little demand in the boom years, or libraries would surely have been built.

The value attached by the people of South Wales to education can be read in the following figures[12]:

Boys under Sixteen Years of Age

Ministry of Labour Area.	Number registered as Unemployed.		Still attending Whole-time Day School.		Not at School.			
					No Employment since leaving School.		Others.	
	Nov. 25, 1935.	Nov. 1934.	Nov. 1935.	Nov. 1934.	Nov. 1935.	Nov. 1934.	Nov. 1935.	Nov. 1934.
			per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.
N.E. Division . . .	8,671	8,036	17	15	42	50	41	35
Wales and Monmouthshire	5,227	3,830	40	20	35	49	25	31
Great Britain . . .	32,695	31,749	22	16	35	44	43	40

Girls under Sixteen Years of Age

Ministry of Labour Area.	Number registered as Unemployed.		Still attending Whole-time Day School.		Not at School.			
					No Employment since leaving School.		Others.	
	Nov. 25, 1935.	Nov. 1934.	Nov. 1935.	Nov. 1934.	Nov. 1935.	Nov. 1934.	Nov. 1935.	Nov. 1934.
			per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.
N.E. Division . . .	8,594	7,129	11	11	49	50	40	39
Wales and Monmouthshire	4,718	3,103	38	18	37	58	25	24
Great Britain . . .	31,427	28,374	17	12	38	46	45	42

The casual visitor to Tyneside invariably expresses surprise at the number of small children who are to be seen in every street. One journalist on a short visit rushed impetuously into several houses and, to the embarrassment of his guide, began discussing the merits of birth control, so impressed was he by the numbers of children he saw about him. But he was an American. The high birth rates and the early marriage age of Tyneside have attracted attention more than once.[13] Although these two factors themselves are closely interrelated, crowded houses due to many children influencing early marriages productive of large families, there seem to be many more factors involved, the

[12] *Ministry of Labour Gazette*, February 1936, p. 44 (Stationery Office). A later analysis published in the *Ministry of Labour Gazette* for June 1936 (p. 205) shows a further increase in Welsh children 'still attending school.'

[13] *Industrial Tyneside*, H. A. Mess, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–36.

relative influence of which it is almost impossible to estimate. Lack of industrial occupation for women, always a notable feature of areas devoted, as Tyneside is, largely to 'heavy' industries; small houses, themselves the result of a complicated interaction of tradition and industrial conditions; a high percentage of men to women, especially in the early days of the Industrial Revolution; all these factors have had their effect in keeping the women of Tyneside in the homes and in raising the birth rate.[14]

The children suffer, both on Tyneside and in South Wales, some of the worst effects of the depression. There is no noticeable difference, so far as can be seen by casual observation, between the health of the children in the two areas. School feeding has undoubtedly done a great deal to counteract the effects of living on a restricted and possibly insufficient diet. Careful investigation into the health of the persons in the areas which have suffered as a result of the depression has failed to reveal any serious malnutrition, although the position is being watched with some concern by the authorities, as there does appear to be a danger of under-nutrition.[15] But if they look fairly healthy, there can be no doubt that living in families where work is the exception rather than the rule has affected the lives of many children; and there is to-day a large group of youngsters who, having had no employment since leaving school, will find the discipline of work difficult to endure.

Tyneside and county Durham have long been the recruiting grounds for domestic service. Migration from overcrowded homes, combined with a very strong tradition of good housewifery and a tradition for going into service in London and the South, has become established. 'Lots of our maids seem to come from Jarrow' was a remark made recently by one who knows the inside of one of the great London hospitals.

There has always been this form of migration from Tyneside. There is no evidence that general migration from the area for industrial reasons is on anything like the same scale. The evidence of a real change of attitude towards their

[14] *Industrial Tyneside*, H. A. Mess, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–36.

[15] Medical Officer of Health's Report, 1934 (Stationery Office, 1935).

lives and work seems much more clear among the workers of South Wales :

Thousands of families, therefore, whose whole existence in the past has been centred round the pit are turning their faces in other directions. Between 1921 and 1931, Rhondda lost 22 per cent. of its people by migration. The 1921 Census showed a population of 162,000, whereas the present population is estimated at about 137,000.[16]

Such a paragraph could not have been written about Tyneside. The comparison prompts the inevitable query about the industrial prospects of the two areas. The Special Areas Commissioner in his Second Report observes two very uncomfortable facts :

Indeed if it had not been for the transference schemes of the Ministry of Labour and certain voluntary bodies, which enabled 22,000 unemployed persons from the Special Areas to obtain employment in other parts of the country during 1935, there would during the year have been little decrease in unemployment in the Special Areas. . . . The real improvement in the Special Areas in the number of persons employed is, therefore, much less than would appear to be the case from a consideration of the statistics of unemployment alone. . . . The decrease [in unemployment] for the Special Areas as a whole is 26,418, or 7·7 per cent. of the 1934 figure, while for the rest of England and Wales the decrease is 160,650, or 11·3 per cent.[17]

Bearing these facts in mind, there are certain similarities and certain dissimilarities between Tyneside and South Wales which will bear inspection.

Both areas are somewhat distant from 'what is regarded as the largest market for the sale of those goods which the new light industries are principally engaged in producing.'[18] It is true that 'within a radius of 125 miles of Newcastle-upon-Tyne there is a population of more than 16,500,000'[19]; but it has to be recognised that Scotland, Yorkshire and Lancashire, which come largely within this radius, have their own industrial centres, which will offer vigorous competition to any developments of Tyneside's trade into their own

[16] *Geographical Magazine*, March 1936 : 'The Rhondda Valley,' by Miles Davies.

[17] Second Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas of England and Wales.

[18] Reports of Investigations into Industrial Conditions in Certain Depressed Areas (Stationery Office, Cmd. paper 4728, p. 83) ; and First Report of the Special Areas Commissioner for England and Wales, p. 15, par. 29 (1) (Stationery Office, Cmd. paper 4957).

[19] *A Survey of the Industrial Facilities of the North-East Coast* (published by the North-Eastern Development Board, Andrews House, Newcastle-upon-Tyne).

hinterlands. Nevertheless, it is also true, and should be more widely recognised, that both South Wales and Tyneside are by no means the isolated far-off industrial units that many still believe them to be.

There appears to be more prospect of a revival of industry on Tyneside than in the valleys of South Wales, although one can only look for the employment of a proportion of those now unemployed. The industrialism of the South Wales valleys depends on coal, and

> It is a great disservice to raise the hopes of the distressed valleys unduly as to the benefits possible from coal-oil or by-product developments . . . although there are distinct hopes of great developments within the industry.[20]

Tyneside offers good transport by rail or water, and a long and fine tradition, not only in ship-building and ship-repairing, but engineering and its kindred trades. It is compact, labour is fluid within the area, transport is abundant, and the area has an excellent record in the matter of industrial disputes. South Wales is much more scattered, its transport problems much greater, having no river to link it together, and the ridges of mountains breaking it up into inaccessible units.

Both areas are struggling at the moment to retain or recreate the iron and steel industries which existed in more prosperous days.[21] In both cases the task is proving a very difficult one, for, as the Special Areas Commissioner pointed out in his First Report,[22] Northamptonshire and Lincolnshire are the centres of the iron and steel industry of to-day. In this connexion it is worth while noting the comment of Sir William Firth, managing director of Richard Thomas & Co., Ltd., the Welsh steel and tinplate combine:

> It would be absurd and against national interests to build modern works in South Wales. Northamptonshire and Lincolnshire are undoubtedly the natural centres for the economic production of British steel, and recent Welsh protests about the introduction of modern machinery into those counties show that Welshmen are too apt to take a local view. The existing works, I think, will remain in operation for

[20] *Wales and Monmouthshire*, October 1935, p. 15: 'New Uses for Welsh Coal, by W. Idris Jones (published by the Industrial Development Council of South Wales and Monmouthshire).

[21] Second Report of Commissioner for Special Areas, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–9.

[22] *op. cit.*, p. 75

many years, and Welsh workers will be gladly welcomed at the new works when they are built. Welshmen must be prepared to live where production can be most economically effected rather than protest that where they live is where employment should be provided. . . .[23]

I record the opinion without endorsing the underlying social philosophy. The 'social capital' invested in the area is many times greater than that controlled by Sir William Firth and his friends. Whether, however, he is right or wrong, both areas should be 'tidied up.' The *débris* of the last century's outworn factories is especially noticeable on Tyneside, where there are literally acres of good industrial sites cumbered with derelict buildings and the accumulated waste of many years of profitable production.

It is astonishing that past industrial activities should have had the power to literally devastate parts of the area, but the fact remains that this has been done.[24]

The money spent in clearing up these sites and making them ready for new industries would be money well spent.

The work of clearing the derelict sites on Tyneside would be eminently suitable for unskilled labour, and although it would be difficult to claim that a definite financial return could be seen from the money so expended, there is little doubt that the improvement in the appearance of the district would go far to remove one of the main deterrents to new industrial development.[25]

Nor would this be the only benefit. The money spent in wages in the district would increase the fluidity of money, which to-day, as a result of the depression, is very tight. The inhabitants of the Special Areas are 'potential producers and potential consumers. But because they are unemployed miners and so forth, their purchases are small. And because their purchases are small there is no resilience in the market to encourage local enterprise and to support it in hard competition with the South.' If a large-scale, carefully designed policy of site clearance and improvement at public expense were put into operation it would provide 'a steady flow of wages, guaranteed over a number of years, which might well strike root and prove viable when the public works had come

[23] *The Times*, May 27, 1936.

[24] *A Survey of Industrial Facilities of the North-East Coast*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

[25] Investigations into Industrial Conditions in Certain Depressed Areas (Cmd. paper 4728, Stationery Office, *op. cit.*, p. 102).

to an end.'[26] At the worst, such a policy would make Tyneside and parts of South Wales less unsightly and more pleasant to live in; the preparation of such sites, which to-day are 'dreary and forbidding accumulations of rubbish heaps and derelict buildings,[27] might very well bring in their places new and prosperous industries.

Tyneside's unemployment figures for June 1936 are the most cheerful for seven years. Whether a new boom in naval building will ultimately be to the benefit of the area is a much-debated problem, but, if ships are to be built, Tyneside recalls that the *Mauretania* was Queen of the Atlantic, not for months, but for twenty years. Road, rail and water transport are available: power, labour and sites await development. Hope is higher than for many years. With its fine city of Newcastle, its past history of industrial progress, Tyneside believes that it has a future.

Coal may or may not be the power it was, but South Wales is an area rich in mineral wealth and rich in human ability. These human factors must have their influence on the life and prospects of the areas, but there is no reason to believe that in either case it is the human factor which prevents industrial revival. In fact there is cause to suggest that most of the differences are environmental and not hereditary, which would seem to argue that the industrial traditions of the areas ought not to militate against new and at first unfamiliar industries being successfully carried on in these areas.

Both these areas have many problems in common. Both have an unenviable legacy from past prosperity. Both have many individual problems of their own. Both claim attention, not only for industrial reasons, but also because of their rich veins of individual human characteristics. Are they vain in their hopes? Will they become the 'Forgotten Cities of Nineteenth-Century Industrialism,' or will this rich mine of industrial wealth be worked again?

JOHN S. MORGAN.

[26] The *Political Quarterly*, December 1935: 'A Policy for the Depressed Areas,' by H. A. Mess, p. 548.

[27] Cmd. paper 4728, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

REVISITING THE FAR EAST

III. Interaction and Outlook

By E. M. Gull

This concluding article has three main purposes: to describe conditions prevailing in China and Japan at the time of my visit and the probable results of their interaction; to amplify references already made to the Russian, British and American aspects of the situation; and to analyse the factors that must influence British policy in the Far East.

In pursuance of the first purpose, it is easiest to proceed chronologically. Shortly after my arrival in China in March 1935, I had conversations in Canton with one of two men who control the province of Kuangsi, Marshal Li Tsung-jen. While he lives, like most of China's leaders, guarded by armed sentries, his bearing and conversation are those of a student steeped in the Confucian classics. He dresses in Chinese style—a severely simple, unornamented gown; talks Chinese only; has the gentlest manners and yet gives an impression of moral and physical robustness. His talk was dominated by three ideas: that the Japanese were about to bring fresh pressure to bear on China; that the head of the Chinese Government, Chiang Kai-shek, was so supine in dealing with them as to make observers suspect his patriotism; and that close co-operation between South-west China and the Government of Hongkong was mutually desirable.

At the end of May the pressure which Marshal Li anticipated began to be exerted. In connexion with anti-Japanese activities in the demilitarised zone—an area of some 5000 square miles between the Great Wall and a line running from Yenching, north-west of Peiping (Peking), to Lutai, on the Tientsin-Shanhaikuan Railway, near the coast—the Japanese military authorities obtained the withdrawal from Hopei province of the 51st Division under General Yu Hsueh-

chung. On June 8 a Japanese newspaper, the *Nichi Nichi*, stated that a movement had been started to make Peiping and Tientsin centres of an autonomous zone, while one of the leading Japanese personalities in the Far Eastern scene, Major-General Doihara, acknowledged that the Japanese army's aim was the establishment of a pro-Japanese *régime* in North China. In the middle of June, following upon alleged anti-Japanese incidents, the Japanese demanded the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Chahar (the 132nd Division under General Sung Chê-yuan) and an enlargement of the demilitarised zone, while at the beginning of July pressure directed towards the establishment of a Manchukuo–North China *bloc* began to be exerted.

During the summer and autumn I was able to obtain at first hand from some of its chief sponsors in Japan, Manchuria, and North China a fairly clear understanding of this conception. Quotation from a memorandum issued by one of them will illustrate the difficulty of complete comprehension:

> The fundamental principle of the continental policy of our Empire [says this document] must be to promote our own national expansion and at the same time emancipate the people of the Orient from oppression, give them an easy life and comfortable occupations, respect their independence and thus promote harmony and co-operation with them; . . . when our Empire pursues this policy, it is following the path of justice in the eyes of Heaven. . . . It is by no means going too far to assert that General Chiang Kai-shek and his associates in the Nanking Government are responsible for the greater part of the hardships of the Chinese masses. It is no exaggeration to state that General Chiang and his associates may be regarded as the common enemy of our Empire and the Chinese masses, inasmuch as they have not only failed to realise that China cannot exist without Japan, but have always been absorbed in feathering their own nests by exploiting the Chinese masses. . . . It is clear that the Chinese masses, given happiness in life, will spontaneously come into indivisible mental and economic relations with our Empire. Then it will be possible for China to become a market for the products of Japan and a source of supply of raw materials. . . . It is safe to state positively that all the thinking minds of our Empire are against such anachronistic ideas as the annexation or invasion of China. The first step to enforce the national policy is to make North China a land of peace and enlightenment, a market where Chinese and Japanese commodities and capital will not be subject to jeopardy but will circulate freely. Such a step will help the healthy growth of Manchukuo and demonstrate to South China that the co-operation of China and Man-

chukuo with the Empire as the centre of gravity can guarantee peace in Eastern Asia. . . . In regard to the overseas expansion of our Empire, we may look back into history and find that, in spite of a few instances of success in stepping upon the continent, we have met with many reverses and withdrawals. Should the present movement of expansion like the founding of Manchukuo and the development of Northern China fail, we would not only retreat from the continent, but the destiny of the nation and the people would hang in the balance. We should therefore study the causes of our past failures and not repeat our errors.[1]

Explanations given by other authoritative sponsors of the proposed *bloc* distinguished more clearly between its strategic, political, and economic aspects. While none seemed able to speak in precise terms about the economic portion of the scheme, its chief features were apparently the exploitation of cotton, coal and iron ore supplies, to be sold against Japanese manufactures, and the provision of increased railway facilities, both activities to be safeguarded by some form of political agreement impliedly backed by Japanese arms. What economic part Manchukuo is to play, and in what ways she and North China are regarded as being economically complementary to one another, was less clear. The idea appeared to be, however, that as North China will be busy producing cotton, coal and iron ore for Japan, she will be less able to grow food supplies for herself. Deficiencies, accordingly, will be supplied from Manchukuo, whose total exports will thus be adjusted to her total imports, mainly Japanese goods. The Japanese army, it must be remembered, has its own economists, and the mysticism which pervades its outlook makes theirs likewise somewhat lacking in clarity. The conception of a Japan–Manchukuo–North China *bloc* has, however, become a governing factor in Japanese policy and has attained an importance of the 'life-line' order attributed to Manchuria in 1931.

Accordingly, very shortly after the issue of the Tada memorandum—which the *Asahi* stated was approved by the Japanese Cabinet on September 7—events began to move

[1] Statement issued to Japanese journalists in Tientsin in September 1935 by Major-General Tada, at that time commander of the Japanese troops in North China. The statement is very long and the sentences quoted are not as closely connected in it as they are above. They represent fairly, however, its main theme. The translation of the original Japanese was made by Chinese. There has been no opportunity to check it.

rapidly. Amid reports of actual and proposed formations of bodies of one kind and another designed to promote the *bloc*, increasing military pressure was brought to bear upon the governors, or chairmen, of Hopei, Shantung, Chahar, Suiyuan and Shansi to induce them to secede from Nanking. These men, with four of whom I discussed the situation, were in communication with one another and with Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking. They were all against any such step. In November Chiang's hands were strengthened by the sixth plenary session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, which increased his powers and virtually left him free to manage Sino-Japanese relations as he thought best. Embarking upon negotiations with the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Ariyoshi, he instructed his colleagues in the North to break off their negotiations with General Doihara. The result was twofold. Foiled in their larger purpose, Doihara and his friends induced an adventurous nonentity, Yin Ju-kêng, who is a Chêkiang man with a Japanese wife, to declare the autonomy of Eastern Hopei. When Yin's arrest was ordered by Nanking, they declared their intention of protecting him and seized strategic points on the railways. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, agreed to the institution on December 8 of a semi-autonomous Council for Hopei and Chahar, comprising their chairmen, the mayors of Peiping and Tientsin, and other Chinese officials.

As this happened just after I had sailed for England, I have no first-hand knowledge of the extent to which Nanking retains any control in these provinces. Over Chahar it had lost all but nominal authority when I visited Kalgan and Suiyuan last autumn. The unchecked 'smuggling' which is going on in Eastern Hopei, and is in reality an organised attack, supported by the local Japanese authorities, military and civil, upon the Chinese Government's fiscal system, proves that the latter has no effective authority in that area either. In Western and Southern Hopei, on the other hand, it appears, from all accounts, to retain at the moment of writing the semblance, and some degree of actual, control, but the chance of success of the Chinese Foreign Minister's recent appeal for less aggressive treatment of his country by Japan is slender. On May 25 this year General Chang Chun,

whom I met last summer at Wuchang when he was still chairman of Hupeh province, said publicly:

The situation between China and Japan being what it is to-day, further failure to achieve a thorough readjustment of their relations will not only be detrimental to the interests of the two countries, but concerns the whole question of peace in Eastern Asia. . . . So far as China is concerned any problems, the solution of which will redound to mutual welfare of the two countries, are considered as coming within the scope of readjustment, and any formulæ based on equality and reciprocity, as well as mutual respect for sovereign rights, are regarded as helpful means of achieving our end. . . . Readjustment is desired, not as a temporising policy to ease the present situation, but with the object of ensuring peaceful co-existence of the two peoples for generations to come.

The reply evoked from the Japanese Consul-General at Nanking, Mr. Y. Suma, who had just left China on a visit to Japan, was this.

The situation [he said] is such that China must choose between mutual interdependence or war with Japan. I have definitely stated that to General Chiang Kai-shek. For Japan to retreat one step would mean a general retreat. Japan must advance straight ahead with its immutable convictions.[2]

The reply of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arita, as described by Reuter, was:

The Foreign Minister, interviewed by the Press to-day, reiterated three points as 'guiding principles' in Japan's policy towards China: 1. Recognition of Manchukuo. 2. Co-operation in checking Communist penetration. 3. Extermination of anti-Japanese agitation.[3]

Commenting upon these replies, the leading British paper in China, the *North China Daily News*, said on June 1:

General Chang Chun has made a brave and dignified effort to bring the two countries once more into proper diplomatic contact. He might as well offer barley sugar to a tiger, if Mr. Suma and Mr. Arita are the twin oracles of Japanese diplomacy.

In these circumstances, which course is the Chinese Government likely to choose, 'interdependence' or resistance? Civil war, of which there have been ominous indications, would almost certainly deprive her of any choice. It is contended by the Southern leaders that recent troop movements were dictated by national considerations. Yet

[2] Reuter, Kobe, May 30.
[3] Reuter, Tokyo, May 30.

the truer that is, the more surely does it indicate a lack of capacity for national co-ordination. In the light of that fact the practical significance of Chinese nationalism is far from easy to assess in relation to the immediate future. Denial of its reality is unhelpful, because it does not dispose of China's consciousness of, and pride in, moral, cultural and political values transmitted through many generations and shared from one end of the country to the other—phenomena accepted in Europe as essential characteristics of nationalism. No more helpful is denial of the existence of patriotism in the sense of love of China as opposed to non-China, a sentiment as real as love of England as opposed to non-England, or of France as opposed to non-France. But whereas that opposition has been brought into play constantly in the history of Europe, it has actuated China, owing to geographical reasons, relatively infrequently. Accordingly its emotional force and its political creativeness have been, and are, less vital and constructive than in English, German, French, or Italian affairs. Those countries, moreover, are individually much smaller than China. Not till their areas are totalled does their size become comparable with hers. Then, however, they become comparable with her also in respect of their separatism, which is very much greater than hers and is the result of similar causes, physical, linguistic and racial—a separatism which persists notwithstanding ideas, sentiments, and customs similar in their unity to China's. Hence the tears shed for the League.

The imponderable factors in the situation, it is clear, are unreliable guides to the future both in the East and in the West. Nor are those describable as ponderable much more trustworthy. Amongst them is the fact that the five northern provinces contain over half China's coal reserves; about an equal proportion of her non-Manchurian iron ore reserves, some 40 per cent. of which are in Chahar; nearly half her wheat supplies; half her kaolaing or sorghum; a third of her soya beans; more than half her millet; over a third of her corn; nearly half her railways, and about 20 per cent. of her population. Loss of control over the North means loss of control over all these resources. In the North, too, was most of China's civilisation born and matured. True, she has lost these territories before, but at a time when

the pressure of population was much less than it is now, when foreign trade was less important, and when money and credit played a much less complicated part in her affairs. Realisation of all these facts, however, adds nothing to her military strength, which, pitted against Japan's without the aid of any third party, cannot, humanly speaking, hope to prevail. Clearly, the course dictated to her by rationalism is to avoid conflict to the last possible point at which non-resistance serves any purpose.

Rationalism also enjoins avoidance of conflict upon Japan; for conflict, even if successful, must mean to her, not only great additional expenditure at a time when her financial outlook is, to say the least, unsatisfactory, but also the immense subsequent difficulty of realising her dubious conception of a Japan–Manchukuo–North China *bloc* in the face of an unfriendly population, likely to prove no easier to placate, though possibly easier to control, than that of Manchukuo. Yet it is quite clear that rational considerations, while not absent from, do not govern Japan's policy, otherwise she would not be making 'interdependence'—for which, in the form of genuine co-operation, the Chinese are ready—synonymous with unconditional submission. It is equally plain that for China to allow the North actually or in effect to go the way of Manchuria without a struggle could only be justified on rational grounds if that course left her able to maintain, south of the Yangtze, a State strong enough to live in the shadow of continental Japan. It is highly questionable whether it would do this. It is questionable both on economic and political grounds, because neither in political nor economic matters could she then hope to be free from Japanese interference. It is also questionable on psychological grounds, because such a surrender (for which there is no precedent in her history, though there are examples of retreat after unsuccessful conflict) would constitute so great a denial of all the qualities which nourish nationhood as to desiccate and render them useless for that purpose.

That realisation of all this is vivid throughout China, and is a genuine though certainly not the only factor in recent anti-Japanese ebullitions in the South, cannot for a moment be doubted by anyone who has recently visited the country with any capacity for understanding it. My conclusion,

accordingly, is that if Japan is irrational enough to prosecute her design to a point at which Chiang Kai-shek's pacifism also becomes irrational, she will meet with military resistance. To say that is not to express the view that the resistance, if unaided by any third party, would be heroic or prolonged. For reasons already indicated, it might not attain to the level of co-ordinated resistance at all. Beginning possibly in some violent anti-Japanese disturbance, it might assume various confused and ineffective forms, having the consequences, and possibly some of the characteristics, of civil discord.

To turn to Russian, American, and British aspects of this unpromising outlook. In their forefront stands a fact common to all, though specially important to Russia and ourselves—the fact, namely, that there is no longer a Far Eastern question in practice separable from European questions. The affairs of East and West are closely—indeed, as far as can at present be seen, inseparably—linked. Thus a Russo-Japanese conflict would make a Russo-German struggle probable, and *vice versâ*. This interdependence cannot be discussed in this article, but must be borne in mind throughout its ensuing paragraphs.

Apart from it, the Russian aspect is twofold. There is the aspect embracing Soviet Far Eastern interests, which are many times greater, notwithstanding the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, than they were in Tsarist times, and there is the aspect embracing the propagation of Communism as such. These two aspects are theoretically separable, and in actuality may well remain distinct. Whether they do or not depends largely on Japan. Sino-Japanese relations, even if they culminate in conflict, need not involve conflict between Russia and Japan, nor, as far as civilian Russia's predisposition is concerned, are they likely to do so. For she has no ambition to reassert control over Manchuria or, on the other hand, to hand it back to China, one or other of which steps she could scarcely avoid taking if in conjunction with China she defeated Japan. On the other hand, a Russo-Japanese conflict, arising out of frontier or maritime friction, or out of fear of Communism as such—and there can be no doubt that Japan fears Communism greatly—would present China with an opportunity which she would probably seize. In either event the existing tendency towards Communism which not

a few of China's intellectuals, some of her politicians, and a relatively large number of agrarian malcontents have displayed —as shown in the first of these articles—would be greatly increased. It is likely to increase without the stimulus of a Russo-Japanese conflict if agrarian problems are dealt with unsuccessfully, or if domestic disturbance recur on a scale large enough to render them insoluble.

American and British aspects of the outlook (apart, again, from their European side) are mainly economic, becoming political in America's case where they involve the Philippines, Guam and other places, and in ours where they involve Hongkong or our prestige in the East generally, Singapore and Australia being vital considerations in the background. From the Philippines, apparently, the United States have decided to withdraw, but they may change this decision should the islands be threatened by Japan. From Hongkong we have, presumably, no intention of withdrawing. Our own purely commercial interests and those of the United States in China are relatively small, but our capital investments are large. As regards economic interests, the outlook, both in our own case and America's, is undeniably threatening, whether visualised in terms of an unopposed or an opposed Japanese domination of China. For in the event of unopposed domination the 'open door,' unless held open by amplification of Japan's commercial opportunities elsewhere, would be closed, while in the chaos ensuing from military opposition all foreign—*i.e.*, non-Japanese—interests would be likely to lose heavily, not only in that, but in other ways.

With these facts in mind, let us turn to the question of British policy. Obviously, what Great Britain, or any other Western Power, can do in the Far East depends upon the real nature of the complex circumstances which these articles have reviewed. I suggest that this should be sought along the following lines. The downward pressure of Japan upon North China appears in certain aspects to be a repetition of similar movements in the past. There have been enough of such movements to suggest the operation of a law embracing both racial and economic phenomena. As regards the former there is evidence to support the view that a strong Mongolian strain exists in the Japanese, a strain which entered Japan in neolithic times through Korea. The Yahoi type of neolithic

relics found in Japan—pottery, stone axes, knives, arrow-heads, swords, and articles of bone and horn—bear strong resemblance to corresponding objects found in Korea, Manchuria, and the maritime section of Russian Far Eastern territory. The dominant Japanese physical type is Mongoloid in so far as it is broad-skulled, somewhat prognathic, yellow-skinned and straight-haired, while the eyelid presents the characteristic 'Mongolian fold.'[4] It may seem, and in fact be, fanciful to suggest that the Japanese are in some racial way feeling the pull of their remote origins. It is, however, undeniable that they are being attracted towards North China, whence so much of their civilisation came, by needs and motives which previous invaders experienced and demonstrated. To the extent that this is the case it is arguable that we are watching the re-enaction or continuance of a process which is extremely old and unlikely to be stayed or deflected until it has worked itself out. If that be so, if the circumstances reviewed in these articles are to be grouped in this way—as to which there can be no certainty one way or the other except in a negligible number of ultra-confident minds—it is clear that Great Britain confronts a situation which she can do little to control, though she may be able to do something to restrict or modify its consequences.

Again, many of the factors are economic, or socio-economic. It is arguable that Japan's desperate efforts to obtain markets are, like our own, the inevitable consequences of the present capitalistic organisation of society. It is impossible to discuss this view within the limits of this article, yet it cannot be omitted, if for no other reason than that Russia enters so frequently upon the scene which I have described. But for the time being this line of thought ends in a *cul-de-sac* as far as British foreign policy is concerned; moreover, in retreating from it, we may note that Russia's economic system has not relieved her of the necessity of concentrating large forces in the Far East, or of building railways designed to serve strategic purposes, or of behaving as regards military preparations much as other Powers, including her two chief neighbours, Japan and Germany, are behaving.

If it be said that Russia is taking these steps because she

[4] George Sansom, *A Short Cultural History of Japan.*

is obliged in self-defence to do so, it may be replied that the imperialism which confronts her in the Far East is, as was stated in the second of these articles and as the Tokyo correspondent of *The Times* showed on July 14, that of an organisation—the Japanese army—which is largely anti-capitalist in its views.

A third way in which the circumstances I have described may be grouped is to regard them as the first stages of an inevitable reaction of the East against the ascendancy of the West, a reaction embracing racial, cultural, and economic elements. To the extent that Japan's policy, as at present prosecuted, is making genuine co-operation between her and China improbable it is also making any unified reaction —European factors apart—unlikely. If, however, Japan substituted for her present policy one which appealed to China, or in a totally new situation created by military conflict succeeded in securing from her an exhausted acceptance of her own domination and leadership, the old and hitherto discredited bogey known as the 'Yellow Peril' might become a reality. It would, indeed, be likely to do so if Europe indulged in a second orgy of internecine strife under the leadership of Tuchuns far more resourceful than any whom China has produced. These evident possibilities point directly to the continued wisdom of developing some form of collective security sufficiently comprehensive to prevent war in Europe or, at least, to preserve the foundations and main bulwarks of European, including American, polity.

Another course, consonant with any or all of the possibilities just outlined, none of which excludes the other, is a re-examination of our commercial policy. This, also, is too big a subject to be discussed in this article. But some of its outstanding features may be mentioned. We control, politically, considerable areas where cheap goods are a boon. We are associated, though without control, with much larger areas also rich in the raw materials which Japan needs. We and our associates are trying to reduce her capacity to sell her manufactures in both classes of territories by tariffs, quotas, and preferential arrangements. To that extent we threaten, if we have not actually diminished, her capacity to buy raw materials. The fact that amongst these materials are some which she wants primarily for military

purposes, when set against our own comprehensive plans for rearmament, cancels out. On the other hand, facts which do not cancel out are—(*a*) that, even assuming that Japan can in normal circumstances obtain all the raw material she needs, she fears that in abnormal circumstances she may not be able to do so; (*b*) that this fear is not without foundation; and (*c*) that part of its foundation is our policy of Imperial economic co-ordination, which is intended, and has shown itself to be, convertible, when necessary, into political and military co-ordination.

In these circumstances, is it reasonable to entertain the expectation of being able to maintain China's territorial integrity or its 'open door'? Is it not, on the other hand, arguable that we are helping to create the conditions in which both will disappear, and that in doing this we are increasing the friction which, if it sets the Far East alight, may also set Europe ablaze? With some knowledge of the difficulties involved in reconsidering our commercial policy, and the still harder problem of raw materials, I venture, nevertheless, to think that it is in this direction that British policy has the best chance of improving the political outlook in the Far East; and, as one who may claim to be familiar with the latter ground, I hope that the offer we made to Japan some time ago to consider our mutual commercial relations upon a world basis—an offer which she rejected—will be made again.

Some recommend that a practical, relatively easy, and unspectacular method of dealing with the situation is to co-operate—by which they mean to enter into a local agreement—with Japan. A suggested method is Anglo-Japanese or Anglo-Sino-Japanese financial co-operation, this idea being a relic, or an off-shoot, of projects discussed during Sir Frederick Leith-Ross's visit to the Far East. The philosophy underlying this proposal is that we should then be in a position to modify Japan's ambition and acerbity, and to persuade her to act in a manner more in keeping with her chivalrous traditions and tendencies, especially in regard to our own enterprises. This seems at first sight, perhaps, a sound suggestion. But what would the realities of the position then be? They would be that, having lent money for the only reason for which money is ever lent in business

circles, that of obtaining a safe or, if risky, a big return, we should in the early stages of its employment have to avert our eyes from the manner of its use (which obviously would be decided in relation to Japanese and not Chinese interests), and at later stages, when the degree of China's 'sincerity' in helping to fructify its use was held to be insufficient by Japan, we should be expected to support, or at least not to hamper, her in such steps as she considered necessary to preserve the 'interest' thus created.

I venture to think that this, or any similar, proposal has only to be stated in realistic terms to be ruled out both upon moral and upon practical grounds. Japan has intimated clearly that she will not tolerate international financial assistance being given to China unless she both decides how it is to be employed and directs its employment. On every occasion on which she has spoken of co-operation with China she has indicated clearly that what she means by co-operation is exploitation. As long as that remains her purpose Anglo-Japanese co-operation of this local kind, the basis of which would be a shoddy opportunism overlaid upon incompatible principles, could only be detrimental both to China and to Great Britain.

E. M. GULL.

THE FUTURE OF THE LEAGUE

By Lord Queenborough, G.B.E.

Moral integrity seems to be at a discount to-day, and withou it society cannot continue to exist; but surely, in an ag when thought is of such vital importance to the world, intellectual integrity is of no less value. Harold Massinghan once remarked that, 'though the law does not permit th shopkeeper to sell "flannelette" for flannel or to advertis "margarine" as pure butter, there is nothing to prevent the adulteration or misdescription of the things of the mind.' In considering the grave problems of to-day, it behoves all men to keep intact, as far as it is humanly possible, integrity of heart and of mind; and at times when human frailty might have occasion to prevail, then man must fall back upon his natural, inherent instincts, and, not least, summon to his aid the power and guidance of the Divine.

The post-war years have been shadowed with ruin and transformation. In Europe we have witnessed the collapse or disintegration of kingdoms, the overthrow of former systems of government, while in several other countries anarchy has stalked through the land. New forms of social organisation and of the direction of national affairs have arisen, sometimes sharply opposed both in ideology and in their social, economic and cultural structure. In the United States of America, after a generation of unexampled prosperity, gloom and disillusion followed, bringing in their wake the deepest financial and social depression. In Indi and the Far East there are rumblings of some coming political earthquake, while throughout the world there continue reverberations of revolution against established law and order. Following the Great War, men had come to believe that Western civilisation would weaken if an attempt were not made to abolish the old system of diplomacy and

of force of arms by a new peace system. The concept of the League of Nations appeared at the psychological moment and, almost hysterically, was universally welcomed by men and women of all races as representing the ideal of their hearts and imaginations. Yet, with the passage of time, as the passions engendered by war propaganda burned themselves out, it became more and more apparent that the Covenant of the League had proved to be but the hasty work of human hands; and though laudable attempts were made to infuse the League with a more generous spirit, and as a counterpart were added the Kellogg Pact and the Locarno Treaty, no satisfactory result has been achieved.

From the outset, unhappily, the Treaty of Versailles had been joined to the Covenant of the League. Clemenceau, 'The Tiger,' had no love for the new system. Its ideals did not awaken any Christian sentiment in the soul of a man embittered by hatred and long political strife. The old French statesman rejoiced that, through the Treaty, 'the peace was war carried on by other means.' The Central Empires of Europe were shattered and dismembered; and among them the most formidable, Germany, by means of the sternest penalties ever imposed upon a defeated nation, was reduced almost to bankruptcy, her population to the edge of starvation, her social order to chaos. It may be easy to be wise after the event. But as the years have passed it became more and more apparent that it is never possible to keep a virile and hardworking people permanently in subjection. Nor, I think, could such an objective ever be desirable.

If a fundamental weakness of the League was the unbreakable bond of the Covenant with the Treaty of Versailles, there remains, also, a serious flaw among the twenty-six articles of the Covenant itself, wherein the members of the League took oath unconditionally, not to abjure war, but to engage to reduce 'national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety,' and 'pledged themselves to the enforcement by common action of international obligations.' The Covenant insisted that any member, or members, of the League resorting to warlike actions, or refusing, after arbitration, to accept the award peacefully, would be subjected immediately by the other members of

the League 'to the severance of all trade or financial rela tions,' and afterwards, if need be, to military compulsion Nevertheless, whatever the flaws, the Covenant was a super conception. The architecture of the League declared it majesty: the profound defects, of which already there had been illustrations in the Mediterranean and in Manchukuo culminated in the Italo-Abyssinian *débâcle*. But, since neither Germany nor Russia, representing, say, 200,000,000 white people in Europe, with the 137,000,000 of the United States of America, were represented at the first Council the League was by no means a real League of Nations. The refusal of the United States to ratify the work of President Wilson was a calamity. The chauvinism of Clemenceau and Poincaré preventing the admission of defeated Germany to the councils of the League can only be regarded as the most tragic blunder of modern statesmanship.

The Kellogg Pact was little more than a meaningless formula of words: it was not even a clear recitation of principles; nor, since pressure was brought to bear, was the Locarno Treaty much less invidious. Yet, while the statesmen argued and sometimes quarrelled over formulæ—the victors yielding little, the vanquished claiming equality, the newer States increasing their demands for economic expansion, the older suffering from grief and grievance—the stricken peoples of the world clung to the ideal upon which popular imagination had seized as the true interpretation of their will in international affairs. No one of intelligence can then have imagined, nor indeed can to-day conceive that the normal characteristics of men or of nations would be changed. Yet past history, to which had since been added the immeasureable advantages of speedy communication declared with unchallengeable voice that the conception of a real League of Nations was both practicable and one which held out the highest hopes of bringing back the world to the paths of peace and to that form and order in its institutions of which Nature herself is the great example.

Recognising as I do the noble work which has been performed by the League of Nations in its attempt to mitigate conditions of labour as they affect workers and operatives engaged in dangerous trades, welcoming the efforts which have been made to suppress the 'white slave' and the

drug traffics, I have been conscious of a departure from what I had clearly perceived as the ideals of the League, and a gradual tightening, rather than relaxation, of the punitive terms of the Treaty of Versailles, as against the extension of the spirit of the Covenant. I have already observed that at its inception Russia, among others, was absent from the League. The acts of the Bolshevist dictatorship had shocked the people of all nations, West and East alike. The admission of men whose hands were yet wet with the gore of thousands of innocent people, and whose butcheries and tyrannies were purposely continued with unparalleled ferocity, was to them unthinkable. Over and over again the tyrants of the Kremlin announced their intention of spreading world revolution, of destroying religion, of overthrowing monarchies, and of imposing what they term '*the rule of the proletariat*' in their place. Those familiar with the facts knew only too well that no government by the Russian people had ever been established when the Romanoffs were murdered, but that a ruthless dictatorship had replaced the man of simple tastes and kindly sentiments, who for them everywhere had been known as 'the Father of all the Russias.'

We should now recall that in 1919 the British Government published a White Paper containing a report from M. Oudendyk, the Netherlands Minister at St. Petersburg, who remained to watch British interests during the Bolshevist revolution. This report, of September 6, 1918, was forwarded by Sir M. Findlay from Christiania to Mr. Balfour. M. Oudendyk stated:

> I consider that the immediate suppression of Bolshevism is the greatest issue now before the world, not even excluding the war which is still raging, and, unless as above stated, Bolshevism is nipped in the bud immediately, it is bound to spread, in one form or another, over Europe and the whole world, as it is organised and worked by Jews, who have no nationality, and whose one object is to destroy for their own ends the existing order of things.

In the years immediately following the war Germany was disarmed, and of this there can be no doubt. Writing in 1924, M. Albert Thomas, Director of the International Labour Office at Geneva and former Minister of Munitions in the French War Cabinet, speaking, therefore, with unquestionable authority, said:

To tell the truth, France at the present time is not threatened. At this moment she possesses the strongest army in the world. The military monarchies which might have been a menace to her are now broken up. In spite of divergencies of policy, she remains allied to England and Italy. She is closely united in daily action with Belgium. She is the ally and supporter of the republics of Czechoslovakia and Poland and of the monarchies of Yugoslavia and Roumania, who, on their frontiers, face the same risks as France.

A treaty is a mutual agreement, in which the obligations and undertakings are not single, but joint. The flaws in the Covenant joined to the Treaty permitted the Allies, in fact, to do as they pleased; and in the matter of armaments it is clear from official statistics that their mood was to disregard their obligations under the Treaty, while maintaining a very different pose at Geneva. It is true that Great Britain, with her immense Empire responsibilities, did in fact make concessions to the Covenant in disarming. But other nations pursued a very different course. In 1931 the armies of Europe grouped together as 'allies,' or joined to French policy through the Little Entente, were as follows:

Great Britain, 137,000 Regulars, 153,000 Territorials. (These figures do not account for 334,000 troops in India, and others maintained throughout the Empire.) France, 497,000 regulars, 55,000 others; 165,000 colonial regulars. Belgium, 86,000 regulars, 6,000 others. Czechoslovakia, 139,000 regulars, 13,000 others. Italy, 491,000 regulars, 90,000 others. Poland, 266,000 regulars, 64,000 others. Roumania, 250,000 regulars, 63,000 others. Russia (U.S.S.R.), 562,000 regulars (no certain information as to reserves is available). Against these colossal figures the regular army of Germany comprised 100,000 men, without other armed military forces.

The air forces of the same countries in Europe in 1932, including only machines fit for active military service, were officially given as: Great Britain, 1,434; France, 2375; Belgium, 195; Czechoslovakia, 546; Italy, 1,507; Poland, 700; Roumania, 799; Russia (U.S.S.R.), 1,500. Germany possessed no air arm whatsoever, and no machines which could have been converted to military use.

In 1932 the British Fleet consisted of fifteen battleships, 150 destroyers, sixteen cruisers, fifty-two submarines, and

other ships. The fleet of Germany consisted of six battleships, five cruisers, thirty-six destroyers, no submarines. The German navy was also far smaller than that of either France or Italy. It must be clear, therefore, from the official figures given above and the statement of M. Albert Thomas, that up till 1932 Germany presented no kind of menace to her neighbours nor to the world at large.

On the other hand, the gigantic expansion of the Russian military machine during the past few years is unparalleled in history. Competent military critics estimate the actual peace strength at not less than 1,300,000, with a further reserve of several millions more. Marshal Tukhachevski, Deputy-Commissar for War, stated before the Congress of Soviets in February 1935 that the peace strength of the army had been raised from 562,000 to 940,000. According to official Russian statements on the military budget, there was an increase of 27·5 per cent. from 1933–34. On February 8, 1935, M. Grinko, the Peoples' Commissar of Finances, informed the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets that more than 5,000,000,000 roubles had been actually spent on the Red army in 1934, while the estimated expenditure for 1935 amounted to 6,500,000,000 roubles. Tukhachevski further said that since 1931 the heavy artillery had been more than doubled, as well as the machine-guns for infantry and cavalry. The number of aeroplanes had been increased by 330 per cent., light and medium tanks by 760 per cent. and 792 per cent. respectively, and small armoured cars by as much as 2475 per cent. of the 1931 figure. Mr. Louis Fischer, the notable American expert, states that Russia now has the most powerful bombing planes known to mankind. M. Eidemann, the Chief of the Ossiaviachim (the organisation comprising non-military riflemen), has stated that there are over 500,000 young men who have been trained as airmen. Very little military equipment is obtained from abroad, and this is practically limited to complicated appliances such as electric starters and measuring instruments.

It may well be asked : 'Why these enormous armaments?' Russia removed the chief source of a possible conflict with Japan by selling her rights in the Eastern Chinese Railway in November 1934, while in China propaganda is her main weapon. Further, a war of the Western countries against

the U.S.S.R. is completely out of the question; while Moscow is the only European capital inaccessible to hostile air squadrons. It must appear, therefore, that Russia's preparations aim at nothing less than offensive warfare, although the protestations of M. Litvinov that Russia desires peace may be sincere for the moment. On January 7, 1936, at a conference of members of the Soviet Government, in the presence of Stalin, Kosareff, Secretary of the Union of Young Communists, said: 'The older generation decided the question who should destroy whom within our country. We, led by our party, led by the great Stalin, commanded by Marshal Voroshiloff, have an extraordinarily arduous and important historic task—to decide who shall destroy whom in the whole world.'

No one could possibly believe that Germany, implacably opposed to Bolshevism, could watch all these gigantic preparations with indifference. Even in March 1935 it became apparent that the negotiations between Moscow and Paris were not to be limited to the Pact as originally conceived, but that a regular military alliance was contemplated. On March 16, protesting again and again that he desired peace—and can anyone doubt this from the lips of an ex-serviceman who had witnessed many of the horrors of the Western Front?—Reichkanzler Adolf Hitler announced the reintroduction of universal military service in Germany. His decision was soon followed by the formal withdrawal of Germany from the League. A year later, in reply to the ratification by the French Senate of the Franco-Soviet Military Pact, with firm decision Germany reoccupied the demilitarised zone of the Rhine, and without doubt will take steps to refortify her frontiers.

The Franco-Soviet Pact is accompanied also by pacts and 'understandings' linking Czechoslovakia, with its air bases convenient to both France and Russia, Roumania, Belgium and other States, completing what is obviously an armed encirclement of Germany. It is to this menace that Herr Hitler has, in my opinion rightly, called the attention of the world. The grim spectre of Bolshevism, supported now by a vast array of armaments, is far more menacing to-day than it was in 1919, when His Majesty's Government first issued the White Paper as a warning. Following secret

meetings at Geneva—a custom which did not appear to be at all in keeping with the spirit of the League—Bolshevist Russia was admitted to membership and took its place at the Supreme Council. The spokesman has been M. Litvinov, a man of whom, in causing his expulsion from this country, Lord Curzon in 1918 said: 'His intrigues were so desperate.' It has seemed that from the moment of his appearance M. Litvinov has largely dominated the proceedings of the League. Not only did Germany secede, but Japan has retired, and the love of Italy has surely evaporated.

British Ministers have again and again demanded of the Russian dictators that their propaganda throughout the British Empire shall cease; but, despite disclaimers, this propaganda has continued unabated, with more than ample evidence of its being financed from Moscow. Close observers of post-war Europe cannot fail to have perceived the hand of Moscow in nearly every country except Germany, and especially in Spain and more recently in France and Belgium. In the former, the passions of a largely ignorant people have been inflamed, authority and law have been overthrown, religious institutions have been swept on one side, and hooliganism and anarchy have been let loose. In France, a grotesque travesty of the democratic system has placed power in the hands of the millionaire-Communist Léon Blum; while Béla Kun, steeped in the blood of his short-lived Bolshevist revolution in Hungary, fresh from the slaughter of priests and patriots in Spain, with the orders of Moscow in his pocket, has arrived in France. As I stated in my letter of resignation as treasurer of the League of Nations Union, 'the League, as I see it now, is no longer a real League of Nations, nor do I see at present that it can function as an effective instrument for peace.' Those at Geneva appear to speak with one voice and to express a common sentiment. But the voice is that of Moscow, the sentiment is the threat embodied in the speech of Kosareff.

The vast majority in all nations have little knowledge of politics and of the international repercussions which ensue from acts which on the surface appear to be only those of domestic policy. The war generation, and that which followed, although brought up in the natural traditions of our national life, were largely ignorant of the international

complex which so unhappily followed the Great War; and as the result, their minds have not been attuned to reality.

Chivalry towards the vanquished has for many centuries added lustre to the battle honours embroidered upon the standards of the British Army, and, naturally, those who had endured the hardships and wounds of the campaign were the first to express their desire for friendship with the former enemy. His Majesty the King, as Prince of Wales, by extending the hand of friendship to Germany's former soldiers—if, humbly, I may say so—clearly demonstrated how fully he understands that friendship between nations must begin in the home; and perhaps more than any other man of our time, or of any other age, has His Majesty familiarised himself with the home life of ordinary men and women wherever he has travelled throughout the wide world. Between 1914 and 1918 the appeal to the soldier, the sailor, and the airman had been for the defence of his own soil, his own national institutions and culture. How well his efforts succeeded, whether with friend or late enemy, is happily recorded on the pages of history.

Nature is the permanent guide and controller of humanity; and Nature, the whole, is far greater than its part, humanity. Nations or racial groupings have developed their social and political structures in accordance with racial characteristics and interests. And here they could not have done otherwise, being a part of Nature, and therefore compelled to act within the sphere of her laws and precepts. It was no less great a scientific luminary and profound thinker than Professor Albert Einstein who wrote: 'Nationalities of different races seem to have an instinct which prevents them from fusing. Nationalities want to pursue their own path, not to blend.' The view which Professor Einstein expresses is one which instinctively is shared by every Briton: it is surely the view held equally by every Frenchman, German, Italian, and men of every race. The time-honoured principles of blood and soil are rooted deep in the history of man, for, inescapably, man, though more glorious in his spiritual perceptions, as I believe, than is the rest of Nature, must nevertheless be a part of the Divine Plan.

If, as I have stated, there were flaws in the basic conception of the Covenant of the League, either by design or

through failure to grasp the true realities in human association, another flaw, a veritable chasm, has developed, threatening the imminent destruction of the whole edifice. A new international order will not and cannot supersede nations. Quite the reverse: it must build upon them. No self-respecting nation, proud of its race, aglow with patriotic pride in its inheritance, glorying in its contributions to science, to the arts, and to its national institutions, will willingly concede such immortal treasures, amassed by the frugality and sacrifice of countless generations, to any other concept through whose organisation or instrument such priceless assets must be jettisoned.

The choice, as it would appear, at the present time for the British people is that they shall throw aside all that has gone to the fashioning of the British character and shall embrace a new materialistic concept, the fruits of which within the space of twenty short years have been the massacre of millions, the destruction of much that men have held dear, and utter subordination in slavery to the machine of a cruel dictatorship. This is the only choice which the League of Nations, as at present constituted, offers as the haven of those natural desires of men and women for the consummation of international good will and peace.

The races of this world are among the facts of Nature. Surely, therefore, the mission of statesmanship is to promote the extension and elevation of each. The forces which have obtained paramount influence in the League do not appear willing to recognise these simple truths of Nature, and what should and must assuredly also be manifestations of the Divine Will.

So many hopes have been built upon the League of Nations that it would be tragic if so sublime a conception were now permitted to crumble into ruin. It is practicable to erect a new edifice, to be eventually crowned with the dome of Peace. We witness throughout the world a resurgence of the national spirit. It is manifest especially among the young. The cramped conditions of modern industrial and city life have everywhere produced a desire for the open country, for a glimpse of glorious landscapes, for contact with soil, for the companionship of woods and vales and hills. Unconsciously, the masses have responded to what is an inde-

structible part of their being. Man emerges from and returns to the soil. Spirit, mind and body are one whole—a trinity, each indispensable to the other. As this is true of the individual, it is true of the nation, which, after all, is the unification of personalities, welded together by the natural conditions imposed by climate, soil and by all those influences which make one country different from another.

It has been found by all classes of the community and among all nations that when they travel abroad, or dwell in foreign lands, they are able to live on terms of perfect amity with the strangers among whom they venture. The longer the foreigner remains, the more he learns to appreciate customs, habits, institutions, which at first sight struck him sometimes with amusement and astonishment, and even with repugnance. With the process of time, however, he learns to understand something of the guiding philosophy and influences which produce cultures distinct from his own. And though he seldom if ever can entirely shake off his own natural sentiment, yet unquestionably he learns to have an eye, an ear and a sense for those things which inspire the natives of the land of his sojourn to great and noble works. Were the League of Nations concerned with making much of the natural and inherited gifts of each one of its members, whether great or small, were the League devoted to the promotion of the happiness of each people, if only the League would set itself the task of examining what better system in world affairs might be employed so that in an age of unexampled prosperity and plenty the people might take advantage of the marvellous discoveries of science and invention, and could make full use of the fruits of the earth in their season, then that would be a true League of Nations at whose council table the representatives of the British Empire could with pride take their seats. In place of an unholy alliance, to which we are being urged, such a League of Nations would prove to be an affirmation that international relations shall be conducted on the principles of Christian morality.

QUEENBOROUGH.

May 1936.

THE FAIRBRIDGE MODEL

By The Rev. A. G. B. West

Thanks to the published reports of Mr. Malcolm Stewart, Commissioner for the 'Special Areas,' the public conscience is being roused. The wholesale tragedies of unemployment in districts of Wales and Northern England, the coal and shipping centres, are seen as a blot on modern civilisation. Not even the return to better trade in general has brought proportionate share of hope to South Wales and Tyneside. Manufacturers for various reasons are slow to open factories or branches where blight has fallen upon once prosperous counties. The very development of more up-to-date methods, in pit and shipyard, lessens increasingly the call for manual labour. So much so, that an increased international trade can now be carried in fewer bottoms, and more coal can now be trucked by far fewer hands. In spite, then, of better prospects at Jarrow, and from Government orders which will help the men on Tyne and Wear, in spite of £3,500,000 of public money spent by the Commission on Harbours and Developments, on hospitals and sewerage, on small holdings and allotments, on holiday camps, educational facilities and social settlements, the position is still very grave. Most of the workers who have spent their lives in Durham cannot believe that prosperity and full-time wages will not return. They will rather wait in sad resignation for that day, subsisting meanwhile on idle acceptance of unemployed benefits than break new ground further afield. Yet sound plans are being made to plant them on the land: 2000 families in two years have been transferred and set going in the Midlands and Home Counties. For the first time in our history the experiment has been made of using public funds to settle on the land those who have no experience of the work or capital to sink in it. The experiment has been justified, but no large

extension of it seems to be warranted by the prospects. The Commissioners are wise in setting more store on transference of young unemployed to areas where they can enjoy some of the benefits of trade revival, and by holiday camps, physical training, medical care and creation of wider interests, rescue them from that gloom of defeatism which wrecks body and soul. We may be warned to remember that among indictable offences 43 per cent. are committed by youths under twenty-one, and 23 per cent. by those under sixteen. Of the comparatively minor offences classed as 'breaking and entering,' 58 per cent. are by children under twenty-one.

Due remembrance of this gives special point to the statement, from such an authority as Mr. Malcolm Stewart, as:

> Probably the most serious problem of the 'Special Areas' is that presented by unemployment among young men between eighteen and twenty-one. There are about 11,000 of them—7000 have been unemployed for more than three months. The problem calls for urgent and drastic treatment. Many of these young persons have done practically no work: they have been brought up in a home where the father has been continually out of work. . . . They have seen their own families and their friends kept for years by the State, and they have come to accept this as a normal condition of life. It is hardly surprising, in the circumstances, that young persons with this background and up-bringing should be ready victims of all kinds of demoralising influences. In short, these young men present, in my view, the most tragic aspect of the problem of the 'Special Areas,' and one fraught with great danger to the State.

This is a danger signal indeed. Yet it must not be thought that the problem is peculiar to England or the 'Special Areas.' In Germany, in Canada, in the United States a similar task confronts all lovers of their kind. How, in the altered economic conditions which amount to a severe revolution, can the rising generation be given their fair chance? How shall we stem that tide of demoralisation which is the inevitable fruit of hopelessness and enforced idleness? Ruination to body and soul comes swiftly to those who, through no fault of their own, are debarred from the career of activity which is their right. Remedies, naturally, take their colour from national temperament. In Germany Herr Hitler, by enforced discipline of labour camps, has been able to diminish crime and infuse a new spirit of hope and efficiency into his workless youths, which is wholly commendable. In the

United States a widespread net of unemployment camps is helping to tide over a perilous situation, not without bitter complaint that no permanent career of independent work can be guaranteed.

> If there is to be any hope for these youths, then training must definitely lead to work, and the provision of this is so urgently needed . . . that national work is fully warranted.

Our English prejudices preclude, at present, any compulsory methods. Our youth must be invited to follow leads which can show the way to betterment. Though, if conscription is allowable in face of hostile aggression, it may presently be admitted as desirable to overcome an economic and social peril. It would apply to capital as well as to labour, enforcing the duty of investment where the need is greatest. And one prevalent weakness must be overcome in our educational outlook. Far too little is made of the dignity of manual craftmanship—or even of its value as mental training—and far too much of the glory of joining the blackcoated brigade. 'You are too good to be a plumber—you should learn type-writing,' is the kind of fatuous advice too often given by teachers. A leading citizen of the Western States said to me last August:

> Again and again I am faced with this. A man tells me that, by dint of great privation to his mother, he has passed through his arts course and is now a graduate. But there is no opening for him in a world overfull of the half-educated. He is simply not wanted. And he might have been happy as a good stonemason.

That citizen was deeply interested in what I told him of Fairbridge Farm Schools and wished to see them started in the United States. If the principles on which they are founded continue to commend themselves, they doubtless will be. They are for universal application.

What are those principles, and how have they approved themselves after trial and error through twenty years? Kingsley Fairbridge was a Rhodes scholar from Rhodesia who, on his arrival in England twenty-five years ago, was appalled at the waste of child life and the grim outlook for youth in overcrowded areas. There was such a crying need for them in the Dominions to buy up the opportunity and enter into their heritage. But how could the two be brought together—children hungry for a career, and lands hungry

for men? Mere transference from one latitude to another was not enough. There must be loving individual care. There must be patient wide training, and, most of all, there must be unceasing oversight and guidance, even when the wards had left the parent home to begin their independent career. The sense of an ever-widening family love must overrule all.

> I saw great colleges of agriculture (not workhouses) springing up in every man-hungry corner of the Empire. I saw little children shedding the bondage of bitter circumstances and stretching their legs and minds amid the thousand interests of the farm. I saw waste turned to providence, the waste of unneeded humanity converted to the husbandry of unpeopled acres.

That was the dream of one who was not disobedient to the heavenly vision. But let it not be supposed that it was immediately acceptable. It was little thought of among emigration schemes in 1914, when 120,000 emigrants every year were finding their way to Australia. It was thought to be too small, too slow, over-expensive in time and outlay. And there was much indifference to be overcome before the first settlement could be even started 60 miles south of Perth.

From small beginnings, and through much financial strain, that school, on a farm of 3500 acres, has grown till it can take 350 girls and boys for a five years' course. Some £60,000 voluntarily subscribed has now been invested in that undertaking. Never was there a better investment; for more than 1000 children have enjoyed the blessings given by training for an agricultural life which 90 per cent. never wish to leave. Within the last two years such confidence in this model has been evinced that the £100,000 appealed for by the Prince of Wales and Mr. Stanley Baldwin two years ago for the establishment of three more such schools is all but subscribed. The second school is already founded in Vancouver on a farm of 1000 acres. It will presently spread a yearly crop of fifty to sixty trained youths over much of British Columbia. Preparations for further schools in New South Wales and Queensland are being made. And a munificent bequest from Lady Northcote guarantees the immediate founding of another such school in Victoria. This is to be worked by a special board of trustees with Earl Grey as chairman, but on the Fairbridge model. Indeed, it was

a sight of the Fairbridge film which finally determined the donor's legacy. These five schools on completion will give the surest endowment to some 1200 children.

From the point of view of peopling our Dominions that total is a mere drop in the bucket. It is the trained character of these migrants which is their security: the fact that they grow up in conditions which newly arrived adults find strange and disconcerting, and insensibly adapt themselves to a new-world atmosphere. They have been rescued from depressing conditions before they were old enough to be demoralised, and thereby have escaped the worst of dangers. More than that, medical tests ensure that they shall be physically sound, mentally and morally without blemish. And while this provision must clearly be insisted on by Dominion authorities, it is often disconcerting for those who would gladly offer this help to children who need it most. That a child should be cut off from a joyous adventure which gives such pleasing prospects, because its teeth have been neglected or insufficiency of food has lowered its vitality, is cruel and wrong. A welcome assistance to Fairbridge from the Special Area Commission will be the medical upbuilding of those who are thus disqualified and can be made fit to pass the tests by six months' care. Various questions, very properly, are asked: How and where do you find your children? What assurance can you give that they are happy and hopeful at such a distance away? What guarantee is there that in ten years' time they will have better prospects of work and eventual independence than if they had remained in England? What sort of welcome do they have overseas?

The system of management is that the Central Committee in London chooses a local committee in Australia or British Columbia. It appoints a Principal for each school, whose position is much like that of the headmaster of a great English school to his governors. The local committee is in charge of finance and general policy. It receives block grants from London and disburses them in consultation with the Principal. Thus most necessary local interest is assured, and (in Australia) *per capita* grants for upkeep are received from both State and Commonwealth exchequers. Minutes of all committee meetings are forwarded to London, where questions involving capital expenditure are decided. Children come to us

from all parts of the British Isles; from the London County Council and other county councils, from Kilburn Sisters, orphanages and from private homes. Last July a special effort was made to collect children from Durham and Tyneside; the year before from Wrexham, after the colliery disaster which left such a crop of orphans. In Gateshead and Newcastle and Shields scores of children besieged our office, longing for escape from an outlook grim and hopeless; many of them were full of lust for adventure and an open-air life. A proportion of the first party to Vancouver Island came from these areas, but scores were turned down. Parents withheld their consent, or they were too old, or they were medically unfit. The hard measure dealt out to deportees from Canada, and the bitterness of those who had lost their all in Victoria, deepens suspicion of all oversea ventures. It is a hard fight to win consent for what youth so much desires. Parents should enjoy the responsibility for their children, and are right to be nervous of handing them over to unknown conditions. There is less to be said for that power of veto when the father is in prison or the mother shows no proper care for her own. But several times a widow who loved her boys refused to stand in the way of what she recognised would be for their well-being, whatever it cost her.

Hence it is that the Fairbridge aim is to reproduce as nearly as possible the sweetness of family life. The children are housed in families of twelve to fourteen, in a separate cottage under a house-mother. She will care for their down-sitting and uprising, their baths and clothes and beds, packing them off at 6.45 to breakfast, and after that to school. Their meals and lessons they will have in dining-hall and big-school. Their cottage is their home. Here, after tea, when, if old enough, they have put in spare time milking, harrowing, wood-chopping, gardening, they discuss with 'ma' the happenings of the day and plan their future. This home they are encouraged to beautify within and without: the cottage gardens at Pinjarra are a delight. And the whole settlement, with its pigs and horses, its sheep and kine, its twenty other cottages, Old Fairbridgians hostel, guest-house, hospital, stables and byres, is their own farm. The unfelled blue-gum and pine which await their axes are adventure in the offing—

with chances of wild bees' honey or fierce cougars. It is all apprenticeship for the real life coming—as is the creek bathing, the physical drill, and the annual seaside camp. No. There is nothing of the 'institution' feeling in their surroundings. To that hostel they will return from far-away up-country when they need a change. In that church they will be married, when, in due course, he and she who came out twelve years ago in the same boat from Southampton have saved enough from their earnings to set up house together. She may have been laundress or housemaid in Perth or Albany, he working on farms in the north-west. At sixteen or seventeen there will be no lack of employers anxious to give them 15*s.* to £1 a week, with keep, for their services. The Principal will see to it that they are under masters who will teach them further lessons about the land, and the after-care officer will visit them, however great the distance, to see that they are fairly treated. Till they are twenty-one, half their wages will be banked for them. At twenty-four, especially if they join forces with a girl who has also saved her nest-egg of £100 or more, they are ripe for investing in their own holding.

So far, there has been no shade of difficulty in placing those who, beginning their course at ten or eleven, have become knowledgeable, brawny and enterprising by the time they are seventeen. In one year the Principal had 800 applications for his fifty trainees. And prospects for the girls who have learnt domestic work are no less satisfactory. They work hard, play hard, and, happily, in great numbers prefer country life and farms to any attractions of the towns. Yet it is true that larger capital than most boys can save up in eight or ten years from their wages is needed for successful start as a farmer. It is being now considered whether some plan of grouping Old Fairbridgians on co-operative holdings might not give them a better chance. A gift of £5000 for this special purpose, whether advanced as loan or otherwise, will be tried. It is too early to say yet whether in British Columbia, after five years, we shall have equal success in advancing our wards. If, however, a trip taken in September through the Okenagan valley is any guide, there is every prospect that well-trained youths will be in great demand, and will be given by fruit-growers, dairymen and farmers every chance to make good. Old-timers who have succeeded

concur in maintaining that training, health and enterprise is the capital which counts in the long run. In almost every line of business the eventual master has begun on the lowest rung of the ladder.

It is claimed for this model of training and migration that it makes use of those tastes which in youths are most humanising and admirable. Possibly there is nowhere greater love for domestic pets, greyhounds, fancy pigeons and the like, than among our distressed miners of the North. That taste, when the chance is given, develops for the Clydesdales and Ayrshires, which are ministers of wealth and comfort. The plea is that its scope should be enlarged. The greatest content, and ultimate success, comes from pride in good stock, the best seeds and fruits. Here is a sphere of labour which ensures continually growing interest. It develops that power of 'taking notice' which is the root of mental growth, and enriches life with values which are outside a commercial standard. Yet even so the best stock pays best.

Admittedly, there is no help from Fairbridge Schools for that division of 11,000 youth in whose worklessness Mr. Stewart sees such a tragic danger to themselves and to the State. The essence of our scheme is that youth should be rescued young from that all too likely demoralisation. Yet extension of this model can sensibly lessen the on-coming crop of such foredoomed failures. And, whatever be devised for the protection of those already smitten with recklessness and apathy, it is certain that training for some occupation which attracts and holds them must enter into the programme.

Frequently recurring signs that the Dominions are again realising the need of increasing British stock are welcome. While this is partly due to improvement in trade, it is probable that the campaign in Abyssinia and its clear moral have sharpened vision. Measureless resources must be developed, or forfeited to those who can make use of them. The urge to spread from overcrowded areas, Italian or Japanese, is certain to grow more acute. That national selfishness, which persists in denying entrance into our vast possessions to any others than our own stock, is criminal short-sightedness, which is bound to add bitterness to the unrest of the world. An outstanding, often forgotten, fact is that Yokohama—sixty hours' sail nearer to Port Darwin, in

North Australia, than Port Darwin is to Melbourne—has 900,000,000 of the most densely packed populations of the earth within 3000 miles. The Pacific Ocean is the coming centre of world politics.

Long-time policies of Empire settlement must aim at attracting capital, industrial workers and land settlers to strengthen the 6,500,000 who hold, but do not occupy, immense Commonwealth areas. Ten times that total, even of Europeans, could be carried by those acres. But so long as they are peopled by under two to the square mile they are of necessity a bait and alluring temptation.

Wise schemes will have to eschew haphazard, huckstering ways, such as those which brought about dire distress in Victoria after the war. That callous exploitation of the guileless and over-confiding must never be suffered again. And it might easily be repeated if visionary projects of mass migration were accepted as practical.

An overwhelming proportion of those who have left these islands during the last century and have made good overseas, have gone as individual pioneers. Their transport may have been assisted from public funds or by voluntary societies; but on arrival they have trusted to their own initiative and adaptability, and have made their own way. If they had been coddled and financed by high-sounding companies launched with many trumpetings, experience shows that two things are certain. As individuals they would have failed to attain the training and self-reliance without which no ultimate success is possible. And great waste of public money, with ensuing dissatisfaction, would have been reaped as a reward for misplaced trust in theoretical schemes. Fairbridge principles assure essential training and avoid unpractical haste.

Arthur G. B. West.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ELECTRICAL MUSIC

By Major R. Raven-Hart

Over four years ago—in *The Nineteenth Century* for February 1932—after studying the developments up to that date, I allowed myself to make certain predictions as to the immediate future for musical instruments using electrical methods to produce the sound: the facts were, I believe, accurate, but the predictions have all proved to be entirely incorrect, with one exception; and this, the improvement of playing technique, was such an obvious and safe prophecy that I can take little credit for it.

In this previous article the desiderata of a perfect musical instrument were summarised as: unlimited duration of note, unbroken by breath or bowing pauses; all notes, not only those of the present scale; any passage from note to note between glissando and detached; practically infinite range of volume without change of tone-quality; all tone-qualities, existing and imaginable; any 'attack' desired; all notes within the audible range; reasonable portability; and reasonable facility of execution. It was in connexion with this last item that hopes of development of a player-technique were expressed, and it is these hopes which have been so amply fulfilled, even to such a degree as to surprise the writer: anyone who has heard, probably by wireless, the recent demonstrations of the 'Trautonium,' especially as played by Oskar Sala, will admit that the limit of melodic (one note at a time) execution has been attained. The musically detestable fantasia on *Martha* is perhaps the best example, where the instrument allows of a virtuosity that compares well with anything to be produced from violin or flute, together with changes of tone-quality which shift the solo instrument dizzily all over the orchestra, from bassoon to piccolo and from

trombone to glockenspiel: the result is frankly unbelievable for anyone who, like myself, has played (or played with) the original laboratory model. It should in justice be added hastily that this particular piece is not to be taken as an indication of the musical taste either of the inventor or of the player: it was arranged solely to show off the possibilities of the instrument and as a reply to critics who were doubtful of its ability to tackle florid passages. With this demonstration the formidable list of desiderata can be considered as fulfilled by at least one type of electronic instrument—at any rate, to a degree which has never before been the case.

With this one exception, however, all the predictions of the previous article were false. For instance, it was there implied that no new type of instrument, working, that is to say, on a basically new principle, would be likely to appear; and one of the most interesting of the recent developments has proved to be the appearance of just such a new principle, one which, moreover, presents possibilities that are quite literally boundless. This principle is the *pictorial* production of music, the creation of audible tones by drawing them on paper. It is, of course, a perfectly obvious one, when it has been stated: if in the sound-film, for instance, it is possible to photograph sound into the form of a black-and-white pattern and to turn this back into sound by the use of a photo-cell and the associated electrical equipment, as is done hourly, then it is equally possible to construct this black-and-white pattern with pen and ink and then make the same photo-cell produce music from it.

Incidentally, and although this is not strictly a question of electrical music, some of the implications of this process are worth a parenthesis here. First of all, it is obvious that the artist who can draw music can also retouch visually recorded music, a point of very great importance for film purposes; but also, since there is no fundamental difference between photographed music and the photographed voice, this same artist can both draw and retouch speech. For example, it is perfectly practicable for an accent to be removed, an 'American' speaker made to talk 'English,' or a normal person given an even more perfect intonation than a B.B.C. announcer. The reverse process is equally practicable:

one might envisage a politician whose speech was considered to be unpopularly refined arranging for slight coarsenings to be retouched into a propaganda film before its release, or even for slight dialectal modifications to be added, differing from one print to another according to the district in which they were to be shown. Or, even more disconcerting but equally possible, his opponents might supplement drawn caricatures of him, and photographs not showing him at his best, by fragments from his earlier speeches, distorted in voice so as to make him ridiculous. That this is technically perfectly possible was demonstrated not long ago when a German station was transmitting disc-recorded fragments of a speech of one of the opponents of the present *régime*, and the voice was incredibly unpleasant: the fact that this distortion continued for some moments during the subsequent words of the station announcer before disappearing suddenly was all that there was to show that the unpleasant effect had been due to some accident in adjustment of the transmitter characteristics, and did not indicate that the original speaker was as objectionable as he sounded.

To return to electrical music, however: an instrument has been actually produced in which all the sounds have been thus drawn, and from the drawings photographed on to films, these then being 'scanned' by a photo-cell to give the notes, and tone-quality being varied either by the shapes of the pattern originally drawn, or by scanning several films simultaneously. Whether this principle is likely to have any important future cannot as yet be judged: there are very grave technical difficulties, especially as regards the wearing-out of the films in use, since for each note there is a relatively short endless band which must be moved along under the photo-cell, and which is almost inevitably damaged in this process. A development by another inventor keeps the 'sound-picture' (which, of course, can here also be drawn by the artist) fixed in position, and sends the light through it to the photo-cell, removing these mechanical difficulties though adding others peculiar to itself; still, an instrument of this type was actually in use in a Paris church for several months and appears to have worked satisfactorily. It should be added perhaps, although obvious, that instead of the sound-pictures being drawn they can be

photographed from the sounds made by existing instruments, an easier but a less interesting method: there is something peculiarly fascinating in the idea of hearing a sound which has had its origin in a design on paper, which has been 'seen' by a photographic lens and by a photo-cell but as yet heard by no one, and which, indeed (if we wish), can now be heard by us, but not even by the player whose touch on the key is letting it loose as sound.

One of the most important practical developments of these last four years, in a field which in itself is of less inherent interest than that of the more radically novel instruments, is the installation of a number of church organs in which wireless valves are the source of sound (not photo-cells, as in the case just mentioned, and involving an entirely different principle); and it is of special interest to note that the firm concerned in most of these installations is also a long-established producer of church organs of the normal type. The incentive to this development has been largely an economic one, since, in the case of an organ of average size, it is possible to instal an electronic instrument at less than half the cost of a corresponding organ of the usual type, the saving being even more marked for larger installations. The disadvantage from the theoretical point of view and as regards the future is that, as in all keyboard instruments, only the notes of the present scale can be used, or of some other arbitrary scale, and progression from one note to the following can never be by a true glissando, two of our desiderata being thus lost. On the other hand, the implications of such an electronic organ are of great interest, quite apart from the financial side of the question. For example, the tuning of the notes is extremely easy, a mere matter of turning a screw, so that the entire organ could be retuned to a different pitch in a few hours were this desirable, as, for instance, in the case of the visit of a foreign orchestra; or again, it is a simple matter to replace a register of one quality by a new one of a different tone-colour by comparatively rapid electrical changes, whereas the corresponding operation in a normal organ would, of course, entail the removal of the complete set of pipes of that register and their replacement, dimensions permitting, by new ones; or yet again, the addition of a new register will cost perhaps

one-twentieth at most of the expense entailed by adding a new pipe-register. The chief advantage, however, is that only the console, no larger than a normal one, together with a series of invisibly installed loud-speakers, need be in the church itself, the valves which replace the pipes being stowed away anywhere that is convenient—in a sacristy, for instance: this point will always be a convenience, and may be absolutely vital in the case of a small chapel or where it is undesirable to spoil the architecture by the usual cumbersome 'kist of whistles.' A further advantage which may readily be overlooked is that the loud-speakers may be installed to suit the acoustic properties of the building, to overcome awkward echo-areas, for instance: again, they can be used singly or in groups by simple switching from the console, giving not only the perhaps undesirably sentimental 'echo' effects, but also the very valuable ability to support congregational singing by switching in the speakers in the nave and at the west end; or, a simple extension of this principle, it is a very easy and comparatively inexpensive matter to add a battery of hired loud-speakers for special functions, in the open square in front of the church, for instance, so that a crowd of pilgrims there can be gathered into the emotional field of the music. (It is hardly necessary to add that such a battery could also be used to make the service and the sermon also audible to such a crowd, with no more additional complications than a few microphones and a controller at a switch-board.) The ease with which loud-speakers can be temporarily installed has also very great importance during the actual setting up of the organ itself, since it is possible to experiment rapidly and at small cost until the proper placement is found, whereas the normal organ has to be installed once and for all, and examples could only too readily be given of organs which have been spoilt by their positioning, whether this was due to miscalculation of the acoustics of the building, or imposed by architectural considerations. Mention should also be made of two points in playing technique, although with the reservation that they are dangerously liable to induce a floridity quite incompatible with the true organ style: one is that the response of the valve is instantaneous, so that ultra-florid passages can be

played or a note repeated rapidly without muzziness; the other is that a 'swell' effect can be added to any register with great ease, no mechanical arrangements to open and close shutters being necessary, as in the case of the normal organ, so that crescendos and diminuendos become readily (too readily) available, not only on the 'swell' keyboard, but on all of them if desired, pedals included. The *Poste Parisien* owns one such, not infrequently to be heard in its broadcast transmissions; and it should also be noted that, like practically all electronic instruments, these organs are particularly suited for broadcasting in that they can put the electrical impulses which they produce directly into the transmitter, instead of first producing sounds and then using a microphone to turn these into electric currents. Mention should also be made of another type of electrical organ, more recent than the French one, the joint product of an American and a German inventor, and largely based on work done at the Heinrich Hertz Institute in Berlin: as far as it can be judged from laboratory models, it may be an advance on the type just described, being even more compact and inexpensive, and offering even more possibilities, these being largely based on the principles used in the 'Trautonium,' described below; it is, however, too early to be sure of this, whereas the French organs have already been in use for years in several churches.

Another keyboard instrument of considerable interest is the electronic piano, developed commercially by the Bechstein house, and, in a perhaps superior form, by an American inventor. Here again the financial aspect is not without interest, since the complete instrument, not only playable as a piano with or without the added refinements to be described, but also serving as a normal wireless receiver and as an electric gramophone, costs less than the cheapest grand piano made by the same firm. The interest for the engineer is less here, the sound being produced, as in the normal piano, by the percussion of a hammer on strings, and electrical technique entering only after this has been done, to convert the sound into electrical impulses and amplify these, finally producing them from a loud-speaker; in fact, the amplifier and loud-speaker essentially replace

the sounding-board of the normal instrument. Since, however, this 'electrical sounding-board' can amplify many hundred-fold the sounds that energise it, these original sounds need only be very weak: hence the strings can be lighter and less tensioned, and the hammers also reduced in weight and size, this, incidentally, tending to purer tones, especially at the moment of percussion; and, a further consequence of the small amount of energy taken from them, the damping of the strings is greatly reduced, so that, if left to themselves, they will vibrate for half a minute or longer, giving sustained notes that no normal piano can produce. Further, the loudness of a note is no longer governed only by the energy of the attack, but can be altered by change of the amount of electrical amplification; it is thus possible to begin such a sustained note *piano* and make it swell up to fortissimo before it dies away again, this being controlled by the left pedal. Minor advantages are that, if desired, the total volume can far exceed that of a normal piano, making it thus possible to dominate, for instance, a full orchestra at its loudest; and that for broadcasting purposes the piano can play directly into the transmitter, the usual chain piano–microphone–transmitter being thus freed of its weakest link, the microphone. It should also be added that a special switch gives the damping of a normal piano, so that if this is used and the left pedal ignored all the literature of the piano can be played without change; in other words, the instrument serves as a normal piano as well as giving organ and harpsichord and other effects. The right pedal is quite normal, its use removing the immediate damping and allowing the strings to vibrate, either for the same time as they would do in a normal piano if the just-mentioned switch is used, or for a far longer period if this switch is in the other position. On the debit side as compared with other electronic instruments must, of course, be noted that, as is the case with all keyboard instruments, only the notes of a definite scale are possible, without, for instance, quarter-tones or a true glissando; and that no great changes of tone-quality are available—nothing to compare with those possible in the 'Trautonium,' for example, an instrument with which we shall deal shortly, although some minor variations of timbre are possible with the Bechstein instru-

ment and some more extensive ones can be made in the case of the American type already mentioned.

Before leaving this class of instrument—that is to say, in which the sound is produced mechanically and then dealt with electrically—it may be of interest to indicate how readily simple experiments may be carried out by anyone interested in electrical music and owning a wireless receiver. As subject a guitar, lute, or, best of all, a 'japanese' fiddle (one-string, cigar-box and broomstick) are suitable, or, in fact, any stringed instrument with a wooden sounding-board and in which the strings have a fairly long vibration period—not the mandoline, for example. All that is necessary is to press the sharp point of a steel gramophone-needle gently into some part of this woodwork (various positions should be tried) and to put the blunt end of the needle into an electrical pick-up in the normal way, bandaging this to the instrument, preferably with rubber sponges as padding, so that the needle does not carry the weight of the pick-up: this added weight makes a violin or viola unsuitable for the experiment, unless played on the knee. If now the cords of the pick-up are connected to the proper terminals of the receiver in the normal way, it will be found that the sounds given out by the instrument are reproduced with greatly increased volume by the loud-speaker, so much so that the actual primary sounds may be practically inaudible to the audience in comparison. If now an assistant controls the loud-speaker volume, using the normal 'volume-control' knob of the set, an idea of the new possibilities can be obtained; for example, by setting this towards the maximum, a pianissimo attack can be combined with fortissimo volume, or the curious ultra-pizzicato produced by merely pressing and releasing the string may be made usefully audible, or a glissando on a string vibrating after plucking, or a variation in volume of the sound after plucking can be made. Or, by careful timing, the volume-control knob can be made to suppress the actual plucking of the string entirely, and only the subsequent vibrations allowed to appear; or, the reverse process, the pizzicato attack can be over-emphasised, with an effect as if the player damped out the vibrations of the string immediately after plucking it. (Obviously the ideal for more elaborate experimenting would be to put the control

of volume in the hands of the player, or, more exactly, in his feet, by constructing a pedal-operated volume-control, a perfectly easy matter for any wireless enthusiast.)

If, as is probable, the receiver is also fitted with a 'tone-control' knob, allowing of prominence being given to the lower or the higher tones as desired, the use of this will give some further idea of the possibilities of electrical music by allowing the timbre of the instrument to be considerably changed at will: here again, however, the best results would be attained by a specially built tone-control, connected directly to the cords uniting the pick-up to the receiver, and readily built from scrap material by anyone capable of building his own wireless receiver.

The recent development of the more truly 'electronic' instruments—of those, that is to say, where there is no adaptation of an existing instrument and no mechanical production of the sound—has been very greatly complicated by patent questions, and at every moment one must pause to query whether certain 'improvements' are genuine progress, as, of course, is claimed by the inventors, and, especially, by the manufacturers, or whether they are in reality retrograde steps made necessary to evade pre-existing patent rights. The development of the 'Trautonium' principle offers an amusing example of the complications existing: it may be remembered that in the original instrument the sound was produced by making a neon lamp, a baby brother of those used in luminous signs, flash so rapidly that the eye cannot see the action, the clicks which each flash produces (as those who have a wireless receiver near flashing signs or traffic signals probably know only too well) being similarly indistinguishable by the ear as separate sounds, only a musical note being audible. Then, still in the original model, 'tone-former' vibrations were added to these notes by use of a wireless valve, to give them tone-colour. The principle has been simultaneously developed in two exactly opposite directions, one of these abandoning the baby neon lamp which was the soul of the original instrument in favour of a wireless valve, and the other replacing the wireless valve, which in the original followed this neon lamp by—a second such neon lamp! As a matter of fact, as far as results go there seems to be little to choose between the two systems,

each in its own field, but it is an amusing example of the intricacy of the situation.

Mention should be made here of the improvements in the Martenot instrument, the original type of which was described in the writer's first article, if only because of the interest taken in it by composers in France: Honegger has scored for it repeatedly, both in ballet music and for films (*L'Idée*, *Rapt*, etc.), Ibert uses two of these instruments in the film *Golgotha* recently released, Milhaud has written a suite for them, and many other examples could be quoted. This is a melodic (one note at a time) instrument, the pitch being fixed in the original model by the position of the player's finger over a dummy keyboard: the principal improvement made is that this keyboard is now no longer a mere dummy, so that two forms of playing are possible—the original form, giving all possible intervals, half-, quarter-tones, etc. (by placing the finger off the centre of the key and without depressing this), but incapable of a true legato; and in addition the use of these keys, making the use of the instrument easy for anyone able to play with one finger on a piano, losing, however, the power to produce true glissandos or any intervals except those of the modern scale, but gaining the true legato lacking previously.

I believed at one time that these truly electronic instruments, where the new methods and possibilities are demonstrated without the hampering of older technique, would be taken up by directors of orchestras to replace some of the present instruments, many of which everyone knows to be unsatisfactory, but which are apparently not susceptible of improvement. This belief, based no doubt too greatly on hope, and not taking sufficiently into account the conservatism of professional musicians, has been very little justified: perhaps the only really important use of such instruments has been made by Stokovski, who has on occasions embodied a type of Theremin instrument in his orchestra. On the contrary, it is not the professional but the amateur musician who has suddenly become interested in these instruments, especially in Germany, and the really striking development has been in their popularisation for home use. Not only have German wireless periodicals given full details of the construction of simple forms of them,

but in addition several manufacturers have put them on the market complete for the less expert as regards wireless construction. Certainly their application to what the Germans call 'house music' is a very desirable one, and they are extremely well suited to interest the music-lover, offering as they do practically all the possibilities of electrical music in a simple form and at a relatively low cost; and, being all melodic in nature (one note at a time), not only are they reasonably easy to learn, but also make good companions to the ubiquitous piano. It is also a pleasant piece of poetic justice that wireless technique, which, by making broadcasting possible, has done so much to kill amateur music-making in the home, should now offer simple and cheap instruments to induce the broadcast listener to make his own music occasionally instead of passively accepting what is fed to him.

These 'home' instruments nearly all work on the idea of utilising the 'Radio-gramophone' terminals with which practically all modern receivers are fitted, the music being heard from the loud-speaker of the set, and the necessary amplification being contained therein: in this way the additional apparatus necessary is relatively simple, and could be produced at far lower prices than those at present asked in most cases; it could also quite readily be built by any wireless amateur capable of building his own receiver. This additional apparatus may take one of many forms, each descending from some particular type of electronic instrument. Thus, for example, the Heinrich Hertz Institute at Berlin, which has taken a special interest in the subject, showed at a recent Wireless Exhibition there a form based on the Theremin, the first electro-musical instrument to attract general attention; and not only showed it, but allowed those who wished to play it—in special sound-proof booths, be it added. This particular type was merely a box about 8 inches cube, with a vertical brass rod projecting from it, and cords attaching a press-button and a pedal: pitch was controlled, as in the parent instrument, by varying the distance between the hand of the player and this rod, and it merely needed to be placed close to a wireless receiver for the loud-speaker of this to produce the music. It could have been put together in about half a day, and at a cost of perhaps 30*s*., by any average constructing amateur. Again, several types of home

instruments have been put on the market based on the principle of varying the pitch by changes in the setting of a variable condenser, and these could equally well be built by any amateur interested: these all connect to the 'Radio-gramophone' ('pick-up') terminals of the receiver, which is, however, in no way altered by this, and is ready for its normal functions at the turn of a switch.

Probably, however, the most interesting is the home instrument based on the 'Trautonium,' since this gives a more complete idea of the possibilities of electronic music than do those already mentioned, especially in the field of tone-quality and its variation. The parent instrument was fully described in the previous article: it may be remembered that it allowed of any existing tone-quality being reproduced, together with a practically unlimited number of tone-qualities which up to the present have never been produced; and the 'baby' will do this very nearly if not quite as well—I should have to test the two side by side to be certain, so little is there to choose. It also has the same really uncanny feature of the original instrument—that of being able to change from one quality to another, not by abrupt steps, as in an organ, for instance, but imperceptibly, so that a 'flute' becomes a 'trumpet' without it being possible to say at what moment the border-line was crossed, the timbre passing on the way through those of all sorts of non-existent instruments.

The musician, and even more the amateur musician, will be interested to know what one of the 'home' instruments looks like, and how it is handled. Taking the baby 'Trautonium' as an example, this is a small case about 3 feet long, 1 foot or so in height, and about the same in depth, connected by cords to a wall-plug, to the 'pick-up' terminals of a receiver, and to a pedal. Along the front of the instrument, below a music-rack, runs a horizontal metal plate, with a fine wire stretched just above it: a note is produced when this wire is pressed down to touch the plate by the player's finger, and continues as long as he holds it down; and the position of his finger along the wire fixes the pitch of the note heard, lower ones lying to the left and higher ones to the right, as in the case of the piano. About three and a half octaves are covered; but these can be placed anywhere in the audible range by altering

the setting of a knob—in fact, the pitch can even be lowered to such a degree that no musical note is heard from the loud-speaker, the separate impulses being heard which would build up to a note in the ear did they recur more frequently; and in the other direction tones above the audible range of the normal human ear can be produced, which, however, are heard by animals, cats especially, as experiment will prove. Another knob produces smaller shifts of pitch—for tuning to a piano, for instance. The degree to which the pedal is depressed fixes the volume of sound produced, and this can range from the practically inaudible to the literally deafening, if the wireless set will stand up to the latter. The sharpness with which the finger is pressed on the wire decides the sharpness of the 'attack,' a gentle pressure giving a violin-like commencement of tone, and a sharper, more staccato tap suggesting the way that the notes from a trumpet or reed instrument begin. Only one note is produced at a time, but this no more implies that only one finger is used than in the case of a typewriter: on the contrary, the other fingers are very busy 'preparing' the next note or notes. In this connexion it will be appreciated that if the 'new' finger presses the wire at the new point before the other one has released it elsewhere, a true legato is obtained, one note merging into the other without gap or overlap, and without the sounding of any intermediate notes: on the other hand, if there is a pause between the release by one finger and the contact under the new one, detached playing will be obtained; and, of course, by sliding the finger along the wire from one position to the other a true glissando is available, all the intermediate tones being sounded. It is perhaps worth emphasising this point, since in many earlier types of instrument the production of a true legato was very nearly impossible, the choice lying between a very definite detached effect, almost bordering on a staccato, and a somewhat monotonous scoop-glissando. It should also be added that rapid movement of the playing finger vertically produces one type of tremolo, change of volume without change of pitch, whereas a rocking movement of this finger gives the other type, variation in pitch without change of volume: both can be made even more 'soulful' than the syrupiest cello or worst cinema organ. Finally,

there are five 'stops,' of the key type as on modern organs, and two further knobs, all of which control the tone-quality, the stops serving for abrupt changes and the knobs for more gradual ones, including, of course, the imperceptible passage from one tone-colour to another already mentioned. If now that formidable list of desiderata with which this article opens be consulted, it will be found that they are all met by this instrument, simple as it is.

What the future of electrical music may be I will not again attempt to predict. For the moment, its chief practical uses lie, curiously enough, at the very extremes of music-making, competing on the one hand with the simplest of 'home' instruments such as the penny whistle and one-stringed fiddle, and on the other hand rivalling the organ, that most elaborate of all musical instruments of to-day.

R. Raven-Hart.

PROBATION AS A TREATMENT OF CRIME

By Leo Page

The system of Probation, wisely used, is as valuable an instrument for the prevention of crime as any at the disposal of a court of justice. The same system, improperly used, is always useless, and often actively harmful. It is, therefore, a primary duty of every magistrate to familiarise himself with the details, the advantages, the potentialities, and the dangers of probation. The object, however, of the present article is to go further. It is an endeavour to interest a wider public in a question of great social importance. It is, in addition, an attempt to persuade those who are responsible for local administration that it would be a wise, fruitful, and economical use of public funds to spend such money as is reasonably necessary to bring to the maximum degree of efficiency the probation system of the area over which they have control.

For these purposes no detailed history of probation is necessary. It is enough to say that the system has spread in many European countries, and in England and Wales is to-day governed by the Probation of Offenders Act, 1907. Like other legal administration, it is in practice best applied in London and the other large cities which possess the advantages of professional lawyers as stipendiaries, and of a co-ordinated body of probation officers. It is less happily administered in certain country districts, in some of which, indeed, it is at the moment so largely misunderstood and misapplied as to reduce its efficiency to a minimum. The Probation Rules, made by the Secretary of State in 1926, were intended as a guide to the proper administration of the Act of 1907, amended in details as it has been by subsequent legislation, and it is a matter for great regret that in many rural districts their letter and spirit have been so lamentably ignored. It is most earnestly to be hoped that, in such places, magistrates

and others in positions of influence may come soon to a fuller knowledge of their responsibilities, and that from that realisation may arise something of that immense influence for good in thousands of human lives which those with knowledge of this system believe that it can bring.

There are three different ways in which a court may treat a person convicted of a criminal offence. He may be punished by imprisonment, or by fine, or he may be dealt with under the Probation of Offenders Act. There are offenders for whom a sharp term of hard labour is the best corrective, as there are a few to whom a sentence of whipping is the most effective deterrent, and persistent professional criminals from whom society will not be safeguarded save by a long sentence of penal servitude. To deny that these things are most unhappily true seems, to those whose acquaintance with prisoners is first hand and practical rather than theoretical, a foolishly perverse and unhelpful sentimentalism. A recognition of its necessity does nothing, however, to reconcile us to imprisonment save as a last resort. There will, surely, be common agreement that if, in any individual case, there is any practical alternative which offers substantial hope of the desired result being achieved, no court should ever impose a sentence of imprisonment. The imposition of a fine is a simple and necessary alternative, which, in many cases, is a suitable and effective punishment; but there are obvious disadvantages to this penalty in some cases. In that of a poor man with a family, for example, a fine frequently results in unmerited suffering to wife and children, unless it is so small as to be little deterrent, in which case there is a danger of the law being brought into contempt.

The third method of dealing with an offender is under the Probation of Offenders Act. The Act gives power to the court, although the charge has been proved, to adopt any one of three courses in suitable cases, where the offence is a trivial one or the circumstances or character of the defendant make such a decision desirable. The case may be dismissed without any conviction being recorded; or, secondly, the defendant may be released to come up for judgment if called upon (this second course is commonly known as 'binding over'); or, thirdly, the offender may be not merely bound over but also placed under the directions and orders of an

officer appointed by the court. It is this third course, of which the supervision is the very essence, to which the name of 'probation' is alone applied.

The advantages, not only to a prisoner but to society, of dealing with a defendant under the Probation of Offenders Act are immediately clear. There is no stigma of a prison sentence, with its inevitable enforced association with men of vicious character. There is no loss of employment, with its attendant suffering of an innocent family. There is not the same danger of loss of character or of self-respect. There is a considerable saving in expense to the public in probation rather than maintenance in a prison.

These considerations are relevant and important, but they are not final. The overriding consideration must be the protection of society. Before, therefore, it is possible to urge the greater use of probation we must examine the question of its effectiveness. That is the crucial test. Indeed, it is the only one. We need pay no attention to the criticism, still sometimes heard, that probation is 'not a sufficient punishment' for wrongdoing, or that it is 'pampering' those who have broken the law. Such arguments betray an ignorance of the justification for legal sanctions. Society has a right to self-protection, and if individuals can be prevented from wrongdoing by no other means than loss of liberty or the infliction of physical pain the community is justified in imposing these punishments. But, if it be possible in any case, the treatment of crime should be remedial. There is, it is submitted, no justification for the infliction of pain or suffering for its own sake, or in cases where equally effective results may be attained by milder means if such be reasonably practical.

We may say at once, and with confidence, that the value of probation has been amply proved. In justification of this claim there are statistics to which we will devote our attention later. It is beyond question that results have been already achieved of enormous value to the community. It is equally beyond question that, in certain areas, the results attained could be very greatly improved if certain essential preliminary conditions were fulfilled. These conditions concern partly the magistrates who in rural areas comprise the court, and partly the probation officers who exercise its supervision.

The responsibility of the magistrates is considerable. It is imperfectly realised, even by justices themselves, how essential is the part they must play in any local system of probation if it is to attain success.

First and most important of all the duties of the court is the selection of persons to be released on probation. It is true that a court of summary jurisdiction can so release a person convicted of any offence punishable by such court. In the same way a court of quarter sessions or assize can so deal with a person convicted of any offence, save only murder or treason. It is an entire misconception that such procedure is applicable only to trivial offences. But a careful and informed examination of all the circumstances of a particular case is vitally necessary before such release on probation is ordered. Such selection is of the very essence of the scheme. Success in probation depends upon the choice of suitable cases. In such cases, in the words of the Report of the Departmental Committee on the Treatment of Young Offenders :

> The personal influence and supervision of a good probation officer may prove the most effective method of reclamation. On the other hand, if young people who have bad home surroundings or are in need of training are put on probation and left in their old surroundings instead of being sent to Home Office Schools or Borstal Institutions, or if offenders are repeatedly placed on probation, despite previous failures, there is every likelihood that they will soon be among the prison 'ins and outs.'

In coming to a decision as to whether the home surroundings are so bad as to make reclamation under a probation order impossible, it is important that magistrates should be guided not so much by material as by spiritual values. Sordid and unlovely surroundings, or even grinding poverty, should not be the deciding factors so much as careless or unnatural parents or a loveless home. Children and parents alike may be helped to rise above their surroundings, distressing as they may be. It is a grievous responsibility to remove a child from its parent even to the best conducted institution. It is remarkable what handicaps of poverty and ignorance a kindly probation officer can overcome. Nor should the mistake be made, as it is in some rural areas, that probation is intended only for juvenile delinquents. In London, where professional magistrates of long experience preside over the police courts,

no less than 50 per cent. of adults convicted are put on probation. But there are country districts where such treatment of adults is unknown. We repeat, therefore, that the importance of the selection of suitable cases cannot be over-emphasised. It is as ineffectual to put on probation a defendant who cannot respond as it is both cruel and wasteful to send to an institution a defendant who could be treated by a probation officer successfully at home.

This selection can be exercised only after careful inquiry, which is best conducted by the probation officer, who will, if a probation order be made, ultimately have charge of the case. This inquiry and the report to the court based upon it will be described under the duties of the probation officer.

Once the court has reached a decision to make a probation order it is important that it should be made in such a way as to create the best moral effect. It is disastrous if the impression is created, either on the probationer or on others, that he has 'got off.' The Act requires that the offender be furnished with 'a notice in writing stating in simple terms the conditions he is required to fulfil,' and this must be read over and explained to him before he leaves the precincts of the court. It is still an unfortunate custom, however, in some areas for no more to be done in open court than for the clerk to read aloud to the defendant a statutory notice, in archaic legal phraseology, quite incomprehensible either to him or to others in court. It is most desirable that the chairman should make it an invariable practice, before the statutory notice is read, to explain in the simplest words, but with all necessary gravity, the meaning of what is done, and the obligations which the defendant is taking upon himself. The court has extensive powers to impose conditions. They are too seldom used. A defendant may be ordered to pay the 'costs of the proceedings, or damages for injury, or compensation for loss, not exceeding in the case of a court of summary jurisdiction twenty-five pounds.' Conditions may be inserted as to obedience to the orders of the probation officer, place of residence, association with persons of bad character named in the order, abstention from intoxicants, and so on as the court sees fit. Such conditions are of immense value, not only in themselves, but as an ever-present reminder of his situation to the probationer during the whole time during which the

order remains in force. Moreover, they serve to bring home to the associates of the probationer that the order is more than an empty formality. It is the best atmosphere for success that the probationer should begin his term fully aware of his obligations and in such a frame of mind as willingly to co-operate in the work of his own reformation. The creation of this atmosphere should be the object of the chairman's words.

As regards the length of time for which an order should be made there is no unanimity of opinion. The maximum period is three years. A personal view which is offered for consideration is that no order should be made for a less period than twelve months, and should in most cases be for two years at least. It is within the competence of the court to discharge the order at any time, so that no harm is done by making the order for a longer period than may, in fact, prove necessary. The exercise of this power is indeed a stimulus and encouragement to a probationer to do his best. Very often, however, the extra twelve months on probation is of the greatest value to the probation officer in the work of consolidating the improvements made.

Even yet, however, the duties of the magistrates are not concluded. The Probation Rules, 1926, made by the Home Secretary, provide for the appointment of Probation Committees of Justices. It is their duty to receive the reports of probation officers and to supervise their work. If this work is looked on as a formality and perfunctorily performed, much of the efficiency of the whole system will be impaired. There should be regular meetings between the committee and the officers in order to consider methods and results. Without them the probation officer works alone, with no one to praise or encourage him, no one with whom to discuss the inevitable difficulties and failures in his work, no one whose help or advice he can seek when a case is going wrong.

The guidance, the criticism, and the support which magistrates can give is an integral part of the system and has much to do with its failure or success.

Finally, there is the duty laid upon the court when a probationer breaks the conditions of his order, or is brought by the officer before the court as having failed to respond to the opportunities given him and to take advantage of the

help given him to run straight. In such a case the court has discretion to add new conditions, or to extend the period of the order; to impose a fine without interfering with the probation order, or to impose a punishment for the original offence.

The responsibility of the probation officer is obvious. His work may be considered under two heads—investigation and supervision. We have already pointed out that upon the selection of suitable cases almost everything depends. The Probation Rules provide that 'the Probation Officer shall make such preliminary enquiries including enquiries into the home surroundings as the Court may direct in respect of any offender in whose case the making of a Probation Order may arise.' At the conclusion of these inquiries the officer makes his report, upon which the decision of the court will be largely based. Whether the result of such inquiry be to eliminate an unsuitable or to confirm a suitable case, the care, accuracy, and thoroughness with which it is made will be of supreme importance to the court.

After an order has been made there will be the duty of making a home visit, and 'the establishment of regular communications to ensure that the officer is in close and constant touch with his charge, having full and prompt knowledge of any changing circumstances so that he may be able to advise (and, if need be, to control) with real understanding.'[1]

During the whole period of the order there are visits to be paid by the probation officer to the probationer at his own home, at frequent, but not regular, intervals; or the probationer is made to report personally to the officer at his home, or office. It is the duty of the officer to furnish written reports on the progress of his cases—clearly, intelligently, and regularly—to his probation committee, and to meet them for such discussion as they may require. It is also his duty where a probationer falls again into crime to give all the information as to character and conduct required by the court dealing with the new offence. Courts of quarter sessions and assizes alike avail themselves freely of the help a probation officer can so give.

[1] *Cf. A Handbook of Probation*, published by the National Association of Probation Officers, p. 55.

Work is the best insurance against crime, and regular work is the first thing needed by a probationer, if he is of an age to do it. No praise is too great for the ceaseless trouble taken by a good probation officer to find work for his charges, or, even better still, to train and encourage them to find work for themselves.

We can make no attempt to enter fully into all the details of the activities of a probation officer. We have said enough to give some outline of his work. It is to be a guide to many who have never known a friend—to give counsel to those on whose ears few kindly words have ever fallen. They have to build up character; to steady against discouragement; to train into strength and manliness. 'Probation is a failure if during the period of supervision the probationer behaves well, but on the expiration of the order he cannot stand alone.'[1] With such a task it need be no surprise that probation officers sometimes fail, but rather matter for astonishment that they so often succeed.

To carry out work of this difficulty with any degree of success calls for exceptional qualities. Nor do the investigation and supervision of probation cases outlined above exhaust the duties of the probation officer. There is the immense variety of social work of the courts which he may be called upon to perform. Parents come to him for counsel because their children are out of control. Destitute persons and discharged prisoners are brought to him for help. Youths and girls are referred to him by the police. Married couples, with any of the hundred miseries of an unhappy marriage, look to him for advice.

It is not easy to describe in a sentence the type of man or woman most likely to succeed in this most difficult, most searching of careers. He must have a genuine vocation for such work, but if he brings to it no more than a religious fervour, important as this is, he will usually fail. He needs courage and a sense of humour, a level-headed common sense, sympathy, an understanding of human nature and of the world, and a tireless capacity for work. He must be an adviser on whose judgment a court can rely; he must be able to make himself respected, as well as loved, by those under his charge: employers must know that they can trust

[1] *Handbook of Probation*, p. 115.

him implicitly. It would be absurd to look for such powers in a man or woman without an excellent education and specialised training. This need of adequate training has, indeed, been recognised by the Home Office, which in 1930 instituted the training scheme now available. This, in the normal period of two years, includes practical probation work under officers of experience, work in court, visits to prisons, Borstal institutions, boys' and girls' clubs, etc., and study for a diploma in social science.

The Rules of 1926 lay down that a whole-time probation officer should receive a salary of not less than £180, rising to a maximum of £370 if a man, with corresponding figures of £150 and £270 if a woman. It is also provided that on first appointment the officer should not be less than twenty-five, or, in the majority of cases, more than thirty-five years of age. The remuneration is, of course, additional to travelling and out-of-pocket expenses. The pay and expenses of probation officers are met out of local funds, subject to a Home Office grant of 50 per cent. It is obvious that there should be at least a certain minimum equipment. There should be an office, furnished with a desk, cupboards, a typewriter, and a telephone, while, for the records essential for efficient work, a card index and filing system is an absolute necessity.

We have reviewed in outline the work of a probation officer and the duties laid upon the probation committee by whom he is appointed and under whom he works. It remains to consider shortly the actual position of the probation system in England to-day.

The Probation of Offenders Act of 1907 empowered every local court to appoint a probation officer, but did not make such appointment compulsory. In very many districts, despite repeated appeals by the Home Office, no probation officers were appointed, and probation work was, as a result, impossible.

In consequence, the Criminal Justice Act of 1925 forced the backward areas into line, and the appointment of an officer by every court was made obligatory. But the position is by no means satisfactory. As we have seen, the appointment was left in the hands of the local probation committees, and in far too large a number of cases the committees have,

either through ignorance or indifference, and to avoid the necessity of paying the salaries of whole-time officers under the Home Office scale, appointed part-time officers, at absurdly inadequate remuneration.

It was therefore inevitable that untrained, and sometimes utterly unsuitable, officers should alone have been available, and in these areas a probation order has been virtually useless. In 1935, out of a total in the whole country of 858 probation officers of both sexes, no less than 559 were part-time appointments.

It is not, of course, suggested that every petty sessional division should appoint a whole-time probation officer. It is obvious that there would be an insufficient number of cases to occupy his time. But under the Act of 1925 this difficulty was foreseen, and it was made possible to combine as many areas as might be necessary to give full scope to the energies of a whole-time officer. By energy and good will the petty difficulties of borough and county jurisdiction can be surmounted, and the aim should be the grouping of every country town too small to justify a whole-time appointment with such number of contiguous county areas as to avoid any necessity for untrained, ill-paid, and part-time officers.

The existing position is absurd. In a county well known to the writer, which has a county town of over 90,000 inhabitants, there are, for the entire county, six probation officers, one of whom is a woman, whose respective salaries range from £10 to £50, and only one of whom is provided with any office accommodation at all. In a contiguous county, with roughly similar area and population and a county town of 80,000, there is one whole-time officer at a salary of £370, with complete office accommodation and equipment, and a part-time woman officer at £75.

Similar anomalies can be found throughout the country. It is more than time that they were swept away and a treatment of delinquency at once humane and effective made available to offenders irrespective of the place of commission of their offence. There are no figures applicable to the whole country by which the value of probation can be tested, because it is only in individual areas that any record has been kept of the number of cases in which a probation order has been made, as apart from the two other methods, of dis-

missal and binding over, by which, as has been explained above, an offender may be treated under the Act. But in certain areas the most careful statistics have been kept over a period of five years. Amongst them are areas as widely different as Cardiff, the West Riding of Yorkshire, and Southend. In each of them, over that period of time, some 70 per cent. of probationers remained clear of further crime. In the North Riding of Yorkshire the area of one whole-time officer can show, since 1920, a record of 754 satisfactory cases out of 804 placed under probation. This is well over 90 per cent. Is there any system which, apart from other considerations, can show a higher percentage of success? But such results are not achieved by accident. They are got by the choice of the right type of man as probation officer; and by giving him the material support of training, proper pay and adequate equipment, the moral support of sympathy, guidance, and interest in his work.

To attain a like result each of us in our own county or borough can do something, if we once realise that from an ill-paid, untrained, part-time officer we can never get, and we should be ashamed to ask, the service it is our duty to provide in the local administration of justice. With adequate combination there should be few areas without the whole-time services of men and women officers whose work will leave its mark for good on the lives and characters of the rising generation. There is the bogey of cost. But a single habitual criminal is as costly to the taxpayer as the probation system of a county. To provide in the probation officer just that wise guide, that friendly counsellor, who may save the erring boy from growing into that tragic figure the criminal man is not weakness or extravagance. It is not sentimentalism. It is common sense.

LEO PAGE.

ARMY RECRUITING

A Solution from the other End

By F. George, Ex-Sergeant, the Sherwood Foresters

To serve the King, the Empire, and the nation in the British Army is a privilege and an honour: it involves the risk of death and disablement, but also, more surely, unemployment and pauperisation.

Service in the Army does much to mould a man's character and to bring out the best in him; he is trained and educated in the proper sense of the word. He is imbued with *esprit de corps*, with great ideals of comradeship and courage, of loyalty to the Crown and to his fellows. He comes to realise that it is for him to carry on the great traditions of the men who fought at Waterloo, in the Indian Mutiny, South Africa and the Great War, building an Empire and preserving peace.

The private soldier can enjoy his favourite sports; his schooling is free. He is assured of a roof over his head, comfortable quarters, ample food and clothes, sufficient pocket-money, and expert medical care in sickness and health. So long as he is in the Army all is well with him; but when he leaves, what then? In the debate on the Army Estimates in the House of Commons in February 1914, the Secretary of State for War, admitting a shortage of 8000 men in the Army, said that the primary cause was 'the unemployed ex-soldier begging his bread in the streets.'

In *The Times* of November 6, 1931, a letter appeared, signed by the heads of the three Fighting Services, appealing for funds to help an association to find employment for ex-Regulars. The concluding paragraph of their letter was as follows:

In conclusion we would point out the issue we raise is by no means sentimental; on the one hand, the supply of recruits for the Services

must largely depend on the contentment of those men in and coming out of the Services; on the other hand, this large body of men, disciplined and trained to arms, seek only to maintain their own independence and self-respect; it were wise to ensure that none of them is left to drift through unemployment into discouragement and a condition of utter despair.

What better evidence is needed, and who can speak with greater authority? Those who signed the letter faced facts: the recruiting problem will be solved when Government and Parliament do the same, and give men security for employment after short service in the ranks.

The shortage of recruits for the Army is nothing new. In reply to a question in the House of Commons on May 19 last, the Secretary of State for War gave the following figures: In July 1899, a deficiency of 16,300; in July 1914, 11,000; in January 1936, much in excess of 11,000. The Secretary of State for War, appealing to young men through the medium of the cinema, claimed that whilst serving in the Army men can learn a trade and find employment afterwards. No man can learn a trade in the six months allowed for the purpose; the men know this as well as employers and trade unions, and in a recent issue of the *Household Brigade Magazine* a contributor states (p. 119) that

Experience has shown that many men unskilled in a trade who complete a Vocational Training Course find themselves unable to compete with the skilled craftsmen in civilian life, and this results in the men coming to the Society [the Brigade of Guards Employment Society] to seek other employment.

The reasons given to-day for the shortage of recruits are the receipt of unemployment benefit, pacifism, and the influence of mothers and fathers who remember the last war. Not one of those reasons could be advanced for the shortage of 1899 or 1914. What was the cause then? Exactly the same as at present; service in the Army is too often a blind-alley, apt to lead, at the best, no further than unskilled employment, or, for the less fortunate, the receipt of 'doles' from charitable sources, repellent to self-respecting men.

When those whose task it is to obtain recruits for the Army look facts in the face and realise that the best recruits are the scions of that great body of self-respecting British citizens comprising the working classes, who dislike charity

and desire an assured future for their sons no less than any other section of the community, they will be near the solution of their 'problem.' Mr. Duff Cooper has not yet referred in any public speech to this aspect of recruitment. The ex-soldier of to-day is not literally begging his bread in the streets as he was during the years between 1870—when short service for the Army was introduced—and 1914. Charity for old soldiers is dispensed in privacy sometimes, at other times it is advertised wholesale as 'entertainment.' Started many years ago as a necessity, and in a modest way by a few people genuinely interested, charity for the members of the Fighting Forces has become a great commercialised business, bringing profit to many through the activities of the serving soldier, who in due course becomes the unemployed ex-soldier. The present military system of Great Britain only too often makes the serving soldier and ex-soldier the bait for charity with profit.

Practically every corps and regiment has an Old Comrades Association. Most of these have a benevolent fund which assists men in distress who know where to apply. Such funds would not be necessary if all was well with the soldier on discharge. Some of these associations are getting rich. One alone has invested funds amounting to over £8600, and the relief dispensed is usually given from the interest on the investment of money contributed by serving men and ex-soldiers. Assuming the investments continue to increase, who will eventually obtain the full benefit of the capital? The men who have contributed it, or someone else when they are dead? The provision of something in the shape of cottage homes for deserving old soldiers of a regiment, with a limit to which the capital should accrue, would appear to be of more material benefit.

The Tattoos held in various parts of the country, and the Royal Tournament held in London, are advertised for 'Service Charities' or 'Services Welfare'—an appeal to the sentiment of the public to help its soldiers and ex-soldiers. Money voted by Parliament for the provision of soldiers is used to provide 'actors' to give a 'good show,' and the public, under the sentimental appeal of charity, pay again to see performances by men already paid as soldiers by taxpayers. Rail and road transport companies, publicity

agents, brewers, refreshment caterers and others—all benefit handsomely. What do these concerns give to charity? The distribution of part of the proceeds of one Tattoo held in a provincial city in 1935 makes startling reading. The Lord Mayor received £1875 11*s.* 1*d.*; and £40 was divided between the Police Widows and Orphans Fund, the Boy Scouts Association, and the British Red Cross. Is this another purpose for which Parliament provides soldiers—to perform for civilian charities of a particular city? This is worse than any charity ball.

Some three years ago Lord Wakefield said:

> The Army is becoming more and more highly skilled in its technical methods, and the typical soldier of to-day is a serious-minded, well-trained, and educated young man of whose character and capabilities we are rightly proud.

On November 28, 1935, Lieut.-General Sir Cecil Romer said that we looked upon the soldier of to-day as the same man as in the days of Waterloo. 'He is not,' he said; 'he is more intelligent and thinks more.' Time-expired men tell would-be recruits that they have found no security for honourable and remunerative employment on discharge.

I have referred previously to Old Comrades Associations. These are organised bodies of old soldiers. They do nothing to assist recruiting. Why? Is it that they are content to hold an annual dinner, disburse money, and obtain employment for their members when they can? As a combined organisation they could do more than any other body of men in the country to obtain recruits. But they will not combine. I know from experience that the regimental spirit is too strong. Individual members of the associations in pre-war days came into the movement to better their own prospects of employment and help recruiting. They brought constitutional pressure on the Government in a way, and for objects, of which brief details will be given, because I am convinced that if ex-soldiers will again organise in the same way, and for the same purpose, they have a great work before them. Not only will they secure employment for themselves and the serving soldier of to-day, who is the ex-soldier of to-morrow, but they will place recruiting on a sound basis by letting it be known that once a man joins the Army he is reasonably sure, on leaving, of obtaining employment

suited to his capacity, which is reasonably permanent. Such men—patriotic, loyal, and contented—will constitute a great source of strength to the country in time of emergency. Surely such objects are worth working for?

The men of 1912 organised themselves as a society to ask Parliament for a statutory right to continued State employment on discharge. This meant political action. But not party action; that would have been fatal. They laid their claim before the bar of public opinion in open meetings, and through their representatives in the House of Commons, irrespective of party labels. After only one year of activity a mass meeting was held in London, the outcome of which was a letter to the Prime Minister, the first paragraph of which read as follows:

> On the evening of Saturday, April 12, a mass meeting of ex-Naval and Military Men was held at the Kingsway Hall, under the auspices of the National Society of Ex-Naval and Military Men. There were roughly 1800 present, and the following resolution was carried without a single dissentient voice:
>
> 'That this mass meeting of ex-Naval and Military Men, held at the Kingsway Hall, W.C., Saturday, April 12, 1913, views with the gravest dissatisfaction the attitude of succeeding Governments towards the ex-Service man, an attitude which not only has a prejudicial effect on recruiting, but inflicts a real injustice on those who have elected to serve in the Fighting Forces of the Crown. We therefore ask the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable H. H. Asquith, to receive a deputation from the National Society of Ex-Naval and Military Men for the purpose of laying their proposals before him.'

The Secretary of State for War received a deputation, and on representations then made to him sought a solution of recruiting difficulties in relation to employment after service. He appointed two Committees. One, under the chairmanship of Sir Matthew Nathan, was to consider

> the conditions of service in the Army and the requirements of civil employment, with special reference to the question of ensuring such employment in Government departments, or otherwise, for all soldiers of good character on leaving the Colours.

The other Committee, over which Sir Edward Ward presided, was to devise a scheme for 'fitting the soldier while serving for industrial employment on quitting the Service.'

Following the appointment of these two Committees the leading London and provincial newspapers took the matter

up strongly, the following extracts taken from two leading articles being typical:

> The State takes the soldier or the seaman for the best years of his life, and then turns him adrift to shift for himself. Such a policy is not patriotic or humane, and the effect of it is now being experienced in an extraordinary dearth of recruits for the Army.—*Daily Mail*, November 16, 1913.
>
> A firm guarantee of public employment after leaving the Colours would be a greater inducement to enlist than a mere rise in pay.—*Daily Chronicle*, January 2, 1914.

The position to-day is unchanged. Cannot these two Committees be again brought into action? The records must be in the archives of the War Office.

On what grounds can a statutory right to continued State employment be substantiated? Whatever the cause which makes men enlist, the State takes the man into its employment as a soldier, paying him a wage in the same manner as if he entered the service of a civilian employer. Similarly, the State discharges a man on completion of his job, just as the private employer does. But there is this great difference in the position of the man discharged by the civil employer and the soldier. The former has been in industrial or commercial employment, whilst the soldier has been engaged in a profession which does not directly qualify him for any particular commercial employment. The labour of the man who has not served in the Army is a marketable commodity owing to his knowledge. He can take up fresh employment similar to that in which he has been engaged. Where is the similar employment to that, highly specialised as it is, which the soldier has been engaged in whilst serving? There is none. The State places the man who has served in the Army in that position, and there should be legal obligation by the State to ensure him a livelihood by honest toil, which is all a man desires. Since short service was introduced, nearly seventy years ago, the State has never admitted that obligation. It never will until ex-soldiers organise to ask that it should.

Space forbids the recital here of a complete list of the objects for which pre-war men were working. They can be summarised under the following headings: Employment by all Government departments; all military stations; all Government contractors; railways and all other undertakings

enjoying a statutory monopoly by Act of Parliament; all municipal bodies. Parliament in the last twenty years has conferred monopolies on many gas, water, electric power, transport and trading concerns. such as London Transport, Milk, Pig, Bacon and Potato Marketing Boards. In no single case has any stipulation been made by Parliament as to the employment of old soldiers. The otherwise excellent educational system in the Army is of little help to a man in commercial life. The syllabus should be altered and co-ordinated with the Civil Service to become an examination for entry into that Service on discharge from the Army, for both higher and lower grade posts, and for municipal employment. It is folly to suggest that the State or anyone else should employ incompetent men. Efficiency is necessary in all public services, and from every point of view the man should have to pass an examination. But the facility to do so should be during his service in the Army, not after he has left it, and it should not be restricted solely to passing a written examination.

Another factor unfavourable to recruiting is the large number of men discharged from the Army for disabilities and infirmities of various kinds which have come upon them during their period of service, generally abroad, but which are not for pension purposes 'attributable to military service.' In dealing with such cases the War Office is guided to some extent by the practice of the courts in administering the Workmen's Compensation Acts; but the proportion of men discharged for non-attributable disabilities—often after many years' service—is surprisingly large. Neither the unfortunate men themselves, nor the public, trouble to distinguish between attributable and non-attributable disabilities. John Doe enlists as a healthy young man: he comes back from foreign parts five or ten years later broken in health, with no pension: the doctors declare that the disability was latent when he enlisted and not attributable to service abroad. Richard Roe goes out shooting in India with his fellows, and is accidentally shot in the leg and is discharged, lamed for life, an unemployable man with no pension. All the public know is that he got shot in the East and is now 'on the parish.' There are some 30,000 such men now living, often in extreme penury. Cases of this kind could be covered by an insurance

scheme, half paid by the men, half by the State. It might cost the men 6*d.* a week; the State as much: it would be worth it to both parties.

Ministers, members of Parliament, and officers of high or low rank in the three Services fully realise that the supply of recruits is bound up with civil employment after service. Yet they have hitherto displayed neither the foresight nor the courage to take action on lines which would give them the recruits they want. Officers of the Services do what they can, which is but little. Parliament must move: if it will not, let ex-Regulars organise and approach the Legislature constitutionally, demanding justice—nothing less, nothing more. If they do this, and, as always, put Empire and country before vested interests and party politics, they will place recruiting on a sure and successful basis, and find employment for themselves, with the wherewithal to live as self-respecting citizens.

F. George.

THE THREE KINGS

By Sir Francis Newbolt

Hail, Mary! Mother of this child foretold,
    Whom we three strangers come from far to greet
With Myrrh, and Frankincense, and Gold,
    Strange gifts to lay before a baby's feet.

Shown by the star—Elect of all mankind,
    Though in this humble place He finds a home.
A greater than the Cæsar comes to bind
    The world-wide menace of Imperial Rome.

I, Melchior, offer gold, most puissant King:
    The royal power in Nubian gold appears,
Eternity in circle of this ring:
    Jesus, all hail! Yet men shall see Thy tears.

The rest is veiled: but when Thy manhood's might
    Shall dominate, all wars shall cease,
Thy sword shall force a way for God and right,
    And rule the world in universal peace.

I, Caspar, bring Thee myrrh for funeral state;
    Arabian dryad's age-long alchemy—
Insoluble enigma of Thy fate,
    Divine Deliverer, but doomed to die.

With what resplendent pageant of renown
    Thy soul will pass: what trumpets will be blown,
Or where: what standards in what town
    Will wave above Thy bier, we are not shown.

I bring Thee frankincense for holy fire,
    The sacrificial blood of India's tree,
I, Balthasar, who heard the heavenly Choir
    Acclaim Thee Lord of every land and sea.

Remember us, O Lord, upon Thy throne,
    When earth, and thrones, and all are wholly Th
Or we return into the dust alone,
    And all our glory to the dust resign.

Mother and Babe, Goodbye. We take our ways,
    You yours. The story of the earth and sky
We thought we knew, is still to tell. Delays
    Are dangerous for you and us. Goodbye.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Left Wings Over Europe, by Wyndham Lewis (Cape, 7*s*. 6*d*.).
Vital Peace, by Henry Wickham Steed (Constable, 10*s*.).

The first of these books, which is at once brilliant and provocative, sets out, not to solve, but to define, the mystery of England's foreign policy in the last two years. Why is England, the one survivor of the old monarchies, the greatest imperial Power, and one of the very few professedly Christian States left in Europe (and beyond all question the most powerful of them), found in virtual alliance with Communist Russia and near-Communist anti-clerical France against the forces of the Right and Centre in Europe? Why has the peace party become the war party, and the progressives the champions *à l'outrance* of the *status quo*?

Mr. Wyndham Lewis begins with a much-needed analysis of those well-known terms 'Right' and 'Left' and 'Centre,' and gets down to reality at once when he says that the Communists 'are to-day the master-class, the party of orthodoxy The outcasts of 1936 are the extremists of the Right.' The British Government, he sees, have committed themselves, if not to Communist practice (though 'we are all socialists nowadays,' and that is a good way along the road), yet certainly to the collective ideology, and he adds, with great truth, that 'no corporate state would be so corporate, nor any totalitarian state so thoroughly totalitarian as the super-state envisaged at Geneva.'

Yet that is what we are working for, a world over-dominated by the politically orthodox—the advocates of the indivisibility of peace, which means peace kept by the socialised Bank of France and the communised bayonets of Russia, on their own terms, or not at all. Did we mean to sleep through this vast manœuvre, or did we join in it out of panic for our Indian communications? Or are we in it

because we like it, or because we are frightened of Germany? Mr. Harold Nicolson, the latest recruit to the National Labour Party, reviewing Mr. Wyndham Lewis in the *Daily Telegraph*, gives the official verdict. We were standing for a principle—in other words, we are in it because we like it. Mr. Wyndham Lewis at least acquits our Government of any such charge. He remarks very interestingly on the dualism of our policy due to the passing of power from the adventuring and governing classes, while, paradoxically, the proceeds of the adventures still remain to be governed. And we still have our own overgrown population to feed. We still have one sleepy eye on the Flanders plains, and an even sleepier and more intermittent eye on the Suez Canal, which is yet so remunerative to shareholders and directors, whose salaries exceed those of Cabinet Ministers. Occasionally both eyes get opened on these historic scenes, and then we experience a bitter awakening. 'Our last nightmare began,' says Mr. Wyndham Lewis with bitter truthfulness, 'when our battleships steamed over the waters of Trafalgar and were met, and saluted, by the sea-sleds of Mussolini, come out to mock at this somnambulist Armada.'

Should the Anglo-Italian episode be considered in isolation, or is it, on the other hand, 'advisable to associate it in our minds with other events, with events which, we may be quite sure, will follow after, which are already beginning to take shape?' Mr. Wyndham Lewis answers his question by pursuing the technique of the detective story with the remark that 'in this detective story the crime has not yet been committed. The crime is the Great War which is in preparation.' Ultimately, the crime contemplated, as he shows in some brilliant chapters on real and bogus liberty, is the destruction of liberty, by the institution, at the point of the bayonet, of a closed political system, operated in the interest of the so-called democratic dictatorships of France and Russia with us as allies, and any other plutocratic or bureaucratic oligarchies who are willing to play subordinate parts in this rather unsavoury orchestra. But, as Mr. Wyndham Lewis observes, the combined support of the Churches, the liberal idealists, the racketeers and the pacifists for the theory of an indivisible peace and a closed political system, has created a hopeless confusion of words.

The flesh-pots and idealisms of the nineteenth century have resulted in a society in which we have elected to rule over us the ticket-of-leave man, the company promoter, the 'good sort' and the tailor's dummy. Liberalism substituted itself for Christianity, and, dying, designated Communism as its heir. The confusion naturally grows daily, until, when we say 'peace' we mean 'war'; when we say 'democracy' we mean 'dictatorship' and servitude; when we say 'security' we mean 'insecurity'; and indeed *everything* that one man says to another has to be reversed before it bears any resemblance whatever to the truth.

Meanwhile, 'as our customary associates have become moneylenders, film magnates, crooks in the salvation racket' (a neat and compendious definition of the Utopia-mongers in Russia and elsewhere), 'drug-addicts, ex-bank robbers, pepper gamblers, and the riff-raff of the dispossessed aristocracy in the pockets of the stock-and-share tipster, it is not very remarkable,' continues Mr. Lewis, that our attitude towards Germany ('this outcast nation without any money') should be a trifle discouraging. He sees, indeed, in the attitude of the Geneva priesthood towards the 'have-not' States, the same 'callous and vulgar irresponsibility' which marks the attitude of our modern big-business or Communist oligarchies towards the 'have-nots' among their subjects, whom they congratulate on their ability to vote and starve with the same cynicism with which the Allies, armed to the teeth and without the slightest intention (on the part of France and Russia) of disarming, threw open the gates of Geneva to Stresemann's Germany.

Mr. Wyndham Lewis is, of course, rightly contemptuous of the argument that the combined armies, united air forces, and central banks of Russia, France, England, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Belgium are in danger. Granted that Germany is powerfully armed, she is, as he reminds us, already under unofficial 'sanctions,' imposed with the blessing of the Treasury, a very good reason why no further 'sanctions' were imposed when she audaciously marched her troops into her own territory. He is equally forcible in his reminder that morality must be practised consistently or not at all; that we cannot break half a treaty and regard the rest as sacrosanct.

And yet, when all is brilliantly said, it is impossible, concludes Mr. Lewis, 'to give a name to those forces whose prodigious power sweeps our little politicians for ever in one

direction . . . one can only feel that out of such violent unreason can come nothing but limitless evil.'

And that, to be frank, is the feeling with which we are left after reading Mr. Wickham Steed's equally provocative book. In his earnest pages, devoted so largely to the castigation of the doctrine of neutrality, Mr. Wickham Steed, with perfect and unconscious appositeness, dots the i's and crosses the t's of Mr. Wyndham Lewis's script. Peace, says Mr. Steed, is not merely a state of non-war—peace means 'creative helpfulness.' And how can we be creatively helpful if people are not ready to be helped? Clearly, only by the use of force. That is, let me say at once, a very bald summary of the argument under view. First, Mr. Steed examines the case for non-war (admittedly weak because based so largely on fear); the case for war (which is not worth so much space as he gives it because there is no case for war except in relation to pre-existing circumstances); and then proceeds to analyse very ably the causes of war, which he reduces to cases of conscience, a conflict between incompatible moralities. From this he concludes that peace must be dynamic in conception, if it is to enlist such fervent support as to put an end to the possibility of neutrality in the next war! But when the reader is inclined to rub his eyes and wonder whether he is in Bedlam or Broadmoor, he remembers that peace is no longer, in the new epistemology, peace, but creative helpfulness, and that the necessary instrument of such universal beneficence, in a world not willing to be benefited, is a military alliance directed against all peoples so misguided as not to wish for the creative assistance of M. Litvinoff and M. Blum.

On the subject of neutrality, and indeed on the history of the peace adventure from 1916 to the present day, Mr. Steed writes brilliantly, and readers of Mr. Wyndham Lewis who ask, as some of them may do, for chapter and verse cannot do better than to read Mr. Steed. With clear and irresistible logic he relates all the salient events of the last twenty years to this issue of neutrality, and shows how the desire for neutrality has, at every turn, crippled the League and prevented the accomplishment of its offensive for creative helpfulness. The new order requires, to be blunt, the annihilation of the conception of national sovereignty; internationalist politicians cannot be creatively helpful to

people who don't want to be helped and are still permitted by purblind customary folly to help themselves.

The shocking thing about this thesis is the complete insensibility of the distinguished author to one basic fact underlying the whole world situation. It is this. Even the horrors of the next war are preferable, not to an international order as such, but to the kind of international order which is determined and ordered for all future generations by the transient and embarrassed politicians who are to be seen hurrying backwards and forwards between London, Paris, Moscow, Prague and Geneva to-day. 'The enemy,' as Mr. Steed defines it, is that corpus of doctrine, almost exclusively Teutonic, in his view, which opposes to the rights of the human personality the rights of the State. But how inexpressibly more evil are the claims of the architects of the new world order to submerge, not merely the rights of the individual,but the rights of whole peoples to a closed political economic system, which must ever be driven, as Mr. Steed and admits, to control economics as well as politics, to order the movements and even the actual growth of the population? It is in the face of the threat of this tyranny that men are hastily, and, as some think, prematurely, sacrificing every other conceivable form of liberty, in order to save for the State to which they belong, for the only kind of human society which they know, the essential social rights. It is not, to be brutally candid, Mr. Wickham Steed who is calling the world to arms for his ideals, but the world which is rushing madly to arms to protect itself from the ideals of Mr. Wickham Steed. His book tells us that the precaution is not superfluous.

'The adventure of peace,' he writes, 'will demand sustained knightliness among members of an international community. . . . It will be a point of honour on the part of stronger and wealthier communities to help the weaker, to succour the needy without thoughts of material reward.' Such honour, no doubt, as was shown at Versailles, and such succour as has been extended to Germany during the last eighteen years. Men will 'then understand what seers have known, that the true purpose of life—its supreme sanction—is to serve others in high endeavour.' Alas for Mr. Steed's dream, men understand already those conceptions of service

which inspire M. Litvinoff and the *Cartel des Gauches*. They have known their Staviskys and their Kreugers, seen their 'liquidated' Kulaks, and watched the generous enthusiasms of the men of Geneva for freedom of conscience in Russia, in Mexico and in Spain. They have studied the long, disinterested and selfless annals of the Reparations and Disarmament Conferences. They have observed what has happened to the Assyrians of Iraq, who, relying on British promises and French undertakings, looked to the League for salvation from massacre and starvation, but in vain. But they have been unwilling to regard these activities as either knightly or selfless, and they have no intention whatever of surrendering their power over events into hands so stained with blood and so lustful of power.

Mr. Steed on p. 179 states that 'the sense of the sanctity of the human personality' was a 'new sense' which 'grew up in the latter half of the eighteenth century.' It was not. It was, and is, the fundamental concept on which Christian society is based and which Marxian materialism denies. It will not be surrendered more readily to Geneva than to Berlin. The world is ready for creative risk, and it will risk everything to save itself from that closed political system which is not the less, but the more, fatally closed because it is planned to include everyone except Mr. Wickham Steed's political opponents.

DOUGLAS JERROLD.

The Strange Death of Liberal England, by George Dangerfield (Constable, 12*s*. 6*d*. net).

This might have been a good book. The author has chosen an admirable theme. The period 1910-1914 was among the most notable, and remains even to-day the most inadequately chronicled, in our whole domestic history. The destruction of the Lords' veto, the spate of social legislation, the turmoil over what seems to-day a culpably moderate measure of Irish Home Rule, the strange outbreaks of hysteria and anarchy on the part of suffragettes, strikers, Ulstermen and members of the English Bar—these events have been sponged from men's minds; the din they created at the time has been drowned in the deeper roar of Armageddon. It is time (if we may vary the metaphor) that the surface of the

palimpsest should be peeled off and the writing which lies beneath it disinterred, deciphered and digested anew.

Hoping Mr. Dangerfield might do this for me, I opened his book with lively expectation; but found, to my disappointment, that one could quite easily put it down. It is not the book for which we are waiting. It contains, indeed, much interesting, and some accurate, information. Judged by the imposing bibliography, it is the fruit of considerable research; there is much lively writing; and though there are passages (such as one about the 'Spirit of Whimsy' on p. 69) which convey no vestige of meaning to my mind, they are not typical of the whole. The book suffers, nevertheless, from crippling defects.

As an appraisement of character and personality, it is marred by an Olympian contempt for almost all the leading men and parties of the time. The Liberal Party, we are told in the preface, committed suicide in the year 1913; 'and a good job too.' By what means it killed itself, why in 1913 particularly, and why it was a 'good job,' is nowhere precisely explained. The Tory Party fares no better: it was 'as sad and quarrelsome a pack as ever bayed a Liberal moon.' King Edward VII. was 'comfortably disreputable'; and a lot more which I will not quote. The House of Lords was 'stupid,' Bonar Law 'crude,' Carson 'a fanatical dyspeptic,' and Mr. Lloyd George 'an angry little solicitor' who 'put himself before his party and his party before his principles,' and across whose face 'emotions chased themselves like wind across a rain puddle.' Redmond (this is almost praise from Mr. Dangerfield) is 'a tame and weary hawk.' Better a hawk, however weary, than a puddle. Mr. Asquith is in chapter i. a 'figure of formal indolence' and by p. 322 has become 'a figure painted in some posture of formal indolence'; he is 'weary' (like Redmond) and 'completely lacking in imagination.' This last misfortune, too, he shares with others, for it appears from p. 51 that Mr. Balfour 'lacked imagination,' and from p. 76 that (*a*) Bonar Law, (*b*) the whole Tory Party, had 'no political imagination.' While not dissenting from all these judgments, I feel that they are dispensed with altogether too undiscriminating a hand, from too full a cornucopia of obloquy. There never was such a galaxy of defects as the writer ascribes to the

leading men and groups in pre-war England. Sir George Askwith, indeed (since, Lord Askwith), escapes castigation; but in this he stands almost alone.

After damning everybody, the author startles one by saying on p. 67 'that this is not a record of personalities but of events.' Who would have suspected this? But let us try to regard it as such. Viewed as a 'record of events,' the book is a perfect mine of misinformation. I have space for a few only of the inaccuracies which leap to the eye on a first reading. On p. 11 we learn that the first Home Rule Bill was killed, not by the Commons in 1886, but by the Lords in 1884. If so, the author may equally have mistaken the date and cause of Liberalism's decease; and, incidentally, Mr. Gladstone must have been a Home Ruler before Mr. Gladstone. He goes on to say on p. 35 that the Conservatives 'always opposed' Home Rule—a bold statement in view of the Carnarvon conversations in 1885. On p. 24 he asserts that after the rejection of the 1909 Budget the 'Liberal Cabinet resigned.' No Liberal Cabinet resigned between 1906 and the war, and, *pace* Mr. Dangerfield, the difference between resignation and dissolution is not trifling. Later on we are assured that, after the Taff Vale judgment of 1901, 'any stoppage of work, however lawful, could be made the subject of heavy damages against the Union.' The decision, in fact, did nothing to make a union liable in respect of a lawfully conducted strike; it merely held that a union was liable for any unlawful acts committed by its servants or agents on its behalf, whether in the conduct of a strike or otherwise. Again, it is a surprise to learn on p. 10 that (until Joseph Chamberlain's fiscal campaign or thereabouts) 'Free Trade had been a faith to which America and Europe subscribed.' The author even gets Mr. Lloyd George's 'penguins' wrong. They were, surely, City men round about 1930, not members of the Opposition in 1910.

All this and more undermines confidence, not only in the 'record of events' supposed to be presented in the book, but in the author's commentary and conclusions. The maxim that comment cannot be fair unless it is on facts truly stated has applications outside the law. But what, to revert to a question raised earlier, are the author's conclusions? Assume (gratuitously) that Liberalism died in 1913: why did it die

deservedly? In what respect did Liberalism, which is described as having been, before 1910, a 'noble' creed, 'intelligible' and 'intelligent,' fail? It hamstrung the House of Lords. There can have been nothing illiberal in a proceeding commended to the party by Mr. Gladstone in his last speech in the House of Commons; nor otherwise unjustifiable in Mr. Dangerfield's eyes, for he holds that the Peers richly deserved their fate. When then did it fail?

It is suggested elsewhere (p. 8) that Liberalism failed because it did not dare to attack 'capital.' Yet, at the time, the air rang with the curses of millionaires, complaining of spoliation and impoverishment. All the social reforms of the period were, to them, robbery of the rich; and they were right to the extent that the effect of the reforms was to redistribute wealth and amenities in favour of the poor. All the leading social measures—old age pensions, super-tax, graduation of income tax, differential taxation of unearned incomes, taxation of 'unearned increment,' National Health Insurance ('*9d.* for *4d.*')—involved, on a big or small scale, such a redistribution. Whatever the merits of these measures (and most of them have been maintained and extended since by every subsequent Government) they were not concessions to 'capital,' or prompted by any tenderness for big business. Wherein, then, did Liberals fall from their 'noble' and 'intelligent' estate? In not prosecuting Carson? Perhaps they should have. There was never any real question of his technical guilt. But what would have been the result of indicting him? First, an undeserved halo for the accused; secondly, the end to any Irish settlement by consent or conciliation; and, thirdly, a probable disagreement within the jury (a human, and politically minded, animal). There was nothing illiberal or stupid in giving due weight to these considerations. Perhaps in some later and better book Mr. Dangerfield will tell us why Liberalism perished, and why it deserved to do so. In the present volume he has posed these questions but left them, save for a few jibes and generalisations, unanswered.

CYRIL ASQUITH.

The New Industrial System, by Dr. Hermann Levy (Macmillan & Co., 15*s*.).

This book is called a study of the origin, forms, finance and prospects of concentration in industry. It is undoubtedly a work of great value and will be read with interest by those who are making a study of modern developments in industrial organisation. The author, who, in his preface, makes it clear that he is neither an individualist nor a planner, regards concentration in industry as the outcome of fundamental necessities which may be checked or supported by deliberate action, but can neither be created nor finally suppressed.

He gives some account of the forms of industrial capitalism in economic history, which his researches have enabled him to relate to an early epoch of concentrated organisation. He reminds us of the Newcastle Coal Guild, the forerunner of the much later 'Limitation of the Vend.' He points out that the organisation of the north-western coal production in the seventeenth century was highly capitalistic, and that by the beginning of the eighteenth century many hundreds of people were employed in single collieries.

After touching on the early history of the Guilds, the author devotes several chapters to an account of the growth and the various forms of monopoly, and refers in particular to the case of coal, cotton and steel. He discusses the finance of big units and the *rôle* which banks play in this and other countries. He points out, quite rightly, that the tendency of banks in Germany and America to control industry has not been a feature of British banking, and the experience of British banks during the recent financial crises seems to be a vindication of their policy as against the policy pursued by the banks in Germany and America. But Professor Levy makes it clear that in Germany and in America abnormal credit inflation had been at work, the disastrous results of which should not be used to discredit the need for new thinking by bankers on this matter. It seems a little too early as yet to say whether or not British banking will depart from its old principles, but there is no doubt that a bank which makes extensive loans to an industry is apt to add to its function of banker the *rôle* of a party vitally interested in the organisation of the particular business.

Concentration in industry is regarded by many as a regrettable departure from the competitive system; whereas, on the other hand, there are many planners who consider that the old system of industrial individualism was mistaken, that it was no organisation at all, and that it was chaotic. Professor Levy takes a middle view, and he tries to find out what limits there should be to the favourable attitude which now prevails towards the big industrial combinations.

He realises fully the dangers which such big units inevitably bring with them, and he tries to analyse the steps which the State should take to restrict any exaggerated effects which may follow from the development of cartels, trusts, and big industrial units. He thinks that the State will undoubtedly have to combat oppressive prices in the interests of the consumer and to act as a protector of the individual from the ill-effects of exclusive agreements, but he thinks that the State may also find itself obliged to support or to facilitate compulsory amalgamations.

The book concludes with some penetrating remarks on the general aspect of the new industrial situation. Shall we all be rationalised, standardised and dragooned in what we consume by some sort of planning? Professor Levy replies that such apprehensions are unjustified. Industry, in his view, needs not only individual initiative and courageous efforts by scientific men, but also it needs some sort of 'planned' scientists working laboriously, though with no personal risk, within the shelter of a huge undertaking. He envisages the possibility of two industrial systems working side by side. He realises that large amalgamations are not the only efficient form of organisation, and that the smaller units have their value in that they can more conveniently produce those articles which require greater variety and more individual thoug ht

The author has nothing like the same robust objection to planning which is to be found in the works of Professor Robbins, nor does he appear to view monopolies with as great anxiety as he might. Industrialists, however, may be permitted to doubt whether he appreciates fully the fact that in a highly organised monopolistic industry the interests of the consumer are apt to be neglected, and that even if high dividends are not paid to the shareholders, nevertheless there is a large army of sheltered employees of all grades who succeed in maintaining a higher standard of living than their less fortunate fellow-citizens who work in less highly organised occupations. It is difficult for a practical man of business to see how anything but a highly competitive system can ever reveal the lowest price at which goods can be produced. It is also difficult to see how the capitalist system can survive unless the price system is preserved, and it appears to me that the price system is being continuously interfered with whenever there is industrial legislation or State direction of industry.

By all means let the State make reasonable provision for the protection of various sections of the community, but do not let the State make the mistake of thinking that it can legislate satisfactorily about the details of trade and industry. If Governments paid more attention to their essential duties of governing and to the main-

tenance of law and order and defence, and less attention to matters of internal trade, for which they are singularly ill-equipped to legislate, the better it would be for the world.

This book, however, is a real contribution to current thought, though it cannot be called light reading. If Professor Levy overlooks anything, it is the enormous importance of individual men and the comparative unimportance of methods; it is the man that matters in all aspects of life.

RALPH ASSHETON.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

Returning to Westminster from an afternoon meeting in a village, I found myself in the same compartment with two men whose hands and clothes were deeply stained. Their job was to line reinforced concrete tanks with asphalt, and it took them all over the country. It was dirty work, often in a confined air-space: it made them cough, but did no harm to the lungs so far as they knew; it was skilled work and not ill-paid, but the hours were long. They lived in Brixton. Cycling through the empty streets, they took the five o'clock train every morning from King's Cross, whither they returned at about seven o'clock. The job was three miles from the nearest station: they walked both ways to save the cost of a daily bicycle ticket. The firm was willing to pay for lodgings; but they were married men and, after sampling local hospitality, decided to sleep and eat at home, and even brought breakfast and dinner with them. It was a simple tale, with no sense of grievance: the job would not last long; the next might be easier; life was like that. Their only complaint was that they left just before the local tavern opened its doors; they could not get what they needed after a long day's work, but their wives would have it ready for them at home. To listen to them was to listen to a sermon *contra acediam*—one of the seven deadly sins for our wise forefathers; but they realised the effect of their words as little as Molière's bourgeois was aware that he was talking prose.

* * * * *

A week later I was travelling out of town with two younger men, old acquaintances, whose job it was to instal and maintain railway signals. They greeted me cheerfully, and did me the honour to liken their duties to those of a

member of Parliament. Since we last met they had completed another course of instruction and got a further certificate and a rise of pay, and I had been returned again to Parliament. We exchanged congratulations. They were proud of their craft, of the company they served, and appreciative of 'the schooling they got in the shops.' This is a side of education of which we hear very little. Such men—they were both under twenty-five—learn more through hand and eye, working in combination, under an expert foreman, with occasional refresher courses, than any technical school could teach them by laboratory methods. They talked to me of ground frames and interlocks, induction and return currents, weeds and interference. The thunderstorms, which, starting in Europe and travelling westwards, had shaken an accident-prone Government, had passed over their heads, leaving them almost, but not quite, unmoved. 'We have been made to look foolish abroad,' said one, not unpleasantly. 'You gentlemen in Parliament ought to have kept us from getting into a mess with everyone at once; that's what you're paid for—same as us.' On my accepting the gentle rebuke, they generously agreed that everyone had to share the blame, and that it was not for lack of talking, in many tongues, that the trouble had not been avoided. They agreed with the views of their fathers (both ex-service men), which they expounded to me. Here was another sermon, lasting nearly an hour, which ended only when we reached our destination.

* * * * *

One sultry evening a stranger sent in his card to me at the House of Commons. While Scottish Education was being discussed in an empty house (the kingdom is not yet sufficiently united for it to be often possible to legislate in one Bill for both countries) we stood on the Terrace, enjoying, as the sun set, a view such as would have delighted Canaletto, while he told me how England and things European appeared to him.

He was a Canadian, born and bred in Calgary. He had gone, full of generous enthusiasm, to France with the Canadian forces at the age of seventeen. He had served later in the Mounted Police; he had worked with his hands on a farm, and knew something of America. He had travelled in

Europe; had visited France, Germany, Italy and Austria, and was now earning a living in England. At one time he was greatly drawn to the Fascist movement in England: it seemed to promise the unity of aim and of action which had so changed the face of Germany, lack of which had brought France to her knees and Spain to the ground. He had left it, for reasons which seemed to him good, but not until he had spent two years speaking to audiences, friendly and otherwise, all over England.

He was unhappy at what he saw, or thought he saw, in England. What had kept the Empire together was not ties of sentiment, race or blood, but the belief of the Dominions that British statesmen, of whatever party, were strong men as well as wise, able to lead the country and the Empire, without losing votes, towards a goal which, though they might never reach it, was worthy.

He was beginning to lose faith. It was not the official Opposition but leading members of the present Government who had allowed our Forces to fall to the verge of risk, and had been parties to the follies of the Statute of Westminster which Ottawa had done nothing to repair, and to the estrangement of India, of which the Government of India Act of 1935 was the inevitable outcome. He found English youth adrift without ideals, unwillingly pursuing commercial aims that accorded ill with their deeper feelings—the daily Press, permeated for the most part with an outlook on life which he detested, sacrificing truth to headlines and youth to dividends. There was much wrong in other lands; but he saw hope and faith and activity, even if not always well directed, in totalitarian States. Could not we regain these gifts without losing our freedom?

The authoritarian States were fast gaining ground. Physical fitness here was on a low level; business and the public services were organised on lines which belonged to a dead past. We must speed up things. What could be done? He was not what H. G. Wells called a 'Gawd-saker,' demanding—for Gawd's sake!—that something, no matter what, should be done. I believe him to represent a great body of opinion which, if it can find expression, will do more to revive our national life, with or without Parliament, than any existing political parties. 'I want to speak,' he

concluded. 'I can hold a crowd; but for whom can I speak? I want to work; but for whom can I work?' We passed in review all the political party leaders; of each he said as did Samuel of the sons of Jesse: 'The Lord hath not chosen these.' England awaits her David, but, as he observed sagely, 'he will not appear so long as trade is good.'

* * * * *

It was doubtless of set purpose that Cervantes depicted Don Quixote at the outset of his travels (book iv.) as finding a wealthy merchant chastising a youth for carelessness and knavery. The knight-errant procured his release, abused the merchant, and rode off. The merchant seized the youth again and flogged him yet more. The youth fled weeping, to curse his rescuer: his master remained to laugh at the knight. Meanwhile Don Quixote was sitting in the inn, many miles away, happy in the belief that he had 'prevented the greatest outrage and wrong that want of reason could form, or cruelty commit.'

The Armenians, the Assyrians, the Abyssinians, and other minorities have in turn suffered thus from the thoughtless gallantries of political Don Quixotes of several countries, but especially from those of the English-speaking world. A salutary resolution for students of international politics and champions of oppressed minorities and nations, after the next meeting of the League of Nations, would be to raise no hopes, to give no assurances, to make no promises and to sign no treaties, without the certainty that they will have, in case of need, the backing of their respective nations—not this year or next, but for the next ten or twenty years. The signature of no statesman, however representative, can bind a nation for long. The Assyrians know this and the Armenians in Syria will soon be reminded of it yet again.

* * * * *

On July 14 a dinner in honour of the Duke and Duchess of Brunswick was given in London, by the Anglo-German Fellowship, at the Dorchester Hotel. More than 400 persons were present, including members of both Houses of Parliament and of the Cabinet, and leading figures in the political financial and industrial worlds. The principal

speakers were Lord Lothian, Lord Rennell, and Sir Frederick Maurice. *The Times*, true to its traditions, devoted a full column to their speeches: the other daily papers dismissed the occasion in a few lines. Such is the power of the Press, as Lord Northcliffe said many years ago, to suppress.

The speeches, before an audience no less august than that to which Mr. Duff Cooper addressed himself at Paris earlier in the month, might with advantage have been delivered by members of the Cabinet. Sir Frederick Maurice, as chairman of the Executive Committee of the British Legion, represents what is to-day probably the strongest democratically organised body of male opinion in the country. His presence and his words were a symbol of the views of that great body of men who are, whether as individuals or branches, inclined to be distrustful of the trend of our foreign policy, so far as it was reflected by Mr. Duff Cooper's polished and carefully prepared utterance. Their views are not without influence on recruiting.

Lord Rennell, who declared that 'the large majority of the plain, simple people of this country were eagerly desirous of friendly relations with Germany,' was followed by Lord Lothian, who, as Philip Kerr, saw every phase of the war, the peace-making at Versailles and the immediate aftermath, in his capacity as principal private secretary to Mr. Lloyd George.

> We had reached [he said] a very critical stage in the relations between their two countries. It was a stage which was at once full of hope and full of menace, an opportunity which, if it was seized, might give the world the twenty-five years of peace of which Herr Hitler spoke last March. . . .
>
> Both sides desired to return to a co-operation for which there was a natural foundation in a certain community of race, . . . but the first and decisive move in seizing the present opportunity must now be made by this country. That move must be to abandon once and for all what was called in Germany the Versailles attitude of mind.
>
> The League of Nations had never yet been a true League, because so many of its members had never been able to escape from the tradition of Versailles. He was a supporter of the League of Nations. . . . It was more important that the League should revise out-of-date treaties in time than that it should have the power to restrain an aggressor. If it could remove the causes of war in time, the question of aggression would never arise. . . . The real test of the League lay ahead—namely, whether it could bring about those revisions by peaceful means which would

ive Germany the place in the world to which she was entitled, and so save mankind from the calamity of another world war.

National-Socialist Germany, as he saw it, was the product not so much of the Treaty of Versailles as of the inability to revise its fundamental discriminations in time. . . .

Germany now [Lord Lothian said] has both equality and strength. Reparations have gone. Part V of the Treaty of Versailles has gone. The demilitarisation of the Rhineland has gone, and the sooner that recovery of her natural right to self-defence is accepted without further discussion the better. Germany is rearmed. It only remains for the British Government to abandon once and for all the fatal system whereby she first has a conference with her friends and then presents the results as a kind of ultimatum to Germany—the system represented by the recent *questionnaire*—and to substitute for it free and equal and frank discussion round a table. The old system is not equality either for Germany or for ourselves. Let us abandon this proposed conference at Brussels, and see whether we cannot come to grips, on equal terms, with the two issues which still separate Germany and her neighbours.

There are aspects of the internal policy of the National-Socialist State which are a serious obstacle to the establishment of cordial relations between the British and the German people. Everyone knows what they are. And the speed and extent of Germany's rearmament have caused a not unnatural anxiety as to the ultimate intentions of German policy. I beg my German friends not to underrate the influence these things exert on British policy or the weapon they give to those elements, here and abroad, which are opposed to Anglo-German reconciliation. I hope that Herr Hitler will weigh these things when the time for free negotiation comes.

On the colonial and economic problem, he continued:

In proportion as a solution is reached of the Eastern European question, the colonial and economic problem is bound to come to the front. It is far more than a question between Germany and her neighbours. It is a question for the world. I have long believed that either the nations had to reduce their tariffs and stabilise their currencies so that they could pay for raw materials and foodstuffs by means of exports and make migration possible once more, or they had to face the colonial question as an alternative to a general war. I do not believe that at this moment the crude transfer of territory, for instance from Great Britain to Germany, is practical politics. . . . The question must be considered on much wider lines. All the colonial nations must be willing to make their contribution to a transfer of territory. The new world as well as the old must be willing once more to reopen its doors to trade and migration. . . .

It is far more important that the League of Nations, if possible with Germany as a member, should grapple seriously with this vast problem next September than that it should attempt to refurbish a sanctions system which can only be used to maintain a *status quo* which is out of date.

And finally there is the most important question of all, the cessation of the present intolerable competition in armaments—a competition which will itself cause war unless it can be stopped in time. . . .

There are good hopes for the future, but do not let us disguise from ourselves that the situation is also full of dangers. A world of equal nations, and still more of equal armed nations, is a more difficult world to manage than a world in which the most dissatisfied nations were wholly disarmed. We are to-day in the midst of the most tremendous competition in armaments ever known. The tensions caused by this competition are daily increasing. To drift is to end in catastrophe.

Great Britain, which till six months ago pinned its faith on a low level of armaments, has completely changed its opinion. . . . The events of the last year have reawakened Great Britain to the truth that peace cannot be obtained on the cheap, and that whether for defence or in negotiation we must play our cards from strength and not from weakness.

I left the hall feeling that Lord Lothian had done more to express public opinion on these great issues than any member of the Cabinet in the past twelve months.

* * * * *

The art of marrying beauty to paper, of reproducing drawings and water-colours, with a perfection which places what was once the privilege of one owner within the reach of hundreds, has never been seen to better advantage than in *Old Spain*, by Muirhead and Gertrude Bone, which Macmillans are publishing in September in a limited edition of 250 copies at 100 guineas each. I made a pilgrimage to St. Martin's Lane to see it, and left, an hour or so later, with lighter step and heightened capacity for visual enjoyment. I would sooner possess these two marvellous leather-bound folios than a new car. The 120 full-page plates are a faithful record of enduring beauty; the work is a record of youthful faith in the worth of great art which has inspired its sponsors, who have lost in the past few months three of their oldest members, in the fulness of a ripe old age. But publishers can say with Horace more confidently than most men, *Non omnis moriar*. The letterpress is figuratively, as well as literally, bound up with them and is the product of a rare mind as well as of a great printer, for the book does no less credit to Dr. John Johnson, of the Oxford University Press, and his expert craftsmen, than to Dr. and Mrs. Bone. As I reverently turned the pages, I felt, as Izaak Walton of the strawberry and the Almighty, that doubtless the printer might

have made a better book, but doubtless he never did; indeed he has himself since told me as much.

This is not a review, but a spontaneous tribute, from one wholly unversed in the arts, to something very beautiful and very noble which, when Spain emerges from the furnace of affliction, will be very dear to her. It will be esteemed most precious, in far-off days to come, in the great republics of South and Central America, which owe to Spain, and to Spain only, their civilisation, their language and their greatest traditions. For here, seen through the penetrating eyes of a man and woman who know and love the country in which East and West once met, in the fields of war, art, architecture, science and love, is the greatest and perhaps the last monument to a noble past. In the words of T. E. Brown in 1887, addressing his fellow Manxmen—

> Dear countrymen, whate'er is left to us
> Of ancient heritage—
> Of manners, speech, of humours, polity
> The limited horizon of our stage—
> Old love, hope, fear,.
> All this I fain would fix upon the page;
> That so the coming age,
> Lost in the empire's mass,
> Yet haply longing for their fathers, here
> May see, as in a glass,
> What they held dear—
> May say, ' 'Twas thus and thus
> They lived'; and, as the time-flood onward rolls,
> Secure an anchor for their Keltic souls.

Lovers of Spain will pray that this book may prove *auspicium melioris aevi*—a harbinger of better times.

ARNOLD WILSON.

CORRESPONDENCE

'THE DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN GENIUS'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—With reference to Mr. Wyatt Tilby's interesting article on 'The Distribution of European Genius' in your July number, I would like to correct a statement in the footnote on p. 50. Mr. Tilby says: 'Portugal has many poets and a few historians; but is sharply distinguished from Spain in having produced neither novelists, dramatists, nor painters.' With all respect, I must submit this is not the case. As regards novelists, the powerful but gloomy and sardonic writer Camillo Castello Branco was an undoubted man of genius, while his style was a model of classic Portuguese. There is also Julio Diniz, the author of various novels dealing with village life which show keen observation and are instinct with a delightful humour.

To come to the dramatists, Almeida Garrett has left his compatriots a noble tragedy in *Frei Luiz De Souza*, which assuredly deserves a wider fame than it has so far attained. That these writers are comparatively unknown beyond the Portuguese border must be attributed to the lack of translations of their works. As regards painters, I am not a connoisseur of this art, but the names of Senhor Julio Ramos and the late D. Aurelia de Souza have at least acquired some fame in their own country.

M. P. GUIMARAENS.

Foz do Douro, Oporto, Portugal,
July 10, 1936.

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Founded by JAMES KNOWLES

SEPTEMBER

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No. DCCXV—September 1936

ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS[1]

By Jean Piot, Editor of *L'Œuvre*

It would be comforting if, as we are given to understand, the recent visit to London of the French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Léon Blum and M. Yvon Delbos, has helped towards a better understanding between our two countries. Mr. Malcolm W. Davis, co-director of the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment, wrote the other day in *L'Esprit International*: 'The history of Anglo-French relations is not exactly that of an harmonious idyll; it is very much more that of a partnership that is as inevitable as it is productive of friction.' If, as this American witness holds, our partnership is 'inevitable'—because facts themselves thrust it upon us—it would be better if it were animated by as much friendship and sympathy as possible. But the two peoples have not always the same way of looking at things.

[1] Translated by Randolph Hughes.

I know perfectly well what fault in particular the English are apt to find with us: our taste for 'logic.' We love impeccably close reasoning, we like ideas, files and documents to be tidily arranged. 'You,' say the English to us, 'are the country of M. Poincaré.' M. Herriot proudly declared that we are 'the country of Descartes.' But our logical rigorism, be it Poincarist or Cartesian, only succeeds in irritating you. We claim to foresee all possible contingencies, and, accordingly, to organise beforehand precise systems which will be automatically applicable as the anticipated cases arise. To the English mind it seems that this formalism is ill adapted to life, which is a shifting process little amenable to logic. But it must be realised that our way of setting about things is not only determined by our 'Cartesian' love for strict reasoning and rigorous deductions. You are fond of saying 'Wait and see.' But to us it seems that that is peculiarly the attitude of an island race, whose geographical position gives it the time to pause and reflect. We, on the other hand, are conscious of being exposed to the hazards of sudden attack. Danger may loom up *suddenly* on our frontier, and even cross it without any previous warning. That is why it appears prudent to us to have a defensive system, diplomatic as well as military, organised beforehand, and such a system as may be brought immediately into play. 'Wait and see'? Yes. Only, unfortunately, we have not the time to wait.

Many Englishmen also charge us with having a legalistic mind. Malicious critics do not use the word 'legalistic': 'quibbling' is what they call it. Because of that, it is often said in England, it has been impossible to bring about a *rapprochement* between France and Germany, which more than anything else would have ensured peace in Europe. It is pettifogging mistrust on the part of the French which has held everything up.

I can speak without any embarrassment of this particular matter, for I happen to be one of those who have always pleaded for reconciliation between France and Germany, and, to the best of my humble ability, I have striven to bring it about. I set myself against the occupation of the Ruhr, and one day, after the event, M. Poincaré said to me: 'You were perhaps right.' I gave my full support to Aristide Briand, who, I think, was justified in wishing to settle the Saar

problem amicably, without waiting for the events of 1935 and their consequences. I recall that in February 1931 I had a long conversation with Herr Brüning, who at that time was Chancellor. The same evening the Berlin papers announced that 'a confidential agent of Briand had come to see Brüning in order to organise a common anti-Soviet front.' (Every time a Frenchman gets into touch with a foreign statesman, why must it necessarily be with the intention of organising a crusade for or against Communism or Fascism? To believe that such is the case has become a positive mania.) As a matter of fact, no such mission had been entrusted to me. It is true, however, that in my conversation with the Chancellor I did touch upon the question of a *rapprochement* between the two countries. And I remember that Herr Brüning remarked to me that what Germany chiefly needed was credits, but that she could never accept them *directly* from France. Why? Because in that case Herr Hitler, who was conducting a strenuous and uncompromising propaganda, would have accused Herr Brüning's Government of 'selling Germany to France.' I recall these facts simply with a view to showing how difficult it may be, on account of psychological reasons, to effect a *rapprochement* between nations, even when that *rapprochement* is sincerely desired. It was obstacles of this sort that often impeded Briand and Stresemann, and Herr Brüning—and M. Laval himself.

But what I want particularly to insist on is the fact that there are many Frenchmen who remain in favour of an understanding with Germany, while fully realising that this understanding can only be had at a certain price. We are in no wise opposed to an organisation of Central Europe which would leave ample room for German interests. The question of the distribution or common sharing of raw materials was brought forward at Geneva by Sir Samuel Hoare. The question of colonies—and especially of the former German colonies—has been brought before public opinion in England. There are some of us in France who would not deprecate a new inquiry into these problems. But what we do not want is the establishment of a German hegemony in Europe, which would allow the Third Reich to dictate its will to the Continent and to other parts of the world.

Now it is beyond question that for some time past this danger has once again been realised in England. I believe I am right in saying that, apart from deep-seated moral causes, this realisation had a lot to do with the success of the Peace Ballot instituted by Lord Cecil and his associates. People in England have awakened to a peril which is all the greater in that the development of aviation has put the United Kingdom into a position which is analogous to that in which we find ourselves. I mean that for the United Kingdom, too, the peril may descend suddenly and unexpectedly, *and that it is a matter of urgency to be able to oppose to that peril a means of defence organised beforehand*, in virtue of the automatic workings of a system of collective security.

I feel bound to say that many people in France have not appreciated and understood this change of mind on the part of a considerable section of the English public, of which the Peace Ballot was one of the manifestations. This largely accounts for the regrettable misunderstanding which divided the two countries in the course of last year. For a long time English opinion had appeared unsympathetic to the idea of collective security—at least, in so far as this latter entailed committals of too precise a nature; and so this veering round was thought by many Frenchmen to be dictated by considerations of interest. It was believed that English opinion had rallied to the principle of collective security simply in order to be able to invoke it in the matter of the conflict in Abyssinia. That was ridiculous, for, at the time the Peace Ballot was organised, there was no question of a war, nor even of a serious conflict, in Eastern Africa. But I well remember the arduous controversies in which those like myself had to engage in order to convince the French public that it was mistaken. For some of us, at the very time when the English came round to the idea of automatic collective security under the law of the League of Nations (an idea which France had championed for the past fifteen years), it was painful to see Frenchmen refusing to believe in this conversion, and abandoning a belief in the efficacy of this idea. We had to explain to them that, on the contrary, they should feel gratified at the acceptance by English opinion of a thesis so dear to themselves, but that if we were anxious that collective security should one day operate in our favour, it was essential

nat it should operate in all cases that might present themselves. For indeed there is no 'one-way street' where mutual security is concerned.

We were not always successful in our efforts to bring our fellow-countrymen round to this point of view. But you must not pass judgment too hastily: you took such a long time to recognise the advantages of collective security that your ultimate acceptance of the principle aroused a feeling of scepticism in many Frenchmen. Alas, it is always the same old story. It is your impression that we conjure up dangers that are entirely imaginary, and you regard our misgivings as being no more than hypochondriacal visions. It is our impression that you are terribly slow to see dangers that are obvious to us, and we regard your famous 'phlegm' as being no more than apathy. Again, very many Frenchmen do not understand the importance you attach to the opinion of your Dominions, and the difficulty that you naturally have in interesting, in apparently exclusively European questions, countries whose attention is preoccupied by other big events in the world at large. It is all this that makes for misunderstanding between us; and in this connexion I naturally do not dwell on the part played by the wicked pamphlets and articles that have appeared on both sides of the Channel in the course of the past year—such things as ought never to be written in one country about another.[2]

All this, however, should not prevent us from coming to an understanding, if only for the simple reason that it is more necessary than ever that we should come to an understanding. Here I do not intend to have resort to principles, theories and dogmas. If I did, I might lay myself open to the charge of talking merely as a democrat: people are fond of accusing democracies and democrats of dealing in rhetoric and unsubstantial idealism. So let us have nothing to do with rhetoric. Let us not even speak of the 'natural affinity between the two great parliamentary nations of the West'—although such an expression may well be more than a collection of mere words. Let us confine ourselves to facts.

[2] M. Piot doubtless refers to such ignorant and vulgar diatribes as have been signed by M. Béraud in France, and by more than one contributor to Lord Beaverbrook's journals in England.—*Translator's note.*

Last year, in the course of the controversies to which I have referred, I tried to explain to my fellow-countrymen that the freedom of your lines of Imperial communication was for you a matter not only of considerable but of vital importance. I believe that on that point there can be no difference of opinion. And what line of communication in particular must you be concerned to defend? That which goes through the Mediterranean, from Suez to Gibraltar and Tangier: whatever happens, whatever new factors appear in European history, that line must always remain capital for England. The fact must be seized that for France the balance of power in Europe has a like importance, *and, above all, that in reality the two problems are simply one and the same.*

It is said in certain English circles: 'France must not imagine that England will follow her in all the undertakings to which she may have committed herself in Central Europe. Anyhow, why should France concern herself with what may be going on in the Danubian basin or in the Balkans?' Such is the point of view of those who, in effect, ask us 'to leave Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe.' Now we might agree to do this. In France, and even on the Right and in the so-called Nationalist parties, there are not wanting people who stand for this policy. We are an old country, and many times over have wars and invasions taken toll of our blood. (I do not in the least suggest that we complain of this or that we ask for pity. I simply mention a fact.) We have courted the hazards of enough adventures and won enough glory to be able to rest on our laurels. We might very well, then, retire within ourselves and leave the rest of the world to itself. And this, when all is said, is just what Herr Hitler would have us do.

For what did Herr Hitler say to his fellow-Germans at the end of *Mein Kampf*?

> Never tolerate the co-existence of two great Continental Powers in Europe. If there is ever any attempt to establish on the borders of Germany a second military Power or merely a State capable of becoming such a Power, regard that as an attack on Germany, and make up your mind that in this event it is not only Germany's right, but also her duty, to prevent the rise of such a State by all possible means, including force of arms, and, should such a Power already exist, to destroy it utterly.

It may be said that the sentiments of Herr Hitler now that h

as a statesman are no longer those he professed in his capacity of agitator and party leader. That this is so I am quite ready to believe. In any case, it is likely that if we promised the *Führer* to remain neutral in the event of any conflict in Eastern Europe, and gave him pledges of our neutrality, he would in return abandon his idea of 'destroying us utterly' and would give guarantees that would enable us to repose in peace: yes, there is no doubt he would do this—for the time being.

But let us get down to essentials: once Germany was mistress of Central and Eastern Europe, and controlled the cornlands of Ukraine and Roumania, and the oilfields of this latter country, and commanded military resources three times greater than those she possesses now, would she not then be in a position to turn her attention to us—to England as well as to France—and, this time, not only to leave us in secure enjoyment of peace, but to dictate to us a peace upon terms which she herself should fix? Is there not even a school of thought in Germany itself which holds that the fate of the empires of the world will be decided, not in the colonies, but in Europe, in the respective mother countries? In these considerations lies the true problem for France and England.

Here again, no doubt, it will be said that we are letting our imagination run away with us, and that we are investing our misgivings with all the prestige of logical deductions. But, so far from talking wildly, we may claim that facts have justified our reading of events. For instance, were not we the first to point out that the claims of Italy, on the occasion of the naval conferences, constituted a danger to the freedom of the Mediterranean? Were we altogether wrong in that case? And when one sees Rome, after she has got home a first blow in the basin of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, intervening in a conflict which brings into question the balance of forces in the Western Mediterranean—before such a spectacle, can one go on talking of purely 'imaginary constructions' on our part? It is not idle to note that Germany has lately requested Italy to grant her the use of a base at Cattaro, in the Adriatic, for her seaplanes, and that Italy has acceded to this request. What is beyond question is that if Germany succeeds in establishing her hegemony over Danubian Europe, then the Third Reich, by this very fact,

will make its influence supreme in the Balkans, and hence in the eastern parts of the Mediterranean. To preserve the balance of power in Europe is, therefore, at the same time to preserve the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and the freedom of the communications of the British Empire.

Let there be no misconception on this point. It is not a question of encircling Germany nor of baiting a great nation because it happens to have a form of government that is agreeable neither to France nor to England.[3] I would not have France embark upon a crusade, I would not have her impose such a course on other nations. Our pact with Russia should not, in this connexion, be an occasion of misinterpretation or misunderstanding. The political *rapprochement* between Paris and Moscow is not the work of the *Front populaire.* The most powerful, if not the most energetic, influences that brought it about were, first M. Barthou, and then M. Laval, who in no wise belonged to the *Front populaire*, and were even intransigent enemies of French Communism. There are still in France more statesmen and more politicians than is commonly believed for whom diplomacy is not and should not be subject to purely ideological considerations. Those French newspapers which make out that certain of our rulers are working in the service of this or that foreign Government or in the service of international revolution grossly misrepresent these personalities. These newspapers are sometimes the very ones which last year misrepresented and insulted England.

Yes, we have concluded a treaty with Russia. It is no more an agreement with Bolshevism than a treaty made by England with Italy would be a concession to the principles of Fascism. But our treaty with Moscow is, as far as Berlin is concerned, purely defensive. I am assured by people who have a good knowledge of present-day Germany that the Reichwehr, which, in reality, controls the Reich, is anxious to ensure the well-being of its country; that, unquestionably, the Reichwehr would prefer to realise this aim by peaceful means; but also that 'it would not hesitate to resort to war if a peaceful solution of the economic problem turned out to be impossible.' I am also assured by these same people that a peaceful solution is not at all impossible, and that it depends

[3] This, of course, is M. Piot's own opinion.—Ed., *Nineteenth Century*.

upon whether an agreement can be reached between Berlin and Moscow, and that Berlin would not be uncompromisingly adverse to such an agreement. I should be happy if this agreement were arrived at, and especially if our two countries could by their united efforts help to bring it about.

I should likewise be happy if we in concert could help to bring about in Central Europe a balance of power where all legitimate interests, including those of Germany, would be amply safeguarded. Most assuredly, Czechoslovakia, provided its independence were respected, would offer no opposition to such an arrangement. Should not the *rôle* of England and France, who have nothing to ask for themselves except assurances against an hegemony in Europe, be just this: to join in sponsoring peaceful solutions of the kind suggested and in securing their acceptance? If the two countries are not closely united, in the name of the above mentioned principles, there will always be found points of detail with regard to which it will be possible to set them at loggerheads.

To sum up things as I see them. Big forces are at present at work in the world. It is not in the power either of England or of France to suppress or destroy them. The art of politics does not consist in preventing what in the nature of things cannot be prevented. It does not consist in denying the existence of realities, but in accommodating oneself to these realities. There are nations who must be given a place which at present they have not got and of which they stand in vital need. To seek to repress and crush these nations—this must not be the common task of England and France. But at the same time it must be seen to that problems of this kind shall not be imposed upon the attention of the world by brute force and that those nations who complain that they have been done out of their due and that they are being subjected to unfair criticism shall not in their own turn claim the right to make others subject to their overlordship and their despotism. It is against this latter danger that a union between our two countries is necessary, and moreover, as Mr. Malcolm W Davis has said, 'inevitable.' And, since it is inevitable, let us act in such a way that sulking and acerbity have no part in it—let us do our best to make it a happy houshold.

JEAN PIOT.

GERMANY AND 'EUROPE'

By Professor W. Alison Phillips

In his *History of Greece* the late Professor Bury, referring tc the effects on Greece of the Persian War, makes some com· ments which have a peculiar interest at the present time, wher the fate of the League of Nations is in the balance and the exaggerated nationalism of Germany is awakening fears tha may or may not be well founded.

> Pressure from without, [he writes] whether on a nation or a race tends to promote unity and cohesion within. In the case of a natior the danger of foreign attack increases the sense of unity among indi vidual citizens and strengthens the central power. In the case of a race, it tends to weld the individual communities into a nation or federation. In the latter case, the chance of realising a complete or permanent unity depends partly on the strength and the duration of the external pressure, partly upon the degree of strength in the instinct for independence which has hitherto hindered the political atoms from cohesion.

In the case of the Greeks, he adds, it was only on the coasts of Asia, where the danger was permanent, that a union came into existence.

In criticising the Covenant of the League, in the second edition of my *Confederation of Europe*, I pointed the same moral.

> States or confederations of States, [I said] whatever the original sympathies which drew them together, are essentially combinations for the assertion and defence of their common interests against other competing groups outside. There are examples enough in history to show that when this competition ceases to be keenly felt the group tends tc lose its sense of community, freer play being given to the centrifugal forces of the conflicting interests within it.

Of the several examples cited one may here suffice. So long as the threat of French domination on the North American continent continued, the English colonies on the Atlantic seaboard were content to form part of the British Empire;

it was only after the conquest of Canada that they struck for independence. Having secured their independence, they quarrelled among themselves to the verge of war; and if, after fourteen years, the United States came into effective existence, this was—according to the *Federalist*—because 'the interest of every State demanded that the central government should be strong enough to ensure the federated States against foreign enemies.' But the very security of the United States brought its dangers in turn; for, in the absence of external pressure, the interests of the States and groups of States within the Union drew apart, until the great federation was all but shattered by the war between the North and South. This was perhaps the most conspicuous example of the general tendency of federations, or of other more or less compacted political groups, to break up in the absence of any need for common defence against external enemies. The question of the moment is, whether or no it be possible to reform the League of Nations, or to establish some other form of 'collective security,' so as to provide an organisation strong enough to resist the disruptive forces from within, while leaving to each State complete liberty to manage its own affairs.

Strangely enough, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, in a letter to *The Times* of July 8 last, sets up the United States as a model for such an organisation. While heartily agreeing with him that 'international monetary stabilisation and the lowering of the barriers to international trade are essential to that return of confidence on which alone co-operating action by men or nations can be built,' I cannot agree with him that a United States of the World, on the American model, would solve the problem of the permanent organisation of peace. Some reasons I have given above, but there are others perhaps even more cogent. Dr. Butler speaks of 'a federated union for the advancement of interests and ideals common to all, without in the least limiting the independence of each member of the group in the control of its own affairs'; but the internal history of the United States has been largely that of the contest for 'State rights' against the encroachments of the Federal Government, a contest which culminated in the Civil War and is again reviving in connexion with President Roosevelt's 'New Deal.' Similarly, a world federation would

sooner or later be forced, in the general interest, to interfere in the internal affairs of nations if these threatened to have dangerous external effects; and the result would not be peace. The people of the United States, moreover, have increased and flourished under quite exceptionally favourable conditions; for they had vast spaces, rich in every form of natural wealth, in which to expand and to build up their fortunes. It is, therefore, impossible to draw a moral from their happy state which should be applicable to the nations of the continent of Europe, with their growing populations confined within more or less artificial boundaries and prevented, by nationalist hatreds and restrictions on immigration, from seeking outlets abroad.

In the case of the League of Nations the disruptive force of a national pressure to expand has been revealed to all the world by Italy's Abyssinian adventure. With this, however, I am not here concerned. The relation of Germany to 'Europe,' which is my immediate concern, presents a problem of which the solution is far more difficult, if indeed it be soluble by any methods other than those of 'blood and iron.' The German nation, too, feels itself to be confined in a space too narrow for the full exercise of its expansive energies, and it never ceases to protest against the losses and limitations imposed upon it by what it calls the *Diktat* of Versailles. It was popular resentment at these restrictions and, more especially, fear of Soviet Russia, with its incalculable armed power and yet more incalculable policy of peaceful penetration, which carried the National Socialist Party to supreme power and established the dictatorship of the *Führer*. Under the combined pressure of the Powers leagued behind the Versailles Treaty and of the Communist peril, the loosely compacted confederation set up by the Weimar Constitution has been transformed into a unitary State organised and disciplined on the Prussian model. Since this State is now also armed to the teeth, it is clearly of importance to know what contribution, if any, it is prepared to make to 'collective security,' and on what terms.

In the recent announcement by Herr Hitler of the willingness of Germany to collaborate in the cause of peace the method and conditions of such collaboration were left vague, and the long delay of the German Government in replying to

the British *Questionnaire* has led to a suspicion that the advances thus made were only intended to divert attention from other and more sinister activities. This delay is, however, susceptible of another explanation, namely, that given by Herr Frick, the Minister of the Interior, in the course of a speech at Frankfurt on July 12, when he said that Germany resented being treated 'like a schoolboy in an examination.' So 'the answer to the *Questionnaire* has not been words, but an act'—the reconciliation between Germany and Austria. In most quarters this reconciliation has been hailed as a move towards peace. In France, however, to judge by the comments in the French Press, it has been interpreted as a move towards the establishment of a Central European 'block,' consisting of Germany, Austria, Hungary and Italy, of which the object is the effective separation of France from her allies in Eastern Europe. In Germany, on the other hand, all sinister intentions are repudiated. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, in a leading article published on July 14, admits, indeed, that later on the four Powers may consult together on important political questions, but adds that 'the protocols of 1934 and 1936 are still valid,' and that 'these merely secure certain economic advantages for Italy, Austria and Hungary as a counter to the French plans on the Danube, especially the Danubian economic federation, which could not disguise the fact that its point was directed against Germany.' As for the Central European 'block,' the writer comments, 'this need cause no misgiving if the Western Powers would collaborate in carrying out the grandly conceived German peace policy.'

That this peace policy is honestly inspired may, I think, be admitted, if only because Herr Hitler and his lieutenants are probably right in their contention that it will require twenty-five years of peace to enable them to complete and stabilise the new order in Germany. Even when this process is completed, and the German people once more feel themselves to be regarded as on a footing of equality with the other great nations, the supreme interest of Germany, they assert, will still be peace, if only because genuine nationalists 'look upon the people, its men of science, artists, soldiers and young people, as the most holy of possessions, which they would contemplate exposing to the war-technique of the present day only in the very last resort.' But they also

maintain that this peace, if it is to be permanent, must be based on justice and backed by forces adequate for its protection. It is therefore of interest to know what the words 'justice' and 'adequate forces' signify to the mind of one of the most conspicuous leaders of the Nazi movement, who is in a position of exceptional authority and influence in Germany and is, moreover, credited with a more 'European' outlook than the others.

Herr Alfred Rosenberg, who was at the *Führer's* side from the outset, combines in his own person an astonishing variety of functions. He is director (*Leiter*) of the External Affairs Bureau (*Aussenpolitisches Amt*) of the National Socialist Party, of which the authority overshadows that of the official Foreign Office; he is president of the *Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur*, which he founded in 1929; he is editor of the official organ of the Nazi Party, the *Völkische Beobachter*, and three other papers; and, finally, in 1934 he was charged by Herr Hitler with the task of educating the party in all that concerns the world at large and Germany's relations to it (*Weltanschauung*). His views as to the future relations of Germany to Europe and the world beyond are, therefore, of considerable significance. The following abstract of them is based partly on several conversations with Herr Rosenberg himself, partly on an article, 'Krisis und Neugeburt Europas,' published by him in Rome three years ago and read and approved by Mussolini, to whom it may have suggested the idea of the Four-Power Pact.

In external as in internal affairs Herr Rosenberg is in revolt against the 'abstractions' of the French Revolution, which he makes responsible for the desolation (*Verödung*) of the nineteenth century, with its exaltation of the authority of mere numbers above that of the individual man of genius. Thus, too, the League of Nations can never be effective, in his opinion, because it is based on the cosmopolitan ideals of the Revolution, which are remote from reality; because it is too all-inclusive and 'mixed,' and is therefore unconscious of any common aim. What is wanted, he maintains, is a Europe conscious of its essential unity, and 'the idea of Europe cannot be based on abstract considerations, but must be rooted in the conviction that the European nations have something in common that distinguishes them from Asia and

Africa.' Europe, moreover, in order to be effective, must not be represented by an all-embracing league, but by those great nations which are, as it were, the cultural suns of which the smaller nations are merely the satellites, and from which these derive their light. The great nations of Europe are four in number—France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy; for the Bolshevist revolution was essentially 'a revolt of the steppes against the civilisation of the West,' and Russia has now 'returned to Central Asia,' constituting a menace against which the great nations of Europe should present a united front.

To make such a union possible the four nations must not only learn to appreciate the causes which have led to the divergence of national characters and constitutions, they must also come to an agreement as to the directions to be taken by their expansive energies. The nature of the differences between them are stated by Herr Rosenberg with sympathetic insight. French nationality, he says, is inseparable from the soil, so that whoever lives in France becomes in some mysterious way a Frenchman. England, which for centuries has known no invader, conceives the nation not as a State but as a community (*Gesellschaft*), into which anyone is admitted who adapts himself to its manners and customs and unwritten law. In Germany, however, it is the idea of community of blood, stimulated by her geographical position and by her political disunion in the past, which has mainly inspired 'the great German awakening of the present day.' 'It is no chance happening,' says Herr Rosenberg, 'that while Italy has chosen the lictor's fasces as the symbol of the most rigorous conception of the Roman State, awakening Germany has chosen the swastika as the most ancient symbol of the German race.' The toleration of this diversity in unity is essential if 'Europe' is to be made a reality; for a war which should issue in the destruction of any one of the four centres of civilisation would lead to a chaos in which the others would also perish.

In order to avoid such a fatality, the four Powers should not face each other, but should stand back to back, Germany facing north and north-eastward, France southward, Italy eastward and south-eastward, Great Britain towards the oceans. France, instead of looking eastward, should turn her attention to her vast African possessions, though she must be careful not to suffer, and still less prepare for, an

advance of Africa into Europe. As for Great Britain, her influence should radiate across the seas. Already the British 'community' forms a great *imperium*, and it is essential to an organised Europe that this should not be weakened; for 'Europe will only be able to play a successful part in the world when Great Britain is in a position to undertake the mission of representing it with power.' England, on the other hand, should see the value of strengthening the still hampered energies of Germany and Italy. For Italy will never be at peace until she can assume the government of her growing population in North and East Africa, while the German people, now split up and scattered, will never be able to recognise the existence of 'Europe' until the prime condition laid down in the *Führer's Mein Kampf* has been fulfilled and all Germans have been united in one State 'for the safeguarding of the race.' Only an agreement on these lines would produce 'organic peace' and, incidentally, give the smaller nations that security 'within their proper limits' which is lacking now in 'the battle against elemental forces.'

'Europe' then, for effective purposes, is conceived by Herr Rosenberg as a league of the four Powers, which, having agreed to 'radiate' to different points of the compass, will be held together by their common interest in the preservation of Western civilisation against pressure from the East, notably that of Bolshevist Russia, which constitutes 'a danger to all the world, that must be faced, whatever the political relations to Russia may be.' And behind the menace of Bolshevism there looms in his mind the more distant, but no less real, menace from the Far East—the possibility of another great migration of the yellow race, armed now with modern weapons and under skilled leadership, sweeping across Central Asia to the conquest of the West. This terror of the 'yellow peril,' which to the English in their island seems remote and unreal, had its share in reviving the military spirit of the German people, disarmed as they were and conscious of their exposed eastern frontier.

Herr Rosenberg admits that the ideas he puts forward are not at present within the range of practical politics. But he urges that, if Europe is to be made safe, 'none of us has much time to lose in helping towards their realisation, since other non-European races are experiencing the same national-

istic awakening.' Whether or no Japan will succeed in placing herself at the head of the yellow race, he says, is an open question; what is certain is, that Europe will have to cease 'cultural propaganda' in the East, confine herself to political, technical and economic intercourse, and recognise the renewal of their 'race nationality' as the contribution of the yellow peoples to civilisation. Africa too, he says, is waking up, but in this case the great mixture of races and the absence of any conception of the State justify European colonisation, though this should not take the form of 'Liberal' attempts to Europeanise the natives, who should be left to develop their own forms. He adds that anyone furthering the mixture of races in Africa should be reckoned a danger to the white community. Clearly, he believes the absence of any colour-bar in the Latin races to be a danger to European civilisation. The question of German colonies he is content to leave for friendly settlement with Great Britain later.

It would appear from the above that, since Herr Rosenberg is the accredited exponent of the *Führer's* views, the willingness of Germany to co-operate in a collective system of guarantee is likely to be conditional on two readjustments of primary importance: the expansion of the Reich by the inclusion in it of all people of German race, and the substitution for the League of Nations of a European alliance from which the Soviet Union would be excluded. The dangers involved in any attempt to realise these ideas are patent enough. The immediate danger comes from the general atmosphere of suspicion and fear. It was fear and suspicion of Germany that led to the Franco-Soviet defensive alliance; it was suspicion and fear of a threat lurking behind this alliance that was the immediate cause of the German reoccupation of the demilitarised zone, of which the defencelessness seemed to invite a French attack. This, together with the new understanding between Germany and Austria, has in turn aroused fresh alarms in France, where there has been a clamour in the Press for a closer alliance with Russia and Great Britain, as a counterbalance to the new Central European group. Since Great Britain seems thus to be once more destined to play her traditional part of *la puissance médiatrice de l'Europe*, it is important that the British Government and public should make up their minds as to how far

these mutual fears and suspicions are well founded and what measures, if any, they are prepared to take to counter them.

In this matter wisdom dictates that Great Britain should, like the other nations, consult primarily her own interests. Of these, peace on the continent of Europe has always been held to be one of the most important. But if, in spite of all her efforts, war should unhappily break out, her interests would only be directly involved by threatened aggressions in two limited regions—namely, the Low Countries and the Mediterranean. Only in the event of an aggression in these directions would she have to intervene in arms, and a clear statement to this effect, backed by a sufficient revelation of force, would almost certainly prevent any such aggression. From a purely British point of view, then, it would be all to the good if Germany, in her efforts for expansion, were to turn her back on France and the Western ocean and be content to 'radiate' towards the north-east—that is to say, towards Danzig and Memel. France might possibly also disinterest herself in such a radiation, if she could be pursuaded that Germany, while determined to safeguard the Rhine provinces, has given up all intention of laying claim to Alsace-Lorraine. She might even be prepared, if the Nazi policy outlined above inspires her with confidence, to regard with equanimity the reincorporation of Austria in Germany. Great Britain at least has no direct interest in opposing the *Anschluss* and no right to object to it, provided that the process is carried out with the willing consent of the Austrians. Unfortunately, under the present form of government in Vienna there is no possibility of finding out what view the Austrian people take though there is evidence to show that the great majority favour union with Germany, if only for economic reasons. If this be so, the justice of the German claim to be allowed to incorporate Austria in the Reich will be admitted, especially if it be remembered that it is only seventy years since the Austrian provinces ceased to be integral parts of Germany. For the rest, it may be hoped that time, and proof of a friendly disposition on the part of the other Powers, will abate the exuberance of young Germany, and that the German leaders will grasp the truth of Cavour's dictum, that the essence of statesmanship consists in *le tact des choses possibles*.

W. Alison Phillips.

PENDULUM OVER SPAIN[1]

By Professor E. Allison Peers

The curse of Spain is the pendulum. Since the first breath of social and political reform moved it from a static position nearly a century and a half ago, it has never ceased to show either a gentle or a violent oscillation. During the five and a half years of the Second Republic, it has been trying to recover from the effects of the agitation into which it was thrown by Primo de Rivera seven years earlier. Upon his fall, the Revolutionary Committee which afterwards became the Provisional Government of the Republic swung the nation to the Left again: there would undoubtedly have been civil war in December 1930 had not the Jaca rebellion been promptly suppressed, and again in April 1931 had not King Alfonso, though begged by his supporters to remain and fight, taken the patriotic course of leaving the country.

Still farther to the Left moved the pendulum for two years more, and, when in November 1933 the Constituent Cortes were dissolved, traditionalist opinion was completely estranged from a Government whose intolerance had forced the resignation of its own Prime Minister. Had the 1933 elections brought back a very slightly larger proportion of Conservative deputies, there would have been a long reactionary period of Right-wing government the consequences of which none could have foreseen. As it was, the Centre group, with a very small number of Right-wing Ministers, came into power, and the pendulum was approaching a position of rest when, in Catalonia and Asturias, Left-wing extremists again threw it into violent oscillation by means of armed rebellion, which of necessity provoked reprisals and a new period of repression. Again, in February 1936, came a swing to the Left with the victory of the Popular Front in the parliamentary elections, and this was intensified

[1] In May 1936 we published 'Turbulent Spain,' by Mr. W. Horsfall Carter. The present article covers somewhat different ground and deals mainly with events which have happened since.—Ed.

during the following four months by the deposition of the Republic's moderately-inclined President, Señor Alcalá Zamora, by the impunity with which Left-wing extremists were permitted to fire churches, convents, clubs, newspaper offices and other buildings associated with traditionalism, and by the violent revenges taken by armed gunmen, presumed to be of Fascist sympathies. The brutal murder of a leading Conservative deputy, Señor Calvo Sotelo, on July 13, caused a complete revulsion of public opinion, and four days later the pendulum swung again to the Right with the outbreak of a new armed rebellion, which this time plunged the country into civil war.

If we are to judge aright the issues in the conflict into which the Spaniards have entered, it is essential that we should see it against the background of the past thirteen years. It is most regrettable that, almost immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, the large majority of our daily newspapers should have become violently partisan. Rarely, save in *The Times*, the dispatches of whose correspondents in Madrid and Barcelona have more than maintained their high reputation, has it been possible to read a balanced discussion of the issues. Most of our remaining daily papers, and even some of the more reputable weekly reviews, have taken one side with some warmth and made no attempt to present the other. One group condemns the rebels in almost unmeasured terms for having taken up arms against a lawfully constituted Government. The other group attacks the loyalists, both for the policy of the Popular Front, to which it is opposed in principle, and for the atrocities and destruction perpetrated by Government forces, which are not by any means unmatched by the other side, but do in fact seem to have been rather the more frequent and reprehensible. Let us examine each of these two positions in turn.

The first is certainly attractive to peace-loving and law-abiding British subjects, and no doubt the Government cause is receiving a great deal of sympathy in this country because it seems to represent the constitutionally elected authority. This consideration, as I know from private correspondence, is also solely responsible for keeping certain diplomatic and consular officials in their posts abroad: the number of resignations from such posts, it may be said in passing, is a

striking commentary upon the constitutionalists' claim that the mass of informed opinion is with them. The ordinary Briton simply cannot imagine himself supporting an armed rebellion in his own country, and he therefore feels that he cannot take the part of armed rebels in Spain. If he had lived in Spain during the Socialist biennium of 1931–3, and again since last February, he might feel that circumstances alter cases. Still, one sympathises with his sentiments, and for my own part I would go so far as to say that, even with detailed knowledge of the persecution which traditionalists have continually suffered under the Republic and of the dictatorial and unconstitutional measures which have been taken by the makers of the 1931 Constitution, I could not side with a military revolt against a Government so recently elected by popular suffrage, however great the provocation which such a Government had given.

But it is quite another thing to urge that we should support the Spanish Government against the rebels, either materially, as a nation, or by whatever force there may be in individual opinion. In the first place, if we may accept the testimony of *The Times* correspondent in Madrid (and, though I have no documentary proof of its correctness, letters received from Spain support it), the Government of Señor Giralt, which is now (*i.e.*, at the time of writing) nominally ruling Spain, is not a constitutionally-appointed Government at all. According to Article 75 of the 1931 Constitution, 'the President of the Republic shall have freedom to appoint the head of the Government, and, on his nomination, its Ministers.' But when, in the small hours of July 19, Señor Casares Quiroga resigned the Premiership, and the President of the Republic, thinking to substitute a Government that would appeal to moderate men, appointed Señor Martínez Barrio as his successor, 'the new Cabinet was torpedoed immediately. The Marxist groups would have none of it, and their veto was absolute.' [2] In a few hours, the battle between the extremists and the President, of whom we used to think as Spain's strong man, was over. The Marxists had a Government to their liking and the Constitution was overridden. If, then, we were in any way to give active support to the Government,

[2] *The Times*, August 5, 1936.

we should, not only in effect but in fact, be supporting those who for their own purpose defied the Constitution.

We should also be supporting men who themselves declared war on a legally-constituted Government in October 1934 and would have been the cause of a conflict as bloody and as savage as this if their rebellion had not been quelled at the outset. It is unfortunate that certain newspapers and individuals who are so eagerly enlisting our sympathies on behalf of constitutional government to-day were not to the fore in denouncing the Socialist rebels in Asturias two years ago and in supporting a Centre-Right Government in which, as it happened, the Right was less numerously represented than would have been justified by the proportion of Centre and Right deputies returned in the election. Then, however, their concern was solely with what they alleged to be the brutal methods by which the Asturian rebellion was put down. They cannot have it both ways. If, to quote Mr. Philip Noel Baker (*The Times*, August 8), the present 'struggle in Spain is that of Fascist militarists who are attempting to destroy a constitutional Government,' the struggle in October 1934 was that of Socialist militarists who were attempting precisely the same thing. Though two wrongs do not make a right, one example constitutes a precedent, and the rebels only followed the example of the ex-rebels, who in their turn might have cited the Sanjurjo rising of August 1932, the leaders of which again might have pleaded the attempted Republican revolt of December 1930. Once more, it is the swing of the pendulum. . . .

But there is still more to be said in answer to the contentions of the pro-loyalists. If we are going to be constitutionalists and support the Second Republic against all who attempt to overthrow it (whether they be the militarists of to-day or possibly those who are now nominally fighting for it to-morrow), let us examine the credentials of the Second Republic itself. How was it established? By votes recorded at the municipal elections of April 12, 1931. And by what clause of the Constitution at that time in force are municipal elections competent to change the *régime*? . . . Again, was there, in fact, a Republican majority in those elections? No figures were ever published to prove that there was. The only results issued by authority were those of the Home Secretary

on April 13, which showed that 22,150 seats, down to that date, had gone to Monarchists and 5875 to Republicans. The Republican Government never published figures to justify its seizure of power, and the Madrid correspondent of *The Times*, applying to the new Home Secretary for permission to examine the results, was refused it.[3] . . . Why, then, did the Republic come in at all? It came in, as a highly successful *coup d'état*, because the large towns had huge Republican majorities, and it came in bloodlessly solely because, for his people's sake, King Alfonso dreaded such a war as that into which the country is now plunged. I am not arguing for a moment that the Republic ought not to have come, or that Republican government is not the best for Spain, but simply that, if we are going to take our stand strictly on popular suffrage and the results of elections, not merely the present Spanish Government, but the Second Republic itself, is in a queer position.

On the other hand, it seems unreasonable, though it is certainly understandable, that the Government should be attacked, and that support should be refused to it, simply on account of atrocities, whether to persons or to property, alleged to have been perpetrated by its adherents. Assuming, as we probably may, that a proportion of those reported in the Press actually took place, we shall not, I think, take the proportion as being a very high one if we contrast the vivid anonymous descriptions with the sober accounts which our own friends in Spain, belonging to whichever side in the conflict, send us. But still less shall we lay it down that in conditions such as these, where the Government is deprived, by an act of mutiny, of the services of a great number of its soldiers, guards and police, it is responsible for acts of violence committed in its name or by its soldiers. Not only are its civil forces of security deficient, but large parts of its armies—or, more exactly, of the bodies of men and women who are fighting for it—are improvised, from sheer necessity, at a few days' notice, and are therefore untrained, undisciplined, and unused to conditions of warfare. It would be remarkable if such hordes, where they have the opportunity, did not let loose their emotions in a way which for five years has unhappily been too familiar. We may fairly be apprehensive as

[3] *The Times*, July 29, 1932.

to what will happen if, in the event of a Government victory, these mobs still prove unrestrainable, but such apprehension is hardly an argument against the Government's cause.

Enough, I hope, has now been said to justify the contention that the duty of foreigners is to support neither the one side nor the other in this domestic quarrel, which all pray will be speedily ended. The position cannot be condensed into such a simple formula as Red *versus* White, Communism *versus* Fascism, Authority *versus* Insubordination. Excessive simplification does nothing but obscure and falsify the issues. If the duty of neutrality of sentiment be conceded, it is needless to argue in favour of the most nearly complete degree of material non-intervention that it is practicable to achieve: the greater includes the less.

Having now established a position of objectivity, let us look, so far as is possible, into the future. The immediate outlook is about as black as it can well be. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the bitterness, ferocity and determination with which the war is being waged on both sides, for these have been amply insisted upon by the daily Press, which describes the conflict as the worst that Spain has known for a century. The reference is presumably to the First Carlist War, now just one hundred years old: the centenary of the mutiny at La Granja falls on the day on which these lines are being written. But, in everything except the length of the struggle (and the present war is fortunately unlikely to last for seven years), the situation to-day seems very much worse. The conflict is spread over a far wider area and may well extend farther still; the number of parties involved is greater, and with it the possibility of internal post-war strife; human progress, in the course of a century, has devised more means of human torture and human destruction; and European complications are both more likely and more dangerous. But the most alarming symptom of the struggle is its ferocity. Never has the pendulum rocked so menacingly before. In the published declarations of the leaders on each side there is plainly discernible a note of exaltation which prophesies a fight to the death and a rare explosion of fanaticism on the part of the victors. And neither side can contemplate defeat. That the enemy should win, it says, is unthinkable. Victory simply *must* be its own.

It may seem paradoxical to preface an attempted sketch of Spain's future with the suggestion that, whichever side gains the victory, the results, as far as Spain is concerned, will eventually be much the same. Yet I believe that the number of years for which either party can establish a *régime* after its own heart is very limited, and that hot-foot again will come a fresh reaction. I can see just one faint possibility of peace in the event of a Government triumph. Even before the February elections, it was clear to all that the Popular Front was an exceedingly brittle structure, and it would probably have broken before now had it not been for the common danger. In any case, a Government representing only Unión Republicana and Izquierda Republicana was unlikely to survive for long, especially when its leader was removed outside the area of party politics by his election to the Presidency of the Republic.

Now it is general knowledge that in Barcelona, where the first really fierce fighting took place and the Government forces first gained the victory, the expected cleavage between Socialists, Syndicalists and Communists has already begun. In Madrid, where in June and July Socialists and Syndicalists fought tooth and nail over an extensive building strike, the cleavage is only delayed by the fear of an imminent attack on the city. In Valencia, according to the diplomatic correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* (August 8th), Anarchists and Anarcho-Syndicalists are menacing the unity of the Popular Front and its disintegration is making steady progress. Should the war last for months, and the forces of disintegration have time to develop, as they are bound to do, beneath the surface, it is just conceivable that a strong man of what we must now consider moderate tendencies (Don Manuel Azaña, as President of the Republic, for example, or the moderate Socialist Don Indalecio Prieto, whose nominee was recently elected to the presidency of the party over the once powerful extremist Don Francisco Largo Caballero) might profit by the divisions and dissensions among the extremists to rally to his support a large Peace Party which would be strong enough to govern. That way, had such a party learned much and could it forget much, might lie Spain's salvation.

But the likelier alternative, in the event of a Government victory, is a short but severe dictatorship followed by a longer

period of extremist rule and ultimately by the inevitable reaction. The rebel leaders, if defeated in the Peninsula, might well retire to Spanish Morocco and hold it for an indefinite period, but the rest of Spain, including the Balearic Islands, would doubtless conform with the result of the conflict. Which of the seven main parties or groups that at present comprise the Popular Front would prevail it is impossible to determine. The Socialist Party is deeply cleft, and Señor Largo Caballero, whose impassioned denial that either he or his associates would tolerate a Communist State was one of the features of the Revolutionary Committee's trial in 1930, has moved notably to the Left in the intervening period. The Syndicalists have made a more or less permanent alliance with the Anarchists, and their organisations, known in Spain as the C.N.T. and the F.A.I. respectively, have taken effective control of the public services, especially in Madrid and Barcelona, during the present crisis. The Anarcho-Syndicalist combination is stronger in influence, though not in numbers, than the Socialist Unión General de Trabajadores (U.G.T.), which, above all under its present leadership, is likely to gravitate towards Unión Republicana and Izquierda Republicana, if these parties, in their present form, survive at all.

The Unified Marxists, whose lengthily-entitled party is abbreviated P.O.U.M., are a body of rapidly increasing numbers and influence, and their leader, Andrés Nin, is one of those striking personalities whom Spaniards will so readily follow. 'The Government do not exist,' he declared quite frankly the other day. 'We are collaborating with them, but they can do no more than sanction whatever is done by the masses.' The future of Spain under such a leader can be imagined. There is also the possibility of Moscow Communism as the dominant power in the country. Many progressives, both in Spain and abroad, deride this idea, but Moscow has already placed the Spanish Communist Party deeply in its debt by sending it frequent reinforcements both of money and of men, and when we read (August 8) that a three-day campaign in aid of the Spanish Popular Front brought in £479,000, we can hardly dismiss the possibility entirely. On the whole, the Anarcho-Syndicalists seem at present the most likely of the extremist forces to dominate in the event of a Government victory. They are particularly

strong in Barcelona, for their programme of decentralisation and group organisation has much in common with the autonomist-federalist schemes which are still dear to many Catalonians. In the recently-reconstituted Catalonian Government they have five places, divided between C.N.T. and F.A.I. in the proportion of three to two, whereas the P.O.U.M. and the Moscow Communists have only one place each. Admittedly Barcelona is not Madrid, and Madrid has always been the stronghold of the U.G.T. But Barcelona, which, since the Pact of San Sebastián and the elections of April 1931, has been perhaps the staunchest supporter of Left-wing Republicanism in the whole of Spain, may be expected to play a larger part in the life of the country than has been the case heretofore if the Government defeats the rebels.

Disquieting as the prospect of a Spain in the hands of Left-wing extremists will be for many, the international situation would probably be little changed by such an eventuality because of its impermanence and the certainty of a reaction. It is Spain herself, torn asunder by feuds between rival parties, with her churches burned down, her best blood exiled and her age-old ideals thrown to the winds, that would be martyred in the process of transformation. In the opposite event, however, of a Fascist victory, and the reconstruction of Spain as a totalitarian State, the repercussions abroad might be serious. An Italo-Spanish *entente*, towards which, it will be remembered, events were moving during the early years of the rule of Mussolini and of Primo de Rivera, would unite the Powers on both sides of the Mediterranean. A Fascist Spain, too, would mean the encircling of France with a ring of Fascist Powers, and might in itself, to omit all mention of further complications, have serious results in that country. But I doubt very much if a Fascist Spain, in the sense in which the term is understood abroad, is as likely an eventuality as a Spain dominated by Moscow Communism.

To begin with, assuming that the military leaders took Madrid and subdued all the Castilian-speaking provinces, they would find it extremely difficult to subdue Catalonia. In the next place, it is only within the last few months that Fascism in any shape or form has become powerful in Spain. It began to assume importance (a fact which Spanish Socialists will hardly relish) after the defeat of the Asturian rebels in October

1934. It attracted numerous adherents between February and June 1936, during a period when revolutionary strikes, assassinations, church-burnings and the like were occurring almost every day (170 churches were burned, 269 persons killed and 351 strikes declared in four months), and the Popular Front Government proved completely unequal to dealing with them. The strong probability seems to be that theoretical Fascism is a very puny plant in Spain, and that those Spaniards who wish to see the establishment of a Fascist dictatorship desire it merely as a temporary measure with a view to the restoration of order within the country, which seems unlikely of achievement by any other method. Even the insurgent leaders themselves have not, so far as I know, expressed themselves as being in sympathy with the principles of Fascism.

A new period of Primo de Rivera rule, then, with rather less of the *dictablanda* spirit and the velvet glove, seems indcated in the event of a militarist victory. There appears to be no reason why the new dictator, in such a case, should not do successfully what Primo de Rivera tried to do and failed—lead the country back gradually to constitutional government. One's great fear would be a return of the spirit of recrimination which characterised the first years of the Republic: the imprisonments, exiles, belated trials for 'responsibilities,' dismissals for 'incompatibility with the *régime*,' and so on. On the other hand, it is doubtful if one need have any fear of even a Fascist Spain's bellicosity. The article in the 1931 Constitution which 'renounces war as an instrument of national policy' (Article 6) was probably the most nearly unanimously approved by the people, and by the political parties as a whole, of any. With war, in all but the tragic sense in which the word is now used in Spain, the country has finished for ever. During the last few years, despite the frequency of strikes, riots and revolts, Spaniards have taken comfort in the thought that their troubles are at least merely their own. 'When you cross the frontier from France,' one has heard it said again and again, 'you may stop thinking of war as they are thinking of it in the rest of Europe.' The spirit of '98 has been kept alive, both by Monarchists and by Republicans, throughout these last troubled years, and relations with the Spanish-American republics have become more and more cordial, the idea of a spiritual unity being so

transcendent that no 'Spanish-speaking Union' is necessary to give it vocal expression.

The question of a possible Restoration, in the event of a rebel victory, has been left till last, chiefly because of its obscurity. It must be remembered that, in all the five and a half years of the Second Republic, the Right has never once governed: even in the most favourable of its coalitions with the Centre, the latter has always had predominance of numbers. During the greater part of this period, then, the return of the monarchy has not been considered a subject within the range of practical politics, and, so far as one has been able to discover what people are thinking about it, all but professed Monarchists seem to have rejected it without a moment's thought. 'The King—no, not that!' was the answer given by a once loyal young Monarchist only a month ago. 'Communism never, but the King—no!' came from a similar quarter at a time when election posters were announcing 'Gil Robles or chaos.'

There is no evidence that a Restoration forms any part of the present plans of the military leaders: it was referred to neither in the proclamation of General Franco nor in that of General Mola. Indeed, such evidence as there is—the reported visit of the Infante Don Juan, Prince of Asturias, to the rebel lines and General Mola's refusal to admit him as a volunteer lest he should prejudice the rebel cause—points rather in the other direction. Nor need the interview of the Marqués de Luca de Tena, formerly editor of the Monarchist journal *A.B.C.*, with ex-King Alfonso be considered of any importance. If the civil war should end with victory for the rebels, however, the question of a Restoration would presumably arise, since in most respects Spain would have retraced her steps as far as 1930. Then there might well follow dissensions within the Government comparable to those which have been postulated in the event of a Left-wing victory. Not only would many certainly prefer a continuance of republicanism, but the Monarchists themselves would probably be divided between the policy of recalling Don Alfonso to the throne and that of inviting the Prince of Asturias. Two incidents which occurred early in 1934, when for the first time in nearly three years it was safe to refer to the question in the public Press, will illustrate this possibility. In January of that year, a

newly-founded Monarchist club in Madrid received a telegram from Don Alfonso, in which he declared that in the Monarchist youth groups lay his 'hope for the salvation of our beloved Spain.' Some point was given to the implications of this message by two articles which appeared soon afterwards in *A.B.C.*, declaring that Don Juan (this was shortly after his two elder brothers had renounced their claims to the succession) was looked upon by many as the hero of the coming Restoration—'a prince who is far removed from discussions and disputes and has played no part in past quarrels.' From such straws as these one can predict which way the wind might blow in a hypothetical future.

There is one further alternative worth mentioning. During the brief negotiations, in April 1931, between the advisers of Don Alfonso and the Revolutionary Committee, a suggestion was made from the royal side, and of course turned down without discussion, that the King might be willing to abdicate provided a regency were established under the Infante Don Carlos. This prince, an Austrian by birth, became naturalised previously to his marriage with Don Alfonso's elder sister, on whose death some years later he married again. He is a man in the sixties, and probably one would not recall the proposal of five years ago were it not that the Press has frequently reported rumours of late that he has visited, or is about to visit, General Mola's headquarters at Burgos. It would indeed be strange if he should become a candidate for the Spanish throne, and if, a full century after the First Carlist War, there should arise a new generation of Carlists.

E. Allison Peers.

THE SITUATION IN SPAIN

By Diplomaticus

[Editorial Note.—*The following is from the pen of a distinguished diplomat, until recently a member of one of the principal Spanish Embassies in Europe, who for obvious reasons does not at present desire his identity to be revealed.*]

All those who have been led by quick sympathy or by professional or amateur interest to study the course of political events in a foreign country realise how very difficult it is to arrive at an adequate opinion concerning those events, particularly when they have to trust to information which is biassed or otherwise unreliable; they are at a disadvantage in not having first-hand knowledge of the *milieu* in which the events have taken place, and also, and above all, owing to the fact that they are naturally prone to judge the political and social problems of another race from the peculiar viewpoint of their own; they are far from making sufficient allowance for differences of environment and national temperament.

In view of all this, the chief aim of the writer of this article, who has spent the greater part of his life in foreign countries, will be to set before English readers, in the most objective fashion possible, the present tragic situation in Spain, and to give some idea of what no small number of Spaniards themselves think about it.

Up to 1923 Spain was a peaceful country, easy to govern and control under a monarchical *régime* that was constitutional, parliamentary and nascently democratic—a *régime*, in fact, that is, and doubtless always will be, the ideal one for civilised nations. To-day, instead of this old Spain, we have a country in which many of those who formerly confined their political activities to going to cast their vote in a peaceful and sometimes even lightheartedly, careless mood are now

fighting one another with implacable ferocity, and are on the way to destroying a culture that is centuries old and what remains of one of the most considerable empires in history. It is not difficult to get at the causes which have produced so remarkable a change.

Before going further, I would remark that Spaniards to-day may be divided into two groups, which are roughly numerically equal. On one side is the Government of Madrid, supported by a proletariat whose aim it is to establish its dictatorship as a price for that support; on the other side are those Spaniards who wish to see their country rid of Marxism, and the partisans of this group are drawn from all classes of the community, and among them are to be found many of the proletariat of a large number of areas in Central and Northern Spain. It should therefore be stressed that the 'rebel,' or 'Nationalist,' movement is not monarchist in its designs, although, of course, there are monarchists on General Franco's side, and they are supporting him because they are patriots.

To return to the essential point: the main cause of the above-mentioned change is the influx into Spain of propaganda and money from Moscow. Knowing how easy it is to make converts in a country rich in energy and imagination, but poor in the goods of this world, the apostles of Communism have set about their task systematically, and they have spared no efforts to inculcate their creed into the miners of the Asturias, the industrial workers of Bilbao and Madrid, and the peasant population of Andalusia and Estramadura. The workers of Barcelona and other industrial centres of Catalonia have for a long time past been Anarcho-Syndicalists. Moreover, these tendencies have been reinforced by Italian influence; many Italians who have left their country because they are opposed to the Fascist *régime* have done in Spain what they cannot do in Italy itself: they have carried on a propaganda in the same direction as the Bolshevist agents, and they have had a certain measure of success, although not so much as have these latter propagandists; and they have not, as a rule, influenced the same section of the population as the emissaries of Moscow.

After the municipal elections of April 14, 1931, the King, anxious above all things to avert fratricidal war,

magnanimously left the country, and the monarchy was a thing of the past. Then the first Republican Parliament was elected, but in conditions of such corruption and terrorism that the parties on the Right were prevented from securing the amount of representation that would otherwise have been theirs. In that Parliament the Socialist Party was the strongest, partly because it was the only political party that had not been rendered ineffective by the dictatorship. It may be asked why what may be called the *bourgeois* parties were so weak at that time. The explanation is that General Primo de Rivera, during the seven years he was in power, did all that he could to destroy the Conservative and Liberal Parties, which for more than half a century had been supreme in Spain; but, on the other hand, he showed a compromising attitude towards the Socialists, and allowed them to survive. That is why, when in 1930 the Cabinets of General Berenguer and Admiral Aznar tried to return to normal constitutional conditions, the Marxist Party was the only one which was so organised that it was prepared to conduct an electoral campaign, and hence it was able to defeat the *bourgeois* parties heavily, not only in the municipal elections, but in the more extensive parliamentary ones.

The first Parliament of the Republic wasted its time in religious and social legislation that was markedly sectarian, and this was not to the liking of the majority of Spaniards; and in particular it did not satisfy those classes who expected from the Republic something more than the secularisation of the cemeteries, the separation of Church and State, the new divorce laws, and the expropriating of the big landowners in such a way that the land passed from the latter to the State, and not to the peasants who were cultivating it. The *Cortes Constituyentes* evolved a Constitution embodying principles suited to no people, and least of all to the Spanish people. In the sixth article of this Constitution it is set forth that 'Spain renounces war as an instrument of national policy.' It is a pity these stout legislators did not, while they were about it, include civil war and the accompanying wholesale slaughter within the terms of their embargo.

The second elections, held under the ægis of a Central Left Government, were conducted with comparative impar-

majority, and the Governments which succeeded one another during the tenure of this Parliament continued to be of this character. It would have been good for Spain could this Parliament have lasted longer than it did; but the play of party interests brought about its downfall.

The third and last elections of the Republic, held on February 16 of this year, took place in an atmosphere of exasperated hatred which already contained the elements of the present tragedy, and it resulted in a Parliament in which the *Frente Popular* possessed a majority, although not a very large one. The first act of this Parliament was arbitrarily to annul the mandate of some forty members belonging to the Right, thereby assuring a comfortable majority to the *Frente Popular*. Immediately after this the President of the Republic, Señor Alcalá Zamora, was dismissed, and there ensued many acts calculated to disturb the internal harmony of Spain, and they indeed paved the way to the civil war that is now going on. On July 13 police forces in Madrid went to the house of one of the leaders of the Right, Señor Calvo-sotelo, carried him off, and shot him a few hours later. For those on the Right this added the last straw to the wrongs they had to endure, and the civil war may be said to have begun. Three Cabinets succeeded one another within the space of three hours. Señor Barrios was followed by Señor Quiroga, and the latter by Señor Giral. Those few hours were, however, of the most vital importance, because they were the last hours during which an understanding between the two contending parties might have been possible. Unfortunately, the Socialist-Communist forces prevailed in Madrid, and succeeded in dislodging the Barrios Cabinet after the latter had been in office for only a few hours; the present Cabinet, instead of seeking to compromise, decided to proceed with the struggle, and thereby incurred one of the heaviest responsibilities in the whole of Spanish history.

In view of this *fait accompli*, every Spaniard is under the necessity of choosing one of two parties: that of the Communists or that of the Nationalists led by Generals Franco and Mola. It must be realised that if the parties of the Left win, the upshot will be a Communist dictatorship, which in the Iberian Peninsula cannot be expected to be as constructive as it may have been elsewhere, and will assuredly degenerate

into anarchy. Should the army be divided and thereby defeated, there is no doubt that the armed proletariat supporting the Government will claim the right to take government into their own hands. And even already they have up to a point succeeded in imposing their will, since the safe-conducts granted by the authorities of Madrid and Barcelona must be countersigned by one of the Communist or Anarcho-Syndicalist associations. It is quite sure that the C.N.T. (National Federation of Workers), the U.G.T. (General Union of Workers), the F.A.I. (Iberian Anarchist Federation), and all those Marxist bodies which, it must be admitted, have given proofs of great courage, will never consent to part with the arms and ammunition that have been indiscriminately handed out to them; and it goes without saying that they will never acquiesce in any form of government that is even remotely *bourgeois*, nor will they tolerate any (for them) retrograde movement on the part of a Legislature which within a few weeks has hastily granted them concessions which it is impossible to justify.

That the Republic in existence before July 19 is now a thing of the past is clearly indicated by *La Solidaridad Obrera*, the Anarcho-Syndicalist organ, in its issue of August 10:

> We are alive to the danger that military officers who have served in our professional armies may attempt to retain their former prerogatives and privileges. A direct and effective check must be maintained upon their activities. By the side of the officer there must always be a worker. *The officers must recognise that the Spain of before July 19 no longer exists.* They must identify themselves with the people in arms, with the workers.

Those who imagine that the triumph of the Madrid Government would result in something else than Communism should meditate on these words. The triumph of the party led by Generals Franco and Mola would, of course, also issue in a dictatorship; the exact character of this latter dictatorship it is not easy to define beforehand, but it would assuredly be national and constructive, and its chief aim would be to inculcate order, industry, discipline, mutual respect, and, of course, the necessary provision for the needs of the lower classes.

It is frequently said in the newspapers of all countries that the partisans of the National Movement are Spanish

Fascists. But this is not true. Behind the Government of Burgos are ranged:

(1) Almost all Republicans who have a love for order.
(2) The Monarchists.
(3) The great majority of those who identify themselves with neither political extreme.

None of these elements can be regarded as having accepted the political creed of Italy or of Germany; they desire neither Fascism nor National-Socialism.

But, as already indicated, from the fact that the National Movement is not Fascist of its nature, it does not follow that its success would not result in a dictatorship. It must be admitted that liberal and democratic government will not be possible for a long time to come in Spain. The hatred of one side for the other is so great, so much blood has been shed, that inevitably a *régime* of force will be imposed by the victors.

This is a hard truth, but it is a truth all the same. The fact is that the Spaniards were not ready for democracy, and so the present civil war cannot be expected to produce anything of the sort. If ever, when the bitterness and hatred of to-day are forgotten, a better state of things be possible, then assuredly the way to it lies through the success of General Franco's forces; for, owing to the stress of circumstances, there are on General Franco's side many Spaniards who admire the English parliamentary system and for a long time past would have liked to see it established in Spain; and these men may be counted upon to make their influence tell.

The present National Movement directed by General Franco is supported by a large section of the civil population, especially in the north of Spain, a fact to which all foreigners testify who have lately visited Burgos, Pamplona, Valladolid and other towns in which conditions appear to be normal.[1] Now this well-supported National Movement is not the first revolt in recent years against the Government of Madrid. In October 1934 the mining population of the Asturias, controlled and secretly armed by the political

[1] *The Times*, August 11, 1936: 'News has been received in London from the British Consul at Vigo that the staff and students of the English College at Valladolid are safe, and do not desire to leave.'

parties constituting the *Frente Popular*, rose against the then Government of Madrid for no other reason than that this Government was of a Conservative complexion, although it was strictly constitutional and had behind it a solid majority in Parliament. In other words, what is to-day condemned in Madrid as a treasonable attempt to overthrow the constitutional power in no wise differs from what took place in 1934 under the direction of those who are in power to-day. No; there is a difference between the two cases: the forces which are to-day fighting to save Spain from Communism were able in 1934, in their governmental capacity, to gain control over the situation in a few days. Whereas those who then led the Communist revolt in the Asturias are to-day, now that they have command of the resources of Government, unable to cope with General Franco's movement, to protect the lives of foreigners, and to suppress rioting and looting in the towns where their writ runs. The artistic treasures of the country are being destroyed wholesale. The seizure of private property, moratoria, non-payment of rents, concentration camps and other tyrannical measures have been authorised by the Madrid Government.

There can be no doubt that a Communist or Anarchist *régime* in Spain would have repercussions in other parts of Europe. The Communists, if successful, would try to establish their influence in Portugal, a country of race and culture similar to those of Spain, and this might lead to a war between the two countries. Spanish Morocco also would become a centre of Communist propaganda, and there is no saying to what distance the latter might spread into Africa. Besides, communistic activity, running wild in Spanish Morocco, would hardly be conducive to peace in Europe. Once it had divided the army in Spain itself, Spanish influence abroad would begin to crumble. An army of occupation is not a thing that can be built up in twenty-four hours. Even such an authority as Pertinax, in his admirable article on Spain published in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, doubts whether a Government dominated by popular committees, and unable to exercise control over one-half of the Spanish people, would be equal to the task of defending and keeping Morocco and the Balearic and Canary Islands.

Generals Franco and Mola have categorically denied

that they have come to an understanding with any foreign Power in respect of the Balearic Islands and Morocco; and yet certain journals still persist in speaking as if an engagement of this sort had been entered into. This is manifestly nothing more than a manœuvre designed to do harm to the Nationalist cause. It is simply unthinkable that the leaders of a movement whose objective is national unity and the political, economic, and moral reconstruction of the country should begin by making territorial concessions. Any such step would involve immediate loss of prestige to, and a consequent weakening and collapse of, any Government that ventured to resort to it; and it is preposterous to suppose that those who to-day are risking their lives to acquire power would engage in clandestine understandings which they as well as anybody realise would very soon lead to their downfall.

What will be the foreign policy of Spain if General Franco's forces are victorious? It may be taken for granted that it will follow the traditional lines determined by the temperament and affinities of the Spanish people as well as by the geographical situation of the country: in particular, a close friendship with the sister nation Portugal, and a sympathetic attitude towards France and England. As regards this latter point, it must not be forgotten that economically Spain is largely dependent upon these two countries; England is by far the best of her commercial customers.

It is frequently said in the Press, and especially in the English Press, that the Government party is at least a constitutional party, and thus no small amount of sympathy is won for them. In view of this, it is well to point out that this constitutional party has already violated no less than fourteen articles of the Constitution. A general statement of this kind may be taken to be more rhetorical than veracious; let us therefore give a very summary list of the articles that have been infringed:

Article 1 enacts that the colour of the flag shall be red, yellow and violet. The Government authorities allow and even prescribe the display of the Red flag on public buildings and on warships.

Article 28 enacts that citizens can be condemned only by duly competent tribunals. Generals and others have been tried and condemned to death by tribunals which, it could be shown, are not legally composed.

Article 29 enacts that a citizen may be arrested and imprisoned only in certain conditions and in accordance with certain procedure. In thousands of cases this enactment has been ignored.

Article 31 accords every Spaniard freedom of movement and ensures the inviolability of his domicile. The Government has put a strict embargo on the movement of individuals, and it is a common occurrence for houses to be entered and searched without any due legal formality.

Article 34 accords freedom of expression to all Spaniards. The Government has suppressed freedom of expression, including, of course, that of the Press.

Article 38 accords the right to hold meetings. The Government has suppressed this right.

Article 39 accords the right of association. This right has likewise been suppressed.

Article 41 guarantees security of employment to State officials quite independently of their political opinions. The Government is dismissing (and in many cases killing) all public servants whose political opinions can be considered heterodox.

Article 42 enacts that the aforementioned civil rights may be suspended during 'a state of alarm.' But it is also enacted that this state of alarm must be renewed by Parliament every thirty days; if Parliament happens to be in recess, the Government must convene it within a week at the outside to carry out the renewal. Now, the last renewal of the state of alarm took place on July 1; it was therefore due for renewal on August 1; but the Government, instead of convening Parliament on that date or within the ensuing week, declared it to be suspended until October. Hence the suspension of the civil rights in question has become unconstitutional.

Article 44 enacts that *in no case* shall the property of a citizen be confiscated. This enactment has been violated on a grand scale.

(It is true that, upon payment of a commensurate indemnity, private property may pass into the hands of the State should considerations of national utility demand it. But this reservation does not apply in any of the cases that have occurred.)

Article 45 enacts that the artistic productions of the country are under the protection of the State. The present Government is not proving an efficient protector of the architectural and other treasures of the country.

Article 75 enacts that only the President of the Republic can delegate power. But the Government itself has set up a junta in Eastern Spain; nothing in the Constitution can be found to justify this measure.

Articles 114 and 117 have to do with finance, and here again it would be easy to show that the Constitution has been infringed.

All this being so, it may very pertinently be asked whether

this 'constitutional' Government is so very constitutional after all.

We have already referred to the Communist character of the forces on the Government side, and this is a point that should be insisted on, especially as it is so often affirmed in England that the Government party cannot accurately be described as a Communist one. It might be argued that the French *Front Populaire* is not essentially or predominantly Communist. But this is not true of the Spanish *Frente Popular*; one must not be misled by the identity of the two party labels. The Socialists headed by Señor Largo Caballero, which are the most numerous section of the *Frente Popular*, take their orders from Moscow, and on several occasions they have declared that they intend to impose, by force if necessary, a dictatorship of the proletariat. I do not say that this is the aim of the other elements composing the *Frente Popular*, but in alliances of this kind it is usually the more numerous section which secures ascendancy. There is another consideration which makes the *Frente Popular* a very different thing from the *Front Populaire*: Frenchmen of all parties are constantly alive to the menace of dangers from across the frontier, and this produces a very strong feeling of patriotism that overrides all internal political divisions; Spain, on the other hand, is threatened by no peril from outside, and thus in her case political dissensions give way to no more imperative feeling such as might help to unite the country. No barrier therefore is interposed between the *Frente Popular* and Moscow.

A play by Alejandro Casona was recently being performed in one of the Madrid theatres. It was Communist in tendency, and every night groups of workers among the spectators raised the cry, 'Hurrah for Moscow and down with Spain.' The slogan of General Franco's forces is, 'Long live Spain.' That of the Government militias is, 'Long live Russia.'

Should the Government party be successful, their foreign policy will not be dictated by national interests; on the contrary, it will unquestionably be international in its scope, it will seek to serve the cause of world revolution. Its aim would be to make Spain the advance guard of Russia in

Europe (as already indicated, the Red flag floats over both public and private buildings in Madrid, Barcelona and other large towns), and a bridge by which Communism might cross to Africa and America. In the early years of the Republican *régime* the Governments of the Left gave their aid to those forces in Portugal which were seeking to overthrow Dr. Salazar's Government in Lisbon, and there is no need to insist upon the significance of this.

Spain then intervened in the domestic dissensions of Portugal, and this leads to the question as to what should be the attitude of the other Powers towards Spain itself. I should say that an attitude of absolute neutrality would be best, provided always that it be strictly observed in practice no less than in theory. (Every day, it may here be mentioned, French trains cross the Spanish frontier near Port-Bou loaded with materials, which may be politely termed suspect, consigned to Barcelona and the capital. And yet France chafes at the delay of other Powers in responding to her invitation to join in a policy of non-intervention.) Why is the attitude of absolute neutrality the wisest? Here we return once again to our main point: the present civil war in Spain is not, as were the nineteenth-century Carlist wars, for instance, a purely national struggle confined to Spain itself. It is really a clash between Marxism and anti-Marxism, it is a collision between forces that are international in their scope and range. Any departure from neutrality therefore might only precipitate a war between these two forces with all Europe for its theatre, which it is the duty of every statesman to prevent.

ENGLAND SINCE 1935[1]

By Douglas Jerrold

During the last eighteen months the National Government has fought and won an election, and has fought and lost the most important diplomatic struggle in European history since the War of the Spanish Succession. Some of the accompanying consequences of our defeat have been the reoccupation by Germany of the Rhineland; the public assertion by Russia of her 'rights' in Outer Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan; the destruction of the Locarno treaties; a close *rapprochement* between France and Russia; the renewal of Japanese pressure on China; the closing of the Dardanelles to British warships, and the establishment of Italy as an imperial power on the flank of our Eastern communications. I said in my book *England*, published before the Abyssinian crisis, that the League of Nations was, as a political instrument for the appeasement and settlement of international affairs, dead. We have since paid the highest price ever wrung without bloodshed from a great Power for our failure to realise this truth.

The bitterness of the price is not lessened by the growing belief in many quarters that our folly was not even disinterested. It is being said, for instance, by many who claim to be in touch with eminent politicians, that we never regarded the League machinery of enforcement as practically valuable; that we were advised that Italy must fail in her endeavour to conquer Abyssinia for financial and military reasons, and that the formal application of sanctions was a gesture designed to insure that this inevitable failure should be ascribed, when it occurred, to Geneva, and so bring a humble and nervous Germany back under Anglo-French political control. On yet another view, for which there is more evidence, and which is popular in naval and military circles, we were never interested keenly either in the prestige of the League or the

[1] In May 1936 we published "Peace through Effective Defence," by Sir Norman Angell. This article deals with current policies from the opposite point of view.—Ed.

fate of Abyssinia—already signed away in half a dozen treaties and doomed, even under the League's own proposals, to forfeit, if not the status, at any rate the realities, of independence. We were, however, fearful of a threat to Egypt, had evidence in our possession that such a threat was not only contemplated in certain contingencies, but was actually prepared, and were determined, if it eventuated, to have behind us in resisting it whatever political and military assistance the League might be able to provide. There is yet a fourth view, widely held in Germany. The application of sanctions, the stirring up of world opinion, the provisional naval and military engagements entered into, were not seriously directed against Italy, but were in the nature of an experimental mobilisation, with Germany, and not Italy, as the ultimate victim.

There is no doubt some measure of truth in all these 'explanations'—mixed with much malicious exaggeration. They are, however, principally important because they are sincerely believed to-day by very many people all over the world. In fact, with one notable exception, there is no nation in Europe, probably no nation in the world, which, after these events, believes without qualification in our good faith. The exception is, of course, Hitler's Germany, and even there, perhaps, the wish for our friendship is father to the kindly estimate of our good intentions.

The factor which most decided our action in the summer of 1935 was, in reality, neither fear of Italy nor enthusiasm for the slave-owning oligarchy at Addis Ababa, nor yet fear of Germany. It was Mr. Baldwin's fear of the League of Nations Union, aroused by the results of the Peace Ballot, and confirmed by the declared intention of Lord Cecil to keep his Ballot organisation in being until the General Election, so that it could be thrown against any Government not considered by the high priesthood of Geneva to be absolute in its loyalty to the new covenant of blood. When the painless sentences of the historian come to be passed on our much-misguided generation, it is on the too-intelligent and enthusiastic organisers of the Peace Ballot that they will fall most severely. The Peace Balloteers alone had not misread the signs of the times. They had seen the League system crumbling, and knew that it could be saved only by

the ruthless threat to use unlimited force as an instrument of its policy. They saw the means as clearly as they willed the end, which was nothing less than the destruction, by and through the League system, of the new and powerful Fascist system which was threatening to drive middle-class parliamentarianism off the world stage as completely as middle-class parliamentarianism itself had swept away the splendid but decaying fabric of the *ancien régime*.

How real was the danger with which the Government felt itself threatened, not only before the election, when it first began to frame its policy against a background of menacing military preparations, but after it, when it humiliated itself in the eyes of the whole world by withdrawing its support of the Hoare–Laval peace proposals? It is hard to say. The Government has in turn blustered amid applause and run away amid cries of derision; blustered again, amid modified applause, and run away again, amid a dead silence which would defy analysis but for the results of a number of bye-elections. These show a steady fall in the volume of positive support for the Government, but also a positively astonishing absence of enthusiasm for the alternative Government of the Left, which has actually, in one or two important constituencies, polled less than at the last election and in one case less than in the landslide of 1931.

We shall conclude, if we have any realism left, that, at the very best, the war policy of the League of Nations Union would have commanded, and will command to-morrow, only the support of that body of irreconcilable Left-wingers who voted Labour in 1931, *less* those Left-wingers who follow Lord Ponsonby and are opposed to war in all circumstances, *plus* a much smaller minority of Conservatives who are in reality Socialists, but prefer to operate under the banner of 'national and international planning.' The catastrophic decline in the popularity of the Government is due to the fact that the great majority of the country are puzzled and despairing. They are being led neither to support the League system, nor towards a defined policy of League reform, nor yet towards a policy of isolation. They are simply being asked to give to a Government, which admittedly has no policy, a blank cheque to pledge their fortunes and their lives in whatever cause may, to-day or to-morrow, appear good to

whoever, to-day or to-morrow, may happen to be Foreign Secretary. A famous journalist was sent for, only a few weeks ago, to lunch with a distinguished Cabinet Minister. Would he use his incomparable powers of persuasion to urge all able-bodied men to join some branch of the Fighting Services? 'To fight for France?' asked the journalist. 'If so, I must refuse.' There was no rejoinder from his host. He was simply unable to say, one way or the other. Not thus are the foundations of victory laid.

So long as this state of affairs lasts there is the gravest possible menace to the peace of the world, and the certainty of ultimate ruin to British interests. The fundamentals of the situation stand to-day as they stood clearly recognisable eighteen months ago. Indeed, they have been forcibly and dramatically corroborated by events. I wrote eighteen months ago that the United States would, in no circumstances, co-operate in any attempt to defend, by military, financial or even purely diplomatic pressure, the Geneva system. I added that we should find that we could not 'afford to stay in the game of European diplomacy without the support of the United States without far heavier armaments than we require' for our legitimate purposes of defence.[1] Unfortunately, my prophecy that the enthusiasm of the pacifists for aggressive political manœuvres would wane has yet to be fulfilled. The issue is still open, and as long as it is open, peace is in the balance. We have not yet reached the point of deciding openly and honourably to return to the path of sanity in occupying ourselves, for a generation at least, with the effective discharge of our Imperial responsibilities.

What of our action to-day? Is rearmament a step towards isolation, or a move towards an armed coalition? And, if the latter, are we proposing to use the League as an instrument against Germany, or to fight Germany to restore the prestige of the League? The answer to this formidable question, on which the whole future of Western civilisation depends, is that we do not know, and that most of us do not care. Ignorance and indifference are bad weapons in the day of battle.

Two things we must learn quickly if we are to avoid disaster. No coalition of Powers can prevent indefinitely substantial changes in the relations of Powers and in the

[1] See *England*, pp. 160 *et seq.*

boundaries of States; and there is no hope for the League, as at present constituted, being accepted as the arbiter of these changes.

The English, of all peoples, are perhaps the most inured to change. We have, of all peoples, the least excuse for not seeing its inevitability and, in the political sphere, its essential advantages. We have seen so much change; we have watched empires come and go; we have suffered rebellion, revolution and reform in swift measure, yet without losing the continuity of our history or the integrity of our character. As recently as 1926 we saw the major part of our Colonial Empire turn into a Commonwealth; we are engaged to-day in turning our Indian Empire into a Dominion, and our protectorate in Egypt into an alliance. These sweeping changes of relationships determined by centuries of history, changes affecting all the continents of the world and all peoples and creeds, have been proved necessary, so we say, within the brief span of a young man's life. How fantastic, then, is our assertion that the frontiers drawn by and the relations derived from the Versailles Treaties, made hastily by amateur diplomatists a bare eighteen years ago, have or should have any quality of permanence. And how much more irrational to suppose that we, who reserved from the jurisdiction of Geneva the affairs of four-fifths of Africa, a third of Asia, the whole of Australia and a quarter of America, can be accepted by the rest of the world as the honest and enthusiastic champions of the principle of the exclusive regulation of world affairs by Geneva?

But there is more in it than that. The very ideas of Geneva are suspect to many able and disinterested people all over the world. Even if the League, while proclaiming the sacro-sanctity of treaties, had not connived at the progressive breaches of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles; even if the victorious Powers, who put on their banners 'no annexations' and 'no indemnities,' had not perjured themselves in the eyes of the whole world by the subterfuge of 'mandates' and 'reparations'; even if everything at Geneva had been honestly for the best, would the League world have been the best of all possible worlds?

This is not a question which can be discussed in a short preface. What is essential to remember is that it is a question

which is being discussed in every capital in Europe—not merely in Rome and Berlin. We may easily accept the desirability of the rule of law in our domestic affairs, and excuse the inevitable injustices and anomalies which any system of law involves, with a shrug of the shoulders: 'hard cases make bad laws.' But are not the questions with which international politics are concerned *all* 'hard cases' by their very nature? Again, even in our domestic affairs, conscience is supreme against law, not by consent of the law, but in despite of it. The moral right to refuse to pay taxes, the moral right to refuse conformity, has been asserted again and again by Englishmen of candour and character throughout our history. In international affairs, are not almost all the problems which arise cases of conscience—cases where the existing framework of international society infringes, or is regarded as infringing, inalienable rights of religious, racial or social well-being, or even of common humanity? If therefore it were, or ever became, within the sphere of practical politics to set up and enforce a code of law for settling all international disputes, is it likely, or even possible, that such a procedure would make for the health and progress of mankind? What would the world be like to-day if for seven centuries it had been governed by the Feudal Code—the last and most workmanlike experiment in super-national government? And are we really so much wiser than the men of those majestic twelfth and thirteenth centuries who, for all their roughness and arrogance, laid the foundations of the modern world? And if we could lightly dispose of these questions, are we really satisfied that the men of Geneva are the stuff we need for what would be the most stupendous task ever imposed on man? It would be nothing less than the organisation and government of the world—a task which neither Cæsar nor Alexander ever attempted. Is Professor Gilbert Murray really at all likely to succeed, even with Professor Noel Baker at his elbow, and all the writings of Mr. H. G. Wells on his desk?

We must not be afraid, in these matters, of raising the personal issue. It is the characteristic evasion of the new aristocracy of the pen and the desk that it talks always in terms of organisation, never in terms of men. Simpler people should be better advised. Political democracy has many

graces and even a few advantages, but it does not bring to the conduct of affairs men of the calibre of Cæsar and Alexander, or even of Stalin and Hitler, Mussolini and Mustapha Kemal. Four great peoples have been in our lifetime brought to the threshold of a new political destiny by sincere, supremely intelligent and ruthless men. Such things are possible. But we, of all people the most intensely and conscientiously, detest the methods and the men through which, and through which alone, these things have been made possible. It would need the scourge of an Attila, the inspired ruthlessness of a Torquemada, and the mercilessness of a Napoleon to achieve the proposed world organisation, within any measurable span of years, in face of the desires, the passions, the consciences and the prejudices of every race, every creed and every nation, not by any means excluding our own. We may find the scourge close upon us; but shall we really welcome it, when it comes, as the sign of a new freedom? Have we not seen with our own eyes, and only a few weeks ago, that nothing less than a world war ravaging three continents would have settled the Italo-Abyssinian dispute on lines acceptable to the League of Nations Union. And where, at the end of it all, would the Lion of Judah have found his rest? Certainly not on the throne of Ethiopia, nor yet in the greater comfort of a first-class cosmopolitan hotel. Thrones and hotels would have crashed together, in one stupendous catastrophe. Yet the scourge, which might provoke this catastrophe in real earnest, is still abroad in the land.

Of all contemporary infamies that kind of bloodthirsty vanity which walks behind the banner of 'the indivisibility of peace' is the most base. Hurt desperately in their vanity, greedy of power, pitiless in their disregard for human life, blaspheming the cause of peace and degrading some of the noblest human ideals to the service of their ridiculous pretensions, these shop-soiled idealogues will plunge Europe into war unless the people of England themselves determine to challenge them and to put them to flight. It is impossible to open a newspaper to-day without seeing an article by a middle-aged professor asking us to take the risk of war (which means the certainty of war, as they very well know and as some of them even admit) to preserve the 'system' which, in its brief years of activity, has brought the world to the very

edge of catastrophe. Why? Because that system is designed to extend until it makes the whole world the province for the muddling and mischief-making of the new privileged class—the professors, the lawyers and the bureaucrats—until, in its ultimate apotheosis, the whole world is governed by clerks.

The clerks will not, of course, get their war openly and in their own name. They do not work in the open. They will get it, unless we take much more care than we are taking to-day, under cover of fighting 'the German menace' and making (once again) the world safe for democracy. What happens to democracy in the process? Let us look at Spain and see. Once open Pandora's box and loose the whirlwinds, and there will be only two camps in Europe and only two armies, and between them there will be a war of extermination. Already the official Opposition of the country, so anxious to fight for 'democracy,' has announced that it will not fight for the democratically-elected Government of this country, though it wishes us to supply arms to the Communist *Camorra* who have displaced the democratically-elected Government of Spain. In the words of Our Lord on the Cross, 'If they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?'

But what of Germany? What of her vast armaments, her expenditure without parallel in the history of any country at peace? The answer, as it seems to me, is clear. Germany is not at peace. Germany believes, with Lenin, that the forces of world revolution will operate from the East and from the West against the centre—first Russia, then Spain, then France adhering to the revolution and moving across Europe to crush the hard core of German resistance. We did not believe this, and if the army triumphs in Spain we may even continue not to believe it. But Germany believes it. What Germany does not believe is that the united forces of France, Russia, and the British Empire are sincerely frightened of her own armaments. She does not believe that the French and Russian armaments, at any rate, are defensive. And she is not prepared to leave out of account the armies of the Little Entente as her potential enemies. She sees in the manœuvres of Geneva, and particularly in M. Litvinoff's outspoken (and, in the circumstances, surprisingly honest)

plea for a League war, not only on aggressors but on potential aggressors, a clear threat to use the League as the instrument of the aggressively disruptive forces of revolution.

Is this view nothing more than a fantastic effort at self-deception, masking, consciously or unconsciously, the desire to promote a world counter-revolution under German leadership? That is the question which Englishmen are asking themselves to-day, but hardly pausing to wait for an answer. They prefer to throng the Russian Embassy receptions and to throw themselves trustingly into the arms of the three Marx Brothers of the European stage—M. Blum, M. Litvinoff and Dr. Benesh.

Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget. . . .

Is it not time that we asked ourselves, more seriously, whether the world revolutionary movement is, or is not, a fact? If it is a delusion—and the Duchess of Atholl has just informed us that there was, and is, no danger of Communism in Germany—then it is, of course, clear that Germany in her feverish anxiety is, at best, deluded about nothing, and, at worst, engaged in a conscious deception which can hardly be well-intentioned.

But is the world revolutionary movement a delusion? The *New Statesman* announced proudly a few months ago that the Communist organisation was still in being in Germany, and gave full and (to its readers) satisfying proofs of its vitality. Spain has been under the hammer and sickle, not since, but for some months before, the army revolt which was led, not by Monarchists or by Fascists, but by soldiers who had loyally supported the parliamentary democratic machine set up by the first revolution. The aims of the Communist wing of the French 'Popular Front' have been clearly set out in M. Thorez's book, of which the authorised, not to say canonised, edition has been published for the edification of the members of Mr. Gollancz's Left-wing Book Club. Moscow has no doubt that it is her cause which is at issue in Spain and in Greece, and which is going to be brought to an issue in France. What is the instrument through which the gigantic task of forcible conversion is to be achieved?

There is one possible instrument, and one only, and that is a new world war. Everyone with any common sense has

said for years that the next world war will mean the end of civilisation as we in Western Europe know it. We have said it so often that it has come to be regarded as a piece of politician's fustian. It is time to consider whether it may not, after all, be true. Do not let us be so cynical as to disbelieve it merely because it has found its way into Mr. Baldwin's stock peroration. And if it is indeed true, what more certain than that the desire for world peace of the confessed and perfectly sincere advocates of the Communist revolution is unlikely to be deep-seated, or, *au fond*, sincere? I am putting Germany's case. Is it a transparently bad case? Is it a case which can be brushed aside as inherently absurd? I do not think so, and I do not think that many of my fellow-countrymen will think it so, once they have brought themselves to study it. Let them start, I pray them, before it is too late.

That there are hot-heads in Germany who would like to fight the last war over again is psychologically inevitable. All the evidence, however, shows that these hot-heads are in an inconsiderable minority. But with every move towards an armed encirclement of Germany, accompanied by an aggressively concerted effort at political pressure on her Government, the number of those who cry out for a war against her late enemies must increase, and the fact that the German Government is powerfully armed must make their agitation, if it ever arises, extremely dangerous to peace. Yet the danger from this source is as nothing to the danger to peace which is threatened from our own country by that crusade against 'the German menace' which unites the Communists, the Liberal ideologues and the Colonel Blimps in a suicidal alliance. The motives of the first two groups are clear enough: the Communists want to spread Communism and to destroy Fascism, and they reckon (probably rightly) that a world war would do both. The Liberal ideologues want to create and fortify in perpetuity a world political system under the permanent control of Liberal professors, and they reckon (of course wrongly) that another world war would produce that Liberal revival which has been so sadly lacking since the golden summer of 1906.

The attitude of those numerically few but unhappily influential Conservatives who share in the desperate crusade against the 'German menace' it is less easy but more important

to understand. There is, of course, a genuine and passionate belief in the virtues of parliamentary institutions and the inherent evils of dictatorship: the same kind of hysteria which led to the outcry to 'hang the Kaiser' leads to-day to the outcry against the 'German menace.' It is perhaps difficult for people who are not professional politicians to realise that the minds of that small but powerful oligarchy are genuinely unassailed by the doubts universally felt elsewhere as to their capacity for leadership in these difficult times. Still more difficult is it for plain people like ourselves to realise that men who call themselves Conservatives or Liberals can get so imbued with the virus of political collectivism that the Socialist-Communist Government of France and the Communist dictatorship of Russia seem relatively inoffensive to many parliamentarians by comparison with the German and Italian systems. Sub-consciously perhaps, but in a very real measure, they identify Socialism with progress, and progress —'catching the bus'—is the god of democracy.

Collectivism, moreover, appears to be, even to many who dislike it, the only remaining chance for the political classes. It is a system which, conceivably, they might operate. Fascism, on the contrary, is, in its essence, not a creed, nor a policy, but an anti-political revolt. It would, the professors realise, sweep them away, not with hostility, not with ignominy, but out of sheer necessity. The authoritarian State requires for its direction and its administration men of a very different stamp. Finally—and here we must return again to personal issues—it is not without significance that the 'German menace' has assumed immense importance in Downing Street since the failure of the Government's foreign policy. Proverbially, it is a weak and not a strong Government that makes war. It was not from the security of Paris and Berlin, but from the nervous insecurity of Vienna and St. Petersburg, that the fatal moves were begun which led to the disaster of August 1914.

Behind all these influences making for hostility to Germany among the political classes lies the reality of German colonial ambitions and German ruthlessness. This great Power, resurgent and armed, spiritually proud, physically potent, economically insecure, presents a problem. No one should deny its reality. Men of resolution and courage can

settle their differences and adjust their relations in peace and dignity. But can Mr. Eden negotiate, except on his knees, with Herr Hitler? Always we are driven back on the personal equation. The lack of balance in this equation lies at the root of much of the world's sickness to-day.

The complication of these cross-currents affects gravely that 'public opinion' on which democratic Governments depend. No one wishes for war; no one seriously accepts the lurid Churchillian picture of a Germany seeking the destruction by force of the great British and French democracies. But there is abroad a spirit of uneasiness, of puzzledom, of frustration, which leads very many to see in an anti-German war the best issue from our present ignominious position. Such a war, people are saying, will at least reunite Labour and Conservative opinion, will make the National Government a reality, will restore our friendship with France, will settle the unemployment problem. And if people, reasoning in this insane but apparently satisfying manner, pause for a moment at the dictates of conscience, they will easily persuade themselves that, anyhow, 'the war has got to come sometime.'

So the menace grows. Not the 'German menace,' but the British menace. It is *we* who hold the keys of peace; *we* who can unleash the dogs of war? *We, not Herr Hitler nor Signor Mussolini. We, and we alone, are the arbiters of the fate of Western civilisation*, for which men have died so willingly in the belief that we at least could be trusted to be worthy heirs to their fidelity. 'If blood be the price of Admiralty, Lord God, we have paid in full.' Yes, we have paid; but are we likely to receive from one of our so-called leaders the courage, the resolution, and the candour for which we have sacrificed so much? Are we sure, indeed, that we have not been already betrayed? Was the shambles of Ekaterinburg not merely an end, but also a beginning? Are the same forces, which dared not, for fear of a little parliamentary difficulty, offer the Tsar an asylum, preparing to-day, to ease other little parliamentary difficulties, to place the British Fleet and Army at the disposal of the Tsar's murderers? Easy to say that it would never be tolerated. The British public, once the game is afoot, will not be allowed the materials on which to formulate a judgment. What were Englishmen allowed to know of the facts of the

Ethiopian dispute and of our action in it? What will they be allowed to know of the next *casus belli* if it all works out according to Herr Hitler's fears and M. Litvinoff's plans?

But if we are not allowed to know, the rest of the world will. For a war of encirclement against Germany there will be no shred of support, not even diplomatic, let alone financial or military, from the United States, from Scandinavia, from Holland, from South America. That game is finished. If we go so far as to be a party to the work of destruction, we should have as our friends the enslaved forces of Communism, and nothing else in the world.

I return to the point where I began. I refuse to believe that we shall lend ourselves to these iniquitous schemings. I believe that we shall, even at the eleventh hour, return to sanity. I believe that we are right to arm ourselves, and to assert our absolute right to determine our own future in our own way. I believe that our future lies in reasserting our naval supremacy, in pursuing our legitimate task as an imperial people, in establishing, on a clear and sure basis of mutual tolerance and non-interference, an understanding between the four great Western European peoples, and in preserving behind a strong Fleet, and with some substantial modifications, our traditional free institutions. But if our institutions cannot be free without being weak, and cannot be preserved without ceasing to be free, if they have so little of that power of adaptation to new circumstances that they need the support of alien and disruptive forces to secure them against attack, then either our institutions or ourselves must pass from the stage of history. It will not be that we will pass; of that I am confident. But we shall only remain as a democracy if we begin now to understand the realities of our position and of the world around us; to seek no longer to teach the world, but to learn from it the secrets of forceful and vigorous growth, and, in so doing, to practise the humility which we have preached for so long. Only a people humble enough to learn can be proud enough to withstand undaunted the assaults of the enemy.

DOUGLAS JERROLD.

FRANCE AND THE EUROPEAN WELTER

By W. Walter Crotch

Danton was heard to ejaculate 'I leave the whole business in a frightful welter: not one of them understands anything of Government.'—Carlyle, *Fr. Rev.*, III, vi., 355.

Europe is again a maelstrom of discontent, for which France is largely responsible. The Austro-German agreement took the Quai d'Orsay by surprise. Conversations had been proceeding with varying success for about six months between Vienna, Berlin and Rome, but the French Foreign Office turned a deaf ear to all warnings and refused to believe that such a thing was possible: the news had a demoralising effect in Paris. The obstinate optimists of the Quai d'Orsay, however, decided that, though Herr Schuschnigg had bowed the knee to the Nazi Baal, there was no reason to suppose that Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini had really become associates or allies; indeed, they still believe that it is possible to prevent the Italo-German block from becoming a *fait accompli*. This belief, erroneous as it may be, is important because it is likely to determine French foreign policy for some time to come. French diplomats have become of late extremely responsive to 'bluff,' and in the past three years have meekly given away, again and again, to a German 'initiative.' When on March 7 this year the German generals marched their troops into the Rhineland, France did not react. Herr Hitler's audacious coup was a complete success. When England, rightly or wrongly, tried to induce the League of Nations to enforce sanctions, Signor Mussolini intimidated the French into delaying and intriguing the British move out of existence.

Were anyone to say this to one of the chief permanent officials of the French Foreign Office he would, as likely as not, refer to a report by General Gamelin, French Chief of Staff, on the subject of Italian armaments. He would probably

point out that France could not, in view of the state of things revealed in that report, incur the risk of a campaign upon a double front; in other words, against Germany and against Italy. He would perhaps stress the fact that Toulon, the French naval base, is within range of Italian guns and that it would be necessary to construct a new naval base somewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean. He would possibly direct attention to the fact that a hostile Italy means that the communications between France and North Africa, the great reservoir of troops and supplies, would be endangered. He would, perchance, crown his revelations by the remark that, whereas French aeroplanes are doubtless numerous enough to keep the German aircraft away from Paris, they could not at the same time keep the Italian aeroplanes from Marseilles. He would then presumably aver that, under these conditions, to offend Italy would be tantamount to suicide.

So far, so good. But this proposition has a corollary, namely, that, since Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini are travelling along parallel paths, we must not offend German susceptibilities. In other words, France must endure the many ills she cannot, or at least dare not, prevent, and must abstain from many measures which seem to be dictated by her national interests. M. Titulescu, for instance, is anxious to tighten up the somewhat loose arrangements between France and Roumania; he would prefer a definite alliance. But that would offend Italy, which has not forgiven M. Titulescu for his angry shout, 'Throw out those savages!' when Italian journalists jeered at their defeated foe in the Assembly of the League of Nations. Russia has been pressing for 'conversations' between the French and Russian General Staffs, holding that the sands are running out, and that if war is to come it had better be under conditions that promise victory rather than defeat. Then there is Poland. Whatever be the sympathies of her remarkable Minister for Foreign Affairs, her people have been deeply moved by Germany's latest coup in Danzig. The rearming of the Nazi S.A. and S.S. men into a regular army, modelled on the Reichswehr, the intended formation of regiments of infantry, batteries of artillery and squadrons of military aeroplanes, which will act in harmony with the East Prussian forces in Germany, were calculated to create anxiety both in Poland and in France.

But any French initiative at Geneva in this matter would offend Germany, so the Danzig coup passed off without comment. France turned the other cheek with a forbearance which looked like pusillanimity.

A ' Left ' administration which embarks upon big schemes of internal reforms always inclines to be weak in external affairs. The Blum Government has shown no signs, so far, of being an exception to this rule. M. Léon Blum's intentions are of the best; his maiden speech at Geneva was a fine piece of humanitarian oratory; but he can hardly be ranked as a specialist in foreign affairs, nor has M. Yvon Delbos, the Foreign Minister in the Front Populaire Government, ever claimed any knowledge at all in the sphere of foreign politics or diplomacy. The standpoint of the permanent officials at the Quai d'Orsay thus acquires a peculiar significance, which may be fraught with ill consequences for Europe. A Polish diplomat of note complained recently to a Frenchman that French sentiments towards his country appeared to have cooled so much that, as he put it, he had the feeling that Paris had become a refrigerator. The Frenchman retorted that this was hardly to be wondered at; though Poland and France were supposed to be allies, Colonel Beck seemed to be doing his utmost to convert Poland into an ally of Germany. The diplomat replied:

> I am not going to defend Colonel Beck. I will merely remind you, *en passant*, that when we wanted to rid ourselves of him some months ago, it was M. Pierre Laval, the French Premier, who implored us to retain him. Now we cannot get rid of him, however much we might desire it, without offending Germany. And we dare not offend Germany. Since Herr Hitler came into power, France has accepted, without more than a verbal protest, every *fait accompli* he has chosen to give us. In short, we cannot depend on France for help; we have therefore no alternative but to make what arrangements we can with Germany. And what we have been compelled recently to do, Prague, Belgrade and Bucarest will be forced to do to-morrow unless France shows that she is not a broken reed.

It was in these depressing circumstances that M. Léon Blum and M. Yvon Delbos went to London to meet their British and Belgian colleagues in July. They had been imbued with the fears and the optimism of their permanent officials, for fear in one direction invariably goes with undue optimism in another. The same people who tremble at the

thought of Hitler and Mussolini bask in the beatific sunshine of a roseate optimism in everything that concerns the allies and associates of France.

Poland [they say] will return to the fold when the hour of danger strikes; does she not possess even now a formal treaty with France? True, England may be left alone to extricate herself from the sanctions affair, but she will be at France's side when the guns commence to bark. As for the Little Entente, who could doubt the devotion to France of either M. Benesh or M. Titulescu? It is true that M. Laval rejected Turkey's offer of a mutual assistance pact, but Turkey will be there on the great day. One must not stress unduly Franco-Russian friendship lest Hitler take offence, but the friendship is there all the same, and, come what may, the powerful Red army is at the beck and call of France.

Such was the atmosphere of fond complacency with which the Quai d'Orsay had invested the French Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs before they left for the British metropolis.

It was the extremely able French Minister at Prague, M. Lacroix, who dispelled these day-dreams. It was known that the Czechoslovakian Premier, M. Hodja, had gone on the morrow of the Austro-German agreement to Vienna and, despite all official denials, had had one or more interviews with Chancellor Schuschnigg. It was even known that the latter had offered Prague a pact and had not disguised the fact that this pact was intended as a first step in the direction of Berlin. What was less well known was that M. Benesh had not only sent his Premier to Vienna, but had also despatched someone else to Berlin. This latter Czechoslovakian parliamentarian had, quite unofficially but none the less effectively, got into touch with the entourage of Herr Hitler. And M. Lacroix, of whom, as of Talleyrand, it may be said that '*sa police est bien faite*, forthwith went to M. Benesh, and in the most friendly fashion inquired what this gesture meant. And M. Benesh, somewhat embarrassed, shrugged his shoulders and said something that strangely resembled the words of the Polish diplomat whom I have already quoted. That information, which M. Lacroix promptly conveyed to M. Léon Blum, was sufficiently disturbing. But there was more to come.

The German plan in regard to Czechoslovakia began to outline itself. The terms of Herr Hitler's proposed pact

transpired. They were quite short terms, but weighty, comprising but two points. The first was that the German-speaking districts of Czechoslovakia must form an autonomous German State, in federal connexion with Prague. The second was that the Little Entente would be given a seat in the council of European Powers, to be composed of Germany, Italy, Great Britain, France and Poland, provided that Czechoslovakia and Roumania relinquished all conventions and arrangements with Russia.

M. Benesh indicated that these conditions could not even form the basis of discussion. Steps were taken to have this view conveyed unofficially to Berlin, and it is now a matter of conjecture whether Berlin will make its offer of a pact after all. The importance of Czechoslovakia for Herr Hitler at the present moment is great; he has undoubtedly been compelled by Germany's internal condition to accelerate the speed of his external policy. Whereas it formerly sufficed if he sprung a 'prestige surprise' upon a gasping world (and, what to him is of greater importance, upon his own people) once a year, he now has to do something of note every six months. These spectacular displays seem to become enforcedly more frequent.

Danzig was, after all, only half a triumph, for out of regard for Poland he had to be content to crush the Danzig opposition and abolish Danzig's liberties, but he could neither annex the city nor abrogate Poland's special privileges there. Another stirring and spectacular foreign success will soon become necessary. Where shall it take place?

Memel? Lithuania? Possibly. But there is a much more urgent affair, that of Czechoslovakia. Has not that little country dared to link itself up with the dread Soviet army? Has it not turned itself into a sort of gigantic aircraft carrier, from which thousands of Red aeroplanes may some day take off to spread bombs and propaganda leaflets over German cities? Has it not just secured from Roumania the concession to construct a strategic railway line across the Bukowina to link up her railways with that of Soviet Russia? Does she not stand like a formidable bastion in Germany's road, separating her from her Hungarian ally, blocking the way to that expansion southwards and south-eastwards, towards the Roumanian oilfields and the rich granaries of

the Danube, to Stambul and the Middle East? German day-dreams change but little whether a Kaiser or a Hitler sits in Berlin. But the far-seeing statesmen who direct Czechoslovakian foreign policy have concluded military alliances with Russia and with France, intimate conventions with Roumania and Yugoslavia, and arrangements of potential importance with the Balkan States. For Germany to attack Prague would be to rouse half Europe against her.

Yet, attack, weaken, and if possible obliterate, Czechoslovakia Hitler must. How, then, can it be achieved? There is a way round. That way is over Poland, over the ever-obedient Colonel Beck. The treaties of alliance with Russia and France only come into play in case of a German attack, because, at the time they were made, no other Power seemed to threaten Prague. The fatal policy of M. Laval and the hesitations of his successors have changed this aspect and outlook. Poland is now the enemy of Czechoslovakia because she has become the friend of Germany. Poland has her own quarrel with Prague over the Teschen territory, and only a few weeks ago a blunt Polish diplomat told a friend: 'One of these days we shall have to settle our differences with Czechoslovakia.'

That is the formidable vista that opened before the statesmen assembled at the London Conference.

The mild policy of the permanent officials of the Quai d'Orsay had clearly to be abandoned if France was to live. For, as a cynical French writer on foreign affairs put it: 'In the present state of Europe, war is unfortunately possible, but victory at a terrible price is probable. If we go on with our present course of weakness and humiliation, war will be inevitable and defeat probable.' M. Léon Blum was quick to grasp the significance of that observation; equally quick to alter the programme which he, inspired by his permanent officials, had come to London to proclaim. The discussions took a different turn from that anticipated. The *communiqué* issued at the close of the Conference was firmer in tone, the decisions less vague than had been expected. Why? Because Mr. Anthony Eden and M. Van Zeeland were overwhelmingly impressed with the disclosure which the French Premier was able to make.

What is the new policy? In outward form it does not

differ much from the old; where it does differ is in the spirit and the intention. M. Léon Blum is still passionately opposed to war, but he is a man of understanding as well as a man of ideals; no narrow-minded doctrinaire, but capable of practical common sense and tactical elasticity. His policy may be summed up as follows: Avoid everything that could provoke Germany or Italy to new breaches of international amenity; give them the opportunity to come in and pull their full weight in the European team, but take care not to sacrifice to this aim and end any of France's friendships; create in Prague, Budapest, Moscow the feeling and assurance that there are certain things that the friends of peace will not allow, and that if the Peace Front is there to defend Peace, it is also there to defend and uphold international decency and honour.

In short, it is the policy that M. Blum outlined in his Geneva utterance. The new factor is that whereas the Quai d'Orsay had tacitly abandoned that policy, M. Blum has now come back to it; and the difference is that whereas at Geneva it was but the exposition of an ideal, it is now a practical and concrete working plan.

Many hours had not elapsed after M. Blum's return to Paris before Spain became a test case. Before they started out on their attempt to reverse by bullets what ballots had achieved in Spain, the generals, it is alleged, had been careful to secure sympathy and support from abroad. That was not difficult in countries already Fascist or with large sections of the community with Fascist leanings. Herr Schleier, envoy-in-ordinary to Herr Alfred Rosenberg, Hitler's Foreign Minister Extraordinary, is understood to have journeyed to Spain, to Portugal, to Spanish Morocco. He had seen General Franco and General Sanjurgo. Other German intermediaries, notably Herr Bode, of Hamburg, had conferred with that mysterious Señor Juan March whose financial tentacles spread over all Europe, and provision had been made for an insurgent fund of five hundred million pesetas. The Generals, it appears, had no very clear notion of the kind of *régime* they would instal if they succeeded; it might be a monarchy, it might be a military junta, it might be a dictatorship. But they had one thing to which they were compelled to pledge themselves—to wit, a very definite foreign policy.

They had to give Germany an undertaking that Spain would leave the League of Nations and 'co-operate in a general way with the peace aims of the Reich'—an elastic phrase, capable of extension to the dread eventuality of war. A pro-German Government in Madrid means that, in case of war, four or five French army corps would be immobilised in the Pyrenees, whilst French communications with North Africa, already endangered by Italy, would be rendered impossible. All clear gains for Germany, which undertook, in return, to contribute to Franco's civil war funds and to apply pressure upon France if the French Government should attempt to assist the Spanish Republic. That, at least, is how the story runs.

There was nothing, of course, in international law to make help from France to Spain definitely illegal. Nothing can prevent a Government from selling or giving arms, munitions or aeroplanes to a friendly Government to assist it in crushing an insurrection—save the force and strength of its own public opinion. The thing has been done before in the course of history, and no one then seemed to be much concerned with any question of a 'breach of neutrality.' For civil war is not war within the meaning of international law. But there existed in France a very positive disinclination against any Government interference in the internal affairs of Spain, not because the masses were not in complete sympathy with the Spanish Front Popular Government which had been wantonly assailed, but because of the idealistic sentiment that all Spaniards are more or less brothers with the men born between the Pyrenees and the Garonne, and that for one of them to die under French bullets would be almost an act of fratricide. Gascons, Bearnais, Basques, whose infancy, in the words of M. François Mauriac, of the French Academy, was cradled in a mixture of Spanish patois and who have some Spanish blood in their veins, could not contemplate with equanimity the spectacle of Spaniards of any caste or rank falling victims to any excess of French sympathy with or hate of a particular form of political faith. A great outcry went up, accordingly, against any French intervention.

But there is little doubt that the sorely pressed Spanish Government did as a matter of fact ask France for aeroplanes, guns and ammunition, and that a number of the members

of the French Cabinet were, in principle, ready to acquiesce. The permanent officials of the Quai d'Orsay protested. M. Edouard Daladier, who, although a member of the Blum Administration, appears to be ever ready to put on the brake, supported the officials strongly. Moreover, this point of view derived considerable weight from the fact that it transpired that Germany and Italy were preparing to make a *démarche* in Paris.

M. Léon Blum settled the matter in masterly fashion. Through unofficial, but none the less powerful, channels he caused Berlin to be informed that France could not accept such a *démarche*, and could take no official cognisance of the German objection to assisting the Madrid Government. He then assembled his Cabinet and induced it to pass a resolution unanimously declining to furnish any arms of any kind to the Peninsula. That course was typical of Monsieur Blum tactics, such as he has followed many a time with conspicuous success in internal or home politics. Give up the shadow but keep a firm grip of the substance. He avoided offending Germany or Italy at a time when Paris and London were straining every nerve to bring Rome and Berlin to a European conference. But he also avoided depriving France of the possibility of helping Madrid should the necessity arise.

Project this minor incident upon the huge screen of European affairs. What does it connote? That France has given up the fatal policy of sabotaging her own friendships, that she will make every concession possible to avoid international complications, that she will give Germany and Italy—the two sole Powers, rightly or wrongly, suspected of endangering European peace—every opportunity of preserving their prestige, but that if they refuse all compromise, France, in close understanding with England, will set a limit beyond which concessions cannot be carried. The day that is accomplished, by a united front of peace-loving Powers, that day the menace of war will have diminished. And that is the best that any statesman can hope for to-day.

W. WALTER CROTCH.

MR. KEYNES AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

By A. L. Rowse

I

The present moment is a very exciting and important one in economic thought. It is a time of considerable disarray in that powerful body of opinion which has exercised such a tremendous public influence for over a century (since the time of Adam Smith in fact), and has hitherto displayed an almost unbroken front, along with an unparalleled self-complacency This disarray, this break-up of the former complacent and obtuse unity, is a sign which all who are concerned for the future of social and political thought in this country must welcome. Economics, as Mr. H. A. L. Fisher has recently reminded us, has something of the key-importance for politics to-day that theology had in the sixteenth century and earlier. We are all concerned in these issues, and it is important that the layman should understand their bearing, even if he does not appreciate all the technicalities of the subject or of the shorthand in which economists love to express themselves. Mr. Keynes recognises this, not least by publishing his new work, which should have cost 15*s*., at 5*s*.[1] It is chiefly addressed, he tells us, to his fellow-economists; but he hopes that it will be intelligible to others.

The disputes that at present rage, the disagreement that exists, should have a most beneficial and fertilising influence upon economics itself. Mr. Keynes describes his book as 'an attempt by an economist to bring to an issue the deep divergences of opinion between fellow economists which have for the time being almost destroyed the practical influence of economic theory, and will, until they are resolved, continue to do so.' If this were all, if it were only a question of divergences of opinion, the prestige of economics would not have

[1] *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (Macmillan).

taken anything like such a knock as it has done in the past few years; and, on the other hand, Mr. Keynes would be open to the reproach from his fellow-practitioners that he was only deepening the divergences, opening the ranks still further when they should be closed. But in fact he knows, no one better, that it is something more comprehensive than this which is responsible for the general lessening of respect in which the *ipse dixit* of the economist is held. There has been of late years a general trend among economists, led by what might be described as the London School, away from the real world of economic affairs. A certain scorn even that economists should concern themselves with 'realistic economics' breathes in the whole tone of the manifesto of this school, Professor Robbins's *Nature and Significance of Economic Science*. It is not to be wondered at that absurdities should have been perpetrated; like the translation, under their wing, of Ludwig Mises' *Die Gemeinwirtschaft*, which has a theoretical demonstration of the impossibility of any planned economy, in 500 pages, and no mention of the fact that in Soviet Russia a planned economy actually exists. How very German; how very foolish! Or there is Professor Gregory, who thinks that 'a planned society, as Professor Mises has abundantly shown, deprives itself of all those guides to rational conduct upon which the progress of economic life, in the last two centuries, has depended.' One does not need to multiply instances of this obtuseness; they are, alas, all too frequent. All one need do is to ask, if the economist's concern is not with the real world of economic matters, then what is it concerned with?—since we do not go to the economist for beauty, or grace, or æsthetic satisfaction, or love, or poetry.

Mr. Keynes is well aware of the root-cause of the loss of prestige that economic science has suffered: the unreality of mind of these (not all) economists, the persistent and even missionary doctrinairism entrenched in the academic teaching of the subject, the ostrich attitude towards men and affairs in the midst of most complex and critical issues. It needed an economist of Mr. Keynes's distinction, the most brilliant ornament of the science in this country, to say: 'It is astonishing what foolish things one can temporarily believe if one thinks too long alone, particularly in economics, where it is often impossible to bring one's ideas to a conclusive test

either formal or experimental.' He notes in case after case the discrepancy between the results of entrenched theory and the facts of observation: 'a discrepancy which the ordinary man has not failed to observe, with the result of his growing unwillingness to accord to economists that measure of respect which he gives to other groups of scientists whose theoretical results are confirmed by observation when they are applied to the facts.' Of the cleavage, frequent enough, between the conclusions of economic theory and of common sense he says: 'The extraordinary achievement of the classical theory was to overcome the beliefs of the "natural man" and, at the same time, to be wrong.' He recalls 'Bonar Law's mingled rage and perplexity in face of the economists, because they were denying what was obvious. He was deeply troubled for an explanation. One recurs to the sway of the classical school of economic theory and that of certain religions. For it is a far greater exercise of the potency of an idea to exercise the obvious than to introduce into men's common notions the recondite and the remote.'

Mr. Keynes means by the *classical* school, the orthodox economic theory which 'dominates the economic thought, both practical and theoretical, of the governing and academic classes of this generation, as it has for a hundred years past.' Its practical importance it is impossible to exaggerate. Since the time when Pitt was converted by reading Adam Smith, it has had an enormous influence in forming economic policy, through the universities which train the personnel of the Civil Service, through the formation of its own professional opinion, upon politics generally and (to a lesser extent) the conduct of banking and trade. If there is any body of intellectuals (usually of such little practical importance) which has had a deep influence upon policy and action, it has been the economists. It may be judged how significant the case is when the foremost economist in this country deliberately challenges the whole tradition of economic orthodoxy, levels his attack against the postulates upon which the imposing structure has been built up, and rejects its conclusions upon the main issues of current policy:

I shall argue that the postulates of the classical theory are applicable to a special case only and not to the general case, the situation which it assumes being a limiting point of the possible positions of equilibrium.

Moreover, the characteristics of the special case assumed by the classical theory happen not to be those of the economic society in which we actually live, with the result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of experience.

The conflict could not be more explicit, nor is it to be minimised.[2] Mr. Keynes has for some time been moving towards it, and now he has thrown over the orthodoxy in which he was brought up, which he knows at least as well as those exponents who remain in it, for he himself taught it for twenty years; and now no longer believes in it. In the Appendix on 'Mercantilism' he makes recantations of former opinions based on the old cocksure orthodoxy—such as that Protection could never increase employment, or that the attitude of the mediæval Church towards usury was inherently absurd—pages which remind one of nothing so much as the pages at the end of Newman's *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, in which he retracts all that he had formerly said against the Catholic Church. History has been dawning upon Mr. Keynes—with results that might be expected; the process has to go a little, but not much, further. His book, it is evident, is an event of the first importance: I should say it marks a revolution in economic thought, but for the reluctance to use an overworked word. Since economics is the chief English contribution to the intellectual life of Europe in the past hundred years, it is to be hoped that the clash of ideas will prove a fertilising one: it is certainly in this country that the battle is at its most exciting. But should an overthrow of the old embattled orthodoxy result, and a new economics emerge, it will be a matter of still greater practical importance; for it may well guide us to new departures in our economic policy, on our way to a new epoch in the life of the nation.

Mr. Keynes, then, after long wandering, has arrived at a position entirely opposed to the hitherto prevailing orthodoxy. And not only as regards the theory of Employment, Interest and Money, to which the title of his book specifically refers; there is hardly any aspect of economic theory, whether on wages, prices, the trade cycle, or tariffs, where he does not traverse the orthodox position and put forward what may be

[2] As, for example, Mr. H. D. Henderson was at some pains to do in his review in the *Spectator*, February 14, 1936.

described as the Opposition view. In more senses than one —since what constitutes the political importance of the book is that at every point, without a single exception, it is in full agreement with Labour policy in this country, and, what is even more significant, expresses in proper economic form what has been implicit in the Labour Movement's attitude all along. Here at last is an economist of the first rank—indeed one of the foremost economists in the world—underwriting the whole Labour position in these post-war years and proving us to have been substantially right. No wonder Mr. Cole, in a vociferous welcome, has acclaimed the book as 'the most important theoretical economic writing since Marx's *Capital*, or, if only classical economics is to be considered as comparable, since Ricardo's *Principles*.' Mr. Cole is justified; it is impossible to over-estimate the influence that this book will almost certainly exert in the future. It may be described as, for the first time in this country, laying the foundations of a Socialist economics.

To illustrate its complete justification of Labour policy, let us take its attitude on wages, in practical politics one of the most controversial issues, one which has been responsible for much of our industrial troubles since the war. We have already noticed the beginning of his divergence from orthodox opinion on this subject. 'The Classical Theory,' he says, 'has been accustomed to rest the supposedly self-adjusting character of the economic system on an assumed fluidity of money-wages; and when there is rigidity, to lay on this rigidity the blame of maladjustment.' How well we recognise, beneath the chaste academic language, the rough remedy of capitalists and capitalist economists alike for our prolonged industrial depression: Reduce wages—there is the cure for unemployment. Mr. Keynes recognises, as we all do, that there are certain circumstances in which a reduction in money-wages may afford a stimulus to output and consequently increase employment. But these circumstances are, in his view, exceptional ones, and to generalise from these that reducing wages will stimulate employment in all circumstances is quite unwarranted. For this view neglects to take into account the influence of the reduction upon demand; it assumes that demand will go on being what it was before. Whereas, in fact, the reduction sets up an expectation of falling

›sts and prices which positively discourages investment, and ıus increases unemployment, instead of reducing it. He ›ncludes that 'there is, therefore, no ground for the belief ıat a flexible wage policy is capable of maintaining a state of ›ntinuous full employment; any more than for the belief ıat an open market monetary policy is capable, unaided, of :hieving this result. The economic system cannot be made lf-adjusting along these lines.'

It happens, therefore, that the trade unions have been for .e most part right in resisting wage-cuts, since wage-reduc- ›ns do not necessarily or in general have the effect of :reasing employment. In any case, as Mr. Keynes points .ıt, 'since there is as a rule no means of securing a simul- .neous and equal reduction of money-wages in all industries, is to the interest of all workers to resist a reduction in their wn particular cases.' The orthodox view maintains that ıe struggle over money-wages between the *entrepreneurs* and ıe workers determines the general level of real wages. In [r. Keynes's view it does not:

e struggle about money-wages primarily affects the *distribution* of the ;gregate real wage between different labour-groups, and not its average nount per unit of employment, which depends, as we shall see, on a fferent set of forces. The effect of combination on the part of a group ' workers is to protect their *relative* real wage. The *general* level of real ages depends on the other forces of the economic system. Thus it is rtunate that the workers, though unconsciously, are instinctively more asonable economists than the classical school, inasmuch as they resist ductions of money-wages, which are seldom or never of an all-round ıaracter; . . . whereas they do not resist reductions of real wages, hich are associated with increases in aggregate employment and leave lative money-wages unchanged. . . . Every trade union will put up ›me resistance to a cut in money-wages, however small. But since no ·.de union would dream of striking on every occasion of a rise in the ›st of living, they do not raise the obstacle to any increase in aggregate ›nployment which is attributed to them by the classical school.

Mr. Keynes opts, therefore, as he always has done, for a :xible money policy rather than a flexible wage policy: the ›rmer being easy to put into practice and on its own merits :sirable, while the latter is necessarily uneven in operation, ıfair and so difficult as virtually to be impracticable. Actually, nce 1932, the Treasury and the Bank of England have been ırrying out a fairly flexible money policy on Mr. Keynes's

lines and given up their attempts, persistent ever since the collapse of the post-war boom in 1920, to force wage-reductions upon the workers and deflation upon industry, in the interests of the *rentier* and of the City; though not before they had brought about the fall of the Labour Government of 1929, in itself no disadvantage to those who brought it about. Mr. Keynes now recommends our adhering to a policy of maintaining a stable general level of money-wages, certainly in the short period, and he gives reasons (pp. 270–271) for regarding it as the better long-term policy too. He suggests a most interesting consideration as regards the alternative, a flexible wage-policy:

> To suppose that a flexible wage-policy is a right and proper adjunct of a system which on the whole is one of *laissez-faire*, is the opposite of the truth. It is only in a highly authoritarian society, where sudden, substantial, all-round changes could be decreed, that a flexible wage-policy could function with success. One can imagine it in operation in Italy, Germany or Russia, but not in France, the United States or Great Britain.

At first sight, the reflection appears paradoxical, one is so accustomed to the received opinion that a flexible wage-system goes with *laissez-faire* and liberal institutions; but one has only to recall the brutal reductions in the general level of wages carried out by the Nazi *régime* in Germany for the sake of its enormous expenditure upon armaments (the real *raison d'être* of the *régime*) to realise that Mr. Keynes's observation is correct.

His treatment of wages expands into the general question of the importance of demand in relation to employment. Here, too, his position challenges the traditional theory. 'The idea that we can safely neglect the aggregate demand function is fundamental to the Ricardian economics, which underlie what we have been taught for more than a century.' He criticises the classical doctrine that 'supply creates its own demand,' on the ground of its assumption that

> the aggregate demand price is equal to the aggregate supply price for all levels of output and employment. . . . It is, then, the assumption of equality between the demand price of output as a whole and its supply price which is to be regarded as the classical theory's 'axiom of parallels.' Granted this, all the rest follows—the social advantages of private and national thrift, the traditional attitude towards the rate of interest, the

classical theory of unemployment, the quantity theory of money, the unqualified advantages of *laissez-faire* in respect of foreign trade and much else which we shall have to question.

All these things are in question; they come from assuming full employment [3] to be the normal condition of the economic system, that the system is self-adjusting at that level. Whereas, in fact, it adjusts itself to a condition far short of full employment, and settles down to a condition in which a large proportion of its resources is permanently unemployed. The problem is so to change the economic system as to secure equilibrium at full employment, bringing all its resources into use.

In building up his theory of employment, he makes use of 'only two fundamental units of quantity—namely, quantities of money-value and quantities of employment.' His definition of the latter, 'by taking an hour's employment of ordinary labour as our unit and weighting an hour's employment of special labour in proportion to its remuneration,' reminds one of nothing so much as Marx's fundamental units of 'socially necessary labour,' to which Mr. Keynes's conception seems to bear analogy. And indeed he says of the relation of labour to capital:

I sympathise with the pre-classical doctrine, that everything is *produced* by *labour*, aided by what used to be called art and is now called technique, by natural resources which are free or cost a rent according to their scarcity or abundance, and by the results of past labour, embodied in assets, which also command a price according to their scarcity or abundance. It is preferable to regard labour, including of course the personal services of the *entrepreneur* and his assistants, as the sole factor of production, operating in a given environment of technique, natural resources, capital equipment and effective demand. This partly explains why we have been able to take the unit of labour as the sole physical unit which we require in our economic system, apart from units of money and of time.

It is natural, then, that wages should play the large part they do in his view of their relation to demand. 'For whilst the other factors are capable of varying . . . the aggregate income measured in terms of the wage-unit is, as a rule, the

[3] The concept of 'full employment' allows for a certain proportion due to 'frictional' or 'voluntary' unemployment, *i.e.*, does not include those who may be out of work owing to difficulties in transfer from one industry to another, unemployables, etc. 'Full employment' means all those employable over and above these particular categories—defined pp. 6–7 of *The General Theory*.

principal variable upon which the consumption-constituent of the aggregate demand function will depend.' (Is it too much to say that the crude political inference to draw is that it is the standard of living of the working class that chiefly matters in keeping up consumption?) Consumption, he reminds us, is 'the sole end and object of all economic activity. Opportunities for employment are necessarily limited by the extent of aggregate demand. Aggregate demand can only be derived from present consumption or from present provision for future consumption.' It is this consideration which refutes the advocates of wage-reductions, 'other things being equal,' as a remedy for unemployment; for other things do not remain equal; the reductions themselves reduce effective demand. It would seem, then, that the complaints with which Labour platforms have resounded since 1931 as before (all too ineffectively, for there is no one so deaf as he that will not hear) were not only plain common sense, but good economics. What is the point of cutting wages if people can't buy the goods? we said roughly, and apparently were not wrong. It is comforting, years afterwards, to learn that we were on the side of the angels, that what we stood for, even if we were *gauche* and without a knowledge of the subtleties of orthodox economics, was in the better interests of the country. It is embittering to reflect, not as against Mr. Keynes, for he at least spoke out his mind in the gigantic fraud of 1931, but as against the unanimous orthodox opinion against us, that our case appears now to have been the better one. Orthodoxy is not what it was. For all that, the upper classes used it in 1931 to turn Labour out of power and to make themselves safe for ten years. They succeeded in putting it across large sections of the middle classes that Labour's economics meant financial ruin. (What they really objected to was that Labour policy was beginning to have a slight effect in redistributing wealth.) It will take years for the Labour Movement to recover from the charge that was riveted upon it in the minds of the middle class. Only the other day the headmaster of one of our great public schools, an otherwise intelligent man, assured me solemnly that everybody recognised that the Labour Government of 1929 well-nigh ruined the country financially. It would have been of no use to recommend him to Mr. Keynes's

economics; he, in common with millions of his fellow-countrymen, would simply not have understood them.

It is indeed impossible to give an adequate account of the central part of Mr. Keynes's book—the demand–consumption–employment relation—in brief space. Perhaps it may be shortly summarised in the words of *The Times* review, a suspiciously short review for so important a work:

> Unless the level of effective demand—*i.e.*, the aggregate spending of the community—is maintained at a sufficiently high level, full employment is impossible. Unfortunately, however, as our income increases we tend to save more, and effective demand tends to become insufficient. In these circumstances the only alternatives are either to expand investment by forcing down interest rates, or to stimulate consumption and restrain saving by redistributive taxation. Mr. Keynes appears in this book, therefore, as a champion not merely of the cheap money policy that has always been associated with his name, but also of the expansion of social service expenditure as a necessary part of economic as well as social policy.

That is to say, in less polite language, that the policy of adequate expenditure upon the social services, such as the Labour Party has always advocated, is not only socially desirable, but an economic necessity if we are to keep employment from decreasing still further. In plain words, there is a gap between the wealth the community could easily produce and the actual consumption which on the existing system of distribution, determined by private property, it is limited to satisfying. Moreover, as Mr. Keynes says,

> the richer the community, the wider will tend to be the gap between its actual and its potential production; and, therefore, the more obvious and outrageous the defects of the economic system. For a poor community will be prone to consume by far the greater part of its output, so that a very modest measure of investment will be sufficient to provide full employment; whereas a wealthy community will have to discover much ampler opportunities for investment if the saving propensities of its wealthier members are to be compatible with the employment of its poorer members.

How paradoxical it all sounds to us in whose ears it has been dinned that there is no more important function to be fulfilled than that of the *rentier* class, in that it is upon their savings that the economic system revolves. Behold, it now appears that unless advantageous investment is deliberately

planned to keep pace with positive saving, it is precisely upon the disproportionate saving of the *rentier* class that the system cranks and breaks down.[4] Blessed are they, in present circumstances, who spend, not they who save—'the more virtuous we are, the more determinedly thrifty, the more obstinately orthodox in our national and personal finance, the more our incomes will have to fall when interest rises relatively to the marginal efficiency of capital. Obstinacy can bring only a penalty and no reward. For the result is inevitable.' How far we have moved from the self-complacency of the Victorians with regard to the *rentier* class and their vital function of providing capital from their savings! Indeed, Mr. Keynes thinks, as we shall see, that there is no longer any need for a *rentier* class to perform that function; and as for capital, it 'is not a self-subsistent entity existing apart from consumption.' These are certainly the economics of the age of relativity. Capital is not created, as we were taught and as the vast majority of our countrymen continue to suppose, out of past savings, but out of the decisions of the *entrepreneur* to produce on the basis of a certain expectation of profit. If this attitude becomes general it will do away with much of the case for the economic necessity of a wealth-owning class—regarding capital as a solid accumulation out of past savings. On Mr. Keynes's view, as in the eyes of Socialists, capital becomes merely the result of the claim that capitalists have upon the country's output, through their control of political power and expressed in the legal system.

Since, then, there is this disparity between our actual and potential production, due to the insufficiency of effective demand—the explanation of the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty—our attention should be directed to the necessity for increased consumption, the possibilities of further investment. Mr. Keynes does not appear to favour the direct subvention of consumption by consumers' subsidies, such as Mr. Durbin has proposed, but is in favour of tackling the position indirectly *viâ* social services and redistributive taxation. His own analysis of the trouble is mainly concerned with the inadequacy of investment in relation to actual savings. He suggests with bitterness, in

[4] *I.e.*, by causing losses to producers, and therefore dissaving and a decrease of incomes.

view of all the lost opportunities for productive expenditure and for raising the standard of living in the years since the war, that even 'wasteful' loan expenditure may enrich the community on balance:

> Pyramid-building, earthquakes, even wars, may serve to increase wealth, if the education of our statesmen on the principles of the classical economics stands in the way of anything better. It is curious how common sense, wriggling for an escape from absurd conclusions, has been apt to reach a preference for *wholly* 'wasteful' forms of loan expenditure rather than for *partly* wasteful forms, which, because they are not wholly wasteful, tend to be judged on strict 'business' principles. For example, unemployment relief financed by loans is more readily accepted than the financing of improvements at a charge below the current rate of interest; whilst the form of digging holes in the ground known as gold-mining, which not only adds nothing whatever to the real wealth of the world, but involves the disutility of labour, is the most acceptable of all solutions. If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with bank-notes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coal-mines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on well-tried principles of *laissez-faire* to dig the notes up again (the right to do so being obtained, of course, by tendering for leases of the note-bearing territory), there need be no more unemployment, and with the help of repercussions, the real income of the community, and its capital wealth also, would probably become a good deal greater than it actually is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses and the like; but if there are political and practical difficulties in the way of this, the above would be better than nothing.

Mr. Keynes goes on in a passage of Swift-like irony, bitter at the thought of so much stupidity in human affairs, to show how complete the analogy is between digging for his bottles filled with bank-notes and the function played by gold-mining in our economic system. History bears him out:

> At periods when gold is available at suitable depths experience shows that the real wealth of the world increases rapidly; and when but little of it is so available, our wealth suffers stagnation or decline. Thus gold-mines are of the greatest value and importance to civilisation. Just as wars have been the only form of large-scale loan expenditure which statesmen have thought justifiable, so gold-mining is the only pretext for digging holes in the ground which has recommended itself to bankers as sound finance; and each of these activities has played its part in progress—failing something better.

Moreover, gold-mining has several advantages to offer; 'if we are precluded from increasing employment by means

which at the same time increase our stock of useful wealth.' Its value does not shrink with use like that of houses; no such disgusting utility disfigures the higher purpose which gold-mining serves:

> Since the value of a house depends on its utility, every house which is built serves to diminish the prospective rents obtainable from further house-building and therefore lessens the attraction of further similar investment unless the rate of interest is falling *pari passu*.

Mr. Keynes here fails to observe, or in deference to our intelligence omits what should be underlined, that the reason why gold-mining has the preference to housing is because it is more profitable to the capitalist. To imagine that you can persuade him to another course than his interest dictates, in other words, to suppose that you can change capitalist behaviour without changing the system, is merely silly—another example of the rationalist fallacy. But in fact Mr. Keynes does not draw the moral that it is the profit system which needs changing—though no doubt he would now largely agree. Instead he continues the irony in a superb passage which yields its own (if merely æsthetic) satisfaction:

> Ancient Egypt was doubly fortunate, and doubtless owed to this its fabled wealth, in that it possessed *two* activities, namely, pyramid-building, as well as the search for the precious metals, the fruits of which, since they could not serve the needs of man by being consumed, did not stale with abundance. The Middle Ages built cathedrals and sang dirges. Two pyramids, two masses for the dead, are twice as good as one; but not so two railways from London to York. Thus we are so sensible, have schooled ourselves to so close a semblance of prudent financiers, taking careful thought before we add to the 'financial' burdens of posterity by building them houses to live in, that we have no such easy escape from the sufferings of unemployment. We have to accept them as an inevitable result of applying to the conduct of the State the maxims which are best calculated to 'enrich' an individual by enabling him to pile up claims to enjoyment which he does not intend to exercise at any definite time.

All this irony means that Mr. Keynes has been going through a dark night of the soul, in his sphere of knowledge and experience, no less than others of us who have been concerned chiefly with the hopes of international order and peace. The source of the bitterness is the same: the simple idiocy of human beings in managing their corporate affairs.

A. L. ROWSE.

ZIONISM IN PALESTINE[1]

By Sir Ernest Bennett, M.P.

Last Easter I paid my sixth visit to Palestine. My first took place before the Great War, when one rode on horseback with tents and servants—a safe and most delightful experience. In those early days order was kept by half a battalion of Turkish infantry and a body of *zaptiehs*, or mounted police. Moslems, Christians and Jews dwelt together in unity and good will. Taxes were light. The Turks at times dealt out rough measures of justice—some of the roughest of these we have recently adopted and extended—and life in general was easy-going and somnolent. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether, in those earlier days, the sum of human happiness and contentment in Palestine was not far greater than it has been during the last fifteen years.

Before the war the Arabs sent two deputies to the Stamboul Parliament and elected representatives carried on the municipal government of the larger towns. This small country—to quote the words of the Covenant (Article 22)—formed one of 'those communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, who had reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone.' In November 1918, a year after the 'Balfour Declaration,' General Allenby, acting under the instructions of the British and French Governments, caused public notices to be displayed all over Palestine, declaring that the object of the Allied and Associate Powers in the East was 'the establishment of national Government and administrations, drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.'

The Balfour Declaration, published in 1917, one of the

[1] In July 1935 we published an article by Lord Melchett, entitled 'The Future of Palestine,' written from the Zionist point of view. This article, written after a recent visit, puts forward the Arab case.—Ed.

most reckless and ill-considered pronouncements which sprung from the stress and peril of the war period, was, as Mr. Stein justly remarks, 'issued in the atmosphere of feverish excitement created by more than three years of war. The Jews, like the rest of us, were in no mood for sober reflection; they read into the Declaration more than it actually contained.' The Bishop of Rochester and Mr. Garstang have told us that Lord Balfour professed, in conversation, ignorance of the fact that the country was peopled with Arabs: he imagined that the withdrawal of the Turkish forces had left the country almost bare of inhabitants. Great Britain has fulfilled her pledges under this Declaration amply and honourably. Under her protection and encouragement the Jews have secured for themselves in Palestine a National Home of surprising strength and importance; and, even if the tide of immigration were finally stemmed to-morrow, the establishment in an exceedingly poor country of some 350,000 Jews, the vast majority of whom come from Poland, Russia and Germany, with their own university and language—a centre of Jewish culture and racial tradition—would surely represent a wonderful achievement.

The fatal obstacle which has hitherto blocked the way to the peaceful establishment of such a National Home has been the determination on the part of many Zionists to go far beyond its original limits, and to work, in season and out of season, for the creation in Palestine of a Jewish majority and Jewish domination. Abandoning the more spiritual ideas of an earlier Zionism conceived by 'Jews, devout men, out of every nation under heaven,' they have extended their demand until their protagonists have come to speak openly of Palestine as 'the National Jewish Home': they have strongly opposed the creation of a Legislative Council, any further inquiry by a Royal Commission, or fresh attempts to reserve land permanently for Arab peasants. Jewish immigrants, of whatever type or origin, are to pour into Palestine without effective limitation until the day arises when a Jewish majority can finally control the destinies of Eretz Israel.

The Zionists have played their cards well. In 1922 Mr. Churchill found it necessary to define the limits of the National Home as follows: 'The expectation of a wholly

Jewish Palestine is impracticable. . . . The Declaration does not contemplate that Palestine, as a whole, should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine. . . . The development of a National Home means 'the further development of the existing Jewish community.' This definition was nominally accepted by the next Zionist Congress, but has since been consistently disregarded. The leaders, following Dr. Weismann, demand 'a Palestine as Jewish as England is English, or Canada Canadian.' 'I will tell you plainly what we are after,' said a very distinguished American Zionist to me, 'I was recently in Geneva, where nations from all over the world were represented. We want to see a Jewish State represented there through its delegate; and that Jewish State with its Jewish flag is to find its home in Palestine.' A Revisionist leader, quoted in *Palestine and Transjordan*, is even more emphatic: 'Our Zionist imperialism will flourish under the protection and support of any Power, on condition that this Power will show no mercy to the Arab population, and uses an iron fist under which the Arabs will not be allowed to move.'

In the earliest days of the Declaration the Arabs were ready to welcome Jewish immigrants, but they never dreamed that such immigration would exceed reasonable limits. They soon realised their mistake. Our own Shaw Commission, referring to the period 1922–29, when the yearly average of immigrants was only 8000, declared that there was 'incontestable evidence that there has been a serious departure from the doctrine accepted in 1922 that immigration should be regulated by the economic capacity of the country to absorb the new arrivals.' These misgivings were endorsed by both Sir John Hope Simpson and Mr. Lewis French, whose reports were issued in 1930 and 1931. Without any adequate regard to the findings of these British experts, the High Commissioner, with the assent of the Colonial Office under Zionist pressure, admitted in 1933 31,000 immigrants; in 1934 42,000, and in 1935 no less than 62,000.[1]

[1] These figures are exclusive of dependants, who almost equal in number the specified immigrants, as can be seen from the figures of 1935: Labour Schedule immigrants 14,653, dependants 13,067; immigrants with capital 6309, dependants 5684.

The report of the House of Commons debate of March 24 was read in Palestine with amazement; apart from enthusiastic Zionists, everyone I met seemed astonished at the one-sided character of the speeches and the obvious prejudice and ignorance displayed by some speakers. Business men, civil servants, soldiers, professional men all over Palestine—British, American, German, as well as Arabs—realised more fully than ever before how successfully Zionist influence had worked its way into the British Parliament. Faced by the apparent indifference of the British public, and the almost solid hostility to their cause displayed in the parliamentary debates, the Arabs seemed to lose hope. They recalled how the reports of Commissions appointed by successive British Governments had been ignored in London. They remembered how the statement of policy carefully drawn up by the first Labour Government's Colonial Minister, Lord Passfield, had been practically nullified in response to Zionist agitation. Nevertheless, though smarting under a keen sense of injustice, five out of six of the Arab political parties accepted the terms of the proposed Legislative Council, despite the fact that immigration, the source of all their troubles, was a reserved subject: the sixth party did not reject it. The miserable story of surrender to Zionist pressure was repeated. Assailed by a storm of abuse and special pleading, the new proposal was abandoned, though it embodied a Cabinet decision, and a pledge conveyed to the Mandates Commission by the High Commissioner at the Government's bidding. At a time like this, when the Arab population, Moslem and Christian alike, were hot with indignation, a fresh permit for 4500 more immigrants was issued! In view of the then state of public feeling and the fact that the preceding quota had still 1000 permits unexhausted, this was an act of almost inconceivable folly. The fresh permit for some 8000 Jews (including dependants) was rightly regarded by the Arabs as a direct challenge, and was accepted as such.

Who can wonder that the Arabs feel that, unless something drastic is done, they are doomed to become a minority in their own land? In addition to the menace of authoritative pronouncements, they see all around them indications of the same remorseless policy. In excess of the quotas authorised by ordinances, great numbers of Jews have been entering

Palestine every year illegally. The existing police force was quite unable to cover the three land frontiers of Palestine; Italian steamers landed hundreds of men and women without passports along the coastline on moonless nights. The authorities at one moment issued *cartes d'identité* as in France, but, thanks to Zionist opposition, this, the only effective means of checking illegal immigration, was dropped in three months, though the High Commissioner had declared in a speech at Nablus that almost as many Jews had entered Palestine illegally as legally! In Palestine alone, of all countries where the British flag flies, not only are immigration laws persistently violated, but the authorities proclaim the fact in public speeches, and seldom attempt proceedings against offenders, for a Zionist appears too often to occupy a position above the ordinary laws of the country. When a large consignment of arms was discovered on the Jaffa quays—owing to the accidental breakage of the cement which concealed them—the arms were confiscated, but no steps were taken to prosecute the guilty persons, though the name of the consignee of this illegal cargo was widely known. In other directions too the despairing Arabs see the signs and tokens of their coming fate. Only some four months ago Sir Herbert Samuel declared that in his opinion a developed Palestine could hold twice or three times as many Jews as at present—a clear anticipation of a Jewish majority. Again, the reasonable and humane law proposed by the High Commissioner, that the sale of the *lot viable* (the minimum amount of land required for the sustenance of a poor family) should be illegal, was violently and successfully opposed by the Zionists.

It is obvious that the main question for the Royal Commission must be that of immigration; and as one of the factors in determining the absorptive capacity of Palestine for fresh immigrants is an accurate knowledge of the country's vital statistics, it is to be hoped that these will be readily available before the Royal Commission—almost certainly the last of the series—reaches Jerusalem. When Sir John Hope Simpson was invited to deal with such questions as the amount of available land and so forth, he did his best, under trying conditions due to time limits and the absence of complete statistical information. Again and again in his invaluable Report he admits that estimates as to the amount of cultivated

land, etc., are, in varying degrees, mere 'guesswork.' Even at this moment everybody seems to use round numbers in any discussion about Palestine. Until quite recently 400,000 was the accepted estimate of Jewish immigrants; and even Mr. Bentwich, in a letter to *The Times*, repeats the very inaccurate estimate of '10,000,000 dunums' of cultivable land. One would think that in the case of so small an area as Palestine accurate figures would have long since been available. The absence of reliable and authoritative estimates has involved the High Commissioner and his officials in many difficulties which need not have existed had it been possible in the case of rival disputants to point to authoritative statements as regards, say, the amount of land cultivated, cultivable or desert.

Immigration into Palestine must for the future be either rigorously controlled or cease altogether, and, in order to avoid the illegal entrance of aliens, the system of the *cartes d'identité*, accompanied by drastic pains and penalties for law-breakers, should be universally adopted. If we once more yield to Zionist pressure and refuse any effective control of immigration, we may no doubt by sheer force of arms and at immense expense beat the despairing Arabs to their knees; no one, certainly not the Arabs themselves, believes that villagers with old Turkish rifles and meagre supplies of ammunition can hope for military success against the disciplined efficiency of well-armed troops. There is nearly a division of infantry in the country at the moment, almost as large as the force mobilised in Egypt against a supposed menace from Libya; but the mere exercise of military strength and the crushing of these ill-equipped rebels will produce no permanent results. Our troops may, in the exercise of their duty, blow up houses, carry off cattle, and shoot down the insurgents; this will bring no lasting settlement. The fellahin are pitting their poor resources against their enemies; and if they are crushed and their wrongs remain unrighted, bitter memories and bitter hatred will live on, and sooner or later we shall be faced with another outburst of popular fury and destruction.

The Royal Commission will no doubt consider the scheme ably sponsored by Mr. Archer Cust, according to which certain well-defined areas already occupied by Jews would

form Jewish 'cantons' where the local law and language would be Hebrew; and similar conditions would prevail in the existing Arabic areas. The delimitation of these reserves would not present insuperable difficulties. Jerusalem, the port of Haifa, and perhaps other places, might form enclaves under the direct administration of the Mandatory. Critics will doubtless declare that this proposal merely follows the line of least resistance, and is adopted in order to avoid the formidable obstacles of a better and more permanent solution. Moreover, our troubles in India and the deplorable animosities of a patchwork settlement in Ireland emphasise the fact that a system of 'reservations' and special areas is generally a policy of 'second best,' which may stereotype a failure in perpetuity. Nevertheless, the cantonisation proposal deserves a careful and sympathetic consideration. The more zealous Zionists will certainly oppose it, because under it the geographical limits of the National Home would be fixed, and the dreams of a wholly Jewish Palestine could never be fulfilled. The advantages of the scheme to the Arabs would be twofold: the dread of a Jewish majority would be removed, and the security of the land still in their hands would be permanently assured.

The Balfour Declaration has created, as a matter of policy, a fresh minority problem in the Near East. To Arabs Palestine is part of Syria, and Syria part of Arabia, with a civilisation as old as that of Europe. They neither admire nor desire the type of Western civilisation of which Tel Aviv seems to them the prototype and Great Britain the protector. This may help to explain a new and sinister feature of this last of the many outbreaks which have marked the unhappy history of our Palestine Mandate. For the first time attacks are being made on British troops as well as the police, both British and native. These attacks arose, in the first instance, from the practice of sending British patrols with Jewish motor-omnibuses, which were fired upon by Arab snipers, with resultant casualties to soldiers and police. Such attacks, however, have since become more direct. It is true that the responsible Arab leaders who endorsed the original strike have never countenanced attacks upon British troops or police, and, to my knowledge, have done their utmost to prevent them. But the movement has by this time passed

out of their control and has grown into a campaign of reprisals.

This new feature in the periodic outbreaks of the Palestinian Arabs indicates, alas, that the personal good will between Arab and Englishman is being strained to the uttermost, and it is fraught with all manner of peril for the future. I was greatly struck, while watching the great Neby Musa procession last Easter, to notice the complete elimination of its formerly religious character. The only time I heard the name of Allah was in a cry which invoked His blessing on the delegation which was going to England. Troop after troop of young Arabs passed along loudly demanding Arab sympathy and help from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Yemen, Egypt, Transjordan and Syria; with cries too for Turkish aid. It will be an evil day for the British Empire if, in an insensate endeavour to fulfil the dreams of Zionist Revisionists, we should incur the implacable hatred and enmity of the Arab world. We may some day find ourselves involved in a naval and military conflict in the Mediterranean; could we spare enough aeroplanes to patrol the long line of the vital oil-pipe from Mosul to Haifa, upon which the efficiency of our ships and aircraft might almost entirely depend? Even if this were possible, could our airmen effectively protect the line by night?

If the Royal Commission reports that definite limits must now be imposed on immigration, and the Government acts boldly in accordance with this finding, there will, I fear, be many sore hearts among the Zionists of the world. The dream of Palestine as the Land of Israel, the Home of the Jewish nation, would be replaced by that less material but infinitely more practical ideal for which other Jews have striven in earlier days—the Home as a centre of all that is best and most inspiring in the faith, culture and tradition of a great historic people. If, however, the Zionists have to endure in Palestine a painful disillusionment, largely brought about by the follies and perversities of European nations, and set to work to use their existing opportunities and lead the Jewish Home to work out its own perfection on fresh lines, the Arabs would, on their side, refrain from any demands for the expulsion of Jews already domiciled in the country. This they must do for two reasons—first, because of the vital necessity of restoring those good and neighbourly feelings between

Arab and Jew which formerly existed; and also because any serious exodus of the Jewish population from Palestine might spell financial disaster to the country as a whole.

A popular belief, fostered and encouraged by Zionist propaganda, exists amongst members of Parliament and others that Palestine is a country with ample resources and a large budget surplus. This is a dangerous error. Those whose work lies in that country suffer under no such delusion Palestine is an exceedingly poor country without oil, coal, timber, or any mineral wealth except the Dead Sea salts. Some two-thirds of its surface, excluding the desert areas of the south, is mountainous; the dreary wastes of southern desert land, often described as 'ripe for development,' are liable to devastating droughts. Few facilities exist in Palestine for any industrial efforts beyond such small enterprises as exist at present in the way of furniture-making, leather-work, etc., for local consumption. Even the famous Palestine Potash Company gives employment to only some 350 people. Fruit-growing has been vastly developed, thanks mainly to the skill, industry and abundant capital of the Jewish immigrants, but the foundations of this great basic industry are by no means solid. Even at the rate of production before the present troubles began—8,000,000 boxes a year—signs were not wanting of a coming glut in oranges in the markets of the world, and of ever-increasing competition from Spain, South Africa and America. Orange-growers have estimated that in three years—*i.e.*, by 1939–40—the Palestinian citrus groves would reach an annual output of 20,000,000 boxes. Under such conditions the Palestinian industry would be in danger of collapse; there was, in fact, some contraction last year.

This danger is already foreseen, with the result, usually ignored in Zionist propaganda, that not more than 12 per cent. of the Jewish immigrants are now engaged in agricultural work; the vast majority display the aptitude of their race in urban trade and commerce. The structure of Zionist Palestine is financially unsound. Scarcely any of the Jewish agricultural colonies are actuarily solvent or could carry on without extraneous assistance. The same is true of many other Zionist efforts in Palestine. Tel Aviv, with a deficit of £70,000, was only saved from bankruptcy by a generous grant

of some £30,000 from Jewish organisations, the balance being found from public taxation, borne by Arabs and Jews alike. There is much justification for the remark by an Englishman, well acquainted with the country, that the prosperity of Palestine is founded upon rhetoric and remittances. So long as the fertilising stream of money, contributed by the amazing generosity of the Jewish race all over the world, continues to flow, the glowing picture of a solvent and prosperous Palestine may persist. But I fear that the almost inevitable curtailment of the Revisionist dream of a Jewish majority and a Jewish State may produce such widespread disappointment and disillusionment that the golden stream may to some extent be checked at its source, in which case I foresee a period of grave financial depression, disastrous to both Arabs and Jews —though, naturally, the town populations would suffer most,

If the industrial finance of Palestine is beset by difficulties, what are we to say of the next and subsequent budgets? In the recent parliamentary debates one speaker after another, duly equipped with copies of *Palestine* and similar literature, sang the praises of a £6,000,000 surplus, without, apparently. the slightest misgivings as to the realities of the case. The fact is that for years past Palestine has steadily imported roughly four times as much as she exported. For the provision of invisible exports to fill this tremendous deficit in the trade balance, Palestine must, apart from grants of Zionist gold from abroad, rely mainly on the tourists who flock into the country twice a year, in the spring and autumn. This financial asset, already seriously diminished by the Italo-Abyssinian War, has now of course disappeared completely, with no prospects of rapid recovery in the near future.

This year's surplus owes its origin almost entirely to a non-recurring windfall—the arrival in the country of a large body of German Jews: these immigrants are men and women of much finer quality and a higher culture than one finds in the 23,000 Polish Jews who entered Palestine last year. Their money has been expended in the purchase of land, houses and building sites on a large scale, and it is the customs duties levied on various commodities for their new homes, combined with transfer fees, which are mainly responsible for the surplus of £6,000,000. Apart from devastating trade losses due to a protracted rebellion, it seems unlikely that Palestine, if called

upon to meet even a small fraction of the military expenses, can possibly provide a balanced budget, much less a surplus. Even had the revolt not frustrated any hopes of fiscal prosperity in the near future, the £6,000,000 was already earmarked for urgent public needs, amongst them the necessary rehabilitation of the Palestinian Railways in their uphill fight against the burden of a £3,000,000 loan and the ever-increasing competition of road motor services. The dangers which beset the public finances of Palestine even under the normal conditions of 1935 have been intensified by the long-drawn-out devastation and havoc of the rebellion. No exact figures of the damage done to crops and trees has yet appeared. The Jewish estimates suggest a total of £150,000 to £175,000 up to date. Compensation for the wholesale demolition of houses in Jaffa has yet to be paid, and, despite the optimistic answers to questions in the House of Commons, it is difficult to see how the Government of Palestine can carry on this year without a loan or a serious diminution in the public services.

I have stressed the economic perils which face Palestine for two reasons: first, because the cost of a protracted campaign cannot possibly be met from local revenues, but must involve the British taxpayer, directly or indirectly, in heavy financial liabilities; secondly, because I am convinced that any sudden suspension of Jewish subsidies from the outside world would prove disastrous to all sections of the population, both Arab and Jew. The Jews of Palestine and their kinsmen in Europe and America should be assured that, under any new conditions of limitations as regards numbers, a Jewish National Home in Palestine will still continue to exist and flourish. The pogroms and persecutions which have disgraced civilisation were the work, not of Islamic, but of Christian nations; and the Jewish victim of European oppression has always found a refuge and welcome in Arab and Turkish lands. The hatred which reigns in Palestine to-day is an artificial result, due to the exaggerated and unreasonable perversion of the Balfour Declaration. If the Arab can feel assured that the Jews have neither power nor desire to dominate the land he will be content, like his Syrian forefathers, to accept the position philosophically. But he feels himself to be part of an Arab nation: 'Palestinian

nationality' means nothing to him. He is not a citizen of the British Empire, like the Moslem of Cyprus: he no longer looks to a Turkish Caliph, the Commander of the Faithful. Unlike the Arab of Iraq or of Saudi Arabia or Transjordan, he is not a subject of a Moslem State, nor, like the Turk, of a powerful Eastern republic. He feels himself to be alienated for a time from his co-religionists and compatriots in Syria: when France abandons her mandate, he will be even more acutely aware of his position. There is, therefore, no easy solution, and no prospect of a ready-made settlement. The *damnosa hereditas* of Versailles is on our shoulders; we must look backwards and forwards, to the right and to the left, before, under the guidance of Lord Peel's Commission, we take the next step.

E. N. Bennett.

NEW ZEALAND

A Warning

By Donald Cowie

I would not like to say how many times during my residence in New Zealand I was asked by irate New Zealanders, 'When are you going to take us seriously?' I know I left the country convinced that English writers and publicists had hitherto done scant justice to a young people properly jealous of their incipient nationhood. And to-day—after three months' absence from the Antipodes—I look back upon New Zealand as a younger son of the British family, true, but yet as a younger son who is still treated as a child by his parents and justifiably resents the fact. They say to you over there: 'The big pots at Home don't seem to realise how advanced we are down here. They're always talking about our trout, our scenery, and our splendid loyalty, but that is all. And we're something more than that.' The expression of this viewpoint may surprise English readers. After all, New Zealand has had every help that England can give. Our sons, our money, our admiration, and our good wishes have gone out to the Antipodes ever since they asked us for them. What more is wanted?

The visitor to New Zealand, whether or not he has previously seen Australia and the other Dominions, is always surprised at the rapid development of the country and the people. He feels that the geography books, the articles in the London papers, and the tourist pamphlets have somehow misled him. He did not expect to find such large towns, such subdued countryside, and so many peculiar institutions. That is to say, the visitor to New Zealand goes to the country with wrong ideas of it—ideas in most cases surviving from the time when the Dominions were still refuges for younger sons and criminals, and a constant source

of expense and mental anguish to the Colonial Office. But the visitor to New Zealand, when he returns to Britain, rarely does anything to dispel the legend that has tricked him. Viscount Bledisloe, the most intelligent Governor-General this Dominion has had since Grey, has had much to write and say about the country in the years after his departure from it, but his words have invariably been familiar, his adjectives complacent. I can appreciate the New Zealander's annoyance that the thoughtful visitor will not treat his country as grown-up—will not, that is, grant it the compliment of criticism as well as praise.

Since there is discussion at the moment about Imperial migration, and New Zealand is one of the countries that do urgently need more population, even if New Zealanders themselves do not particularly want it, I have been urged to summarise the advantages and disadvantages of this Dominion as a place in which to live. And, with New Zealand's youthful self-consciousness in mind, I am moved to do it candidly. The very fact that the Dominion does need more population makes her, temporarily, a very good place in which to live. As the world's leading exporter of dairy produce, and of mutton and lamb, and the second largest exporter of wool, she is a wealthy country, and, possessing large capital resources, thanks to successive inflows of British loan money, she is able to provide her inhabitants with high money wages and a fairly good standard of living. The private wealth of the country has been estimated at £435 per head of all population. At the last assessment there were only eleven New Zealanders with an income of £100,000 a year and over, and a few more than 6000 had an income of £1000 and over. The vast majority of the people had incomes between £300 and £1000 a year; and incomes of less than £300 were actually in a minority.

I know a county council that employs twenty-two roadmen at from £4 to £4 14*s*. 7*d*.; three truck drivers at from £4 14*s*. 4*d*. to £4 14*s*. 7*d*.; two engine drivers at £4 15*s*. 9*d*.; one tractor driver at £4 14*s*. 7*d*.; and an outside foreman at £385 a year and a car. The wages paid to the office staff are as follows: Counter and telephone girl, £1 15*s*. a week; typist, £3 5*s*.; electrical clerk (woman), £4; rates clerk, £4; junior clerk, £3 10*s*.; junior accountant, £200 a year;

town office (woman), £3; accountant, £376 a year; county clerk, £565 and car. Besides ten days' leave at Christmas, the office staff is given all other public holidays in the year and also New Zealand Cup day, Trotting Cup day, and Grand National day. The staff is also given fourteen days' annual leave on full pay.

New Zealand has a population of approximately 1,500,000, and in 1935 exported produce worth nearly £43,000,000. A newcomer to the country finds it difficult to share the enthusiasm of those who shout for serious changes in a governmental and economic system that, as it is at present working, could hardly be bettered. Where farm labourers have been known to receive 13*s*. a day and 20*s*. a week keep, linotype operators and newspaper reporters earn as much as £8 10*s*. a week, and dustmen go home from work in their own six-cylinder motor-cars, it seems there is little necessity of red revolution.

I have culled expressions of surprise and interest at living conditions in New Zealand by several recent visitors, and find a general unanimity. One Englishwoman, remarking that in a tour through the Dominion she had been entertained by people whose homes, cars, radios, and clothes all revealed most comfortable circumstances, concluded that New Zealanders were unaware of their own prosperity. 'I do not think I have met a single New Zealander, man or woman, who has not grimly assured me that nobody has any money!' she declared. 'If it is indeed true that a great number of people in this country are at present living on reduced incomes, then in normal times the inhabitants of the Dominion as a whole must have an extraordinarily high standard of living!' 'We have missed signs of wealth (in country houses and parks),' said two other tourists, 'but we have both been impressed with the apparent absence of extreme poverty in the cities.' They had read of the unemployment position, and were still looking for indications of distress; but even the poorer people appeared to have plenty of warm clothing, respectable houses, and sufficient food. It was pleasant to note the absence of slums. As a South African visitor to New Zealand wrote after his return to his native land, 'It is doubtful whether the workers' standard of living is higher anywhere in the world. . . . New Zealand boasts not a single millionaire, nor any who are starving.'

Positive confirmation that New Zealanders live very well was given not so long ago by a London business man who pointed out that the population of the country, according to the extent of its trading, should be at least 5,000,000. The Dominion imported as much as Norway and Sweden. New Zealand has more telephones and cars per head of population than any other country with the exception of the United States and Canada. The capital invested in the electric supply systems operating in New Zealand is nearly £33,000,000, and during last year new consumers of electricity were connected with supply at an average monthly rate of 650. The Dominion has a death rate of 7·98 per 1000, the lowest in the world; an infantile mortality rate of only 31·64 per 1000, the lowest in the world; and she possesses a variety of free social services that are unequalled elsewhere. A handful of people, extracting the goodness from a country capable of carrying millions, New Zealanders have inevitably romped away with the British *per capita* records.

The man with modest capital who is lucky enough to obtain permission to immigrate into New Zealand at the present time should therefore expect to improve himself financially and socially. According to the facts I have set out above, and the encomiums of every tourist who returns from a three months' tour, he should be making a wise move. But so far I have presented only one set of facts. Following traditional lines, I have picked out a few statistics here and a few outstanding examples there to prove what, discussed from other points of view, is a very doubtful thesis. So far I have only stated the advantages of living in New Zealand at the present time. I have not yet mentioned the disadvantages.

But I was careful to refer to the high wages of New Zealanders to-day as money wages. The fact is that the cost of living in the Dominion is approximately as high in proportion to the English cost of living as the wages in the Dominion are high in proportion to English wages. The worker may earn twenty more shillings a week, but he has to spend those shillings upon commodities and services that are dearer than the corresponding commodities and services at Home. Certain articles, notably meat and milk, are cheaper; but everything else is dearer, from house rents to clothing, from

bread to amusements. A great number of the worker's purchases are necessarily imported commodities, and for these he has to pay substantial duties and the difference in the rate of exchange between the New Zealand pound and the pound sterling.

The wealth of New Zealanders, as I have already detailed it, may look very well on paper. But it must be remembered that the sum total of the public and the semi-public debt of New Zealand at the present day is £347,245,069, or £224 per head of population. It is not generally realised in this country that New Zealand owes a large portion of her wealth and her high standard of living to the fact that she has been able in the past to raise loan money easily in the London market. To maintain that standard during the depression she depreciated her currency. The formula that the British investor pays the piper and New Zealand calls the tune is quite simple, and has worked without a hitch since it was discovered over half a century ago by Julius Vogel, the Colonial Disraeli, who doubled the population of his country in a decade at the cost of a debt increased from nearly £8,000,000 to £28,500,000. New Zealand has borrowed over £60,000,000 for her railways, £37,000,000 for State advances to settlers, £29,000,000 for land settlement and improvements, £27,000,000 for roads and highways—and so the tale continues. It is not difficult to understand the frame of mind of the ignorant New Zealander who in a recent letter to a Dominion newspaper described his country as 'an orange for British financial interests to suck.' The debtor frame of mind is rarely a happy one.

The New Zealand immigrant will at first be delighted with the prospect of free primary, secondary, and university education, and an abundance of social services that fulfil the wildest dreams of Socialist municipalities in this country. But he will not feel so happy when he discovers he must pay approximately £15 per annum in rates and taxes for those luxuries. The annual total of taxation is equal to, roughly, one-fourth of the total value of national production, and is four times as heavy as in pre-war years. In 1933 the Government squeezed £19,703,703 out of the people of New Zealand; in 1935 the extortion was £24,737,939. There are unemployment taxes (5*s.* a quarter and 8*d.* in the pound

of earned and unearned income), and a sales tax of 1*s*. in the pound.

Neither will the immigrant feel so easy when he discovers another glaring defect in the Dominion polity—her complete economic and political reliance upon a small group of islands at the other side of the world that have their own serious economic and political problems. What Throgmorton Street and Whitehall think to-day New Zealand, 11,000 miles distant, has to suffer to-morrow. When somebody said recently that New Zealand was no more than an economic annexe of the United Kingdom he was not playing with words. In 1935 Great Britain absorbed over 84 per cent. of the exports of New Zealand. If, for any reason, New Zealand's market in Great Britain were to be curtailed, the Dominion would face bankruptcy. She would not be able to find another market, and her scanty population, already large eaters, would scarcely be able to absorb the tremendous surplus of produce that would rapidly accrue.

One cannot avoid the conclusion that New Zealand's wealth and prosperity is built upon a very insecure foundation. Should Great Britain be engaged in war elsewhere, this Dominion, almost completely unprotected, would fall an easy prey to such a neighbour as Japan, whose imperial aims have yet to be satisfied. In any case, New Zealand could neither afford nor man adequate defence herself. I am tempted to quote the words of a writer in a New Zealand journal:

> Let us reflect upon our own insignificance in world affairs. We have nothing that the rest of the world cannot get elsewhere, and for the most part in more attractive forms—Danish butter, Australian merino wool, South American meat, Canadian cheese, Tasmanian apples. Were we to sink beneath the waves it would be a shock, but in thirty days the necessary adjustments could be made, and New Zealand would be just a memory.

I have stated both extremes, and, if I have made some sensational statements and have seemed to attach undue importance both to New Zealand and to certain aspects of her polity and economy, it is only because I am anxious for the future of the British Commonwealth as a whole, and particularly afraid for the weakest member. My arguments, lined up, both warn the intending immigrant to the country

and stress the necessity of more immigration. I would advise no one with a competence in Great Britain to emigrate to New Zealand at the present time, for the simple reason that I believe New Zealand to be one of the most vulnerable countries, externally and internally, in the world. But I would strongly advise New Zealand and Great Britain co-operatively to find a speedy means of increasing the population of the Dominion. A chain is as strong as its weakest link, and man-power is the only safeguard against a disastrous future.

It would be all right if New Zealanders could do the job themselves. But they can't. I have just received a cable message from the Dominion stating that the latest census returns show that the birth rate is at the lowest level for any decade in the country's history. The population, including Maoris, is now 1,573,482, a gain of only 163,343 since the last census was taken in 1926. This is the smallest gain ever recorded. The birth rate, I am informed, has been declining for over sixteen years. Accordingly the number of people in the Dominion to-day at ages below ten years is approximately 16,000 less than the number in 1926, despite the total population has increased by 141,000 during the decade. And New Zealanders aged sixty years or over number 40,000 more to-day than they did in 1926.

This tendency for the New Zealander, like Rip Van Winkle, to grow older without knowing it is exceedingly serious, and, if not checked, may have far-reaching effects. The most obvious of these will be an accelerated decline in the already declining birth rate. Population problems have a habit of resolving themselves into vicious circles. As the bulk of New Zealanders grow older, and increasing numbers advance beyond the reproductive age, there will be fewer and fewer children. If the present tendency continues, the race of New Zealanders will die out within a few hundred years. The problem is complicated by the fact that in recent times more people have been leaving New Zealand than arriving in it from overseas, and the bulk of the emigrants have been men and women in the prime of life. During 1935 the excess of departures over arrivals was 2013. Of these 1266 were under thirty-four years of age, 1658 were under forty-four, and only 376 were forty-four and over.

New Zealanders cannot do it themselves; therefore it must be done for them. This argument, I submit, is as logical as it is unpleasant. New Zealanders must realise that they cannot have their cake and eat it. Among the fallacies they entertain out there is that of the wages fund, which, some people may remember, maintains there are only a certain number of jobs to go round in any community, and an increase of the population naturally creates unemployment. And another bugbear out there to-day is the belief that New Zealand's sole destiny is to produce primary exports, and, the present market for these commodities being glutted, it would be fatal to increase the ranks of the producers. New Zealand has even contrived to enlist the sympathy of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs for this viewpoint, as when Mr. Malcolm MacDonald remarked at a recent Imperial function: 'A renewal of migration depends upon our being able to expand the markets inside and outside the Empire for primary products.'

Yet it seems patently obvious that the Dominion can never hope to attain the smallest measure of economic and political self-sufficiency so long as its population is inadequate to man defences and provide a profitable subsidiary market for New Zealand's produce within New Zealand. The wages fund fallacy is easily refuted. Immigrants take in each other's washing, and yet have surplus requirements that provide additional employment for the natives. If the wages fund theory were not a fallacy, New Zealand would still be an empty land to-day. As for the theory of reliance upon primary exports—well, the natural alternative is the creation of a home market for produce and manufactures, which demands first and foremostly an increased population.

After the Coronation next year there will be an opportunity for the discussion of these problems. I pray and hope that our Imperial statesmen, for once, will adopt the long view, cease tinkering with migration, and, taking full cognisance of the facts I have set out in this essay, agree upon broad essentials and inaugurate novel particulars. Migration must be resumed, but not the migration of the past. Great Britain also has a falling birth rate, and can hardly spare the more enterprising elements in her own population. The Dominions in general, and New Zealand in particular, can

nly look to child migrants—the Fairbridge experiment in Australia has proved the value of this class—and to foreign nigrants, notably northern Europeans, for the population ansfusions of the future that will make them severally mpregnable and the Commonwealth as a whole compact gainst the world.

I have felt that by quoting the case of New Zealand I could nost easily make it clear that the British Commonwealth, as t present constituted, is the most vulnerable empire or ssociation of States that history has known. At present, I ave felt, we are living in a fools' paradise, from which we re very likely to emerge with an unpleasant thud. 'The ld order changeth,' and the old order, I have felt, is very ear the end. The present policy of the British Government vith relation to Imperial affairs is a policy inherited from the ast. That policy must be changed to suit a world that is astly different from the world of *laissez-faire* and 'Rule ritannia.' I have tried to show in this essay that even little New Zealand, up till now the steadiest and most secure of he Dominions, is internally and externally vulnerable. I ould have concluded my observations at the end of my irst section, and thereby qualified for inclusion in the noble ompany of returned Governors-General and others, but hen I would have been unfaithful to truth. We can't all be ostriches.

DONALD COWIE.

THE SKILLED LABOUR PROBLEM

By W. F. Watson

The proposals for the reorganisation and speeding-up of the armaments-producing industries in connexion with the Government's National Defence plans have raised, among other questions, the problem of the supply of skilled labour. Extravagant statements about the high wages being now paid to mechanics have appeared in the Press. A Sunday newspaper, for example, recently declared that certain grades of craftsmen are so favourably placed because of the shortage that wages of £10 and upwards were easily obtainable. Asked for details, the editor could name no firm paying such wages. Had he taken the trouble to acquaint himself with the facts before publishing such a wild statement, he would have discovered that in London, a highly rated district, the standard union rate for operative engineers, other than those employed on ship-repairing work and in newspaper houses, is £3 4*s.* 11*d.* for a forty-seven-hour week, or 1*s.* 4½*d.* an hour. The Employers' Federation advise their constituent members not to pay more than the minimum, though many federated employers are to-day evading that instruction by paying what is called 'ability' money, usually an extra 4*s.* a week. By mutual agreement between the Employers' Federation and the Engineering Unions the basis of piecework earnings is fixed at 25 per cent. above the minimum rate.

That many mechanics—the majority, perhaps—receive a wage in excess of the minimum cannot be disputed. In addition to the ability money paid to day-work craftsmen in federated shops, quick, accurate pieceworkers can sometimes increase their earnings by as much as 50 per cent., though this is discouraged by the unions on the sound ground that it leads to rate-cutting. Non-federated firms are offering from 1*s.* [illegible]*d.* to 2*s.* an hour for good mechanics, some will

pay 2*s.* 6*d.* an hour, whilst a few very highly skilled men engaged on special work may be getting no less than 2*s.* 9*d.* an hour. Forty-seven hours at 2*s.* 9*d.* amounts to £6 9*s.* 3*d.*

A lot of overtime is being worked to keep pace with the demand for engineering products. A few favoured piece-workers, by working late every night and on Saturday afternoon and Sunday, have doubtless earned as much as £10 in one week. But to say wages of £10 a week and upwards are easily obtainable is misleading and mischievous.

Highly placed trade union officials indignantly repudiate the shortage, pointing to the number of their unemployed members as evidence of ample available skilled labour. They are anxious on financial grounds that their unemployed members shall be absorbed in industry, and they want to resist all attempts to dilute skilled labour and the introduction of trainees.

It may seem absurd to assert that there is a shortage of skilled engineers when the Amalgamated Engineering Union alone has nearly 9000 unemployed members; but it is true that many employers are experiencing great difficulty in getting a sufficiency of the right type of mechanic.

The problem is by no means a new one. Addressing the annual National Committee Meeting of the A.E.U. in 1929 the president, Mr. J. T. Brownlie, said:

> One of the most valuable assets of a country which depends for its existence on the export of manufactured articles is the skill of its workers.
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> It is believed that, in general, employers during recent years have had little or no difficulty in obtaining the number of apprentices whom they required. On the other hand, it is frequently stated that the number of apprentices engaged since the war has been restricted both by the hesitation of employers to engage apprentices and by the reluctance of boys to bind themselves as apprentices.
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> In the absence of accurate and comprehensive information it is very difficult to determine how far the present supply of apprentices in the various industries is sufficient to secure an adequate supply of skilled workers in the future, or to forecast whether industry, when trade revives, will find itself with a shortage of journeymen owing to the various causes which may have operated to diminish the number of recruits. The possibility of such a shortage is sufficiently serious to make it necessary for employers to consider the position very carefully.
>
> The number of boys and girls becoming available for employment is in process of gradual diminution and the fall in the birth rate during

the war years will accentuate in the years 1931 to 1935 the reduction in the numbers.

Mr. Brownlie proceeded to quote estimated figures showing the diminution in the number of boys and girls reaching school-leaving age in the years 1926 to 1940.

From 1934 onwards to 1937 [he continued] the position will temporarily improve, as a result of the high birth rate of 1920 and 1921, but from 1937 onward the normal decline in the birth rate will resume its influence.

With great emphasis I commend these considerations to the thoughtful meditation of engineering and shipbuilding employers.

To maintain in future the high standard of efficiency, skill, and inventive ingenuity, which has characterised the British engineering and shipbuilding industry in the past, depends to a large extent on the apprentices of the future. As captains of industry under the present industrial system they are primarily responsible, and it is incumbent on them, irrespective of the industrial exigencies of the moment, to pay a rate of wages which will be sufficiently attractive to induce the intelligent youths of the future to become apprentices in these branches of industry.

His warning was not heeded, though many months later, when Mr. Brownlie and Sir Alan Smith (president of the Engineering Employers' Federation) jointly made strong representations to the Government, pointing out that during the years 1922 to 1927 no fewer than 67,000 skilled metal workers had left the country, steps were taken to stem the tide of emigration of British mechanics to America.

Subsequent events have fully justified Mr. Brownlie's apprehensions. In 1931 a well-known Coventry firm of tool and gauge makers, unable to obtain suitable mechanics, inaugurated an apprentice-training school for the purpose of providing promising lads with a thorough training in modern workshop practice. More recently Messrs. Vickers selected fifty likely youths to be specially trained for highly specialised aircraft work. The shortage has now developed into a very serious problem, and union officials seem to be nonplussed. The observations of the present writer, a mechanic who is also a union branch secretary, may not be out of place—they may even be helpful.

It is not difficult to explain the strange anomaly of a scarcity of skilled mechanics side by side with a large number of unemployed engineering workers. The bulk of the A.E.U. unemployed members are divided between the

Clyde, the Tyne, the Tees, the textile and mining areas, districts not yet participating in the general revival. They have spent their lives in shipbuilding, in making textile and mining machinery, and in other branches of heavy engineering, and, splendid mechanics though they undoubtedly are—perfect wizards in the use of hammer, chisel, file and heavy machinery—few could so adapt themselves to modern methods as to satisfy the requirements of an up-to-date toolroom or aeroplane factory, even were they able to leave the district where they were bred and born.

The number of unemployed craftsmen in other industrial areas is negligible. In London and the surrounding districts, of 21,000 members in 100 branches, only 237 are unemployed. These are made up of casual workers in ship-repairing, floating mechanics who love to travel from shop to shop even though it entails a few days' idleness; men over sixty who are registered as unemployed because they are not eligible for the union's superannuation benefit; and the irreducible percentage of unfortunates who for various reasons seem to be unemployable.

Recently I had a note from one of my members asking me to send a brassfinisher to a certain firm, the only condition of engagement being that the man must not be over sixty-five! Two of my members, both over sixty, obtained work in a Government factory where the age limit is supposed to be forty-five; more than a dozen old-age pensioners are working, and two 'old boys' of seventy-three are still carrying on at the bench. Yet brassfinishing is a branch of engineering that is fast becoming obsolete, and one would expect to find a surplus of 'brassies.' I could place a few more if they could be found! It is much the same in other branches.[1]

Employers are crying out for good centre-lathe turners, universal millers and grinders, planers, shapers, tool-makers, die-sinkers, pattern-makers, bakelite-mould-makers, machine-setters. No competent mechanic in any of the districts named need be unemployed for any length of time. Firms like Whiteheads, of Weymouth, are scouring the country for men, offering to pay fares from any district.

To get a true conception of the causes of this phenomenal

[1] See footnote on p. 358.

scarcity of skilled labour one must go back to the introduction of the machine in the 'eighties. The wholesale displacement of skilled labour which followed in its wake alarmed the workers and gave rise to a belief that the time was not far distant when skill would be no longer necessary in industry, a belief that became universal by the rapid development of the machine, and of mass production and scientific management. It was rightly contended by the advocates of progress that by lessening production costs the machine would reduce prices, the demand for engineering products would inevitably follow, and there would be more work for engineers. But the displaced craftsmen, and those not displaced, contended that all this additional work would be done on labour-saving machines operated by unskilled labour. That was the cry of the mechanic when I entered the industry in 1896, and it has been heard above the clatter of machinery ever since. In addition, the doctrine that by making themselves more efficient and skilled the workers would become more profitable to the employers, and would consequently prolong the life of capitalism which was on its 'last legs,' had a widespread influence.

And so, even in the early days of the present century parents were not so willing as formerly to apprentice their sons to engineering, nor were employers so anxious to engage

The following figures are taken at random from recent reports:

District.	Membership.	No. of Branches.	Un-employed.
Bradford	1,555	9	38
Bristol	2,081	12	62
Billingham	355	1	1
Chatham	344	1	4
Chelmsford	616	2	4
Derby	4,674	14	17
Birmingham	5,485	22	95
Erith	3,494	20	38
Crewe	2,785	10	54
Coventry	3,616	10	47
Cowes	723	2	2
Manchester	8,430	38	264
Norwich	777	2	1
Portsmouth	2,583	7	29
Peterborough	1,214	5	9
Swindon	2,386	10	14
Sheffield	4,674	16	114
Weymouth	702	2	2
	46,494	183	795

them; whilst journeymen mechanics, firm in the belief that the need for craftsmen was a diminishing factor and that the capitalist system was in a state of decay, manifested an increasing disinclination to improve and adapt their skill to meet the requirements of changing methods of production. And one must take into consideration the effect of the natural revolt of the old-time mechanic against scientific management, often in the hands of men whose science stopped short of humanity or psychology.

So overwhelmed were we by the immediate—disastrous, so far as many workpeople were concerned—results of the widespread adoption of the machine that we completely lost sight of the significant fact that the whole basis of engineering rests on quality and craftsmanship, and that the very nature of the industry precludes the possibility of mass production ever becoming the rule. We failed to realise that, whilst some engineering products can be mass-produced, even in mass production factories there is always a variety of individual key jobs requiring the highest degree of skill. It was never generally expected that mass production would produce new, and equally skilled, types of craftsmen; least of all was it realised that mass production itself demands a continuous supply of properly trained skilled craftsmen, and that the number required would tend to increase with the expansion of mass production. By 1914 the whole industry was permeated with the fatalistic philosophy that engineering was no longer a remunerative occupation for craftsmen.

To some extent the war checked its growth. Being an 'engineers'' war, those not in the Fighting Forces became engineers—or rather, munition workers. The exigencies of the war demanded improved machinery and methods of manufacture, and tremendous advances were made in labour-saving machinery and metallurgy. In addition, few apprentices were taught the intricacies of the craft—they were immediately switched on to repetition work; many who joined the mechanical units were killed, and there was a great influx of men trained only in one form of skill.

Then came the slump of 1920, and there began the great exodus from the factories which continued until every employment exchange was besieged by unemployed mechanics clamouring for non-existent jobs. Wages fell below those of

the municipal street scavenger: the pessimism of pre-w days returned. Workless craftsmen became active in th unemployed workers' movement, and at street corners an in trade union branches they permeated the minds of th people with the same despairing philosophy. The sorr plight of engineers was the talk of every club and pub. Th omnipotent machine was responsible, said the wiseheads Politicians proclaimed that the human element was fast bein eliminated from industry. Imaginative writers followed ther and reaped a golden harvest. The public was bull-doze with novels of the Jules Verne type, pseudo-scientific work films and plays, all depicting doleful pictures of a robc State in which skilled men would have no place. Inventiv geniuses made mechanical men for which chemists sought th ingredients of a soul. Thousands of craftsmen turned else where for a livelihood. Some emigrated to America, wher work was more plentiful and skill valued. No one aske why British mechanics, whose plight was a consequence c the development of the machine, should find work at higl wages in the country where scientific management and mas production had reached their zenith. Other mechanic entered other occupations, and, though many have sinc returned to the industry, skilled craftsmen may still be founc in a great variety of businesses.

As indicated by Mr. Brownlie, the engagement of appren tices in the early post-war years was restricted by the hesitanc of employers to engage them, the reluctance of boys to binc themselves as apprentices, and the disinclination of parent to put their lads to a trade so risky. Widespread unemploy ment made parents increasingly dependent on their children's earnings, and induced both lads and parents to prefer th relatively higher immediate wage of non-apprenticed—anc often blind-alley—employment. But the universal belief tha industry needed fewer mechanics was the principal reason.

The social legislation of the past thirty years, the growtl of the postal and kindred services and of the Insurance Acts have greatly increased the personnel of the Civil Service anc of municipal departments. The expansion of every kind ot insurance, private and commercial, and of the co-operative societies; the vast development of transport, its rationalisa-tion and that of other industries; the growth and centralisa-

tion of trade unions and friendly societies necessitating big staffs; the growth of publishing, advertising, salesmanship and distribution, all widened the field of selection for those seeking situations.

For years past the tendency has been to place youths in one of these soft clerical occupations rather than encourage them to undertake the hazards of a mechanic's career, and most lads acquiesce, not because the art of engineering has lost any of its glamour, but because the trade offers so few advantages. One can hardly expect lads who have been brought up by indulgent parents in an atmosphere of cinemas, tennis-courts, and dance-halls to go to the trouble of learning the intricacies of a craft and entering an industry which will return to them a very precarious £3 a week in some of the most desolate and dismal areas in the United Kingdom.

Lastly, even when a lad is apprenticed he has little chance of acquiring a thorough knowledge of the craft. Among the many thousands of mechanics who emigrated or entered other occupations (and among those who never returned from the war) were some of the most highly skilled men, unaccustomed to sticking in one shop or working for the bare minimum. They were craftsmen who had endeavoured to keep pace with modern developments, and were, in consequence, capable of handling any job that came their way. But those who remained in the trade were for the most part men who had been in the same factory all their lives—railway mechanics, maintenance men, shift engineers—whose experience was limited to one way of working, and that usually old-fashioned. Such men cannot teach youths modern workshop methods. Those who can are unwilling to train apprentices to become competitors in the fierce struggle for jobs; and if working piecework they have no time to do so.

The days when journeymen took a paternal interest in training lads are gone: in many factories no attempt whatever is made to teach the apprentices; they have to shift for themselves, and are frequently put on production work as soon as they can understand which is the right end of a tool. Consequently, on reaching journeyman's age they are not competent enough to command the standard rate. So much for the shortage of skilled labour.

An examination of the causes of the demand for skilled labour compels one to abandon preconceived ideas concerning the effect of the machine on craftsmanship and man's relationship to the machine. The primary factors in mass production are standardisation and the interchangeability of parts, to ensure which a high degree of accuracy is absolutely essential. It is obtained by the use of precision tools, delicately constructed moulds, and complicated jigs, fixtures and press-tools, and new types of specialised craftsmen are required to make them.

Forty years ago there were, roughly, only six crafts in the engineering trade (as distinct from iron-moulding and boiler-making)—namely, pattern-makers, millwrights, blacksmiths, turners, fitters and machinists, which covered boring, slotting, shaping and milling. To-day, in addition to those crafts, there are universal-millers, universal-grinders, internal-grinders, surface-grinders, cutter-grinders, automatic-setters, capstan-setters, turret-setters, tool-makers, gauge-makers, jig-makers, bakelite-mould-makers, press-tool makers and setters, etc., all highly skilled craftsmen.

Union officials contend that their unemployed members possess the necessary maturity of craft which would quickly develop if employers would show a spirit of tolerance towards this type of skilled labour. The principles of craft may have remained unchanged, but the technique is entirely different. These splendid mechanics may possess maturity of craft, they may be masters of the technique of heavy engineering, but few could easily adapt themselves to the technique essential to the building of a delicate mould, or complicated press-tool, jig or fixture.

It is the extraordinary demand for skilled labour on the production side of industry that occasions most surprise: it confounds all theories. 'They can't get centre-lathe turners for love nor money,' is a cry echoing through the factories and union branches. Yet comparatively few years ago it was confidently predicted that however necessary centre-lathes might be in the tool-room of a mass production factory, labour-saving machinery would drive them out of the production shops.

Moreover, employers are displaying a marked tendency to employ only skilled mechanics to operate machines specially

designed to eliminate the element of skill. There are many reasons for this startling development, the most important being the realisation of the impossibility of eliminating from industry the human element, or the element of skill. The nearer a machine approaches to fool-proof perfection, the further it recedes from its position as a machine capable of being operated by an unskilled workman. The delicate, precise and complicated mechanism which makes the machine supposedly fool-proof also makes it necessary to employ a highly skilled man to operate it. A semi-skilled operator may be trusted to manage a machine producing ordinary screws or components where the tolerance of accuracy is 0.005 inch plus or minus, but only a skilled man can be relied on to operate a machine producing airplane parts where the extreme limit of tolerance must of necessity be 0.0001 inch plus or minus. A machine may be perfect when new; after it has been in service a few weeks it develops an individuality of its own which only a skilled man can understand.

The most amazing thing of all is the number and frequency of newspaper advertisements for 'Capstan setters and operators. Must be skilled men. Top rates plus bonus paid to the right men.' I operated a capstan when I was fifteen years old; it is a simple type of machine generally regarded as a boy's machine. Indeed, many mechanics are too craft-proud to work on them. We now know the truth: machines cannot be run by human robots without a soul, and as 'devoid of individuality as machine-made automata, as monotonously alike and characterless as a herd of well-cared-for cattle.' In the production of aeroplane and other armaments particularly, a high degree of intelligence is absolutely essential. Such is the demand for positive accuracy that only highly skilled men of character and individuality are competent to do the work. The immediate problem is how best to increase the supply of skilled labour, a problem that will never be solved by the indiscriminate introduction of trainees and the dilution of skilled labour. Already there have been several strikes against trainees, and the president of the Amalgamated Engineering Union has made it abundantly clear that indiscriminate dilution will not be tolerated.

The attitude of the craftsman is grossly misunderstood. He who has served his apprenticeship resents dilution because

it menaces his standard of living. He is willing enough to teach any lad his trade, but he suspects an arbitrarily introduced trainee in the twenties or older as being a form of cheap labour. Unfortunately the suspicion is often justified. Another point. Craftsmen love their work, and they love a fellow-craftsman. They despise 'half-inch' mechanics!

At the back of their minds there is the realisation that on the accuracy and quality of their work depends the lives of their fellows: 'Dud' fuses, 'dud' breech-blocks, 'dud' shells—the fruits of war-time dilution—live in the memory of craftsmen who know what they cost the Fighting Forces. The smoothness and continuity of production can be maintained only by harmony in the workshop. The indiscriminate introduction of trainees tends to disturb that harmony.

So, then, the true solution lies in mutual co-operation between the Government, the employers and the trade unions. The first step is to absorb those of the unemployed mechanics who can adapt themselves to the new methods of production. If it is then found that dilution in the form of trainees is necessary to maintain the demand for armaments, it must be applied with wisdom and discretion, and with the full and free co-operation of the skilled men and their accredited representatives. Above all, engineering must be made more attractive. The wage should be raised so that it will be more commensurate with the skill required and the sacrifices demanded by the parents of apprentices and the apprentices themselves.

Let all parties concerned hammer out a practicable scheme whereby a continuous supply of skilled labour can be maintained without menacing the prestige and standard of living of craftsmen, absorbing all available unemployed skilled workers and ensuring the accuracy and quality of all our armaments and other engineering products. This can only be achieved by allowing the unions to have a larger measure of control in the determining of factory conditions.

Therein, I submit, lies the solution to the skilled labour scarcity problem and the safety of our air force.

W. F. WATSON.

COMPENSATION FOR ROAD ACCIDENTS

By Sir Alexander K. Butterworth

Considering how much public attention has been directed to the dangers of the road and how terrible are the suffering and distress caused by road casualties, it is strange that so little thought has been given to the question of compensating the victims of these casualties and their families. It might have been expected that the very fact that measures of prevention had met with but scant success would have turned people's minds to another side of the road problem, for if we cannot prevent accidents, we can at least see that the victims are fairly compensated, so far as money can alleviate the results of death or bodily injury.

But this has not been the case. While much time and thought have been given to the seemingly insoluble problem of accelerating the journeys of one section of road users without diminishing the safety of others, very little attention has been devoted to the simpler and hardly less urgent problem of adapting the rules of compensation to present-day conditions. This may be in part due to a vague notion that the needs of road victims [1] have been met by the introduction of compulsory third party insurance, but mainly, it is feared, to the extraordinary apathy shown by all classes in connexion with road accidents. And yet the great majority of road victims belong to those classes whose sufferings and losses might be expected to evoke the greatest measure of sympathy—the old and feeble, the very young, the wage-earners and their families. We hear much to-day about the sanctity of life in relation to war, but it is doubtful whether those who lightly dismiss the subject of killing and maiming on the road with an impatient and contemptuous reference to a 'lack of road sense' realise how nearly comparable the

[1] Throughout this article the word 'victims' is used to designate persons suffering loss or injury, as the result of a road accident without regard to any question of fault.

figures of road casualties are to the numbers of killed and wounded in great wars.[3] No figures are available showing what proportion of the persons injured in road accidents receive compensation or what amounts they receive, either in the aggregate or on the average; all that is known is that there are a number who for one reason or another receive nothing and that many others receive sums which bear no relation to the loss sustained by them.

Those who fail to receive anything do so either (1) because the law denies their right to damages, or (2) because, when the law has awarded them damages, the person liable is unable to pay. The second grievance is largely met by the scheme of compulsory insurance and the question of extending that scheme, so as to cover cases which at present are not met by it, is under consideration. The first is the larger question, and it is that with which the present article is wholly concerned. My submission is that the law, as it stands to-day, does not fairly meet the claims of persons injured by a motor vehicle and that it can be made to do so by a simple and reasonable amendment. The persons referred to are the non-motoring users of the road—pedestrians, cyclists, riders or occupants of a horse-drawn vehicle, etc.—and pedestrians are taken as illustrative of these classes of road users. Accidents to the drivers and occupants of motor vehicles involve different considerations.

Now, what is the position? The rights of a person injured by a motor vehicle are governed by the law of negligence; he is in the same position as a person knocked down by a runaway horse; he must prove negligence on the part of the person in control of the vehicle and may have to rebut the charge of what the law terms 'contributory negligence' on his own part. If he fails in either respect, he is not entitled to any damages. Such, broadly speaking, is the law of negligence, and the question is whether it works fairly when applied to the present-day conditions of road traffic.

The question may conveniently be divided into three—

(1) Should the victim have to prove negligence affirmatively, *i.e.*, on whom should the burden of proof rest—on

[3] In the South African War, which lasted three years, the British losses were 5774 killed and 22,829 wounded; in the Great War (1914–1918), 812,317 killed and 1,849,494 wounded. The road casualties in the ten years 1926–1935 were 64,778 killed and 1,871,411 injured.

the victim, to prove that the driver was negligent (as he has to do to-day), or on the driver, to prove that he was not?

(2) Should a victim be entitled to damages, even when the driver is shown to have been negligent, if he himself 'contributed' to the accident by his own want of care?

(3) Should the driver ever be liable, if he proves that he was not negligent (*e.g.*, when neither party is negligent), *i.e.*, should there be 'liability without fault'?

'Burden of proof'—'contributory negligence'—'liability without fault'—these are the points upon which the question turns.

(1) Probably a measure providing merely that when a pedestrian is run down by a motor vehicle it shall rest with the driver to show that this was not due to want of care on his part would not meet with much opposition. It would place a motor accident in much the same position as a railway accident, where the liability of the railway company to an injured passenger rests on the saying '*res ipsa loquitur*.' A train being entirely under the control of the company and its staff, if an accident occurs, it lies on the company to explain how it happened; if it can show that it was not occasioned by negligence—*e.g.*, a latent defect in the rolling stock—the company is not liable to compensate injured passengers. In the same way, if the driver of a motor vehicle proved that the injury to a pedestrian was not due to negligence on his part, he would not be liable, but in the absence of such proof he would.

This principle is already acted upon in certain classes of road accidents, *e.g.*, when a motor vehicle mounts a footway, and it would not involve a great change in the legal position if its application were extended to all casualties in which a motor vehicle was concerned. This is already the case in most Continental countries, and a moment's reflection makes one realise how unfair it is to a pedestrian knocked down by a motor vehicle to make his right to damages and that of his family depend upon ability to prove that the driver was negligent. If he is killed, he obviously cannot prove it, nor in ordinary circumstances can his dependants. But even when he is only injured, if his injuries are serious, it is very unlikely that he will have a clear, if any, recollection of what happened, and the only story told is that of the person who inflicted the

injury and his friends. The victim, therefore, is seriously and unfairly handicapped in litigation, and even if the insurance company is prepared to entertain his claim, the '*onus probandi*' loads the dice heavily against him in any negotiations for a settlement.

(2) Next, assuming the negligence of the driver to be proved, we have to consider the position when the victim also has been in fault and the casualty has been due to the joint negligence of the two.

In such cases our law is both harsh and difficult to apply. This is not the place to attempt a scientific definition of 'contributory negligence'; it must suffice to point out that in our courts of common law (unlike the Court of Admiralty) if a plaintiff is found to have 'contributed' to the accident (in the technical sense of that term as established by a series of complicated judicial decisions) by his own want of care, however serious his injuries and however grave the negligence of the defendant, he can recover nothing.

The difficulty of applying this rule to the occurrences of everyday life was illustrated in a recent case (*McLean* v. *Bell*), where a girl, after alighting from a tram-car, was knocked down by a motor vehicle as she was crossing to the pavement. She eventually recovered substantial damages, but only after a delay of more than two years, during which the case was twice tried before a judge and jury, was twice the subject of appeal by the insurance company, and finally was carried by the plaintiff herself to the House of Lords—and all by reason of differences of judicial opinion as to the words in which a judge ought to explain to a jury the meaning and effect of 'contributory negligence.' A layman may be pardoned for thinking that a rule of law which leads to such fantastic results in a matter of daily occurrence is hard to justify. It does not follow that no account should be taken of a road victim's carelessness, as in the case of industrial accidents, where nothing short of serious and wilful misconduct debars an injured person from compensation, a point to which reference is made later on (p. 374).

(3) The final question is more controversial than either of the other two; indeed, here lies the crux of the problem. Is it fair that a man should have to pay damages when he was not to blame for the injury? The question so stated at

once suggests a negative answer, but less convincingly if we turn the question round and ask, 'Is it fair that a man should suffer loss when he has done nothing to bring it about?'

It is common knowledge that (apart from contract) the general rule of English law is that a man is not liable for the consequences of his actions if he has used due care. It is perhaps not so well known that this rule is subject to many exceptions, some of them long established at common law—the result of judicial decisions; others created by Act of Parliament.

Of the former class probably the most familiar to lawyers is the principle laid down some seventy years ago in the case of *Rylands* v. *Fletcher*, namely, that a person who brings on to his own land (and *a fortiori*, it would seem, on to a highway) something which is likely to cause damage, if it escapes or gets out of control—such as a wild beast—is liable for the consequences independently of negligence. His liability becomes that of an 'insurer' (using that term in the strictly legal sense), who is not only bound to take care, but must make sure that his precautions are successful.

The applicability of this principle to road accidents was early pointed out by Mr. A. P. Herbert in one of his amusing, and often instructive, 'Misleading Cases'—*Haddock* v. *Thwale*. After quoting at length the classic judgment of Mr. Justice Blackburn in *Rylands* v. *Fletcher*, he makes the imaginary judge proceed:

> Mr. Thwale's motor car should in law be regarded as a wild beast, and the boast of its makers that it contains the concentrated power of 45 horses makes the comparison just. . . . The ordinary walking citizen cannot be expected to calculate to a nicety the speed, direction and future conduct of such monsters, for not even their own drivers can do that. In the face of a procession of them the wise may well blunder, the brave falter, the resolute waver and the swift be too slow.

'Excellent fooling,' it may be said, but many a true word is spoken in jest.

Whatever might have been the case thirty years ago, it is probably too late now to argue that the rule in *Rylands* v. *Fletcher* applies to motor vehicles under the law as it stands, but, however that may be, its application to them certainly involves but a slight extension of the rule. A motor vehicle in rapid motion fully justifies the description often given of it—'a lethal weapon'; and no one will suggest that when

Parliament abolished the red flag and allowed motorists to share our highways with other road users, it was foreseen how deadly would be the consequences. Indeed, the very fact that so many road casualties are officially returned as 'accidental' and that responsible public men have spoken of them as being 'regrettable but inevitable,' goes to show that the use of motor vehicles on the road falls logically within the principle affirmed in *Rylands* v. *Fletcher*, though the action of Parliament in legalising their use may debar an injured claimant from relying on it in a court of law.

Turning from common law to statutory enactments, an instance of 'liability without fault,' familiar to us all, is found in the series of Workmen's Compensation Acts passed in Great Britain and in most American States as well as in Germany and other Continental countries. The analogy between road casualties and industrial accidents was strongly emphasised in the Report of a Committee, which reported in 1932 on the whole question of 'Compensation for Automobile Accidents' to the Columbia University Council of Research in the Social Sciences. The Committee included in its number judges and other distinguished lawyers and spent two years in investigating all sides of the question.

After pointing out that the Workmen's Compensation Acts were adopted 'not because of a theoretical preference for the principle of liability without fault, but because it had become imperative to discard a system which worked very badly' and cast a heavy burden upon injured persons and their families, the Report proceeds :

> In many respects there is a close analogy between the industrial situation, where workmen's compensation has been developed, and the motor vehicle situation, where the application of a like principle is now being discussed. Accidents are inevitable, whether in industry or in the operation of motor vehicles. It has been accepted as sound policy that the major part of the cost of accidents to employees should be borne by the industry, and it is proposed that the major part of the cost of those caused by the operation of motor vehicles should be cast upon the persons for whose benefit the motor vehicles are being operated. The conditions calling for the application of the compensation plan are similar, viz., the failure of the common law system to measure up to a fair estimate of social necessity.

In reply to the argument that the justification of the Workmen's Compensation laws was to be found in the

contractual relationship between employer and employee, which does not exist in the case of road accidents, the Report says:

> The insistence on the importance of this relationship magnifies the *source* of the economic evils sought to be adjusted and gives too little attention to the evils themselves. It is with the *consequences* of these accidents that the Committee is concerned, whether death or disability, with its train of distress and suffering and want, be caused by the operations of a machine in a factory or a motor vehicle on the road.

From the foregoing it will be seen that there is ample precedent for applying the principle of 'liability without fault' to road casualties. Whatever may be thought of the merits of the proposal, it cannot be rejected on the ground that it runs counter to legal principles or that it is asking Parliament to do what has never been done before. It means looking at road casualties from the victim's point of view. Someone has met with an accident involving loss; is it fair or socially desirable that he shall be compensated? If it is, the question is 'by whom,' and in the absence of a scheme of State insurance, can anything be fairer than that the loss should be borne by the persons and undertakings deriving benefit from the new form of transport?

The additional risk which the insurance companies would have to face would presumably be met by an addition to premiums. The addition would probably not be great, but only the insurance offices can give reliable information upon that point, and up to the present they have declined to give any estimate. The amount, however, hardly enters into the question; if the necessary addition be slight, so we may expect to be the objections to the proposal; if it be large, that in itself emphasises the hardship at present suffered by injured persons and the need for a change in the law.

In view of the ample justification afforded by precedent for the adoption in suitable cases of the principle of 'insurance' or liability without fault, in the place of the law of negligence, it seems unnecessary to labour the unsuitability of that law for arriving at a sound conclusion upon claims arising out of road casualties. The point is dealt with by the American Committee, to whose Report reference has already been made. On the general question of liability without fault the Report says:

The Committee believes that the principle of negligence is a principle of social expediency, and that it is not founded on any immutable basis of right. . . . The value of either principle [*i.e.*, the principle of negligence or the principle of liability without fault] is to be tested by its results rather than by *a priori* moral considerations;

while with regard to the particular case of motor accidents the Report points out that in these 'the principle of negligence is peculiarly difficult to apply,' seeing that

it is almost impossible for witnesses, even though they have not been participants in the accident, to remember and to reproduce exactly to the jury swiftly succeeding events which they have been neither trained nor prepared to observe.

Indeed, the objections raised to the amendments in the law advocated in this article are nearly always based on the assumption that they are unprecedented and inconsistent with well-established legal principles, but, as has been shown, these objections are founded on a misapprehension.

I have purposely left to the end any mention of the important Bill in which most of the foregoing suggestions are embodied, the Road Traffic (Compensation for Accidents) Bill, introduced into the House of Lords by the late Lord Danesfort in 1932. When the Bill was discussed on Second Reading, not only was it warmly supported by Lord Buckmaster, Lord Cecil and others, but the Lord Chancellor, in a sympathetic speech, referring to the principle established by *Rylands* v. *Fletcher*, said that it did not seem 'a very alarming or revolutionary change to apply it to a potentially dangerous machine like a motor vehicle.' The Second Reading was carried on a division, but the Bill was not proceeded with further that Session on a promise by the Government to consider the questions raised by it.

It was, however, re-introduced in the following Session and at the suggestion of the Government was referred to a Select Committee. That Committee, after holding nine sittings and hearing twenty witnesses, presented a unanimous report affirming the general principle of the Bill, but redrafted it and altered it in one important respect, namely, contributory negligence. The Bill as redrafted by the Committee passed through all its stages in the House of Lords, and an identical Bill introduced in the next Session met with the same success,

though for some reason, not fully explained, the Government withdrew its support.

The Report of the Select Committee deserves careful perusal. It stated that the Committee had been greatly impressed with the gravity of the problem with which the Bill dealt. While no precise statistics were available, evidence pointed to something like a quarter of the claims for compensation being rejected and the Committee said that they had reason to believe that in many of the cases where compensation was paid the amount was inadequate. (Obviously the number of victims who presented no claims, because they were advised that in the present state of the law it would be useless to do so, can only be a matter of conjecture, but their number must be considerable.)

The Committee met the objection that the Bill went counter to the principle of the law of negligence by pointing out that that principle had already 'been subject to frequent and important invasions,' instancing the decision in *Rylands* v. *Fletcher*, the Workmen's Compensation Acts, the Air Navigation Act and (as regards contributory negligence) the rule in cases of collisions between ships, and they came to the conclusion that a departure from the general principles of the law of negligence was fully justified in the case of road accidents.

> It seems to the Committee [the Report said] that the roads of this country have—at all events in certain places and at certain seasons—been rendered places to which it is dangerous for pedestrians to resort; that, nevertheless, it is necessary for pedestrians to resort to the roads; and that where a pedestrian, without negligence on his part, is injured by a motorist whether negligent or not, he should be entitled to recover damages.

The Report went on to say that the payment of compensation to innocent pedestrians should be regarded as a duty, not so much of the individual motorist who did the damage, as of the motoring community as a whole, to be met by insurance against the increased third party risk.

With regard to contributory negligence the Committee said that they could not go the full length proposed by the Bill, under which an injured person was entitled to full damages, unless his injuries were wholly caused by his own negligence, and the Bill, as redrafted by the Committee,

provided that where an injury was contributed to, but not solely caused, by the negligence of the injured person, there should be taken into account, in computing the damages, the degree in which his negligence contributed to the accident. Where the accident was caused by the conduct of a third party, the Bill, while leaving the driver liable to the injured person, gave him a right of indemnity against the third party.

No doubt there is much to be said for the Committee's alteration of the Bill as regards contributory negligence, which would assimilate our law to the codes of several Continental countries and embodies a principle which, as the Committee point out, 'has been applied and worked without difficulty in the case of collisions between ships at sea where both are to blame.' To some extent probably the principle is often acted upon, consciously or unconsciously, by juries in running-down cases, for they must find it difficult in assessing damages to leave out of account altogether the degrees of blameworthiness which they attribute to the two parties respectively.

It will be convenient to summarise the practical results of the Bill as applied to the weekly toll of some 400 road casualties, many of them causing death or lifelong injury, and the arguments advanced for the amendment of our law.

If the Bill became law in the form in which it passed the House of Lords, the effect would be that when injury was caused to a pedestrian on the road by negligence on the part of—

(1) Motorist, there would be payable to the injured person or his dependants *full damages*.

(2) Pedestrian, there would be payable to the injured person or his dependants *no damages*.

(3) Both parties, there would be payable to the injured person or his dependants *part damages*.

So far the law would be altered in two main respects: first, the burden of proof would be shifted from the person injured to the person inflicting the injury; secondly, where both parties were to blame, the injured person would receive damages reduced roughly in proportion to the degree of his blameworthiness, instead of receiving nothing.

There remain those cases where the injury has been due to the act of a third party, and those which may be said to have

been the result of 'pure' or 'inevitable' accident, though if those terms are taken to mean that no amount of care would have prevented the casualty, such cases are probably much less common than people are apt to assume.

It is here that opinions are most sharply divided. The Bill says that a motorist who does damage must pay for it, even though he was not in fault, provided the pedestrian himself was free from fault. Why? Because the motor vehicle has proved itself a 'lethal weapon,' and the law differentiates between dangerous things and animals and those not in their nature dangerous: if I am leading a cow, which escapes from control and injures you, you must prove negligence, but not if I am leading a tiger. If the law differentiates between a cow and a tiger, why not between a pony cart and a motor car?

That would have been the argument for the Bill—*and perhaps the only argument*—before 1930. The motorist might be innocent, but he must pay, because he was using and failed to control a dangerous machine. On the question 'Who shall suffer?' there were only two alternatives—the innocent motorist or the innocent pedestrian—and in view of the dangerous nature of the vehicle, it was argued that it was not only fairer that the man who inflicted the injury should suffer rather than the victim, but more in accord with legal principles, because a motor vehicle in its potentiality for harm more nearly resembles a tiger or a railway train than a cow or a pony cart.

But those are *not* the alternatives now: the position is fundamentally changed by the introduction of compulsory insurance. The motorist now would never pay the damages; they would be paid by his insurance company; he would pay a premium and would have to pay that whether he injured anyone or not, and the payments to road victims being made by the insurance companies would be spread over the whole motoring community. The question would cease to be one of damages paid for a wrong inflicted and would become solely one of compensation received for a loss sustained; it would cease to be a mere question of law and would become (as in the case of accidents to workmen) one of economic policy and social justice.

In these new conditions, what are the alternatives?

One of them remains the same as before, namely, that the innocent victims or their families shall bear the burden—an easy but heartless solution. What is the other? An addition to insurance premiums to cover the extra risk.

Now, even granting that the advantages to the community of swift transport are as great as enthusiastic motorists claim them to be, it cannot be denied that motor vehicles have revolutionised road travel and converted the use of our highways, which used to be a comparatively safe act, into a highly dangerous one, and if we admit, as we must, human nature and faculties being what they are, that this revolution involves a certain number of accidents each year, in which legal blame cannot be brought home to either motorist or pedestrian, and further that these accidents, apart from suffering, entail a substantial money loss, which, we ask, is the fairer—that the loss shall fall on the few thousand innocent victims and their families or be shared by the two millions or more of owners or drivers of motor vehicles, *i.e.*, the people who, for pleasure or profit, are taking advantage of the new form of transport?

That is the question. So stated it seems to admit of only one answer, even without taking into account what must not be forgotten, namely, that whoever bears the *money* loss, the whole 100 per cent. of the *suffering* is borne by the injured persons. There is no sharing of that!

ALEXANDER K. BUTTERWORTH.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

Ten days *en famille* in Kerry at Castle Gregory, at the base of the narrow chain of lofty sandhills which separates the great bays of Brandon and Tralee, have served, not to modify, but to heighten the delights of earlier visits.[1] The narrow strip of arable fields which runs for 20 miles between the shore and the blue hills rising to 3000 feet, ending in the sheer cliffs of Brandon Point, is as fertile as when Arthur Young told of it in his *Tour of Ireland*, 150 years ago. Crops are good this year, cattle are fetching better prices, and the demand for bacon is keen. Yet the stream of emigration to England flows unchecked as it did, in Young's day, to Newfoundland and America: almost every household has sons or daughters mostly in London or the Midlands.

In Young's day, and long after, the flow of migrants was ascribed to rack-renting by absentee landlords, and lack of security of tenure. Neither cause operates to-day. Dublin Castle rules no more; Whitehall and Westminster exercise no control; the Irish Free State is mistress of its own destinies. But, from the point of view of the working man, conditions are, at least on the surface, and for the time being, better in England, though food is cheaper in Ireland, with potatoes at 4½*d.* a stone, meat half the English price, and daily necessaries and small luxuries like beer and tobacco no dearer. As water finds its own level, so do Irishmen, who individually feel themselves to be members of the British Empire and citizens of a United Kingdom, tend to go where conditions of life are best. No race is more adaptable, none has done so much to people the waste places of the earth. The men are strong to labour: every English farmer with a beet crop to lift knows at what price and with what speed a gang of Irishmen, sleeping rough and going from farm to

[1] See *Nineteenth Century and After* for October 1935 and July 1936.

farm, can do his harvesting. English contractors often prefer nomad Irish to resident English labour. England is as much the market of Ireland as of South Wales and Scotland. The four countries are fated to live together.

Among the passengers from Fishguard to Cork were some thirty naval ratings from sixteen to nineteen years of age, all in uniform, going on leave. 'How will they like your kit at home in Skibbereen?' I asked one of them. 'There's more that likes to see it than the other sort,' he replied easily. 'A lot of young men at home wish they had gone across with me. I'll serve twelve years and come back with a trade and a bit in the bank; that's what Ireland wants.' He was one of three brothers, one of whom was in the Mediterranean with the Fleet. His father believed in De Valera, his mother did not bother either way. They were Catholics and prayed that the army might win in Spain. He hoped to go on foreign service next year.

Here was one tie. Another was indicated by the cargo I saw unloaded at Fishguard—Irish butter and cattle and, marvellous to relate, churns of milk consigned for manufacturing purposes to a place in Surrey.

* * * * *

A few days later I was in a village on the wildest part of the Kerry coast, exchanging reminiscences of foreign travel with a seventy-year-old fisherman and his crew. They each had a few acres of land on which to grow potatoes, carrots and onions, with some clover and grazing for the horses and cattle. Some ran a few geese, turkeys or ducks on the common lands. A few grew wheat and beet, thanks to a subsidy on rye and barley. Their only manure was seaweed, which, with its rich iodine content, should surely add value to the crops. It no longer paid to burn kelp for the ash, even when the May weed, which gave the best ash, was coming in. A few years ago they had built, with stone and cement, special places for the burning; but few of them had ever been used, for the Government stopped the subsidy, being unable to compete with iodine and bromine cheaply produced from the Dead Sea and Utah. The change had hit thousands of families all along the west coast of Ireland But the market for *carragheen* moss was better: it fetched

2*s*. 6*d*. a stone this year; it all went to Germany and Belgium, where it was valued, when reduced to a jelly, as a remedy against colds and as a delicacy. They did not know why the English did not use it. *Slokane*—an edible seaweed (*Fucus saccharifera*), sweet to the taste—was a side-line: it mostly went to America, where its medicinal properties were prized, especially for children of Irish descent. Lobsters and crabs were their best articles of trade, but after October the weather stopped fishing.

Next day a small French boat, fitted with an auxiliary motor, sailed into the bay, and I was sent for to translate in detail the 'statement of account' which it brought of the sales of the last batch of lobsters consigned to a firm in *Les Halles de Paris*: the gross sum received, some 550 francs, was reduced to 250 francs after all expenses had been paid—transport, customs, *octroi*, commission and stamps—which meant that the sender received about 6*d*. for each lobster. The weather was against them; though the lugger was fitted with a tank, they had arrived dead. A note at the foot of the account promised better prices next time, so they pulled out another twenty dozen lobsters from the wooden tanks lying in the Bay and sent them off. The English buyers took a bigger commission than the French, and paid less, though lobsters were cheaper in far-off Paris than in London. It was well to keep in with two buyers and not give a monopoly to one. The trouble was that French boats came into the bay, not only to buy lobsters, but to poach on grounds that were already fully fished over, and Spanish boats too. So this remote village was selling the harvest of the sea to France, Belgium, Germany and America, but little or none to Dublin or England, and valued their international connexions.

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The monthly cattle market was held in the main street on a Monday. There was no auction; a few dealers went from group to group, offering a price and, receiving no word, moved on, to return later to make a better price, which would at last be clinched with a gesture that was more like a slap than a handshake. Prices were better, but 'Dev.'s' economic war hung heavy over all. How long would it go on, I was asked, and should we charge duty on

turkeys at 6*d.* a pound next Christmas? Bold speeches a week later at the Galway and Wexford by-election, which favoured 'Dev.,' suggests, as a farmer put it to me, that if the Irish are changing their minds, the President is changing his too, and even faster.

August 15 was our 'Pattern Day'—'Saint Mary of the Warren,' the patronal festival of the Magharees ('the sand hills'), home of rabbits and hares. A few gypsies came from Puck Fair, held from time immemorial on August 11 at Killorglin, where a goat, garlanded and well fed, is set up on a stand 40 feet high to preside, being, as one man explained, the only animal that has the patience and dignity to do the honours of the fair for three days. 'The strongest man in the British Isles'—those were his exact words—balanced his own bicycle on his head, a borrowed cartwheel on the palm of his hand, and lay on a board studded with nails, allowing his assistant to jump on his hirsute chest.

But before all this began Mass was said in a crowded church, whilst men knelt on the steps at the open door. As the sacring bell rang, all in the street bared their heads, and many, silent for a moment in shops and at the booths, crossed themselves. Presently the parish priest came out to spend half an hour with his parishioners. By mid-day the village street was full: the swings, at half English prices, in great demand. John Duffy junior's Talkie Coliseum Cinema (entrance 4*d.*) drew many behind the screen in the open air. A strolling flautist and a violinist at one end of the street, and an accordion-player at the other, played for what few pennies the audience cared to give. I spun a coin with an old man to decide who should pay at a booth: 'the lady,' he cried, not 'heads'; I had not heard that since army days in India thirty odd years ago. At nine o'clock dancing began (entrance 3*s.* to keep it select). The *shebeens* were full of men, and of song; the *garda* (police) walked slowly up and down, but found nothing to require attention. There was much courting—many couples arm in arm—but none of the lively squeals which on such a night in England show that someone is making someone else happy. Men and women alike spoke in soft tones. In the far distance a lighthouse flashed. The stars shone, reflected brightly in the lough close by; a flock of starlings, startled by fishermen in quest

of sea-trout, fluttered noisily. At 10.30 the doors of the taverns closed: at 11 the last occupant had left. The guards passed slowly by, to see that the law was being kept. The doctor turned to say good-night: the trim, well-stocked shops remained open till midnight. Then silence till 4 o'clock, when couples began to leave the halls to walk or ride home. The sun rose over Tralee as brightly as it had set over Brandon. 'Pattern Day' was over, and a few hours later men and women were assembling for Mass at the cross, erected to the memory of men slain near-by during the last 'troubles.'

* * * * *

Between Cork, one of the most beautiful harbours in Europe, and Fishguard, I had some talk over the taffrail with an American returning from a visit to the land of his birth. Himself a farmer as well as an industrialist, he thought that Ireland needed good farming and small industries, and that to this extent a protective policy was right, but not the economic war. He saw with alarm the falling birth rate and the stream of migrants. The best young men and women tended to leave: that had gone on for a century, and the effect was visible. It cost at least £1000 in food, clothes and services to produce a young person of eighteen. Ireland was exporting its most valuable natural product at the rate of £4,000,000 or £5,000,000 a year, for the Irish Free State land was under-peopled; worse still, it was losing potential leaders. *Cœlum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt* was not true. Men did change when they crossed deep waters, and if they returned could not adapt themselves to the conditions they had left. But we agreed that there was still in Ireland a great reservoir of good men and women who, if they could accept a life of simplicity and relative poverty, would be far happier there than in London, Liverpool, or Chicago or New York: the spiritual awakening which he thought he had seen in some European countries had not reached Ireland. He had met courtesy, good temper, and good nature everywhere, but the desire to migrate was not a good sign. The young men were restless, *tendebantque manus ripae ulterioris amore*, like the shades beyond the Styx in the Sixth Aeneid.

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On August 19, in the small hours of the morning, th *Innisfallen* disgorged at Fishguard a full cargo of third-clas passengers and cattle in about equal numbers. The cattl were lucky, for food awaited them: when I visited the tin station buffet at 5 o'clock in search of victuals, I found everything sold out. The ship had brought more passenger than usual, explained the tired young woman: the Traffi Department did not advise them how many to expec Breakfast (at 3*s.* 6*d.*) could be had on the train. The hundrec of persons who could not afford to spend so much woulc have to wait till they reached London.

My American friend was censorious; third-class passengers were better treated in this matter on the Continent we in England made things comfortable for the fairly well-to do, and ignored the rest. Why was nothing but 'trash,' a a young sailor termed it, left? He wanted a few slices of bread and butter, a 'hot-dog,' or a meat pie. He was offerec chocolate or (for 4*d.*) a cold boiled egg.

* * * * *

I returned to the welter of London and, if the daily Press is evidence of public opinion, to the 'absolute confusion of thought,' of which, in another sphere, the Dean of St. Paul's recently spoke so truly. Whilst the Government is pressing for a policy of neutrality towards the parties in Spain, the spirit of partisanship is being very actively fostered by a section of the daily Press, of which the following from the *News Chronicle* of August 11 is a fair sample:

> Barcelona is a proud city to-day. Rising out of the ashes of its night of fire is a belief that it has made history and that Spain has once more given something to humanity. With every church destroyed, and much of its glorious art blotted out, this may be hard to understand, until we realise that on July 19 a military revolt planned for months and materially supported by the Fascist International was crushed by the poorly armed workers side by side with the sort of people who in England are reading these words in tubes and buses during the rush-hour.

Comment is needless, except perhaps to speculate as to the names and addresses of those who direct the 'Fascist International.' The *Daily Mail*, on the other side, reported on August 12 under captions 'Patriots Restore Order: Siesta

Again,' that ' at Barcelona another Government has been set up, taking no orders from Madrid.' It is not surprising that recruiting is at its lowest ebb in London, where these papers are most widely read. Never, even in August 1914, was there a more general support in Great Britain for isolation; but it is not yet realised that such a policy, if it is to succeed, requires an overwhelming backing of armed force.

* * * * *

Those who would understand the spirit which animates both sides in Spain would do well to remember with what ferocity the Spanish-speaking countries of Paraguay and Bolivia, with a common tongue and a common history, were recently fighting. They should turn to Napier's *Peninsular War* (bk. xvi., chap. v.) to read his account of the Assault of Badajos.

Former failures there were to avenge, and on either side, such leaders as left no excuse for weakness in the hour of trial; and the possession of Badajos was become a point of honour, personal with the soldiers of each nation. But the strong desire for glory was . . . dashed with a hatred of the citizens on an old grudge, and recent toil and hardship, with much spilling of blood, had made many incredibly savage: for these things render the noble-minded indeed, averse to cruelty, but harden the vulgar spirit. . . . Thus every spirit found a cause of excitement, the wondrous power of discipline bound the whole together as with a band of iron, and, in the pride of arms, none doubted their might, to bear down every obstacle that man could oppose to their fury.

* * * * *

Let any man picture to himself this frightful carnage taking place in a space of less than a hundred square yards. Let him consider that the slain died not all suddenly, nor by one manner of death; that some perished by steel, some by shot, some by water, that some were crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some trampled upon, some dashed to atoms by the fiery explosions; that for hours this destruction was endured without shrinking, and that the town was won at last, let any man consider this and he must admit that a *British* army bears with it an awful power. And false would it be to say that the *French* were feeble men, for the garrison stood and fought manfully and with good discipline behaving worthily. Shame there was none on any side. Yet who shall do justice to the bravery of the soldiers? the noble emulation of the officers?

No age, no nation ever sent forth braver troops to battle than those who stormed Badajos.

When the extent of the night's havoc was made known to Lord Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss of his gallant soldiers.

Let us not scoff, nor speak with scorn of either side. Let us rather weep with Wellington at this latest proof of the inhumanity of man to man.

The decision of the European Concert not to intervene in Spain is doubtless prudent, but it is a policy of negation. It assumes that intervention must be in the interest of one side or the other and that it must divide Europe into armed camps. Neither of these assumptions are self-evident. Four Powers intervened on the outbreak of war between Greece and Turkey, with complete success, in 1897. They garrisoned Crete and kept troops there till 1906; and there are many other examples of honourable and disinterested intervention in recent history, such as that of the French in Syria in 1860.

Public opinion on both wings in this country is horrified at the carnage in Spain. Their feelings are in no way reflected by the prudent silence of the bishops and the Free Churches, generally so ready to declare themselves upon such issues. But most Englishmen desire to maintain an attitude of impartiality, though not necessarily of detachment. Their sentiments are those expressed by Virgil in his Eighth Eclogue:

> saevus Amor docuit natorum sanguine matrem
> commaculare manus: crudelis tu quoque, mater.
> crudelis mater magis, an puer improbus ille?
> improbus ille puer: crudelis tu quoque, mater.

which has been beautifully translated by an anonymous author as follows:

> 'Fierce love has made a mother stain her hands
> With her own children's blood—fierce mother too
> Was she more cruel, or the boy more vile?
> A cruel mother, and an impious boy.'

I believe that popular opinion, if it could be ascertained, would to-day favour disinterested and impartial intervention by the four Powers—Britain, France, Germany and Italy—principally concerned.

Arnold Wilson.

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THE

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THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE

By Arthur Merton

Without the support of some strong Power Egypt's territorial integrity would not be worth a day's purchase. On the other hand, it is vital for Britain that no other Power should sit athwart the Suez Canal, which runs through Egyptian territory. These two factors should provide all the incentive for an alliance between the two countries. Unfortunately, politics and *amour propre* on the Egyptian side, lack of appreciation of Egyptian psychology, and an exaggerated conception of prestige on the British have conspired throughout the past eighteen years to prevent this very desirable consummation.

Recent developments in North-East Africa—the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and the presence of large Italian forces on the frontiers of Egypt and the Sudan—suddenly brought home to both parties the expediency of some immediate understanding. The result has been the Anglo-

Egyptian Treaty of Alliance signed on August 26 by Mr. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, and Mustapha El Nahas Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt.[1] This treaty is for twenty years, after the expiration of which either party can request a revision. Any disagreement in regard to such revision will be submitted to the League of Nations or to arbitration. Negotiations for a revision can also be engaged at any time after ten years if both parties wish it. But every revision must provide for the continuation of the alliance which the treaty establishes. Before analysing the terms, it may be interesting briefly to review the events since the Great War which have led to Egypt, then a vassal of Turkey in the occupation of Britain, being able to-day to enter into this alliance as an independent sovereign State.

Turkey's adhesion to the Central Empires in 1914 liberated Egypt from her vassalage, promoted her from a khediviate to a sultanate, and made her a British Protectorate. During the war Egypt rendered the Allied cause invaluable services. Our short-sighted policy immediately after the Armistice gave, however, the impression that we did not intend to accord her the consideration which her services entitled her to expect. And so there began to manifest itself a movement for 'Complete Independence,' the prime mover of which, Saad Zaghlul Pasha, acquired such an influence over the people as to give the Wafd, the party which he formed, a dominant political position which it enjoys to this day. A mission under the late Lord Milner inquired into the upheaval that occurred early in 1919. After an exhaustive investigation on the spot and protracted discussion in London with Zaghlul Pasha, by then the acknowledged mouthpiece of the nation, Lord Milner handed him, in August 1920, a memorandum outlining the basis for a treaty of alliance.[2]

The main points were: Recognition of Egypt as a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions. Britain to keep a military force for the protection of Imperial communications at a point in the Canal zone to be decided by the treaty and to defend the territorial integrity

[1] The Parliaments of both countries have yet to ratify the treaty. But there is no reason to anticipate any hitch in this respect.

[2] This has served in many respects as the basis for the present settlement.

of Egypt, who in time of war would render all assistance within her borders. Egypt to have foreign representation. The British representative in Egypt to enjoy an exceptional position and precedence over all other diplomatic representatives. The Financial Adviser to assume the powers of the Public Debt Commission. The Judicial Adviser to be kept informed on all matters affecting the administration of law where foreigners were concerned. The Capitulatory *régime* to be formed by agreement between Britain and the Powers, who would transfer to Britain the rights they enjoyed. All consular jurisdiction to be transferred to the Mixed Tribunals. All legislation, including fiscal legislation, to be applicable to foreigners, subject to a veto by the British representative, to be exercised only when any law would operate inequitably against foreigners. The Sudan was excluded from the proposed treaty. With characteristic hesitation Zaghlul Pasha, the pen almost in his hand to initial the documents, decided first to sound Egyptian public opinion. The result was that such reserves were made from Egypt that further discussions became impossible.

After the publication of the Milner Report the British Government invited Adly Yeghen Pasha, then Prime Minister, to visit London to discuss the implementation of the recommendations. He could not come to terms with Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary, and on his return to Egypt a serious deadlock ensued. This Lord Allenby, then High Commissioner, solved by going to London and persuading the Cabinet to issue the now celebrated Declaration of February 28, 1922, which conceded everything on which there was no dispute and reserved the matters on which no agreement could be reached. The Protectorate was abolished and Egypt was recognised as an independent sovereign State with the right to a Constitution and foreign representation. The safeguarding of Imperial communications, the protection of foreign interests, the defence of Egypt against outside aggression and the Sudan were, however, reserved for the absolute discretion of Britain until an agreement could be reached thereon. The sultanate became a monarchy. In the following year Egypt was granted a Constitution based on most modern principles.

Zaghlul Pasha was returned with a majority to the first Parliament, which met on March 15, 1924.

Meanwhile Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had become Premier and Foreign Secretary. Zaghlul Pasha was his great friend, so he invited him to London to discuss a settlement of the reserved points. But Zaghlul Pasha proved to be in a truculent mood and Mr. MacDonald had to break off the discussion. A month later the assassination of the Sirdar caused the fall of the Wafd Cabinet and necessitated the suspension of the Constitution. A Palace *régime* of some eighteen months followed. Then the opposition parties agitated for, and secured, a return to constitutional life. A coalition Cabinet was formed under Adly Pasha. Within a year Sarwat Pasha, who had mainly been instrumental in persuading Lord Allenby to fight for the 1922 Declaration, had succeeded him and negotiations were opened in London, this time with Sir Austen Chamberlain. The auspices seemed unusually favourable, for Zaghlul Pasha had promised to support whatever Sarwat Pasha accepted. Unfortunately, Zaghlul Pasha died before the conversations were concluded. Sarwat Pasha found on his return that, owing to Wafd opposition, his Cabinet would not accept the further concessions he had obtained. He resigned. Nahas Pasha, now leader of the Wafd, succeeded him. A few months later King Fuad dismissed him and called on Mohamed Mahmud Pasha to form a Cabinet. The Constitution was again suspended and a dictatorship declared.

In 1929 Oxford invited Mahmud Pasha to come and receive the Hon. D.C.L. Barely had he reached London than the new Labour Government pressed on him terms which were such an advance on the Sarwat offer that he could not refuse them, though he realised that, having no political following, he was probably signing his own death warrant as Premier. In effect, on his return he found it impossible to fulfil the condition attached to the British offer—ratification by a freely elected Parliament—and so he resigned. The Wafd returned to office under Nahas Pasha, who went to London to discuss the Mahmud proposals. He obtained further concessions beyond the 'utmost limit' which those proposals had been represented to be. But just when all appeared settled, negotiations broke down,

ostensibly over the Sudan. Ten years had thus witnessed six abortive attempts at a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian question. The reason for this persistent failure, in spite of ever fresh British concessions, was threefold: first, each negotiation was entered upon almost under the shadow, and in the disturbed atmosphere, of the preceding break-down; secondly, the initiative always came from London, where the negotiations were staged amid a blaze of publicity; thirdly, the Egyptian negotiators, usually drawn from one party, were always exposed to the 'overbidding' of political opponents in Cairo.

On this occasion six years had passed since the last attempt. The initiative came from Cairo. The negotiations took place *in camera* in Egypt. The Egyptian delegation although predominantly Wafd, represented every political element that counted in the country. True, changes in the world situation had eased the atmosphere. But the different venue, the passage of time, and the composition of the Egyptian delegation undoubtedly played a decisive part.[3]

The Egyptians had four main grievances. The presence of British troops in the chief cities offended their dignity. Exclusion from participation in the military and civil administration of the Sudan affected their sovereignty. The Capitulations impeded the development of the country. Egypt's position as an independent sovereign State suffered by delay in admission to the League of Nations. On the first two and the last points they are receiving complete, and on the third partial, satisfaction. The occupation of Egypt is formally terminated. Britain recognises Egypt as a sovereign independent State and undertakes to support her admission to the League of Nations. The alliance provides for mutual consultation and aid in the event of war, imminent menace of war, or apprehended international emergency. In any such contingency Egypt will afford Britain all facilities on Egyptian territory and Britain can send extra forces. Thus, in all emergencies Britain will

[3] Nor must the spade work done by Aly Maher Pasha be overlooked. It was entirely thanks to his statesmanship, both as Director of the royal Cabinet and Prime Minister during the elections preceding the Wafd's advent to power in April, that almost insuperable difficulties due to the temperamental incompatibility of some of the party leaders were swept out of the path of the negotiations.

be able to take, with the willing assent of Egypt as an ally, any precautionary measures she may deem expedient, and a right of re-entry is assured even if the British garrison has already been withdrawn by agreement from Egyptian territory.

The 'military' clauses gave considerable trouble. All preceding negotiations had provided for the evacuation of the British garrison to the Canal. But after the rupture in 1930 the War Office decided that the troops must be retained in Cairo and Alexandria. This was the position when the present negotiations were opened. It was in anticipation of the difficulty this would cause that the British Government, in acquiescing in the Egyptian proposal to negotiate, stipulated that agreement must be reached on the military clauses before the rest of the treaty was discussed. For long a deadlock ensued. Then suddenly the British Government made a *volte-face* and, with minor modifications in the 1930 proposals, agreement was reached.

The British garrison will be concentrated in the Canal zone. It must not exceed 10,000 land forces and 400 pilots, with the necessary ancillary and civilian personnel. They will be stationed south of Kantara for the defence of the Suez Canal, which, 'while being an integral part of Egypt,' is also 'an essential means of communication between the different parts of the Empire.' Small detachments will be maintained at Port Said and Suez for the handling of material and supplies. The Egyptian Government undertakes to erect barracks with all necessary amenities, to construct and maintain certain arterial roads, and generally to improve railway facilities. The transfer from Cairo and Alexandria will not take place until the barracks and certain roads and railway improvements have been completed to the satisfaction of the British authorities. A period of eight years is mentioned.

Ample provision is made for training. The Air Force will be allowed to fly wherever necessary, reciprocal treatment being accorded to the Egyptian Air Force in British territory. Adequate landing-grounds and seaplane anchorages will be maintained. At the end of twenty years, if the two countries cannot agree on the point, the question of whether the Egyptian army is in a position to ensure

alone the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal may be submitted to the League of Nations or—this, as in the case of revision, is an improvement on previous drafts—to arbitration. Old stagers may regret the disappearance of the Union Jack from over Kasr-el-Nil and Mustapha Pasha barracks, where it has flown for the past half-century. But the new arrangement responds far more to modern conditions. Times have indeed changed since the first British troops occupied the Citadel in Cairo. Mechanisation and aviation have revolutionised transport. The new roads and railway lines, which will also benefit the civil population, will make the garrison on the Canal far more mobile than the troops quartered in Cairo and Alexandria have ever been. A British Military Mission will replace the present Inspectorate-General for the purpose of training the Egyptian army, whose armament and equipment will be identical with that of the British, and personnel of the Egyptian forces sent abroad for training will be trained in the United Kingdom. Co-operation between the two armies will thus be facilitated.

The Sudan question was expected to give trouble, but agreement was reached with little difficulty. The settlement is fully justified by the changed conditions. Under the Convention signed in 1899 after the reconquest, the supreme military and civil command was vested in a Governor-General appointed by Egyptian decree on the nomination of the British Government, Egyptian troops formed the main garrison, and Egyptians were admitted to the Civil Service and permitted to enter the country. This was the position until 1924, when Egyptian troops in the Sudan mutinied and the Sirdar was assassinated. All Egyptian military and civil elements were then repatriated, a local defence force was recruited, the door was closed to Egyptian immigration, and Egypt was made to contribute annually £E.750,000 towards the cost of administration, on the ground that the maintenance of peace in the Sudan safeguards Egypt's water supply and relieves her from keeping a force on her own southern border.

The new situation that has now arisen on the eastern frontier completely changed the outlook. Acceptance of a return to the *statu quo ante* 1924 is eminently sensible, since

this means Egyptian military co-operation in the defence of the frontier. It is also logical, for an alliance of friendship could scarcely be made while the Egyptians still bore resentment over the Sudan. And so henceforward the Anglo-Egyptian Convention of 1899 will again regulate the administration of the Sudan. Britain remains the dominant partner, but Egyptian troops will co-operate with British. British and Egyptian candidates will be selected for all posts for which no qualified Sudanese is available. Promotion up to any rank will be made, on the basis of individual merit, irrespective of nationality. There will be no discrimination between British and Egyptian subjects in the matter of commerce, immigration, and possession of property. An Egyptian officer will be appointed as military secretary to the Governor-General. An Egyptian economic expert will be seconded for service at Khartum: the economic interests of the two countries dictate close co-operation. The Inspector-General of the Egyptian Irrigation Service in the Sudan will be admitted to the Governor-General's Council when matters relating to his departmental interests are discussed—a concession fully justified by Egypt's dependence on the water flowing through the Sudan. Finally, the indebtedness of the Sudan towards Egypt for capital advanced up to 1913 for budgetary purposes and development, variously estimated at £E.30,000,000, will be discussed between the British and the Egyptian Treasuries. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the British Government has guaranteed capital and interest on £E.16,000,000 borrowed by the Sudan on the public market.

The rights of the Sudanese are specifically safeguarded by a provision which puts on record that the primary aim of the Administration is the welfare of the Sudanese. There is, however, little fear of any influx of Egyptians. The Sudan still bears the unsavoury reputation it acquired in the days of Ismail Pasha as a land of exile whence few ever returned. The recent visits of leading Egyptian economists and landowners may lead to some extension in business relations, and some enterprising Egyptian may take up some land. But that will be all to the good, for what the Sudan lacks is capital for development.

Contrary to expectation, the 'legal' clauses created con-

siderable difficulty. They still threaten to be the cause of international trouble. Some confusion seems to exist in the public mind on the subject of the Capitulations and the Mixed Tribunals, which many quite erroneously regard as one and the same thing. The Capitulations were 'letters of privilege' granted by the sultans to Genoese and Venetian merchants who wanted to trade with, and reside in, the Ottoman dominions. Later these were extended to other nationalities, until just before the war fifteen nations enjoyed capitulatory rights.[4] These rights include exemption from taxation[5] or legislation, not unanimously accepted by the Capitulatory Powers, immunity from arrest and domiciliary visits unless a consular agent accompanies the police, and trial by the consular courts. Like other parts of the Ottoman dominions, Egypt inherited the Capitulations from her suzerain.

The Mixed Tribunals are a derivation of the Capitulations. They were created in 1876 by international convention to deal with cases between Egyptians and foreigners, foreigners of different nationality, and foreigners and the Egyptian Government. Their only connexion with the Capitulations lies in the matter of legislation. While, generally speaking, new laws must be accepted by the Powers, certain legislation need only have the assent of the General Assembly of the Mixed Tribunals. The Egyptians wanted, as soon as the treaty had been ratified, to abolish the Capitulations and transfer to the Mixed Tribunals the consular jurisdiction over foreigners, and also to amalgamate the Mixed and the Native jurisdictions within five years. Britain very rightly objected that these were matters which must be discussed and settled with the Capitulatory Powers. It was agreed finally that these questions should be dealt with by diplomatic action. Britain recognises that the Capitulatory *régime* is no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times, and promises to use her influence to bring about a speedy abolition of the Capitulations and the fixation of a 'reasonable and not unduly prolonged' transitional period, during which the

[4] Germany, Austria and Russia have since lost their rights.

[5] The oft-voiced complaint that foreigners in Egypt contribute nothing to the cost of administration is wholly incorrect. Foreign residents pay every tax to which the Egyptians are subject. In addition, the foreign communities, although numerically but a fraction of the whole population, contribute the major portion of the £E.11,000,000 collected annually by the Customs.

Mixed Tribunals will exercise the jurisdiction at present vested in the consular courts.[6] At the end of the transitional period Egypt will be free to dispense with the Mixed Tribunals. In the event of no agreement being reached with the Powers, Egypt reserves her full right to abolish the Capitulations by a unilateral declaration and the Mixed Tribunals by giving the prescribed notice of one year.

It is possible that diplomatic action will, in the end, take the form of an international conference. Acquiescence in the disappearance of the Capitulations seems a foregone conclusion, and to meet the apprehensions of the foreign communities a special declaration is made that legislation applicable to foreigners will conform to modern principles and that no fiscal legislation will discriminate against foreigners. But there may be lively discussion with regard to the Mixed Tribunals. These courts have become a fundamental part of the economic life of the country. They handle all land registrations and land cases. They respond to a real need. The opinion Egyptian commercial and financial circles hold of them is illustrated by the policy of one of the greatest Egyptian institutions, whose constitution forbids it to have non-Egyptian shareholders or to do business with any but Egyptian clients, but which specially employs a European, to whom it transfers its cases so that they may come before the Mixed instead of the Native courts.[7] In the interest of Egypt herself the organisation of the Mixed Tribunals should continue untouched. Instead of the proposed 'amalgamation' with the Native courts, these tribunals, which, like the former, already deliver judgment in the name of the King of Egypt, could be transferred bodily from their special position into the cadre of the national jurisdiction. Thus they would be preserved intact as the basis of the economic structure of the country. Nomination to the bench could be vested entirely in the Egyptian Government. And, since for the handling of the intricate and

[6] Questions of personal status will remain with the consular courts where Capitulatory Powers desire this. Such questions affecting foreigners do not touch the sovereignty of Egypt. Apart from their transfer adding considerably to the intricacy of the work of the Mixed Tribunals, there is no reason why the foreign minorities should be less liberally treated than the Moslem majority, which has its own personal status courts.

[7] This expedient is followed regularly in thousands of other instances.

important commercial litigation of such a cosmopolitan country as Egypt a foreign element will be necessary in the magistracy, foreign judges could be appointed without reference, as at present, to their Governments. There is, indeed, no reason why in time it might not be possible to realise the project long cherished by many clear-sighted Egyptians, who frankly admit the fall in prestige which the native courts have suffered since the English judges were withdrawn, and give the national courts, in so far as concerns the Native and Mixed jurisdictions,[8] an Anglo-Egyptian judiciary in the appellate division.

Responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners devolves henceforward exclusively upon the Egyptian Government. The European bureau of the Public Security Department, created to watch over the interests of foreigners in 1923 when the political murders were at their height, will be immediately abolished, but a certain portion of the European element in the city police will be retained with British officers for the first five years of the operation of the treaty. The desire to abolish the European department is understandable, since it enjoys great influence. The elimination of the European element in the city police, although regrettable from the point of view of efficiency, is welcome, for of late purely political demonstrations have often developed an anti-British character by reason of the fact that there were British policemen in the force dealing with them. But the elimination of the European elements will not suit the Mixed Tribunals, which will find it difficult to handle the consular work without European police to carry out their orders. Since it is highly probable that the transitional period will be fixed at between fifteen and twenty years, some extension may have to be made in the period for which the European element will be retained in the police.

Contrary to previous drafts, no reference is made in the treaty to the Financial and Judicial Adviserships, the only survivors of the excellent system introduced by Lord Cromer. But there is a verbal note attached in which Nahas Pasha states that the absence of any provision means that the Egyptian Government will be free to act as it pleases. The

[8] The national courts include also the Mehkemeh Sharieh (religious courts), which must of course have purely Moslem judges.

Financial Advisership is certain to disappear at an early date. Until the Declaration of February 28, 1922, the holder played a decisive part in the administration of the country. He had a seat on the Council of Ministers, where he represented the views of the British representative and could veto any Egyptian project. Latterly the Financial Advisership has become a misnomer, and its disappearance will be no loss to British prestige. The Judicial Adviser, however, serves as a useful liaison between the Government and the Mixed Tribunals. It is quite possible that the post will be continued in some form for some time—at any rate, during the period of the elaboration of the contemplated judicial reforms.

Even the most ardent nationalists admit that Egypt will require foreign assistance for many years to come. When such foreign advice or help is needed Egypt will generally seek it in England. The greatest care should be taken in the selection of candidates. The appointment of mediocre men has frequently done our prestige incalculable harm, and the British Government might well give this matter its attention. Local politics will continue, as in the past, to influence the conduct of internal affairs. But, in the long run, the execution of the treaty and the maintenance of British influence will depend on the personality of the Englishmen appointed to these advisory posts, and, not least, on that of the British Ambassador.

To sum up, the treaty admirably adapts the 1930 proposals to the new situation, and is a tribute to the good sense and diplomacy of both parties. Nahas Pasha, the chief Egyptian negotiator, has displayed qualities which no one ever suspected. Sir Miles Lampson has further justified the high opinion already held of his ability. The past eighteen years of Anglo-Egyptian history have been replete with tragic misunderstandings and sad estrangements. That chapter, with its distressing souvenirs, is now closed. The Treaty of Alliance has opened a new one. The atmosphere of friendly understanding and sympathy in which it has been negotiated offers an augury for the resumption of the happy associations which from the occupation to the Armistice characterised the relationship between Britain and Egypt.

ARTHUR MERTON.

THE NEEDS OF DANZIG

By David Stephens

No subject has claimed more anxious attention in the last sixteen years at Geneva than that of Danzig. The affairs of the Free City, appearing regularly on the Agenda, are a standing item on the menu of the League; and at the last session, in July, the dish seemed to have acquired a more than usually pungent flavour. Since the ten years' pact of non-aggression was signed between Germany and Poland, it has been differently served, and with fresh ingredients. In earlier days the Council of the League were regularly invited to examine and resolve some quarrel between Poland and Danzig: sometimes upon comparatively trivial issues, such as the right of the Poles to set up Polish pillar-boxes, adorned with the white eagle, in the streets of Danzig; sometimes upon weightier questions of principle, such as the Polish munitions dump on the Westerplatte, or matters of currency, tariffs and quotas. The principal function of the High Commissioner was, as originally conceived, to be that of mediator between Poland and Danzig in such disputes as these. Now, however, these matters never reach Geneva. They are settled between Berlin and Warsaw. But if Germany and Poland prefer, for the moment, to settle the problem of the external relations of Danzig between themselves, the internal problem of the Constitution, of which the League is the guarantor, remains.

Danzig is one of the two remaining places in Europe where, as a result of the Peace Treaty, the League has still a direct duty of mediation and supervision. (The other is, of course, Upper Silesia, about whose affairs those of its critics who hold that the League can claim no practical successes or positive results would do well to inform themselves.) Articles 102 and 103 of the Treaty of Versailles

placed the territory of the Free City under the protection of the League and the Constitution under its guarantee—a Constitution which was, be it noted, not imposed but drawn up by the representatives of Danzig in collaboration with the High Commissioner. The League was in fact never summoned to exercise its functions as guarantor until the Nazis achieved power in Danzig. But ever since the elections of May 1933 tension has been steadily growing between the Nazi Government and the League's representative; and violations of the Constitution have been brought before the Council with increasing regularity. At the end of 1934 Mr. Lester referred in his Annual Report to 'doubts and apprehensions about a tendency in legislation and administration.' At the end of 1935 he noted 'an intense development of the policy to create a National-Socialist community *de facto*' and 'the application of an anti-constitutional policy in a steadily increasing degree.' The British Foreign Secretary described the situation in January of this year as 'exceptionally grave,' and doubted 'whether the Danzig Government is in fact dealing with these questions with good will and good faith.' The President of the Senate's assurances that the Constitution would in future be respected were accepted, and Danzig again disappeared from the forefront of international politics until the end of June last. Then came the climax. Herr Greiser appeared before the Council on July 4 and, 'speaking in the name not only of Danzig but of the whole German people,' made a demonstration in favour of the return of Danzig to German sovereignty. He declared that 400,000 Germans 'did not wish to regard themselves as bound eternally to the League of Nations when, by blood and race, they are bound to Germany.' [1] Herr Greiser's historic gesture as he left the Council chamber, which earned him the admiration of his supporters and the gratitude of all cartoonists, was aimed at the Press gallery in reply to an improper demonstration from that quarter, but it seemed to the world at large to epitomise the attitude of his Government to the League.

The position is only too clear. Most of the cards are already on the table. '*Gleichschaltung*' is steadily proceeding under orders from Berlin. The internal political development of the past three years in Danzig follows, though more slowly,

[1] Cf. *The Times*, July 6, 1936.

the stages by which Hitler rose to power in Germany. First comes a constitutional success at the polls, giving the Nazis a majority of something over 50 per cent.; an '*Ermächtigungsgesetz*,' or law empowering the Government to rule by decree, quickly follows. A period of compromise supervenes, during which the opposition parties are played off against one another, all against all. These parties are then branded as traitors to their country and gradually squeezed out of existence by the usual methods: their Press is forbidden, their meetings are broken up. No secret was ever made of the methods by which the Nazis in Danzig intended to achieve their aim of 'co-ordination.' 'Our purpose remains unchanged,' declared Gauleiter Forster in a speech made last November, 'to work for a great and powerful Germany. A day will come . . . when all those fellows who dare to oppose us will be flung into concentration camps, which is where they belong.'

This policy has not gained the support of an overwhelming majority of the citizens of Danzig; indeed, no German community outside the boundaries of the Reich has yet offered such solid opposition to the Nazi *régime* as has Danzig. At the last election, held in April 1935, the Nazis strained every nerve to gain the requisite two-thirds majority for an amendment to the Constitution. They are said to have spent 2,000,000 gulden (£120,000) on propaganda alone. The result was gravely disappointing. After an election campaign in which all known methods of persuasion were employed, the National-Socialist Party was returned with a majority of 59 per cent. As a result of a joint appeal of all opposition parties to the High Court, praying that the elections might be annulled, the votes cast for the Nazi Party were reduced by 3 per cent. in municipal and 10 per cent in rural areas. It was a brave decision on the part of the High Court, and one which gave convincing proof of their political independence.

The one remarkable feature of the election was, indeed, that so large a proportion as over 40 per cent. of the voters dared in the circumstances to cast their vote against the Government. How much real support the Government could command in a free election, if such a thing can be imagined, is no easier to say, nor much more profitable to speculate, than it is in Austria.

For one thing, the Danzig electorate is never likely to be asked to vote on the issue 'National-Socialism *v.* the Rest' or 'Totalitarian *v.* Democratic Government.' German elections are now expressly fought on the national issue only, and, as between Germany and the world, the population of Danzig is not likely to hesitate. But the fact remains—there is now substantial opposition to the Nazi *régime* in Danzig, which requires explanation. So much dissatisfaction does not arise of its own accord or by the malice of fortune. If truth be told, three years of Nazi government have not brought prosperity to Danzig. The cost of living has increased, the flow of money from the Reich has become a trickle, and the Poles have been alienated, especially the Jewish merchants in which Poland abounds, so that they now send everything possible by Gdynia. The Danzigers are not amused. The ultimate aim of Nazi policy is proclaimed at the head of every edition of the *Danziger Vorposten*, which carries on its title-page the proud motto: '*Zurück zum Reich*' ('Back to Germany'). But the economic consequences for Danzig of reincorporation in Germany are not considered.

Even for the preliminary purpose of '*Gleichschaltung*' the existence of a democratic Constitution and the presence of a League Commissioner as watch-dog are clearly embarrassing accompaniments. The new wine of National-Socialism does not go kindly into the old bottles of democracy, and in this case the new wine, in the process of export from the Reich, has developed such a ferment that soon it may 'burst the bottles, and be spilled, and the bottles shall perish.' The Nazi point of view is, however, intelligible. To those who subscribe to Nazi ideology, who hold a democratic form of government to be inefficient, wasteful and tedious, and who are prepared to forego liberty for the sake of strong government, it must be madly irritating to be forced to work under the restraints of (as it seems to them) an outworn liberal system which the Reich has discarded. The Danzig Constitution is based on principles which we in England value, but which Nazi Germany for a variety of reasons has come to despise.

At present no effort is being spared to make the position of the High Commissioner impossible, as the next indispensable

stage in the progress towards the realisation of a totalitarian ideal. In a speech on July 19 Herr Forster declared that Mr. Lester wished to make Danzig a centre of Bolshevist activity, and that he was responsible for the deaths of three Storm Troopers killed in recent brawls (one of whom, anyhow, was medically certified to have died of heart failure). Criticism is, however, no novelty to Mr. Lester. For the past eight months he has been attacked in the Reich Press for 'unwarrantable interference in the internal affairs of Danzig' and for taking the side of the opposition against the Government. Nazi journalists cannot forbear to compare him with their old *bête noir*, Sir Geoffrey Knox, late chairman of the Saar Governing Commission. With the ordinances of July 18 the Constitution seems to have been abandoned. But the High Commissioner still remains, and his mere presence is embarrassing. Great efforts are therefore being made to drive a hard bargain with the Poles over the head of the League. Can the Poles be induced to turn a blind eye to the process of 'co-ordinating' the German opposition in return for confirmation of their own rights and those of the small Polish minority in Danzig? If the gradual extrusion of the League from Danzig is only a step towards the ultimate goal of the return of Danzig to Germany, the Poles are possibly wondering whether the '*quid pro quo*' is sufficiently generous.

If this, then, is the present situation, let us turn from particular tendencies and anxieties and examine some more general aspects of the problem of Danzig. It is worth while now to inquire, before events overtake us, what has produced sixteen years of quarrel in the Free City, and to detach, if possible, from the dust of conflicting national aspirations the constant elements inherent in the situation of Danzig, which no change in political status can affect. Danzig is a purely German town; it is backed by a purely Polish hinterland. Here are the elements of strife; the heart is ever pulling one way, the purse another. The population is 96 per cent. German and was detached from Germany after the war in defiance of its own wishes. But an independent Poland had been promised 'free and secure access to the sea' in President Wilson's Thirteenth Point, and the principle of self-determination had to yield to the claim of economic necessity.

The claims of Poland were strong: 'Every law of geography,' the Poles urged before the Peace Conference, 'insists that the natural outlet for this country [Poland], possessed of all sorts of economic possibilities and now in process of being industrialised, is by the mouth of the river around which, and upon which, the whole fabric of Polish society has been built.' The German counter-proposal to 'make Memel, Königsberg and Danzig free ports and grant far-reaching rights to Poland in those ports,' on the analogy of the rights which Czechoslovakia was to enjoy in the port of Hamburg, would clearly not have satisfied the Poles nor provided the 'free and secure access to the sea' that they had been promised. In the view of a Polish writer the German proposal would indeed 'have been just as efficient a means for paralysing Polish trade and navigation as was the cannon mounted by Frederick II. at the Marienwerder Customs House.'[2] But for Mr. Lloyd George, who prevailed upon M. Clemenceau and President Wilson to accept a compromise, Danzig would have been finally awarded to Poland. The 'Free City' thus represents an honest attempt to reconcile competing claims. Why has it proved so tragically unsuccessful?

Before attempting to answer this, let us review the history of Danzig, where the clash of conflicting allegiances is as old as the city itself. At the very beginning of the fourteenth century we find the Margraves of Brandenburg disputing the possession of Danzig with the Teutonic Knights—at that time allies of the King of Poland. By 1400 Danzig had a population of 20,000, and was fast developing its municipal life under the leadership of a patrician class and the ægis of the Hanseatic League. In 1453 occurred an event in another part of Europe which turned out greatly to the advantage of the expanding Danzig community. The Turks took Constantinople and thereby placed a barrier across the trade routes to the south-east. A year later Danzig entered into 'Personal Union' with Poland, and received, in return for the formality of homage to the Polish king, the grant of a royal charter. This obscure relationship evidently served two purposes: it ensured the political independence of Danzig and at the same time provided the broadest possible

[2] Mieczyslaw Rybczyński, *The Pomeranian Vistula*.

basis for economic co-operation. Danzig was no more part of Poland between 1454 and 1793 than Hanover was part of England in the eighteenth century, but the relationship was so intimate that Danzig could at once adjust itself to every need of its hinterland. It provided exactly the kind of discreet compromise between economic and political requirements that Danzig has always sought and, but for the disturbing factor of contemporary nationalism, might still enjoy.

After the conclusion of the union, the next 250 years were the most prosperous in the history of Danzig. 'Within the three years 1474–76 the number of ships clearing the port rose from 403 in the first year to 634 in the last; and this figure rose to 720 in 1490.'[3] This, as Mr. Morrow goes on to point out in his recently published work, was due, not only to union with the Polish hinterland, but also to the activity of the Hansa in finding markets. The interdependence of Polish prosperity with that of Danzig was tragically demonstrated in the eighteenth century, when Poland was the prey of warring families, and the prosperity of both Poland and Danzig suffered accordingly. This period of internal strife paved the way for the Partitions and ended in the disappearance of Poland, but not of the Polish people, as a political factor, from Eastern Europe. Thus in 1793 Danzig passed from independent to Hohenzollern sovereignty and took its place as one of many other German harbours that look out upon the Baltic. The heyday of the great Hansa city was over. In the course of the nineteenth century Danzig became a pleasant residential coast town with important shipbuilding yards and a considerable military garrison. But as an exporting harbour it never approached in importance the position it had once enjoyed in the days of the Hanseatic League, or was to enjoy again as a Free City. The whole history of Danzig before and after 1914 proves that Danzig needs Poland every whit as much as Poland needs Danzig.

To come now to the post-war period, which is more intelligible when the historical relationship of Danzig with Poland and Germany is kept in mind, one may well inquire why the Versailles solution of an independent free city under

[3] Morrow, *The Peace Settlement in the German-Polish Borderlands*, p. 28.

the protection of the League of Nations, which seems so little different in principle from that of the independent Hansa town in 'Personal Union' with Poland, has given rise to such persistent and continual difficulties. There is, however, one clear difference, which cannot be too much insisted upon: in the days of the 'Personal Union' there were Germans and Poles, but no German or Polish nationalism. Here lies, perhaps, the whole secret of Danzig's troubles.

From the economic point of view Danzig increased vastly in substance after the war. The table of imports and exports (in metric tons) may be allowed to speak for itself:—

Year.	Imports.	Exports.
1911	1,039,701	1,203,795
1912	1,141,455	1,311,757
1913	1,233,630	878,471
1923	654,929	1,062,864
1924	738,072	1,636,485
1925	690,778	2,031,969
1926	640,696	5,659,605
1927	1,517,192	6,380,419
1928	1,832,409	6,783,273
1929	1,792,951	6,766,699
1930	1,090,631	7,122,462
1931	754,300	7,576,205
1932	428,103	5,047,949
1933	493,167	4,659,808
1934	655,763	5,713,181
1935	778,468	4,314,547

It will be seen that in 1931 Danzig was exporting five times as much as in pre-war days—admittedly in terms of volume, not of value—but the contrast is, nevertheless, sufficiently remarkable. Between 1913 and 1928 Danzig rose from thirteenth to third place among Baltic seaports. There are now over twice as many cranes in action in Danzig as in 1913. Deposits in the savings banks were more than tripled between 1925 and 1930 (rising from 16·3 million gulden to 57·8 million gulden) and in the private banks more

than doubled. The population rose between the 1923 and the 1931 census from 360,000 to 415,000. Why, then, in these favourable economic conditions has Danzig never been able to settle down politically?

From the very birth of the 'Free City' Danzig has ever been on the defensive against Poland. The bogey of Polonisation has never long been absent from the minds of Danzigers, though how Polish culture in these days of rampant nationalism could be expected to make much impression on a 96 per cent. German population, if it had not done so during 350 years of 'Personal Union,' is not altogether clear. It is the compelling fear of the extension of Polish influence that has moved the Danzigers during these last sixteen years to put politics before business, with disastrous results for the commercial life of the city. Maybe, Polish rights were too vaguely defined at first in the Treaty of Versailles and the two subordinate agreements which were drawn up to implement the general intentions expressed in Articles 100–108 of that Treaty. For example: the Poles had the right to establish direct postal, telegraphic and telephonic communication with Poland. Had they the right, as they afterwards claimed, to erect Polish pillar-boxes throughout the Free City? Another burning question was the status of Polish nationals and the rights of the Polish minority: were Poles entitled to preferential treatment or, as the Government of Danzig held, only to the same treatment as other alien nationals? Danzig complained that the Poles were using their control of the railway and postal services to flood the city with Polish nationals and complained that the Polish railway officials would not speak German. The Poles replied that the Danzig tram conductors refused to speak Polish, which was likely enough true because they had none. Such problems as these, which no two States sincerely anxious to work together for the mutual advantage of both would have taken more than a week to settle, have frequently been magnified into major questions of principle and prestige and allowed to drag on for months, sometimes years.

The main difficulty has clearly been psychological, and therefore all the harder to resolve because no physical action could have removed it. Anyone who has personal experience of the struggle between Teuton and Slav in the Eastern

Borderlands will have seen how difficult it is for the Germans, who had been formerly the overlords, to settle down under Slavonic sovereignty. In Danzig there was no question even of Polish sovereignty, but simply of making the port of Danzig available for Poland. Nevertheless, Danzig has been constantly on her guard against the Slav 'menace,' and, whether these fears be real or imaginary, they do not make collaboration any easier.

Thus Danzig is, to her own way of thinking, the badly-paid and ill-used *concierge* of Poland, while in the Polish view she has been the disloyal *concierge*, ready to open the door to the foe and even in time of emergency to withhold vital supplies. The latter conviction dates from the earliest days of their association, when Poland was fighting for her life against the Bolsheviks and urgently needed munitions were held up in Danzig by a strike of dock labourers and had finally to be unloaded by British soldiers. It was an inauspicious beginning. Could anything have been better calculated to shake Poland's faith in the newly acquired 'free and secure access to the sea'?

The chief and most persistent causes of quarrel between Poland and Danzig have always been economic. As in the political so in the economic sphere, Danzig has suffered by being a bone of contention between Germany and Poland. Before the war Danzig was enabled, thanks to a share of shipbuilding orders, a well-to-do residential population and a considerable military garrison, to maintain, like the rest of Germany, a high standard of living. After the war Danzig was included in the Polish customs union and the advantages of the garrison and the shipbuilding yards were replaced by a share of the customs duties on Polish imports. But a legacy of pre-war days remained in the shape of some 15,000 pensioners of the Reich, who were drawing monthly salaries from Berlin. The result was an unhealthy financial position. For while Danzig was economically at the mercy of Poland (as the quarrel of last summer, 1935, showed) she was at the same time dependent for something like half the credit side of her balance of payments on Germany.

The precarious nature of Danzig's economy was amply demonstrated in the financial crisis which led to the devaluation of the gulden down to the level of the zloty (May 2.

1935) and the subsequent closing of the banks. For this one may distinguish three main reasons: one was that Poland had for several years been deliberately curtailing imports; another that the National-Socialist Government in Danzig had been overspending its income; a third, that the Reichsbank had by that time run short of foreign exchange and could no longer transfer the 3,000,000 odd gulden which is computed to have been the Reich's monthly debt to Danzig. Thus Danzig found herself in the unhappy position of being the pensioner of a Germany that could not pay, and the door-keeper of a Poland that was admitting as little as possible. The position would not have been so serious if the Nazi Government had not formed the habit of relying on Berlin to foot every bill that they could not meet themselves.

Before concluding, one word must be said of Danzig's new rival, Gdynia, the most remarkable achievement of post-war Europe. In 1924 Gdynia was a fishing village of 800 inhabitants. It is now a flourishing modern seaport of between 80,000 and 90,000. Every day it grows a little; and every year it takes more business away from Danzig.[4] Nor has the limit nearly been reached. As the traveller approaches Gdynia he will see ploughed fields on all sides pegged out with signposts, that show where to-morrow there will be streets, planned on a generous scale.

The Nazis say: 'Poland has now built her port; what need has she any longer of Danzig? Why cannot Danzig now return to the Reich, where she rightfully belongs?' One answer to this would be that two ports are not too much for the needs of an expanding Poland; besides,

[4] Cf. the following table of percentage of total sea-borne trade:

Year.	Danzig.	Gdynia.
1923	100	—
1924	99·6	0·4
1925	98·1	1·9
1926	93·4	6·6
1927	89·7	10·3
1928	81·6	18·4
1929	75·2	24·8
1930	69·2	30·8
1931	61·1	38·9
1932	51·3	48·7
1933	45·8	54·2
1934	47·0	53·0
1935	41·1	58·9

Danzig and Gdynia are not exclusive but complementary in function. The main argument, however, must remain: it is unnatural to sever Danzig, the port at the mouth of the Vistula, from Poland, the country of the Vistula. Quite apart from the hampering effect on river traffic which would result from the severance of Danzig from her natural hinterland and the erection of a fresh customs barrier between them (which is what a return to the Reich would entail), it is clear that Danzig and Poland would both be losers thereby. For strategic reasons, too, the Poles may be expected to resist the reincorporation of Danzig in East Prussia. But that is an appeal to expediency; of which there is less need, when the nature of the case is already so clear.

In conclusion. If I have ventured to criticise the present course in Danzig, it is because I cannot see that the avowed aim of reincorporation in Germany would benefit either Germany, or Danzig, or Poland. National-Socialism seems at the moment to be missing a rare chance of demonstrating its moderation. The requirements of Danzig remain, in brief: political independence, ties neither to Poland nor Germany, but good relations with both, and, above all, avoidance of nationalism, which in both its political and its economic manifestations is prejudicial to international commerce. Cannot some middle way be found whereby the German character of Danzig may be guaranteed, yet these requirements fulfilled?

DAVID STEPHENS.

GERMANY IN JULY–AUGUST

By T. P. Conwell-Evans

A five weeks' stay in Germany, during which places were visited as far apart as Königsberg and Göttingen, Berlin, Breslau and Hamburg, tempts the writer to set down some comparative impressions.

In general, the German people may be said to be more contented than they were in 1935 or, to be sure, in 1934. There is less nervousness; the pains and travail, the doubts and anxieties of the revolution seem to be diminishing and giving way to an awareness of the positive forces that are at work. In many important spheres affecting the daily life reconstruction is taking shape, and appreciation of what the future offers is becoming a more insistent note. This is the upshot of innumerable talks with all classes of people and visits to various places and institutions.

I can only indicate here some of the reforms which are already making themselves felt; but each of them deserves an adequate investigation on its own account. The pioneer work of the Cadburys and the Rowntrees in beautifying the environment of the factory, within and without, is being followed as an established policy to be applied to the whole of Germany by the Government, and sufficient progress has already been made to impress the workers, who are finding themselves gradually provided with light and airy rooms looking out on grass lawns and foliage, and with other amenities worthy of the human personality. Paid holidays have become the rule throughout Germany, and the Government enables the worker, with his family, in increasing numbers, to enjoy the opportunities of travel at home or abroad, reserved elsewhere for people with larger purses. The experiment of enabling working people to take sea cruises to the Norwegian fiords, or even to places as far as Madeira, has proved successful, and is so welcomed by the

workers that it has become an institution: some people feared that such travel might induce in the worker expensive tastes or dissatisfaction with his lot; this is to miss the fact that a socialistic revolution is taking place in Germany, which is producing a new outlook and giving a place of honour to every trade and calling in the community. The relations between employer and worker are undergoing a gradual change, and the tendency seems to point towards the transformation of every great industry into a public utility; there is something in a name because it reveals the formative spirit behind it, and the substitution for the words 'employer' and 'employed' those of '*Betriebs-führer*' and '*Gefolgschaft*' (leader and followers) implies the acceptance of the principle of trusteeship on behalf of the community or suggests the idea of the loyalty and team spirit of the playing-field.

A promising institution is the *Reichsberufswettkampf* (National Competition in Trades and Callings). Its purpose is to promote skill and excellence of performance in the daily task, and to select for the purpose of higher education the most promising of the apprentices. The institution is too young yet to permit considered judgment of its value or otherwise, but it is already considered a distinction to take part in the competition, and such an honour coveted by a million participators—young men and women—provides an impressive spur to general progress. Members of trades and professions, from bakers, butchers, tailors, metal-workers, mechanics, to university students, undergo a test of their skill chiefly in their own calling, but also of general intelligence and prowess in athletics. General intelligence would include, I imagine, political orthodoxy, which in every revolutionary State is essential, although for most young Germans the prevailing doctrine is an ardent belief; this feature would certainly be regarded by Englishmen as most undesirable. The most skilled apprentice or student appears finally before the 'leader,' and only those who have lived in Germany can appreciate the powerful attraction of such an award. A young fisher-lad living on the *Kürische Nehrung*, in the remotest corner of East Prussia, emerged by this means from oblivion as the best netmaker of the Reich and was awarded a scholarship. Ability in the humblest classes is thus sought out and encouraged.

The evils of an industrial life removed from contact with Nature, and the resultant instability which sometimes leads to hysterical movements of opinion, is widely admitted even in England. To counter these tendencies, cottage holdings and allotments are being established for industrial workers on the outskirts of large cities—a development which we ourselves would do well to study. The German Government is following the example set by Prussia in the Saar area, where miners are also in part agriculturists. Many thousands of children from crowded areas are given six months' schooling in the country, as I saw for myself in Holstein. But the most widespread experiment of the kind is provided by the better known Public Service Works Camps (*Arbeitsdienstlager*), at which 200,000 young Germans from the ages of seventeen to twenty-five spend six months. I lived for several days in July at one of these camps, and it was an agreeable experience to cycle out in the early morning with the members through the pine woods of Brandenburg to the open fields, where reconditioning of the soil, and in some cases reclamation, was in progress. Young men of all classes seem to work in the spirit of pioneers, colonisers within the homeland, wresting land from sea, moor or fen. These service camps are primarily educational, aiming at a deeper fellowship between the classes and a love of country, made real by attachment to the soil and by improving, by personal labour, the primary asset of the nation—its land. The health and physique of the young men were a pleasure to observe as, clad in shorts and bathed in sunshine, they cleared ditches or regulated river banks. In his leisure each member is encouraged to find some expression for his particular skill—wood-carving, painting, drawing or music. For the working-class members—young masons, tailors and shoemakers—with whom I spoke the common life with students and others, the camp fellowship, provides something of the advantages of a brief period of college life; they acquire a certain confidence and an ease of manner.

If I were to sum up in a word the general aim of these institutions, I would say that an effort is being made to give to the skill of the artisan and of the agriculturist a professional status, and to arouse a pride in one's calling which may be compared to that of the guildsman in the Middle Ages. At

an International Congress on Work and Leisure held at Hamburg in July a sort of gigantic Lord Mayor's Show was organised to illustrate these constructive forces. Every German province was represented showing the native skill and art for which each is famed, and this was supplemented by contingents from nearly every country, and notably from France, which sent groups from Normandy, Brittany and the South; unfortunately, equivalent societies from England had declined an invitation to attend, although the British Government had sent its official delegate to the Congress—namely, Sir Noel Curtis Bennett.

There is no doubt that the German people are conscious of promising beginnings, of a new social order, growing organically out of the simple process of promoting skill and excellence of performance in the daily task. This high quality of workmanship is moulding the character of the citizen, who will carry into the political and other spheres the feeling of responsibility and duty acquired in the daily task well done. I know of no better work which explains, though quite unconsciously, the positive forces that are transforming life in Germany to-day than Professor L. P. Jacks' *Constructive Citizenship*, written in 1927, in which he applies to modern life the principles taught by Ruskin and Carlyle. I am aware that these words sound surprising, particularly to those who are rightly disturbed by other aspects of contemporary Germany, upon which I need not enlarge, as they are daily brought to our notice to the exclusion of the more promising activities of German life. But it would be foolish to overlook the fact that the *régime* derives much strength from these constructive impulses; popular support would never be forthcoming if the Government relied chiefly on force, on the secret police and the concentration camp, which are so abhorrent to Englishmen.

Church disputes do not appear to occupy so large a part of the national stage as hitherto. The Confessional movement started well and succeeded in breaking the 'theistic' group, led by Dr. Hauer, who tried to capture the National-Socialist Party. The Confessionals are now split into warring factions, and are missing the opportunity to carry the Christian message to German youth, to whom the Churches have long made little appeal. The Protestant religion was thirty years ago

or more almost deprived of its message by the exaggerated intellectualism of the 'New Theology,' whilst the German cult of specialisation has hindered the growth of a lay Christian movement which might have attracted youth. Parsons and priests, jealous of their tasks, have too often discouraged the efforts of laymen to start such movements in Germany. The work that Baron von der Ropp is doing in this field deserves special mention and encouragement.

One constantly has the feeling that the German and British peoples know so little of each other's ways of life and thought, and this experience was renewed in my recent talks, especially with leaders of the Hitler youth. I was given the opportunity to explain to some 200 of those young leaders some of the essential conceptions which lie at the root of British public life. The trouble lies in the fact that the same words representing ideas of commanding importance convey an opposite meaning in each country. The citizen of the new Germany rejects the Liberal and everything for which he stands. '*Liberalistisch*' has become one of the most obnoxious epithets in Germany. It represents self-seeking, greed and materialism, which drags everything down to its own level. It represents a soulless intellectualism which ridicules and sneers at national traditions and virtues; a cosmopolitanism which disintegrates the national life; a world in which individuals are counted by heads and not distinguished by any quality except that of the purse.

But the term 'Liberal' has generally meant in England precisely the reverse of all these characteristics; and what a prolific source of misunderstanding and suspicion is at once thereby revealed! It is often stated that England is at heart Liberal, and that although the Liberal Party has all but vanished, its ideas live on in the changed outlook of the existing great parties of the State. By this one means that ideas of chivalry, of common welfare taking precedence over self-seeking, State control in varying measure of capitalistic enterprise, the State's responsibility towards the citizen in times of sickness or unemployment are the dominant motives of English public life. It was, indeed, the Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer who in 1909 took Prince Bismarck as his model and introduced Prussian socialistic ideas as the essential contribution of English Liberalism to social life in England.

But this ideal, under another name, is not so foreign to present-day Germany.

Again, the word 'international' has not the doubtfu meaning in English which it seems to have in German; tc be interested in international affairs (*i.e.*, in German, if one is to be correctly understood, '*Zwischenstaatlichen Angelenheiten*') is to care for those forces which promote co-operation between the nations. When the German denounces the 'internationalist' one should remember that the word 'international' has a doubtful post-war history in Germany. It was the Communists' slogan as they struck at the roots o' German nationhood, and under its cover misguided Germans brought the word 'pacifism' into evil repute by reporting to the enemies of Germany every attempt made by their country to restore its independence.

The English, for their part, are apt to confuse respect for soldierly ideals with militarism, and one will never understand the German until the distinction can be made. Englishmen who have lived in Germany understand the wealth of meaning suggested by the word '*Soldatentum*'—loyalty, self-control, discipline, readiness to make sacrifices for the common welfare, the concentration of one's energy on a given task. How different are these ideals from the conception of the strutting, boastful and arrogant officer summed up in the words 'Prussian militarist'! The qualities of the soldier in Germany would correspond with the word 'gentleman' in England. The army in Germany has played the part of a great popular educational force in the past, and has produced in the German people their well-known habits of neatness, order and cleanliness. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the people of Prussia led the world in literacy, thanks to the army policy of the Prussian kings.

The German is also deeply conscious, it need hardly be said, of the army's specific purpose—defence. He regards it as an honour to serve, and his eagerness to become an efficient soldier cannot be mistaken. The Frenchman regards military service as a necessary evil; the Briton at the end of the war cast off with relief his military uniform, and, with a 'goodbye to all that,' returned with zest to civilian life. Does the German, then, love fighting for its own sake, one asks? The French take this view of the German—that he is a militaris

at heart. This is, however, erroneous, and is due to the fact that neither the French nor the English have been able to distinguish between militarism and '*Wehrhaftigkeit*'—a term difficult to translate, implying readiness to defend one's country. This failure to make the distinction is more excusable in the Englishman, whose country, thanks to its Fleet, has not suffered invasion from a foreign foe for hundreds of years. Away on the remote high seas the protecting forces of Great Britain are beyond the vision of the people and remote from their daily experience. Meanwhile, safe on their islands, Britons pursue their vocations, and have no need of great land forces. Universal service in England and in the Dominions would not be tolerated in peace time. By applying their own standpoint to German conditions Englishmen fall easily into the error of confusing the *Wehrhaftigkeit* of the German with militarism.

The German, for his part, does not regard the professions of the Englishman with a wholly uncritical eye, and would say that his pacifism is very often nothing more than a sort of 'naval pacifism'—*i.e.*, an attitude of mind produced by security based on naval strength. The German would point to his open frontiers on the Continent and to the great plains which, stretching away along the north of the country, have no natural boundaries until they reach the Urals; he would point to the invasions in every century to which his country has been exposed. A willingness to defend one's country, pleasure in the daily exercise of the army at peace, that seems to be *Wehrhaftigkeit* of the German, and does not rule out by any means a hatred of the waste and horror of war. But against this eager *Wehrhaftigkeit* of the German one should set the far more instinctive sense of nationhood which lies deep in the heart of the Englishman or Frenchman. The national consciousness of the Englishman can be compared to a great oak tree with roots deep in the soil—able to weather any storm, and able to reproduce itself in almost any climate. German national consciousness, on the other hand, is a young sapling; it has to be kept free of extraneous influences, and these are many and pressing, for the young German nation is surrounded by a dozen foreign peoples with whom it intermingles on the frontiers, where constant struggles of assimilation and counter-assimilation take place. And the centri-

fugal tendency has been accentuated by the past intern history of the country, which has been tribal and particulari. The revolution must also be looked at historically, if we a to see through or with the eyes of young Germans, in the right proportion, the constant emphasis on *Deutschtum*, the marches, parades and demonstrations. This was the sort understanding that one reached with one's young Germ friends.

Turning to the sphere of foreign affairs, I found in the ear part of my peregrination towards the beginning of Ju public opinion to be dominated by Italy's success in Abyssin and no less unfortunately by the failure of the League led b Great Britain. The collapse of Abyssinia had coincided wi the publication of the *Questionnaire* which the British Gover ment had addressed to the German Government in orde as it appeared to Germans, to test the good faith of Hitlei peace plan. The coincidence was not a happy one, and I w astonished at the resentment expressed by university ar other opinion. The Germans failed to see that the docume was intended to play the part of shock-absorber in a neig bouring country. That Germany alone should be asked place all her cards on the table merely because, as an answ to the Franco-Russian alliance, she had occupied her ow territory seemed intolerable. Why should not Italy be aske to explain her future intentions? Germany had not she blood nor threatened the independence of any other countr

In spite of this general feeling, the Note might have bee answered but for Mr. Duff Cooper's speech in Paris, whic the Germans interpreted as expressing an intention to rene the *entente cordiale* against their country, and the ensuing deba in the House of Commons confirmed rather than diminishe this impression. What makes the present-day Germa despair is the assumption that his country is a potential enem of England, and I personally share in this feeling, as I kno the people so intimately and how they regard us. One of th tragedies of our relationship is that neither those in offic nor their advisers seem able to break away from a traditic unbroken since the days of Sir Eyre Crowe. There migl have been good reason for such a policy in 1907, but there a none to-day, especially in view of the Anglo-German Nav Treaty. Mr. Baldwin is making valiant efforts to get out

the rut and to pursue a policy which takes account of new factors, and he has undoubtedly the support of British public opinion. The necessity of friendship between England and her nearest neighbour is well understood in Germany. French colonies lie adjacent to British on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, in Africa and elsewhere, but hostility to Germany is not a necessary corollary. Mr. Baldwin's idea of co-operation between the three Western countries is a first essential to European peace. The Germans are disappointed that Hitler's offer of a wider and fairer Locarno Treaty, to include Holland—negotiated free from the menace of Allied guns in the Rhineland—has not been appreciated more warmly. They feel keenly that British policy lacks precision and strength. Hitler's plan, combined with the existing Anglo-German Naval Treaty, completely covers the vital interests of Great Britain in Europe; it would guarantee the existing *status quo* in Western Europe, and would reduce to a minimum any risk of intervention on behalf of France or the Netherlands. It would make possible the fulfilment of Mr. Baldwin's ideal of a friendship between the three Powers, of which the German Chancellor is an ardent supporter. He declared to me some time ago that he had selected Herr von Ribbentrop as his plenipotentiary because 'the latter had made it his life task to bring about reconciliation between France and Germany through the mediation of England.' As German Ambassador in London he will pursue the same policy.

As to the feelings entertained by Germans towards France, visitors to the Olympic Games were left in no doubt whatever, as I myself witnessed. But equally impressive was the welcome given to the French delegates at the above-mentioned International Congress at Hamburg in July, which I also attended. An audience of 20,000 Germans was witnessing dances given by various national groups, when at a given moment a German speaker appeared on the stage, and in a few words of warm welcome, in which he declared that some bridges on the Rhine led straight from French to German soil, he announced the French group; they were given a tumultuous reception, and many German eyes were filled with tears. It must be remembered that in these summer weeks of 1936 the occasion for such meetings between French and German

people has first arisen, and it has revealed the deep desire for reconciliation.

But the tasks which the statesmen have to fulfil are still formidable. Mistakes, that could easily have been avoided, have proved disastrous in the past; chief among them is the habit of keeping Germany waiting in the ante-chamber until the Powers have completed a plan. Germany is now strong and confident of itself, and its leader is far too powerful and able a personality to tolerate being kept on the doormat. A famous British statesman recently declared to me that the German Chancellor may be ranked with Bismarck in his successful handling of foreign affairs, but with this difference —he carries the nation with him, as Bismarck was never able to do. This popular orator, who sways the people as Mr. Lloyd George used to do at the height of his power, has never had occasion to withdraw any of his utterances regarding foreign affairs, even although they formed part of a passionate oration, and in this respect he was compared to Gladstone. Our Cabinet Ministers would do well to reflect upon the calibre of the man with whom they have to deal: they have not always been furnished by diplomatists, or by the Press, with the necessary material on which to base a sound judgment.

The recent proposal to hold a Conference of the Locarno Powers in Brussels, at which Germany was to be brought in only at the concluding stages, the German Chancellor countered by swift and decisive moves. He made a rapid agreement with Austria which pleased the Italians, who refused to attend unless Germany was present from the beginning. He thus prevented the restoration of the Hapsburg Monarchy, which, as I am aware on the highest authority, might have happened overnight.

The difficulties lying in the way of a successful outcome of the forthcoming Locarno Conference are still enormous. To-day, in contrast to Stresemann's time, France has a Treaty of Alliance with Russia aimed against Germany, which is regarded in Germany as contravening the letter as well as the spirit of the Locarno principle which rules out war between the participants. Moreover, France desires a guarantee of the *status quo*, not only in the west, but also in the east; in other words, she opposes even peaceful revision

Eastern Europe, and would embroil all Europe, let us say, the maintenance of the *status quo* against even Hungarian aims. But the Locarno principle cannot be applied to astern Europe unless the High Contracting Parties are tisfied, as in Western Europe, with the *status quo.* Clearly, e Conference will need many months of preliminary plomatic work before success is assured. If France finally olds aloof, it is profoundly to be hoped that the British overnment will accept, in the form of a bilateral treaty with ermany, Hitler's offer of a guarantee of Belgium and olland and of the Franco-German frontier, to which France n one day adhere. That, in the view of many well-qualified dges, is the only course capable of bringing about the uch-desired tripartite co-operation of the Western Powers.

T. P. CONWELL-EVANS.

THE TURN OF THE TIDE IN POLAND

By W. Walter Crotch

It is a crime arbitrarily to divide the States of Europe into two opposing camps—Fascist and non-Fascist. It would be a blunder to ignore the tendency of European politics to crystallise along these lines, but the division is not definite. Several States are uncommitted, a prey to conflicting currents of thought and action. In some, as in Spain, the conflict has culminated in war; in others, such as Poland, disaster may yet be averted.

Poland is a State with a glorious past which was revived—more as a result of the political calculations of other Powers than through any heroic efforts of its own—and has assumed a not unimportant place among living nations. Reborn, as the result, ostensibly, of a struggle to free democracy from the shackles of despotism, Poland became in outward semblance a democratic republic, but one destined from the first to live under arms, a condition of things not easily reconcilable with democracy.

Poland is not a self-supporting economic unit and, during the first few years of its renewed existence, had to lean upon Paris and London. When the unwise ardour of her military chiefs committed Poland to an ill-timed war with Soviet Russia, French technical skill and military counsel alone saved the country from being wrecked. It was an unpropitious but ineluctable beginning. Without French guns, a French General Staff and British money, Poland would not have survived the Russian war which she had herself so irresponsibly provoked. This same light-heartedness was a leading feature of Polish policy in those early days of her renaissance: witness events at Vilna, wanton strife with German border-settlers, and unintelligent handling of the

iinorities problem. But the severest handicap of the young epublic was the incapacity of her rulers to grasp the essentials f sound economics or to subordinate petty party differences nd personal bickerings to the national well-being.

Poland was lifted from the slough of anarchy by the strong and of Pilsudsky, who rode rough-shod over every principle ipposedly dear to good democrats. He banished from ublic life every man whose brains or popularity were likely rival his own. His treatment of political opponents was ore than ruthless; but he kept Poland together. He forced er upon the Council of the League; he strengthened her restige, and he did so without endangering the peace of urope. He found no successor. The short, allegedly peral, *régime* of M. Marian Koscialkowsky proved futile; peralism cannot long exist in the atmosphere of an autocratic ate.

The reins were seized by the 'Colonels' Party,' a *camarilla* second-rate general officers with whom Pilsudsky had rrounded himself. They tried, and are still trying, to carry the Pilsudsky tradition without Pilsudsky. The head of is Government, General Slawoi-Skladkowsky, had earned s reputation as a ruthless 'pacificator' of the south-eastern rovinces. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Joseph eck, was at one time Polish military attaché in Paris. During s term of office the French *deuxième bureau* became so conrned at his close relations with the German Intelligence epartment that the Warsaw Government was asked to recall m. The outstanding qualities which have made the names these men are not such as to commend themselves Polish people. As to the other members, even their names e almost unknown. Nominally enthroned over the entire pric of the State, there sits M. Ignaz Moscicky as President, io for nine years was content to be in that position a mere pher in the shadow of Pilsudsky. When he assumed office eneral Slawoi-Skladkowsky thought it necessary to announce icially that he did so on the order of the President *and* eneral Rydz-Smigly, the Inspector-General of the army. was felt that, since the authority of the President was a nus quantity, some sort of effective authority must be voked. By this time the 'Colonels' party' must regret t it should have thus exalted General Rydz-Smigly, for he

is certainly not subservient to them. That is the outstanding new fact in the Polish situation. But we are anticipating.

Elections were last held in Poland in September 1935. They were 'elections' after the pattern not uncommon in 'authoritarian' States. The Government party won hands down; it would have won hands down even had not a single elector in all Poland cast a vote in its favour. But this particular Government party was in some respects unique: it was, avowedly, not a party at all, but officially described itself as 'the non-party block.' It had no sooner justified its existence on paper by 'winning' the elections than it was dissolved, on the ground that all political organisations are dangerous. Since, on that principle, no political party must be tolerated, they were bound to set a bright and shining example by abolishing their own party, or rather 'non-party block.' The resultant absence of all form of political organisations entailed the disappearance of any sort of liaison between the people and the Government. The masses were left with but two alternatives—either to become absolutely indifferent to politics, or to rush in their thousands to join the secret, illegal political organisations.

To complete political indifference there were many barriers. A nation may conceivably become politically indifferent when agriculture is healthy and industrial production intensive, when taxation is low and there is no unemployment, and, finally, when there is no hostility between the foreign policy of the Government and the deeply-rooted national sentiments of the people. But in Poland precisely the opposite is the case. The economic crisis shows no sign of abating. The peasantry live to-day in conditions of misery, the populace in the towns on the verge of starvation. Industry, hampered by the economic crisis, is beset by acute differences between masters and men, which find expression in perpetual strikes and acts of violence. Taxation is so high that the middle classes are crushed and farmers are driven almost to despair. Unemployment is heavy and social legislation a mockery. Finally, Colonel Joseph Beck has apparently sought to co-operate with Germany, a country which the overwhelming majority of the Polish people fear and distrust. Little wonder if, on the morrow of the seventh World Congress of militant international Communism, which

'as held in Moscow last year, one of the shrewdest of its articipants stated his belief that the next revolution would : either in Poland or in Spain! That Spain, and not Poland, as turned out to be the revolutionary battlefield is due, in ome measure at least, to the fact that, whereas in Spain the aders of the Right did little to obviate and much to sharpen ie conflict, in Poland the man from whose authority the resent Cabinet claims its mandate, General Rydz-Smigly, s sought to steer the ship of State into new and quieter 'aters.

There were when he first appeared in the forefront of the olitical stage—and there are still to-day—three great camps Poland. There is what may be termed the 'National ront,' which comprises the majority of the army officers and vil servants; considerable portions of the well-to-do iddle classes; the ultra-patriotic and often anti-Semite art of Polish youth; most of the big landowners and some the industrialists. It is a loose association of widely diver-ent forces and interests, conservative, if not reactionary, in ndency. Then there is what is known as the 'Red Front,' omprising the Social Democrats and the illegal but active ommunists. To talk of a 'front' in this case is a misnomer, r there is no unity between the two factions; but their aims 'e practically identical, and they appear to be separated more personal differences than by conflicts in ideology. This mp embraces practically the whole of the working classes, large section of the intellectuals, and a considerable part of ban youth. It is increasing in both numbers and in driving ower. By a curious combination of circumstances, a recent cal election in Zgierz was exempt from the usual official essure, notwithstanding the fact that a 'Government list' candidates was nominated. But that list only carried five ccesses out of twenty-seven vacancies. The National Party st five seats; the Socialists obtained twelve, or a net gain seven. This result is interesting as the proverbial 'straw' dicator. But it does not take into account the third of the eat Polish political camps—that of the Peasant Populist rty. Poland being predominantly an agrarian country, the nportance of the agricultural masses can hardly be over-timated. Should they swing to the National Front, then 's amorphous conglomerate of private interests and

patriotic aggressiveness will certainly win the day. If they be absorbed in the Red Front, that medley of discontent, revolutionary sentiment and dilettante culture, then it is almost certain that the hour of the predicted Polish revolution will have struck. To a man like General Rydz-Smigly (who does not want Poland to go Communist, but, on the other hand, does not want her to become the third or fourth fiddle in the Fascist orchestra) this situation was, and is, fraught with danger. He is a soldier responsible solely for the efficiency of the army; he could have stood aside and allowed political events to take their course. Instead of which he decided to act, in dramatic fashion. With the instinct of the strategist he concentrated upon the Peasant Populist Party.

The peasants had organised at the village of Nowosielce, in Little Poland, a mass demonstration for the unveiling of a monument to Michael Pyrz, a local farmer who, 300 years ago, led the peasantry victoriously against a Tartar invasion. From all parts of Poland the peasants streamed to Nowosielce. The Government had taken extensive precautions and concentrated a strong armed force to control this concourse of nearly 150,000 men. General Rydz-Smigly appeared upon the scene. He gave the order to withdraw the armed force which the Government had sent down, and he himself took the review of the endless marching columns. For seven hours as they marched past they shouted 'Long live Liberty! Long live the Army and its Leader! Give us back our Witas![1] We demand Free Elections! Long live Democracy!' The General stood at the salute all the time and he gave a cordial reception to the deputation that waited upon him to formulate the peasants' demands. The latter were three in number: restoration of the republican Constitution, free elections on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot, and a general amnesty for political prisoners and offenders.

This dramatic incident created a deep sensation throughout Poland. But that was but the beginning of the impulse which had brought this soldier to realise the path which must be taken if the masses were to be placated. General Rydz-Smigly invited to Poland the chief of the French General Staff, General Gamelin. He organised for him an official and a popular reception of such warmth that it amounted to a

[1] Witas is the leader of the Peasant Populist Party, now living abroad in exile.

disavowal of the foreign policy of Colonel Beck. He informed his French colleague that he feared Germany was about to have recourse to startling military measures that would result either in war at an early date, or in such an increase in the pace of the race for armaments as would render the situation untenable. He discussed with General Gamelin questions of staff interest, based upon the assumption that the Franco-Polish alliance was a living reality, and in such a way as to convince General Gamelin that so long as he remains where he is Poland may be reckoned in the 'Peace Front.' The German Ambassador reminded Colonel Beck of his treaty obligations with Germany; the Polish Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs assured the Wilhelmstrasse that Colonel Beck's policy was unchanged. The Inspector-General of the Polish Army forthwith announced his intention of repaying General Gamelin's call by going to France himself! This he did, and during the first week in September had interviews with the French Prime Minister, the Minister for War, and others.

Conversations that ensued as a result of these courteously exchanged visits carried the process one step further. One of those who was privileged to take part in these conferences, a man who is in Rydz-Smigly's confidence, summed up the position as follows:

> Poland cannot afford to continue an equivocal policy; otherwise she will be crushed between the upper and nether grindstones. We want to preserve a good understanding with Germany, but we are not willing, as its price, to abandon our friendship and alliance with France. No country trembling upon the brink of a social revolution can play an efficient part. We must set our house in order. That can only be done through the people and with the people. That is why Rydz-Smigly went to Nowosielce and that is why he went to France.

If that declaration means anything, it certainly implies that events are moving in Poland towards a return to free institutions. The tide seems to have turned in Poland. Will General Rydz-Smigly, the soldier-statesman-artist, malicious caricaturist, practical joker and winter sports enthusiast, with democratic leanings, direct it to a safe haven? If so, he will have earned the gratitude of his country.

W. WALTER CROTCH.

SOVIET RUSSIA'S MEANS TO HER END

By Lancelot Lawton

In some circles outside the U.S.S.R. the opinion is now held that the Soviet Government is reverting to Capitalism. Is there any foundation for this view? If a drastic change in policy has taken place in the U.S.S.R., then it would seem that the revolution has at last entered upon its Thermidor, and that henceforth the rest of the world can work harmoniously with it. But if, on the contrary, no such development has occurred, it is imperative that misapprehension be removed, for the longer it remains the more unreal will become the relations of the U.S.S.R. with other countries. The presumption that Bolshevism is in retreat is founded upon the introduction of reforms which seek to restore numerous pre-revolutionary practices and principles. These reforms are comprehensive; they embrace social, cultural, political and economic spheres. At first glance they appear to be part of a plan to recast the national life in a mould familiar to the capitalist West. But more than a superficial examination is necessary to reveal their real purpose.

We must not forget that in Soviet Russia means are subordinated to ends, and that the creed of the Bolsheviks compels them to compromise whenever it is necessary that they should do so to preserve their power, and with it their inflexible will to revolution. *Economic Life*, a leading Soviet organ, recently referred to a suggestion in *The Times* that the U.S.S.R. was retreating towards Capitalism as a characteristic example of 'bourgeois unintelligence.'

In the social or cultural sphere the new measures are designed to rebuild family life, to restore discipline among the young, to revive respect for parents and teachers, to get rid of educational fads and replace them by sound, well-tried methods, including severe examination tests. Such aims are quite the reverse of those hitherto pursued; formerly educa-

on was directed towards the queer conception of a schoolless
ociety, and children were incited to revolt against parents
nd teachers. But, after eighteen years of juvenile anarchy,
oviet leaders have at last recognised that civilisation is
npossible when corruption of the young is deep and wide-
pread. Although there can be no doubt that part of the
esponsibility for this corruption is theirs, with a cynicism
at reveals criminal mentality they have put the whole blame
pon the old Bolsheviks, the veterans who spent many years
f their lives in Siberian exile, suffering for the ideal of revolu-
on. No names have been mentioned, but everyone under-
ands that the finger of scorn is pointed at well-known
ersonages.

While the reforms, to which allusion has been made,
fect educational methods they do not touch educational
rinciples, for it is explicitly reaffirmed that in future educa-
on must continue to be strictly materialistic, and that, as
efore, it must develop a class outlook. The changes in this
phere, therefore, do not involve modification of funda-
ental policy. They have been made solely because they
ere necessary for the maintenance of order and the security
f the *régime* itself. The lesson has been learnt that family
fe is a civic essential, not merely 'a bourgeois prejudice.'

Let us pass to the political sphere. Here if, as is sug-
ested, there has been a serious modification of policy, we
ught to find proof of it in concessions to freedom: for
ithout some such concessions political reforms in Russia
ould not be worth anything at all. It may be remarked at
nce that the importance of the changes pending has been
uch exaggerated. When it is said in Russia that a demo-
racy and a parliament are to be established, it is believed
utside Russia that a democracy and a parliament in the
nglish meaning of the words are to be created, whereas, of
ourse, nothing of the kind is intended. In certain respects
e Constitution is to be revised. Open ballot is to be
placed by a secret ballot, indirect by direct elections; and
e larger representation allowed to urban regions is to be
educed, and equal representation established between urban
nd rural regions. But these innovations will not alter the
asic fact that the *régime* is autocratic at root; for neither
hoice of parties nor of policies is to be permitted the elec-

torate. In the future, as in the past, only one party will be tolerated, the Communist, and in this party no deviation from the policy laid down by the ruling clique will be allowed. The Bolsheviks maintain that their system is more democratic than any other, but it would be difficult to persuade an Englishman that a *régime* which did not allow him to say freely what he thought on political questions was superior to his own.

But of all the changes made or contemplated, the most significant are those of an economic character. In order to discover whether they are a departure from or an advance towards the original aims of the revolution we must relate them to Bolshevist theory. According to this theory, which is based upon Lenin's interpretation of Marx, Communism was to be realised in two stages. First was to come Socialism, the conversion of the means of production into common property, when, in words which Marx borrowed from St. Paul's Epistle to the Thessalonians, 'if any would not work, neither should he eat.' Lenin interpreted these words as meaning that for an *equal* quantity of labour an *equal* quantity of products should be given; hence he concluded that inequality was inevitable for a time. It was inevitable, he said, because bourgeois law still survived, and people could not learn at once to work for society. During the epoch of Socialism, he reasoned, as did Marx, that an uninterrupted torrent of social wealth would pour out, and all distinction between brain and manual worker would disappear. Then ultimately, as a consequence of each giving according to his ability, there would be such a superabundance of commodities that each would receive according to his needs. Thus Communism would be attained.

After assumption of power in 1917 the Bolsheviks, heedless of Lenin's teachings, dispensed with the preliminary stage of Socialism and plunged straightaway into Communism. As is well known, the results were calamitous. Money was all but abolished, and so, too, were commodities. In 1921 Communism, which was only another name for complete chaos, was brought to an end, the intention being to return to it later, but only when the preliminary stage of Socialism had been passed through. It is necessary to emphasise here that the Bolsheviks regarded Socialism as

synonymous with plenitude—that, in other words, they applied to their own system the simple and severe test of the standard of living. The first Five-Year Plan, initiated in 1928, promised by 1929–30 to create an abundance of goods in place of the severe shortage which had so far existed. It failed entirely to achieve this object; indeed, throughout its whole period, and for some considerable time afterwards, rationing had to be resorted to. This insufficiency was explained by necessity to divert larger amounts of capital and labour to industries making war materials than had been originally intended; consequently, curtailment of production of consumable commodities was unavoidable.

The second Five-Year Plan, which began to operate in 1933, was designed to bring about long-deferred abundance. Stalin himself had no doubt but that it would succeed. In a speech made at the end of November he asked: 'Why can, why must, and why will Socialism certainly triumph over the capitalist system of economy?' And his answer was as follows:

> Because it can produce higher examples of labour, a higher productivity of labour than the capitalist system of economy; because it can give society more products and can make it wealthier than the capitalist system of economy. Some think that Socialism can be strengthened by making people equal materially on the basis of a poor man's life. This is untrue. In reality, Socialism can triumph only on the basis of a high productivity of labour, higher than under Capitalism, on the basis of an *abundance of products and of all sorts of articles of consumption*, on the basis of a well-to-do and cultured life for all members of society.

I have cited the foregoing passage because it underlines what Marx and Lenin said before—namely, that Socialism would speedily create superabundance. It was left to Stalin to translate faith into action, for it was he who sanctioned a plan designed to bring about abundance within five years; and when, at the end of the period, dearth continued, he refused to believe that Socialism was responsible for failure, and immediately introduced a new Five-Year Plan, promising rapid enrichment of the population. This second plan terminates in 1937; if, therefore, within a year from now the standard of living in the U.S.S.R. does not rise to heights unattained under Capitalism, then, judged by the test which it has set itself, Socialism will have failed. It should be

noted that the Bolsheviks do not agree with those apologists abroad who say that because Socialism has existed only a short while in Russia too much must not be expected of it. Yet neither the Bolsheviks nor their apologists, I think, present the issue fairly. Socialism may not have been established in Russia long enough to lead to overwhelming prosperity, but, if it is a workable system, it should by this time have created living conditions at least equal to those prevailing in other countries, whereas there is conclusive evidence to show that in Russia such living conditions are markedly lower than those existing elsewhere.

But as Soviet leaders dare not speak of failure, they reiterate their belief that Socialism is capable of achieving gigantic results with amazing swiftness. At the same time they mask their contradiction between their optimism and life itself by absurdly exaggerating the accomplishments of the Soviet Union and belittling those of the rest of the world. No lie is too crude to be believed by a population which is credulous and literal-minded to an almost inconceivable extent. The chief official newspaper, the *Pravda*, for instance, continues to tell its readers that the people of the U.S.S.R. are so well-fed that grain can be spared for export to capitalist countries where masses are dying from hunger.

It is a curious fact that many of the economic measures which are being taken 'to make Soviet society the most prosperous in the world' are the reverse of those applied during the period of the first Five-Year Plan. Some of them are also a departure from methods which hitherto have been regarded as inseparable from Socialism. A certain amount of relief has been afforded the peasantry, who, more than any other section of the population, suffered from the incompetence of the *régime*. Collective farms have been guaranteed the use of their land in perpetuity. But the sincerity of this guarantee may be doubted; for the Bolsheviks have always held that the collective farms are not a manifestation of Socialism, but merely a stage transitory to it, and that as soon as possible they must be replaced by State farms, when all peasants will be wage-earners in the employ of the Government. Another concession made to the peasantry is that each household in the collective farms is now allowed to have for itself, adjoining its dwelling, a plot of

land of its own, ranging, according to region, from a quarter to one hectare, and to possess a cow and some sheep, pigs and chickens. As a matter of fact, these privileges were first granted as far back as 1930, when collectivisation *en masse* was resorted to; they were subsequently withdrawn or curtailed, but, owing to discontent throughout the countryside, it has been deemed expedient to restore them. As was only to be expected, the peasants are bestowing special care upon their individual holdings.

Although by 1935 gross grain production had not increased proportionately to population, owing to diminished exports, the quantity for each person was slightly larger than it was twenty-three years ago. But experience has shown that official estimates of gross grain production are exaggerated. In addition, it must be borne in mind that data are withheld which would allow of a reliable estimate being formed of the grain available for the peasants who constitute two-thirds of the population. No estimate of losses during harvesting, which are known to be exceptionally heavy, is given; nor is the quantity of grain taken at confiscatory prices for feeding the urban population disclosed. According to official statistics, since 1928—the initial year of the first Five-Year Plan—live-stock has decreased by the following totals: horses, 18,000,000, large-horned cattle, 20,000,000; and sheep and goats, 25,000,000.

Of all the reforms recently introduced the most important, perhaps, are those affecting finance. Here, as in other spheres, former practices have been modified or reversed. In the opinion of Soviet leaders, finance will play a dominant part in creating that abundance which is to prepare the way for the passing of the U.S.S.R. from Socialism to Communism, when, in the words of Marx, each shall give according to his ability and receive according to his needs. Until the beginning of this year rations, of which there were several scales, formed part of wages. The highest scales were allotted to the manual workers. Any margin of money left over, after rations had been paid for, bought little in the open market, where exorbitant prices ruled. Consequently an individual had no incentive to improve his position, nor was saving of any avail. But of all the ill-effects of the system the worst was the tendency to equalise remuneration on a very low scale.

From January 1, when the abolition of rations was completed, wages were paid solely with money. Hence it became imperative to raise the value of the currency. Hitherto the pretence had been kept up that the purchasing power of the rouble was equivalent to that of foreign gold currencies. Yet the rouble had no link with gold, and as a result of the insufficiency of commodities, which necessitated rationing, prices were much above world prices. The value of the rouble had to be constituted before it could be raised; this was achieved by the abolition of rationing and the substitution of a single unified price level for a multiplicity of price levels. Thenceforth all Socialist workers, no matter to what grade they belonged, paid the same prices; thus money reascended its throne and inequality was restored, along with incentive to get on and to save. But it was much less difficult to create a single price level than to lower it, or, in other words, raise the purchasing power of the rouble, which by this time had fallen to such depths as to be worth little more than the equivalent of twopence. The only way this purpose could be achieved was the prosaic way of increasing production of consumable commodities and lowering costs.

The Soviet Government has long ceased to publish statistics relating to cost of production. As a matter of fact, they do not know what this cost is. Regularly they plan what they would like it to be; but this plan is usually exceeded, as are also fixed wholesale prices of finished goods. Consequently, instead of the profits anticipated being realised, losses, of a magnitude never before equalled in any country, have resulted. It was easy for the State to recover these losses. All it had to do was to raise the prices of retail commodities, the sale of which was a Government monopoly. Thus it was left to the citizens to foot the bill with labour and sacrifice. While working a full number of hours daily, they had to forego many of the necessaries of civilised existence, and to pay ever-increasing prices for such commodities as were procurable, without at the same time receiving compensatory advances in wages. Hence they produced far more surplus value, and derived less personal benefit, than did the workers under modern Capitalism.

Although the State was able to make good its losses by the mere manipulation of book entries, it could not be

indifferent to the consequences. Losses signified inefficiency; they were the chief cause of the exorbitant prices, and therefore of the meagre value of the rouble; they led to shortage of commodities, and this, in turn, called for rationing, the drawbacks of which have already been described. Yet losses could not be avoided, for the Government was afraid to check extravagance too drastically lest the expansion of heavy industry should be retarded. Now, when it is understood that if Socialism is to become a reality an abundance of goods must be swiftly produced, orders have been given that economy shall be enforced, that State enterprises shall lower cost of production, raise productivity of labour, forego subsidies, and amass as much profit as possible. It is not the first occasion upon which such orders have been issued; experience has shown that plenitude cannot be brought about by decree. If, as Soviet leaders predict, an unmeasurable increase in the standard of living is bound to occur in the near future, then it can only result from some miraculous development in the creative powers of the worker. This miraculous development, we are told, has taken place; it is what is called the Stakhanov Movement.

Last October a miner in the Donbas region named Alexei Stakhanov mined 102 tons in a single shift of six hours, an output fifteen times in excess of the average achievement. This record was soon surpassed: another miner named V. Puzanov produced 548 tons in one shift. The essence of the method, which gave such amazingly fruitful results, was the concentration of the miner upon the operation of his machine, all subsidiary tasks being performed by the remainder of the 'brigade' to which he belonged. At once the vast organisation of propaganda at the disposal of the State was set feverishly in motion; the record-breakers were lavishly praised and high decorations and other honours were bestowed upon them. The movement rapidly spread from the mining to other industries; record-breakers cropped up in all parts of the Union. The Soviet leaders, who had hitherto been at their wits' end to find some means of quickening production, promptly greeted the Stakhanovites as the originators of that superabundance which only Socialism could give. It was said that such achievements as theirs would have been impossible in countries whose productive

forces were fettered by Capitalism, and whose workers, for that reason, were deprived of the full fruits of their labour.

Is the Stakhanov Movement a manifestation of Socialist superiority, and is the worker under Socialism capable of far higher production than the worker under Capitalism? It must be borne in mind that in the U.S.S.R. rations have now been abolished, along with the privileged categories entitled to receive them. Thus, although prices are still fixed, the value of money is largely determined by the volume of commodities offered for sale. Those individuals, therefore, who earn the most money are able to secure the best life. The Stakhanovites, like all other Soviet workers, are remunerated at piece rates. Consequently, no matter how good their intentions may be towards the State, benefit for themselves is their primary incentive to produce prodigiously. It is related in the newspapers that many of them visited the Central Store in Moscow and purchased fur coats, smart suits, fashionable dresses and various gifts. It was impossible to please the Vinogradova sisters, who were reputed to have set up a world record in operating looms. 'We showed them crêpe-de-chine dresses,' said a shop-assistant in an interview; 'but they remarked, "We've already bought that kind." Then we brought out other kinds of silk dresses, but with no better luck. "We've got them, too, they exclaimed!"'

Weekly earnings by means of the Stakhanov method differ widely. Calculated according to the newly fixed rate of exchange (25 roubles = £1), the wages of some workers have amounted to £20, while a few engineers have received as much as £100 or more. But these instances are exceptions. In Russia the average weekly wage is equivalent to 35*s*., but food is so dear that the standard of consumption of a Russian skilled worker is incomparably lower than that of an English unskilled labourer. Sharp inequalities therefore now exist under the Soviet system. The Bolshevist leaders insist that, far from being a frustration, these sharp inequalities are a fulfilment of Socialism; and they point once again to the declarations of Marx and Lenin that inequalities are unavoidable during Socialism, the period when superabundance is being created, preliminary to Communism, when it will be possible to gratify everyone's needs.

Only a limited number of individuals have reached the

high productivity rendered possible by the Stakhanov method. Whether or not they will be able to intensify their labour over a period sufficiently long to translate this method into practice is open to doubt. The most that can be hoped for is that, their example will inspire others to exert a little more effort. It is the output of factories, not of individuals, that matters; and at present the output of Soviet factories is very much below those of the chief capitalist countries. Stalin himself declares that he will be gratified if general productivity is raised, not fifteen, but five or six times. But even a six-fold increase of production would not bring the standard of living up to that of advanced capitalist countries. Where, then, is the abundance of which Soviet leaders speak? It is only in Moscow, Leningrad and a few other large cities. And who is enjoying it?—the new proletarian plutocracy. Who else, indeed, could afford to do so when such exorbitant prices prevail?

While the newly rich are spending joyously, the 'lower classes,' with official encouragement, are making merry as best they can; for the Soviet rulers are artists as well as humanitarians, and they do not want their picture to be spoiled by a disharmonious background. The masses accept the situation because they have been persuaded that inequality is inseparable from Socialism, that Socialism will speedily lead to the superabundance inseparable from Communism, when the pool of products will be so immense that everyone will be able to select from it whatever his fancy dictates. But it is possible that they have been misled; judging from present conditions, it would seem that inequalities are bound to multiply greatly and to continue indefinitely. Of limitless plenitude there is no sign as yet. As time goes on, will the Russian people forget all about Communism and submit to a condition in which the overwhelming majority are poverty-stricken and the small minority well off? Was it for this that the proletarian revolution was made? Is this Socialism?

Earlier in this article I suggested that the Soviet leaders were either deceiving themselves or the people over whom they ruled. There is another possibility which should be considered, that they are trying to deceive the world. Having spread Bolshevism far and wide with a view to undermining foreign States, having striven to build up formidable arma-

ments for aggressive purposes, they are now apprehensive lest Japan and Germany should take retaliatory measures against them. Lenin held that it was necessary to zigzag, compromise, and, in fact, resort to any expedient in order to preserve Soviet power. But at the same time he urged that the U.S.S.R. must be ready to have 'recourse to armed intervention against the exploiting classes of other States.' In 1925 Stalin endorsed this declaration. He said that Soviet Russia 'must create an armed force which will be able to march forward to the help of the proletariat in other countries, where the struggle against Capitalism is in full swing.'

This threatening speech was delivered seven years before Hitler published *Mein Kampf*, the book which now causes Soviet leaders so much concern. Stalin has not repudiated his statement, nor has the Soviet Union withdrawn its patronage and assistance from the Comintern and the parties and organisations associated with it. Large sums of money, the source of which cannot be doubted, are being expended in this and other countries on revoluntary agitation, and still larger sums on attempts to create discontent and anarchy throughout our Empire. Numerous publications are subsidised, the pages of which frequently contain vulgarly offensive remarks about institutions which are cherished by the British nation. So long as the malevolent activities described continue, the sincerity of the protestations of friendship by the U.S.S.R. must be doubted. Anxious to gain allies to sustain their evil power, Soviet leaders are now merely following Lenin's counsel to zigzag whenever danger threatens. Their manœuvre on this occasion consists in an elaborate effort to persuade the world that there has been a drastic change of heart, of mood, and even of conditions, in the U.S.S.R. But the truth is that Soviet leaders are faced with the crucial test which their own creed has set them: the test of the standard of living by which Socialism, and indeed all systems, must be judged.

If they can raise this standard, which is at present much below that of capitalist countries, to the highest in the world, then Socialism will have triumphed over all nations and universal revolution will come about. But if they do not achieve this purpose, it will be made manifest that the 'great experiment' has failed. For it must be remembered that the

Bolsheviks themselves insist that Socialism is swiftly proving itself, and that it is producing torrents of wealth and gigantic developments. The year 1937 is the one they have appointed for fulfilment; after that, either poverty will be swept away from the Russian lands and the epoch of Communism and boundless prosperity will begin, or Bolshevism will be revealed as a fallen cause—the most destructive that history has known.

It is conceivable that some reader of this article might desire to inquire of the author: How is it possible to reconcile your views with the two volumes of praise of the Soviet *régime* written by Sidney and Beatrice Webb under the title of *Soviet Communism*? [1] The answer is that I have described Soviet realities, whereas they have largely mistaken Soviet theories for accomplished facts. No other book in existence affords so clear an account of the Bolshevist point of view as does theirs. Everything that the Bolsheviks say of themselves is said, everything that they omit to say of themselves is omitted. Authorities other than Soviet are only cited in such a manner as to fit in with this treatment. From beginning to end the work is uncritical and unscientific. No attempt is made to question facts and figures obtained from Soviet sources. Nor is a word of condemnation passed upon Soviet severities and atrocities. The Webbs, whom hitherto we have regarded as mild and harmless, betray not the least squeamishness at the wanton shedding of non-socialist blood; indeed, they reveal themselves as complete Bolsheviks, except that, in spite of their laudation of the universality of the revolution, they prefer to live in England. Is the explanation of their partiality for a bourgeois country as a place of residence to be ascribed to the 'recklessness of old age,' or to the security of income derived from capitalist sources? In their preface, written from Passfield Corner, Liphook, Hants., the venerable compilers say: 'Why did two aged mortals, both nearing their ninth decade, undertake a work of such magnitude? We fear our presumption must be ascribed to the recklessness of old age. In our retirement, with daily bread secured, we had nothing to lose by the venture . . .'

LANCELOT LAWTON.

[1] *Soviet Communism* (2 vols.), by Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 35/- net (Longmans Green & Co., Ltd.).

A FEW KIND WORDS ON THE PRESS

By Hilaire Belloc

What shall we do to get a newspaper in this country which shall tell the average educated Englishman facts important to his judgment of the world?

Not so very long ago we possessed a Press which performed this function—admittedly the first function of the Press—better than did the Press of any other nation. To-day it is just the other way; to find out what is going on men have to turn to the foreign newspapers, and even the newspapers of countries under despotic government are continually giving us information which we fail to find in our own.

Changes in England are imperceptible because they arrive without shock. The change in the constitution of our society is often greater between two fixed dates than the contemporary change in countries which have suffered from public violence; but the change is not noticed because there are no marked moments in which its steps are apparent. The advantages of such smooth development, of an uninterrupted path whether that path goes up or down hill, are obvious; they are all the advantages which accompany repose and peace. The disadvantage is that the change takes place without being appreciated. It is hardly known to have happened. Therefore, if it has been a change for the worse (and the change in our Press has been a change very much for the worse), men are reluctant to admit it and correspondingly reluctant to reform it.

The writer of these lines has somewhat under fifty years' experience of the matter since his first introduction to London journalism in 1888–9. He began, like most men of liberal education, to take interest in public news, foreign and domestic, after leaving school and before proceeding to the university—which he did not do until after some interval of foreign

travel in Europe and the United States. In these forty-eight years or so there has been, as everybody knows, a very great change in material instruments and, what is far more important, a considerable change in the mood of the European mind. Some aspects of this change are obviously of greater moment than the particular one I deal with here—the loss of religion, for instance, is of far greater moment—but the change which my generation has seen in the character of the English newspaper has been of special importance because it has affected the direction of the State, particularly in foreign affairs. It is a change that may be called revolutionary.

The contrast between the externals of the English newspaper of 1888–9 and the English newspaper of 1936 is slight; the headlines are more numerous and more vulgarly emphatic, the columns are more often broken up by sub-headings, certain new terms—very few of them—strike the eye; but the outside of the thing remains in the more respectable papers very much the same. The spirit has changed altogether.

Here most critics would interrupt me by saying that I am telling them nothing new. We all note to-day a disgusting interference with private life which the older English newspaper never knew, a proportion of space given to crime and every other form of sensation which a more cultivated age would not have tolerated, an ignorance of the past which would have puzzled our fathers; but these are not the main characteristics of the change. The main characteristics of the change are negative; it is the absence of information on vital things, the contrast between what men can learn from a private conversation and from foreign sources on the one hand, what they hear or do not hear from their newspapers at home on the other, that is the capital point in the transformation which we have suffered.

I once heard the whole thing expressed simply and thoroughly by a man who many years ago conducted a daily paper which was at that time perhaps of most influence with educated opinion in England. The paper came to an end, and a little while later its former editor said to me: 'I go to Vienna, Berlin, Paris, Rome, the Hague and Brussels, and I find newspapers which an educated man can read. I come back to London and I find none.'

That was putting things tersely and epigrammatically,

and therefore without due proportion; but the underlying observation was lamentably true. Such a man coming back to London may hear much upon which to form a judgment; he will hear it by word of mouth from acquaintances in public life; he will even get it now and then from books. He will not hear it in any sufficient volume, nor set forth with any sufficient instruction, in the newspapers.

Now it is the newspapers which form the mind of the nation to-day. This is a truth often contested. It is pointed out with justice that the demagogic Press with the largest circulation and the most offensive (and therefore most impressive) violence of manner may advocate some cause for weeks, and yet fail to carry its object with the public. A frenzied 'campaign,' as the phrase goes, may be led against this or that policy during some bye-election, and the voter will show in the majority recorded that all this shrieking and tub-thumping has had little effect on him. That is true of obvious selected points, but even of these it is not true in the majority of cases. Much more often than not, the public Press reiterating this or that falsehood or absurdity gets it accepted in a very short time. But anyhow, whether such selected, particular, affirmations are accepted or no, hardly affects the general statement that the tone and mass presentation of affairs by the Press creates the public mood of England to-day.

It does so positively, by making men familiar with a repeated statement; but with far more effect does it do so negatively, by keeping men uninformed upon that which the very small number of men who control the bulk of our newspapers deliberately suppress or do not know.

It must be remarked that the first of these causes, deliberate suppression, is itself of two very different kinds: there is suppression of truth undertaken from motives of public policy, there is suppression of truth undertaken from base private motives of vengeance or avarice.

The first cause is sometimes productive of advantages to society. There are cases in which it is essential that things certainly true, and even certainly important, should either not be mentioned, or if mentioned not emphasised. There are cases in which the giving of information on this or that would manifestly do harm to the Commonwealth; and this is

articularly true in time of war. It may even be argued hat the suppression of exposure on corruption, the cloaking f scandals, is of advantage because it raises the prestige of the ation in the eyes of foreign rivals. It can be argued with reater force that the hushing up of such things makes it much asier to conduct government in a country which is still ristocratic in quality. Make the populace believe that wyers, when they become judges, are suddenly informed vith Divine qualities; that politicians are quite indifferent o money for themselves or their relatives; that blackmail n public life would not be tolerated for a moment, and the Commonwealth will work the more smoothly. For men will bey those whom they respect; they will hardly obey those whom they have been taught to despise. It may also be rgued that a sort of complacency and living in a fool's aradise of supposed general virtue is of advantage to the Commonwealth, as it is certainly productive of good temper nd peace. The effects of the opposite, as we see them in oreign countries (such as America) where criticism of public ffairs and men is permanent and lively, are repellent to the verage Englishman.

Yes, the practice of suppression from the motive of ublic advantage has much to be said for it. Nations have t all times been compelled to practise fraud. It is only, fter all, a question of degree. Some falsehood of this kind here must be, though after a certain point the dose may ecome dangerous.

So far, so good. I will quote a few examples to illustrate his, the least mischievous form of newspaper suppression. Only when we have dealt with these may we go on to the nore dangerous kinds.

We had within the last few months a very striking example f suppression for public purposes in the complete silence naintained upon the movements of the Home Fleet at the eginning of the quarrel with Italy. The motive here was pparent, though perhaps insufficient; you cannot mobilise moothly in the presence of panic, or even of acute discontent. f the general populace in England had understood what was oing on in those critical days, if there had been widespread omment upon it (most of which would have been adverse), f there had spread a sudden fear of war (war being the

one thing which since 1918 the English populace is most instinctively and intensely determined to escape), the whole machinery set at work might have been thrown out of gear. The few thousands who are always in the know in this country —perhaps it would be better to write, in connexion with important matters, 'the few hundreds,' or, in connexion with really critical matters, the few dozens—laughed heartily, after the event, at the contrast between the foreign Press and our own in this same matter of naval mobilisation. The United States was full of the news; all continental Europe was full of the news; the only people who knew nothing of what was going on were the English people who might have woken up to find themselves at war.

Here is a very good case in which the question of degree may be debated. The advantage of suppressing that piece of news was obvious and has just been stated. There are equally obvious disadvantages—for instance, the memory people will retain of being bamboozled, and the absence of that check which informed public opinion can provide against rash policy. We must balance the advantages against the disadvantages and decide for ourselves which predominate.

Another more doubtful case was the propaganda for vigorous action by the League of Nations against Italy; or, in general, the propaganda for what was called 'Collective Security.'

Here there was suppression of the essential fact that our Government, in particular, had prevented the functioning of Collective Security in the past. We had refused to use it against Japan, for instance, when the aggression was glaring; before that, the Protocol which was designed for this very end, Collective Security, was rejected by the English authorities as violently as a thing could be rejected. To this rejection of the Protocol our Press hardly alluded when the opposite policy was hurriedly determined on last year.

Of course, the effect of all these falsehoods upon foreign opinion was deplorable; it put this country in the light of a shameless hypocrite, pretending to all manner of moral motives in order to cover a very plain material one, and pretending to general international ethics when it was really acting upon nothing more elevated than the defence of the vital trade route through the Mediterranean and Red Sea.

n so far as loss of moral prestige can hurt a nation, this uppression of truth hurt England; but, on the other hand, t made for the unity of the country in a grave international crisis—and unity is strength.

Similarly, there was the suppression of another simple and elementary truth—a truth of the first importance and manifest on a mere comparison of dates. This was the truth that the idea of using the League of Nations as an ally against Italy was an after-thought.

We did not have recourse to it until we had already tried the menace of the Fleet and had found it fail us; or at any rate, had thought it more prudent to drop that menace. It was as though a man having a dispute with another upon a right of way were to threaten the trespasser with his fists and then suddenly cease to threaten and run off for a policeman. Such episodes are bad for our reputation, but there is a great deal to be said for not allowing opinion at home to know *how* bad.

To go somewhat further back: when the Black and Tans were let loose in Ireland all Europe and all America knew what was happening. Plenty of details were published; our plans for harrying Ireland were published and emphasised and re-emphasised in France, Germany, Italy and America: the things done were notorious all over the world; the whole episode is vividly remembered abroad, and the Black and Tans and their failure now form part of European history. With very few exceptions the English Press was and is silent upon the affair; even those newspapers (such as the *Manchester Guardian*) which did do a little reporting of the matter handled it gingerly.

Here, again, there is an arguable case. The situation was virtually a state of war; and, as in a state of war, news was controlled.

We might have won: had we won a legend would have been started which by this time would have taken firm root—we should be hearing to-day that English power had reasserted itself against an abortive Irish rebellion; the part played by the Black and Tans would have been glossed over, and, according to our official histories, all would have been well. As it is, although in the event we were badly defeated and the Black and Tan experiment made fools of us, and shame-

faced fools at that, not one man in a hundred now within the country has any appreciation of the effect the thing had outside. That weakens a nation's instruction, but it makes for national satisfaction and coherence.

The same is true of those episodes which are called 'scandals' in public life. It is in the nature of things that they should continually recur, especially in a parliamentary country. Elsewhere allusion to them is continual: here there is a fixed policy of suppression. On the exceedingly rare occasions when suppression becomes impossible, every effort is made to represent what is normal to political morals as highly exceptional.

This policy, again, can be defended. In a household where, say, the father gets drunk a good deal too often the mother will be at pains to prevent the children from finding out too much about it; and if they come across their parent blind to the world, everything will be done to make it out an unfortunate accident, such as hardly happens once in a lifetime.

For all these forms of suppression, I say, the deliberate suppression of displeasing or dangerous truths upon public affairs, there is much to be said. It may be carried too far, so as to poison all our public life; but in principle some measure of such falsehood is indispensable.

Of suppression due to avarice, to the desire for a private money advantage, there is not the same to be said. It is bad, and wholly bad: it does nothing but harm, and the habitual practice of it is poisonous to the Commonwealth. The same is true when the motive is not monetary, but one of personal spite or ambition, or even fear; but as avarice is the principal motive here at work we may make it typical of all the rest.

It works in all sorts of ways—most obviously, of course, through advertisement revenue. Our Press does not depend for its profits upon direct purchase by the public; it depends for its profits upon this source of revenue in part, but in a much larger part upon payment received from other commercial enterprises which advertise their wares or services in the newspapers. There is not one main branch of advertisement to-day the effect of which is not conspicuous in the tone of the Press through false emphasis and suppression.

To take a first example of a small, comic sort, but illuminating. Patent and proprietary medicines, as we all know, are more or less under supervision by the State—or, as the State is often called in this country, 'public bodies.' The authorities interfere to prevent active poisons being sold, though the line is very loosely drawn in the matter of drugs. And most of the stuff sold is harmless enough—certainly more harmless than the chemical foods which have called the patent medicines into existence. The evil does not lie in the mere existence of the patent medicine; it lies in not allowing people to know what patent medicines are made of. In the old days of the *New Age* under Mr. Orage's courageous editorship, when it was a tribune for Mr. Wells, Mr. Bernard Shaw, the late Arnold Bennett, the late Mr. G. K. Chesterton, myself and others (and never mentioned in the public Press), there was regularly published from time to time a list of what patent medicines are made of. It was one of Orage's most amusing tricks. He would give his restricted public—alas, they were not of the kind that buys patent medicines or is, for that matter, taken in by the daily Press—an exact account of what they were getting in the much advertised remedies offered them; and he would always put in a little challenge suggesting that some one of the great dailies should take the matter up and copy the information given.

That, I say, is one small comic example, and any reader may test it for himself by writing a short letter to a newspaper of large circulation giving the exact composition of some one concoction. The fate of that letter will instruct him.

Take a larger example—motor car advertisement. Car advertisement revenue is of much graver effect. It is partly through its value to the Press that emphasis upon the appalling loss of life on our roads, especially children's lives, is accepted as tolerable. There is no suppression of the facts, there is no suppression of comment, indignant protest is printed, and all the rest of it. But the horror of the thing and the futile protests against it are quite out of proportion.

Obviously the cause of the mortality on our roads is not to be found here. You might suppress all advertisement by motor car manufacturers without reducing the volume of accidents at first; and it is common sense that the main cause of those accidents is the survival of the old-fashioned road

system and the almost unavoidable dangers of combining rapid transport and slow on the same tracks. But what the advertisement revenue does affect is a certain damping down of the volume and violence of the protest.

Put it the other way: supposing a reduction in the number of accidents were automatically followed by a large increase in the revenues of the newspaper owners, supposing the presence of protests in the columns of the Press meant money in the pockets of those who control those columns, and supposing that the sums were large in proportion to the intensity and generality of the protest—do we not all know that there would have been a campaign long ago for greater strictness in penalties, and particularly for a rapid rearrangement of the main road system? Of course there would have been!

But if in these two simple and quite subsidiary examples we see the motive of advertisement revenue at work, we see another form of restriction in general comment upon economic affairs. The interesting discussion upon 'social credit' is boycotted by the Press; and the usual explanation given when indignation against this boycott becomes strong is that those who touch on social credit, only to ridicule the various schemes, have not enough economic knowledge to deal with the matter properly.

That excuse is not valid. There are hundreds of highly educated men in England to-day who are discussing schemes of social credit, and in particular the Douglas scheme, for and against; there is no particular difficulty in understanding the contention of those who favour or those who disfavour schemes of social credit when their motives are intelligent and have nothing to do with personal gain. There is not a newspaper which could not have intelligent discussion on this important subject. Why is it omitted?

Occasional discussion is allowed, but no more, and it is invariably accompanied by a sort of official ridicule. We all know that the existing organisation of public finance would lose by the functioning of a credit scheme; we all know that there is a financial monopoly exercised by the banks and profitable to them, and that any attack upon it is met by their hostility. It is natural and inevitable that where there are conflicting interests the wealthier one should have a prepon-

erant voice. But in this case the money power is pushed together too far. Every intelligent student of the social credit schemes, quite as much one who has concluded against them as one who is favourable, is struck by the treatment they have received at the hands of the Press.

The second cause of our weakness as a nation in the character of our Press is ignorance. It may be more simply dealt with. The presence of ignorance in this department comes from three separate sources. In the first place, there is the disappearance of the editor.

It was a sound instinct which made educated men demand a generation ago that the editor of a newspaper should be really responsible for what went into it, that he should be known, that his position should be more or less permanent, that he should be a cultivated man. He was nearly always in those days a highly cultivated man and often a very well instructed man as well. The owner of the newspaper might be anybody. He did not direct the policy.

The change came when the owner took charge. As sensationalism and demagogy and all the cheaper appeals would increase his profits, he would be more successful in proportion as he was less cultivated. When men of this kind began to accumulate the enormous fortunes which have come to dominate the Press monopoly in the last thirty years, when the editor became less and less responsible and more and more of a servant, when the advertising manager played more and more the principal part among the higher subordinates of the controlling capital, the level of culture and instruction in the Press correspondingly fell.

Side by side with this loss of instruction on the part of those who present the news went the loss of demand for instruction on the part of those who receive the news. The proportion of cultured men to the whole community has fallen rapidly during the last lifetime, and this is a matter of grave moment to a nation still essentially aristocratic—that is, still essentially dependent upon class government.

The statement will be challenged, because the words 'educated' and 'cultured' are vague. Let us take two tests of the instruction: (1) knowledge of the main facts of past history; (2) general acquaintance with the map. There can be no doubt that the proportion of people who are of average

instruction in either of these departments is much less than it was, and is growing less with every decade.

Efforts have been made by individuals to give its due importance in our Press, for instance, to Gdynia: they have certainly failed. Efforts have been made to make some sufficient though small proportion of the public understand the importance of Pantelleria strategically, of the Bab-el-Mandeb and the island of Dumeira; they have been without effect. Pantelleria now blocks the trade route through the Mediterranean; Dumeira threatens the straits of Perim and the route through the Red Sea. How many have heard of them in England?

How many people will you find to-day who know anything of the religious divisions of Europe, who understand the contrasting cultures of the Catholic and Orthodox districts of Yugoslavia? How often do you hear the word 'Prussia' used in connexion with Germany? Even in so simple a matter, and one so easily ascertainable, one on which there is so widespread information and definite experience as the modern rise of aircraft and its effect on strategy, the Press fails us. In this, as in almost every other important international matter, every new event takes us by surprise.

There is also a group of *lacunæ*—gaps in our information—on which it is difficult to say how much they are due to deliberate suppression, and how much to ignorance.

A first-rate example of these is the silence of our Press upon contemporary expression abroad. For instance, during the whole of the quarrel with Italy, the violent antagonism to this country of great sections of the American Press was completely ignored. It may sound extravagant to suggest that there was any element of ignorance in this: the suppression, I shall be told, was deliberate and could not have been otherwise; there is continual intercourse between very rich English-speaking men on both sides of the Atlantic, and nowhere is that intercourse closer than in the very small world of newspaper owners. Yet I do believe that ignorance played here quite as large a part as deliberate falsehood. We must remember that one of the characteristics of ignorance is the function of 'the ignorant imagination.' The man who thinks a thing is so when it is not so will overlook the most obvious evidence and miss a mass of things

irectly before his eyes. The man who is so ignorant of the nodern world as to think that the Americans are our cousins—lmost our brothers—is quite capable of thinking hostility to his country a negligible exception in America, although the vidence to the contrary is right before him and overwhelming.

The American example is of course only one of a particular ind; it is striking because one might imagine that, of all oreign countries, the United States, having a common nguage with our own, would be the best known and the nost quoted. But the same is true of the Dominions—both of those which have a common language and those which peak a different idiom. We have no real information on South African opinion; none whatever on French-Canadian; ittle worth reading on Irish-Canadian; and nothing fully nformative upon the mass of Canadian opinion outside these ections. There is not an Englishman who goes to Canada or the first time but is startled at the contrast between what ie thought to find and what he does find.

As for our Press information upon the events of Europe, it seems past praying for. A man may form a easonably good judgment by talking to the right people, comparing their experiences and opinions; and he can form hat judgment the better if he travels intelligently. He can ften form a judgment of a sort which may be approximately ight if he regularly consults the various organs of foreign opinion, especially the extreme organs. But from most of ur daily Press he will get no basis for a conclusion worth iaving.

Even as I write there is appearing a lamentable example of iis sort of thing. One of the major events in modern istory is the Spanish civil war. Now no one can comlain that our Press has left it out. What anyone *may* omplain about with justice and insistence is that in all the nass of printed matter that has appeared upon that subject o sufficient proportion has come from those who know Spain.

This is the more remarkable as opinion in this country has een strongly moved, and there has been, for once, a certain iversity in our opinion. One whole section of the Press is been violently in favour of the revolutionaries; another esser number of papers have been mildly opposed to the

revolutionaries; one group of papers with a very large circulation has been quite definitely 'anti-Red.' One would have thought that amid violently conflicting interests a large body of truth, and of important truth, was bound to appear. One would have thought that a fairly well-educated reader, reading both sides, could arrive at some conclusion by balancing one set of statements against the other. On the contrary, he can only have been completely bewildered. I have read most of what has appeared, and I have seen no full grasp of the contrast between town and country; no one seems to know the varying tenures, especially the difference there is between the North and the South; no one, therefore, has been informed as to the reasons which make the peasant revolutionary in one place and strongly conservative in another. No picture has been drawn of the violent and age-long hatred between Aragon and the Catalans. I will bargain that not one educated reader of our Press out of a hundred has understood from what he was told that Catalans coming into Aragon to massacre and burn are about as welcome as would be Irishmen coming thus into the Lothians.

Why and how the Basques are divided, the effects of their position astride the frontier, the sharp limits of race and language in that region, which make all the difference to the situation, are left undescribed. The essential fact that the Western Nationalist forces are tied to the few main roads, with all the consequences of that situation, has nowhere been emphasised; even such elementary points as ranges, and an estimate of the efficiency of fire on either side in various fields; the situation and equipment of the main arsenals—any number of essential pieces of information of that sort—are lacking, and there has not been one even passable map published up to the present moment to explain any one of the series of movements. Yet one would have thought it the business of a journalist to acquaint himself with things of that kind. There is no reason why the operations round Irun and St. Sebastian should not have been fully illustrated; there are excellent large-scale detail maps of that corner, and for the Peninsula as a whole there is the admirably accurate and detailed German map in four sheets on which I am myself following the operations as best I may.

One might go on multiplying instances indefinitely.

Is there a remedy? As with all grave social disease, the only radical remedy would be a change in the character of society. But a superficial remedy might be discovered in this particular case by the foundation of even one well-conducted weekly review. We cannot at this end of the long development of the evil hope for a properly instructed daily paper. The Englishman will have his daily paper of great size, well printed upon good paper, and he will pay for it 1*d*. or 2*d*. at the most. That is, he will insist upon having for 1*d*. or 2*d*. something which may cost anything from 4*d*. to 6*d*. to produce. The gap can only be filled by advertisement subsidy, and the provision of true information will not nourish the necessary circulation. A paper well instructed on foreign affairs would find few readers. No: a daily paper now attempting the task fulfilled by the Press of a generation ago would lose thousands a day. It would cease soon after it was launched or reformed.

Even a weekly review properly informed and appealing to informed men would certainly lose heavily; it would need a special subsidy, demand a subsidy of many hundreds—perhaps some thousands—every year.

The chances of reform therefore are slight and the prospects of it discouraging. Disaster—and a certain measure of malinformation must land us in disaster—will teach us the nature of the evil too late: it will not produce a remedy. That remedy, I say, can only be sought for in the foundation of a weekly review which shall be, in information, intelligence, historical knowledge and the rest of it, on a level with the best Continental work. The experiment would be costly, it could only be maintained at a regular recurrent sacrifice; but if that sacrifice were undergone some beginning might be made in the remedying of what has become a peril.

H. BELLOC,

ANATOLIAN SPRING

By W. E. D. Allen

The old man opposite to me has a charming smile. Tired and poor in his shabby fawn-coloured raincoat, yet that smile seems to declare that he has weathered seventy years of Bosporan history with dignity and some degree of entertainment. The two women in their ill-cut weeds look as dreary as only unveiled Muslim women can, listless and devitalised. How unattractive the Stambul women are! How is it that women lose their looks when a city loses pride and place? As the ticket-collector pursues his round, a plump and debonair young man is paying decorous court across the leather seat to a rather over-blown blonde. Love among the troglodytes! Is the meeting casual, or do they travel every evening illicitly on the ferryboat from Galata to Asia, drifting on the Bosporus currents towards some Zolaesque *dénouement* in a dingy Kadiköy villa? An atmosphere of string-bags and papier-maché attaché-cases and straw 'boaters' and evening papers! Behind us another evening is enfolding the domes and minarets of the city laden with history, and the grey light induces a ghostliness which imposes the all-surviving magic of Stambul.

Ankara offers a striking contrast to the Franco-Levantine world of the Marmara towns. In the pellucid air of the upland capital there is movement and building, hurry and a sense of achievement. It was eight years since I had seen a city which had given me the impression of a jerry-built Middle Western mining camp encircling a mediæval Muslim town. The change is astonishing. Smart shops and blocks of flats already indicate the outline of a planned metropolis which has room to expand over the wide plain and the surrounding hills. The new Government offices have been built with taste, particularly in respect of the interior decora-

tion, where the characteristic Anatolian chestnut brown—a Hittite colour—predominates. Turkish architects, with collaboration from Hungarians and Germans, deserve full credit for the work and give promise of a real vitality in modern Turkish applied arts.

If in Stambul (as in some other parts of the Near East) there is a cloying decadence of bourgeois forms altogether lacking in virility, in Ankara there is something of the naïve exuberance of the Russians. The Turks are, in fact, developing an autochthonous brand of State Socialism. But this least doctrinaire of peoples is careful to avoid Russian ideals and conceptions. The national-social revolution of the last thirty years in Turkey has pursued its own peculiar way in conformity with the special native genius of the Turk. The C.U.P., nourished in the tradition of Western revolutionary liberalism, brought both the country and the liberal-democratic cult in Turkey to disaster in 1918. Revolution was in the air in Turkey, but conditions were very dissimilar to those in Russia. There existed no industrial proletariat to carry to power Communist successors of the discredited leaders of the C.U.P. In Russia the army passed through a period of impotence. In Turkey it saved the country in the military sense, and it probably saved the country as a continuing national entity. In Russia the bourgeoisie was regarded as a social enemy. In Turkey the bourgeoisie—largely Greek and Armenian—was a racial enemy. Turkey therefore emerged from the War of Independence with the bourgeoisie stricken and in large part exterminated, without the people being conscious that a social conflict had ever taken place. The officers and men of the victorious army remained—and a community emerged of peasants and professional administrators. Big capital in Turkey—almost solely foreign—could play no *rôle* after the failure of the Sèvres policy. Such remnant of the pre-war bourgeoisie as was Turkish in blood was unable to express itself politically and finally succumbed in the collapse of the attempted Liberal revival and the executions of 1928.

The Turkish dictatorship—personal in its origin and prestige—has come to represent a system whereby the Anatolian peasantry through the army expresses its will to control, and it stands in sharp contrast to other dictatorships—

particularly the Russian, under which the army is by no means predominant, and under which the peasantry were until last year actually an officially depressed class in the terms of the Constitution. 'The peasant,' declared President Kâmâl Atatürk in a recent speech, 'is lord of Turkey.' The finest building in Ankara, the magnificent Agronomic Institute, where young peasants from all parts of Turkey receive a university course in agricultural science, is the concrete symbol of that fact. To the historical mind the peasant figures which surround the Ghazi statue in Ankara give a significant continuity to the primitive conception of the old Hittite peasant-god of Ivriz. Gone is the decorous religion of Islam, which held men bound in arabesques to the quietist philosophies of the East. Despised and rejected is the slick materialism of the Mediterranean which might have degraded the Turks into the hewers of wood and drawers of water of a new Byzantine-Levantine commercialism. Shaggy, lean and ragged, the authentic Anatolian—dumb conscript of a century's wars—at last emerges as the master of a land which is new because all has been laid in ruins.

An impression of ruin dominates the mind of the traveller in the wide spaces of Asia Minor. All the old cultures have left their artefacts crumbling over the dry uplands. Hittite fortresses and Hellenic cities, Roman aqueducts and Byzantine walls, Armenian castles and Seljuk mosques, and everywhere the *débris* of the East Christian population which met its cataclysm only twenty years ago. War scarred the eastern vilayets incredibly. For the ruthlessness of the Turkish armies against the insurgent Armenian population scarcely outpassed the depredations of the Cossacks and the Armenian legionaries against the Mussulman elements. Eight years ago I found many parts of the eastern vilayets more than half depopulated. The Kurds have been decimated and dispersed. Only in the Dersim highlands do they remain concentrated in any considerable numbers. Of communities like the Assyrians, the survivors have migrated. Even in central Anatolia places like Talas, near Kayseri, are almost uninhabited. Along the hillside hundreds of deserted and half-ruined houses stare out over the plain—their empty windows like rows of miserable eyes.

All over eastern Asia Minor life begins again. And here

can be perceived an atmosphere of newness, of vigour, in the life of modern Turkey. A new nation has discovered itself, and is pushing into a new country. The Anatolian, in taking possession of himself, is taking possession of infinitely old lands which have become, through the catastrophe of war and revolution, new virgin territory. Railways are being pushed through the devastated highlands of Armenia and the Taurus. The Turks have their Five-Year Plan, destined to convert the territorial unit of Anatolia into yet another self-contained and self-sufficing autarchic State. The central plateau is once more beginning to become a granary as the encroaching railway makes the national market accessible to the peasant. In 1925 the Turks imported £T19,000,000 worth of wheat and flour. Already by 1934 they had become exporters to some small extent. It is an undoubted fact that the increasing prosperity is reaching the homes of the peasants. Outside the age-old cities of Sivas and Kayseri, Ereğli, Karaman and Konya, imposing modern factories financed by the State-controlled banking organisations (Merkez, Sumer, Iş) are coming into operation to convert the wool, mohair, cotton, silk and sugar-beet of the primary producers into articles of consumption for the home market. At the same time the farming community, particularly those engaged in the production of tobacco, cotton, fruits and nuts, benefit from the exchange agreements under which the bulk of Turkish foreign trade is now conducted.

The standard of living has been notably raised during the last ten years. A village seen from without looks much poorer than it actually is. In a village of the relatively poor Kayseri plain I was entertained to lunch by a headman who had the telephone and radio installed, and who was supplied free with the latest agronomic publications from Ankara. In the Adana plain a species of 'estancia-capitalism' is developing, and many Turkish cotton farmers are on the way to becoming wealthy men. A small orange farmer outside Mersin—who interrupted our conversation to make his evening prayer—told me that he had sold his crop for just under £1000 sterling. Next year he hoped to put more ground under cultivation. 'In the old days,' he said, 'the Turk was a beggar asking the foreigner for alms, and all the time he was walking bare-foot upon gold.'

The cities of Asia Minor have a fascination of their own which does not grow less with the progress of industrialisation, nor even with the degradation and virtual disappearance of the bazaars. Brusa 'the Green' is deservedly famous, set on the forested flanks of Mount Olympus, sloping down to a wide plain of woods and gardens which in springtime are a paradise of flowers. Brusa can have changed little since it was the capital of the early Osmanli sultans, and the best of its hundred and three ancient mosques are, in the opinion of many, superior in beauty and charm to the more celebrated piles of Stambul. In Stambul the Osmanli reconditioned Byzantine models or copied them; in Brusa they built a Turkish city of the West which surpassed the finest of Seljukid creations, and gave promise of a depth of spirituality in the Turkish mind—later to be aborted by the sophisticated and complex influences which flooded in upon the Ottomans when they became the masters of Byzantium.

'See all the world, but see Brusa,' is an old Turkish saying. No Turkish city approaches it in the beauty of its setting nor in the magnificence and variety of its antiquities. It is a precious relic of the past which can rank with Venice and Palermo. But there are other Turkish cities which are of surpassing interest to the historian and the archæologist, and which can attract the simple connoisseur of byways. There is Konya, with its fine monuments of Islamic architecture, its gallant Seljuk tradition, and its stories of the mystic, Jelal-ul-din er-Rumi. Trebizond is remote, alike in situation and history—flanked by Byzantine walls, and studded with ancient churches and towers and warehouses of the Genoese. The traveller who visits Trebizond should read Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo's account of the court of the Grand Comneni, that handsome, ill-starred race of emperors who seem now as legendary as Prester John. Then there is Sivas, with some of the best Seljuk monuments, and memories of Senekherim, King of Armenia, and the Danishmand emirs and Tamerlane; and Kayseri (Cæsarea), with its flat roofs all green with turf—lying in the brown plain under the snow-capped bulk of Mount Argæus.

Kayseri is one of the triangle of ancient cities which once dominated the passes over Taurus. As Mazaca, it was the residence of the Cappadocian kings, and its name is tradi-

tionally derived from Mosokh, the eponymous patriarch-hero of the Cappadocians. The name-form certainly still survives in Samtzkhe ('Meskhian land'), the Georgian province which covers the country of the upper valley of the Kura. The old Mushki of Cappadocia were displaced in a north-east direction during the period of invasions which preceded the foundation of the Armenian kingdom. But in the twelfth century B.C. they had established a powerful State in Cappadocia. The late Dr. Hogarth associated the Mushki with the Phrygians and suspected an Aryan admixture. The Mushki are undoubtedly identical with the Biblical Meshech.

The second city of the triangle, Tyana (generally placed at the modern village of Bor), commanded the famous route over the Taurus by the Vale of Bozanti and the Cilician Gates. Here again is a pure Georgian name-form which is found in that of the ancient district of Tianeti (literally in Latin form *Tiana*), north-east of Tiflis. The third city was Comana Cappadociæ, commanding the difficult route over the Anti-Taurus by Göksun to Maraş (followed by Godfrey of Bouillon and Bohemond of Tarentum on the First Crusade). Comana Cappadociæ, according to Strabo, was a centre of the cult of the goddess Ma, served by no less than 6000 priests and votaries. Sir Charles Wilson, who describes 'a mass of ruins' (mostly of the Classical period) and numerous *tumuli*, considers it to have been 'the strongest centre of pre-Aryan influence in Asia Minor.' Certainly excavations at Mazaca, Tyana and Comana should throw much light on the phases of Hittite and Mushki culture in Cappadocia and the Taurus.

Cilicia is a world of its own, a lush plain of rich grasses, flowering shrubs and abundant orchards—in contrast to the bleak tableland of Anatolia and the misty alps of Taurus. The climate, which has a bad reputation, is agreeable in spring, although intolerable in summer. At the beginning of May mosquitoes had scarcely appeared, and in Mersin the balmy air was sometimes cooled by strong breezes from the sea. An atmosphere of prosperity pervades the Adana plain, where fruit and cotton farmers are making good money. Rents are high in Adana and Mersin, and both towns are expanding. Mersin is a rather unattractive Levantine port, but Adana has a graceful charm, with its large houses

with their overhanging balconies and its wealth of gardens and trees. Archæologically the country remains almost unexplored. An American expedition working at Tarsus appears to be on the verge of important discoveries of remains dating back to the pre-Hellenic period. Misis, Anazarba and Sis, in the wide eastern plain, are all important sites, particularly for the Byzantine and Armenian periods, and casual finds indicate the promise of a rich reward to the excavator. The beautiful coast westward from Mersin to Selefke (once Seleucia, now renamed Icel)—a wilderness of wild olive trees running down to deserted beaches where only the nomad Yuruks camp—is littered with the ruins of once important towns: Soli-Pompeiopolis, Elæusa-Sebaste, Corycus.

Selefke, dominated by the ruins of a great Byzantine castle, is situated on the estuary of the Calicadnus (Gök Su), in whose waters Frederick Barbarossa met his death, after having crossed Mount Taurus by the difficult pass through Mut from Karaman. In the mountains a few miles to the north-east of Selefke are the magnificent ruins of Olba, capital of the priestly Teucrids. Selefke undoubtedly offers a rich prospect to the excavator. In a peasant's house there I was shown a mosaic floor of the late Roman period, only recently and casually uncovered, which extended under the whole of the house and over the yard at the back.

The hinterland of Cilicia is one of the most beautiful and unspoiled parts of Western Asia—very sparsely inhabited, and traversed by no roads except the highway from Tarsus to the Cilician Gates. Through Gözne we followed horse-paths to Namrun—the ancient Lampron of the Crusaders, famous in the history of the kingdom of Little Armenia—passing through the wild forest-clad 'Devil's Gorge' (Jehennem Deresi), and from Namrun rode in a day and a half to the ridge over to the west of the Cilician Gates, and camped on the mound of Ibrahim Pasha's battery, constructed to command the Gates during the Turko-Egyptian campaigns of a hundred years ago. The forests round Namrun are suffering severely from the depredations of shepherds and charcoal-burners, and deforestation pursues its ruthless way over the flanks of Taurus. It is to be hoped that the present Government, which in so many ways is showing itself an enlightened administration, will take steps to check the evil.

Not the least significant of developments in Turkey is the vivid interest which is being taken in historical studies. Scholars like Yusuf Akyurt, the Director of the Museum at Konya, who has compiled no less than nine manuscript volumes on the Seljuk and early Ottoman monuments in Konya and Karaman, and Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, formerly Dean of the Faculty of Letters of the University of Stambul, are concentrating their attention on the mediæval culture of the Western Turks. The veteran Mehmed Köprülü has effectively challenged the views of the orthodox schools, most recently adumbrated by Jorga and Diehl, on the origins of the Ottoman Empire and the importance of Greek influence in relation to Turkish institutions, and his theories on the extent of Turkish immigration into Anatolia between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries merit serious consideration. A committee of the new Turkish Faculty of History in Ankara, under the presidency of Professor Muzaffer Göker, is at present undertaking a new history of Turkey on the collaborative basis now so fashionable among historians.

The interest which Turkish circles are taking in Hittite culture is equally gratifying, particularly in view of the importance and desirability of further excavations in Anatolia. But it is to be hoped that this subject will not be approached from an altogether nationalistic standpoint. The importance of the Turanic element in the prehistoric world is now recognised, and it is unnecessary for the exponents of the Turkish idea to attach labels too hurriedly to the cultures of the past. If the Anatolian is the heir of all the civilisations of the peninsula, it must be remembered that many stocks have gone to the making of the bones of the modern Anatolian peasant. It may be now that he is more authentically Turkish than his Galatian or Cappadocian ancestors were Greek under the Byzantine Empire. Languages and religions change, but the peasant always remains, and Turkish scholars will do well to maintain a purely scientific attitude of mind until further research reveals the always relative truth. The Hittites may not have been Turks, but they were certainly Anatolians, and the modern Anatolians are content to be Turks.

W. E. D. Allen.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF GRACE

Fourth Centenary of the Great Armed Protest of the North of England, October 1536, against Henry VIII.'s Suppression of the Monasteries

By John G. Rowe

The incessant conflict which went on all through the Middle Ages between the Papacy and the European princes, and which culminated in what is known as the Reformation, reached its height at the beginning of the sixteenth century. But, as Mr. H. G. Wells points out,[1] 'We have to distinguish clearly between two entirely different systems of opposition to the Catholic Church. They intermingled very confusingly. The church was losing its hold upon the consciences of princes and rich and able people; it was also losing the faith and confidence of common people. . . . Princes began to think seriously of breaking away from the Roman communion and setting up fragments of a church. And they would never have done so if they had not perceived that the hold of the church upon the masses of mankind had relaxed.' Mr. Wells very accurately goes on to say that 'the revolt of the princes was essentially an irreligious one, but the revolt of the people against the church on the other hand was essentially a religious one.' The people 'objected not to the church's power, but to its weaknesses. They wanted a deeply righteous and fearless church to help them and organize them against the wickedness of powerful men.'

Princes all over Europe were alternately the allies or bitter opponents of the Pope, as served their purpose, and at the same time the people everywhere were either opposing or supporting Martin Luther, and splitting straws between his teaching and those of Calvin, Zwingli, Melancthon and other reformers, and the old dogmas of Rome. In 1529 Charles V.,

[1] *Outline of History*, vol. i., p. 503, section 5.

the German Emperor, summoned a Diet at Spire to take into consideration the state of religion. That Diet issued a decree confirming a previous edict at Worms against Luther and prohibiting the abolition of the Catholic service of the Mass. Those princes and imperial cities who protested against this decree were called *Protestants*, and the appellation subsequently became common to all the Christian sects who have since separated from the Church of Rome.

In 1530 the Protestants put forward their opinion in what is known as the *Confession of Augsburg*, and in 1532 Charles V. granted them liberty of conscience. But within a year there was great disorder occasioned in Germany by a new fanatical sect called Anabaptists. They formed a sensual republic at Munster, but were suppressed with bloodshed in 1535. This distracted state of things on the Continent was increased by Francis I. of France persecuting the Protestants there, and at the same time warring on Charles V. for the possession of Italy. And some little time earlier—namely, in 1527—the city of Rome had been taken and plundered in most horrible circumstances by the Emperor's troops under Bourbon, the Pope being made prisoner.

It was during this turmoil on the Continent that Henry VIII. of England broke away from Rome because the Pope would not grant him a divorce from his first queen, Katherine of Aragon, or recognise the validity of his marriage with her maid of honour, Anne Boleyn. Thus the Reformation in England started with the revolt of its prince against the Papal authority: the people had nothing to do with it, and were at the time, as a matter of fact, very much, if not wholly, on the side of the Pope. The weakness and truckling of the hierarchy played into the King's hands. Bishop Fisher of Rochester was the one and only prelate who had the courage to refuse to take the Oath of Supremacy, passed by a most subservient and lickshoe Parliament, declaring Henry to be the supreme head of the English Church *in* earth and making it high treason to deny him that title. Fisher, Sir Thomas More, and some others, including the Carthusian or Charterhouse monks, suffered under this Act in the following year, 1535, and their fate apparently crushed all further opposition.

But Henry knew well enough that the monks and friars in particular were most inimical to his claim and had merely

bowed their heads to what they considered a passing storm. The Right Honourable Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1581–1648), in his *Life and Reign of King Henry the Eighth*, aptly expresses the matter thus:

> Our King being thus many ways exasperated against the Pope, neglected no means of extirpating his chief Agents and Favoreurs, and, with them, all his Authority in this Country. . . . Our King . . . proceeded more confidently in his Intentions of suppressing, together with the Pope's Authority, all those who chiefly supported it. And because he thought Monasteries did furnish more able Men to contest with him in this point, then (*sic*) any part else, he advised how to proceed with them.

Henry determined to suppress all the monasteries and thus eliminate the power of the monks to oppose him. It is pretty evident that the pecuniary benefits which would accrue to him by the seizure of their lands, gold, silver, and jewels was only a secondary consideration with him. Avaricious as he was, hate and spite are believed to have been the chief inducements of his action. But either he or his counsellors were wise in their generation, realised that it was necessary to find a very good excuse for interfering with these religious establishments as well as to proceed with caution. 'The abbeys,' says Froude in his *Reign of Henry the Eighth*, 'as the State regarded them, existed for the benefit of the poor'; but various ugly charges had for more than a century been brought against them—charges 'which had led Wickliffe to denounce their existence as intolerable, the House of Commons to petition Henry IV. for the secularisation of their property, and Henry V. to appease the outcry by the suppression of more than a hundred as an effectual warning to the rest.' Moreover, in 1489, at the instigation of Cardinal Morton, then Archbishop of Canterbury, Pope Innocent VIII. 'issued a commission for a general investigation throughout England into the behaviour of the regular clergy. The Pope conferred on the Cardinal a special power of visitation and directed him to admonish, to correct, to punish, as might seem to him to be desirable.' [2] Archbishop Warham, Morton's successor, performed a second visitation in 1511 (see his *Register*), and Cardinal Wolsey in 1523 made a third one.

Henry VIII. therefore did not lack precedents for insti-

[2] Morton's *Register*, MS., Lambeth Library.

tuting a fresh visitation in his new, if self-arrogated, capacity as supreme head of the English Church; and accordingly in 1535 Thomas Cromwell, his new Secretary of State and his vicegerent, or vicar-general, 'in all his ecclesiastical jurisdiction within the realm,' issued a commission for a general visitation of all the religious houses. The visitors employed by Cromwell were three doctors of the law—Richard Layton (or Leyton), Thomas Leigh (or Legh), and William Petre—as well as Dr. John London or Loudon, who was Dean of Wallingford, and Dr. Ap Rice, with certain subordinates. Froude says that Layton and Leigh, the two principal commissioners, 'were young, impetuous men, likely to execute their work thoroughly than delicately, but, to judge by the surviving evidence, they were as upright and plain-dealing as they were assuredly able and efficient.' On the other hand, Roman Catholics assert that Layton was 'a most immoral scoundrel,' and certainly a letter of his is extant offering Cromwell £100 for the chancellorship of the Diocese of Salisbury. Cromwell himself, too, bore no very enviable character and was a willing tool of the King, as well as no friend of the monks. It is also rather reasonably asserted that no great credence can be put in the reports of men who knew well that they were not expected to report at all favourably upon the monasteries, but quite the reverse.

A very ancient, yet pretty copious and exhaustive *History of England*, published in 1801, and written by George William Spencer, Esq., and Edward Barnard, A.M., Esq., very neatly sums up the general consensus of opinion to-day, in these words:

> These deputies were no friends to monastic institutions and did not fail to exaggerate the particulars in their reports. . . . The reports of these visitors, according to some historians, are of so enormous a nature, that they cannot be related without offending decency and shocking moderation, which, *added to the motive of the visitation, and the prejudice of the deputies*, we think sufficient to justify an omission of the particulars.

Anyhow, Henry VIII. had got the plausible pretext he wanted, and on February 4, 1536, the report was laid upon the table of the House of Commons, which was called upon to pass a Bill forthwith for the dissolution of only the lesser monasteries, or those with incomes under £200 a year. Why were not simply the monasteries against which the charges were

brought dissolved? Why were the guiltless made to suffer with the guilty? It was given as the excuse for not dealing with the greater monasteries that in the main these were conducted in a more orderly way. The Parliament had been elected on the packed jury system: all but royal nominees had found their elections cancelled; and yet the Bill did not pass the Commons until Henry sent them word that it must do so 'or he would have some of their heads.' The Upper House passed the measure promptly enough, and 376 monasteries were dissolved, all their revenue, amounting to £32,000 yearly, becoming the property of the King, together with all their goods, chattels, and plate, which at low rates were valued at £100,000.

Froude tells us that the dissolution of the religious houses began in the midst of an ominous and sullen silence. It was attended in many instances by scenes bound to exasperate all who looked upon the monks and nuns with respect, and considered that they were cruelly used. 'It was said that the visitors' servants had made apparel, doublets, yea, even saddlecloths, of the church's vestments.'[3] Froude says: 'They [the visitors' servants] had ridden along the highways, decked in the spoils of the desecrated chapels, with copes for doublets, tunics for saddle-cloths, and the silver relic-cases hammered into sheaths for their daggers.' They ordered common markets to be held on *Sundays*.[4]

Formidable insurrections broke out in the autumn, both in the north and south. 'For the people did rise in many places,' says Lord Herbert of Cherbury, 'though as they agreed not alike in the causes of their discontentments, they neither took arms at once, nor altogether for the same pretexts.' The first great rising was in Lincolnshire. On the evening of Sunday, October 1, a crowd gathered on the town green at Louth. They had the great silver cross belonging to the parish, and a voice cried, 'Masters, let us follow the cross, God knows whether ever we shall follow it hereafter.' An armed guard was set upon the church plate all night, and next day the book of the royal commission was taken by force from the registrar and burnt by the mob. The registrar himself was only saved from being killed, by some of the

[3] Examination of John Dakyn, *Rolls House MS.*, first series, 402.
[4] *Ibid.*

better class hurrying him from the spot. Cromwell's servants were seized, and first set in the stocks and then lodged in the town gaol. Under the leadership of one Nicholas Melton, who, being a shoemaker, was called 'Captain Cobbler,' a mob of horse and foot, 'harnessed and unharnessed,' marched on Castre to seize other commissioners there. They found the commissioners fled, but a thousand horse were waiting to join them, and the number was every moment increasing. Whole parishes came in, headed by their clergy. A rendezvous was fixed at Rotherwell, and there several of the gentry came in, bringing their armed retainers and stores from their houses. Among these were Sir Edward Madyson, Sir Thomas Tyrwhit, and Sir William Ascue.

On the following day a great muster took place outside Horncastle, when 'the gentlemen of the county came in, in large numbers, with Mr. Dymmock, the sheriff at their head.' Dr. Mackrell, the abbot of Barlings, came with his canons, and brought a wagon-load of victuals. Oxen and sheep were collected, and a banner raised, bearing a plough, a chalice and a host, a horn, and the Five Wounds of Christ. One of the gentlemen, whose name does not transpire, wrote out upon his saddlebow six demands to be made upon the Crown. The first of these was that the religious houses should be restored, and the last that the reforming bishops—Cranmer, Latimer, Hilsey, and their own bishop, Longlands—should be deprived and punished. The sheriff was very active and read out the articles, one by one, to the people, asking 'Do they please you or not?' 'Yea,' the people shouted in each case. Messengers were then chosen to carry the six demands to the King at Windsor. Bishop Longlands' chancellor was especially hated, as Cromwell's instrument. He fell into the hands of the insurgents at Horncastle and was beaten to death by two of them with staves, amid shouts of 'Kill him! kill him!'

Simultaneously there was a rising at Lincoln, where armed bodies of rebels attacked and plundered Bishop Longlands' palace. The whole country, indeed, was now in movement, alarm bells ringing and beacon fires blazing at night; and, pending the reply of the King, all the rebel forces concentrated on Lincoln. Lord Hussey of Sleford was the nobleman answerable for the peace of the county, but he decidedly

favoured the rising, made no attempt to suppress it, and his wife actually sent provisions to the rebels at Lincoln. Sir Edward Madyson and Sir Marmaduke Constable were the messengers sent to Windsor from Horncastle.

Immediately on receiving their message, Henry VIII. despatched fleet couriers to Lord Hussey and the Earl of Shrewsbury to raise all the men they could, and then sent private letters to the gentlemen who were with the insurgents to recall them to their allegiance. On October 9 the Duke of Suffolk was placed in command of the royal forces, and he advanced on Lincoln, where the insurgents, numbering between 50,000 and 60,000, were divided among themselves. Some of the gentry were willing to compound with the King for their lives and property, and, on discovering this, the commons had practically immured them all within the cathedral, a natural fortress. Suffolk hesitated to make an attack with the small force he had, but forwarded the King's reply to the rebels' demands. The royal letter was typical of Henry VIII. It is too long to give in its entirety, but it was to the effect that a prince's counsellors and prelates were not to be appointed

> by rude and ignorant common people. How presumptuous then, are ye, the rude commons of one shire, *and that one of the most brute and beastly of the whole realm*, and of least experience, to take upon you, contrary to God's law and to man's law, to rule your prince whom ye are bound to obey and serve, and for no worldly cause to withstand. . . . We charge you eftsoons that ye withdraw yourselves to your own houses every man, cause the provokers of you to this mischief to be delivered to our lieutenant's hands or ours, and you yourselves submit yourselves to such condign punishment as we and our nobles shall think you worthy to suffer. . . .[5]

While matters were at this stage a private gentleman of Yorkshire, named Robert Aske, rode quietly into the city, intending to join the insurgents. Indeed, it would appear that he had been assigned command of the district from the Humber to Kirton, as his brother's property lay but a few miles distant, across the Trent, and that he was endeavouring to organise the movement into some kind of form. He saw that the dissension among the Lincolnshire insurgents was bound to defeat their cause, and so he hurried back to his native county and there inaugurated the still greater revolt

[5] *State Papers*, vol. i., p. 463.

known as the 'Pilgrimage of Grace.' He was the youngest son of Sir Robert Aske, knight, deceased, of Aughton-on-Derwent, near Selby, and was a barrister in good practice at Westminster, London, and a Fellow of Gray's Inn, home on vacation. The Askes were highly connected, being cousins of the Earl of Cumberland, and he himself was well known and respected by high and low. There can be no doubt that he was a born leader of men, and one well worthy in all respects to take his place amongst the highest and noblest in the land. The insurgents were lucky indeed to get such a man to guide and direct them. Most intellectual, and shrewd, and temperate he proved himself to be, as well as the soul of honour. Froude cannot speak too highly of him.

In company with a fellow-barrister named William Stapleton, he now in a few days raised a well-appointed rebel host at Market Weighton, proclaiming his rising a 'Pilgrimage of Grace' (*Itinerarium Gratiæ*) and raising a banner displaying the Five Wounds of Christ. All who joined him had to wear the badge of the Five Wounds and take solemn oath to stand by one another to the death for the restoration of the monasteries, the suppression of heresy, and the expulsion of the bad blood among the King's counsellors, but to do no wrong to any man for private enmity or personal gain. Even as he was riding back from Lincolnshire, the church bells were ringing backward all over Yorkshire and beacon fires were blazing on hilltops to call out the people everywhere to the support of the Lincoln men, and on Saturday, October 14, Robert Aske must have had 15,000 to 20,000 horse and foot, all well armed, around him, when on that same day Stapleton came in with 9000 more men from Beverley and Holderness. Sir Thomas and Sir Ingram Percy, the brothers of the Earl of Northumberland, were already with Aske, having come from Wressil Castle, near by, and now Sir Ingram hurried off to Northumberland to bring in contingents from that county.

On the very next day, Sunday, October 15, Aske with the main body of the Yorkshire insurgents marched upon York, while Stapleton, with *his* division, advanced upon Hull.[6] Meanwhile, however, on October 13, the Lincoln-

[6] Aske's two elder brothers, John and Christopher, did not join him, but took refuge with their cousin, the Earl of Cumberland, in Skipton Castle, which was ineffectually besieged by a savage mob.

shire revolt had collapsed like a house of cards on the approach of Suffolk with the royal army. The gentry had told the people that for the present their enterprise must be abandoned, and all dispersed quickly 'in sullen silence.' But it is more than likely that the great mass of them went off at once to join Aske, who just as probably had taken a goodly number of them with him to Yorkshire. Suffolk certainly rode unopposed into Lincoln city and was able to secure Dr. Mackrell and some fifteen other ringleaders, but he was received with gloomy and lowering looks by the towns-people. No cheering greeted him.

Robert Aske was before the gates of York on Monday, October 16; and, as the citizens were all in his favour, the mayor was only permitted to stipulate for the security of all life and property. Aske guaranteed both, and took possession only with the horse, the infantry encamping outside the gates. Riding up to the minster, Aske affixed to its doors a proclamation inviting all the dispossessed monks and nuns of the neighbourhood to report to him with a view to their immediate restoration. And now to his standard came flocking contingents from all the other northern counties—Durham, Westmoreland, Cumberland, and Northumberland—led by their nobles or gentry. Lord Latimer, Lord Nevill, Sir John Bulmer, Sir John Lumley, Lord Scrope of Bolton—all the flower of the North Country and the powers of all its great families, except the Cliffords, the Dacres, and the Musgraves, joined Aske. Froude, who gives a long list of the gentry who came in to the confederacy, says:

> We scarcely miss a single name famous in Border story. Such a gathering had not been seen in England since the grandfathers of these same men fought on Towton moor, and the red rose of Lancaster faded before the 'summer sun of York.'

Mr. Arthur H. Norway in his interesting book, *Highways and Byways in Yorkshire*. writes:

> Whatever may have been the truth of the charges brought against the conduct of the monasteries, there was nothing in this great armed protest against their suppression which was not noble. Those who made it were the very pith and marrow of the northern counties . . . veteran soldiers, hoary statesmen, peaceful country gentlemen, hot-blooded lads. To the abbots and priors they had resorted for advice in every difficulty . . . as wise friends willingly consulted. These trusted

counsellors it was who were torn suddenly from the midst of the society which relied on them, and which had no substitutes to take their place. That society would have been base indeed if it had struck no blow in their defence.

No pillage or injury of any kind was permitted by Aske—'the prices which were to be paid for victuals and horsemeat were published in the camp by proclamation.' Aske was unanimously elected captain-general. Losing no more time than was necessary to secure his rear, he next marched on Pontefract, in the castle of which was Thomas Lord Darcy of Templehurst and Aston (the Lord Lieutenant of Yorkshire), in company with Dr. Edward Lee, the rather timorous and time-serving Archbishop of York, as well as some others. Appearing before Pontefract or Pomfret Castle on October 19, Aske demanded its instant surrender under threat of storm, the town itself being wholly with him. Lord Darcy asked for a conference, which was granted by Aske, who at it soundly berated the lords temporal and spiritual for their apathy over the King's treatment of the Church 'and other their negligences in doing their duty, as well to their sovereign as to the commons.' [7]

Darcy, who was over seventy years of age and had fought in Spain against the Moors as well as elsewhere, was really in full agreement with the demands of the insurgents. He asked for time, however, to consider the matter, stating he could not lightly ignore the trust the King reposed in him. Aske would only allow him until eight next morning, at which hour the drawbridge was lowered, and Darcy, the Archbishop, Sir Robert Constable, and all the others with them took the Pilgrimage oath. On the same day as Pontefract Castle capitulated, Hull did likewise without bloodshed to Stapleton.

The only royal forces available were wholly inadequate to deal now with the situation. Suffolk did not dare to quit Lincolnshire, and Lord Shrewsbury, who was at Doncaster, had but 4000 men, most of whom were well affected towards the insurgents. On October 21 Shrewsbury sent Lancaster Herald (Thomas Milner) to Pontefract with a royal proclamation under a flag of truce. Aske received the herald in state, 'seated on a throne,' probably merely an armchair—

[7] *Rolls House MS.* A2, 28.

with the Archbishop on his one side and Lord Darcy on the other. What were the actual contents of the royal proclamation we have no means of knowing, for Aske, on reading it, refused to allow it to be published. Lancaster Herald asked for his answer in writing. 'With a right good will,' replied Aske, 'I mean no harm to the King's person, but to see reformation; and I will die in the quarrel, and my people with me.'

On October 24 the insurgent host marched on Doncaster in three 'battels' or divisions, without counting a long train of monks, priests, and friars who led the way carrying banners of the saints and singing hymns and canticles. First went Sir Thomas Percy with 5000 men, with the banner of St. Cuthbert. Then went the main body, over 10,000 strong, under Aske himself, Lord Darcy, and Sir Robert Constable. And the rear was brought up by 'a magnificent body of 12,000 horse, all in armour'—the knights, esquires, and yeomen of the county and Durham, under Lord Scrope of Bolton. What with the detachments thrown forward to the bank of the Don, the skirting parties, and strong garrisons left in Hull, Beverley, York, Selby, Pontefract, and elsewhere the strength of the Pilgrims under arms must have considerably exceeded 40,000 men at this time, and were probably in the vicinity of 60,000. 'Lord Darcy subsequently assured Somerset Herald that they had a reserve of 80,000 men in Northumberland and Durham.'

Shrewsbury, who was now joined by the Duke of Norfolk, with about 4000 more troops, had fortified the bridge across the Don with some pieces of cannon, and the river was in flood. The two armies lay quietly facing each other through the night. Then in the morning Norfolk sent Lancaster Herald to Aske to request that four of the insurgent leaders should confer with him, under a safe conduct, in Doncaster. Aske replied that he would prefer eight or twelve principal persons of either party to meet and confer openly on the bridge. The Duke would not hear of that, and Aske called a council of war, at which he was all for peaceful measures.

A further parley took place, with the result that on October 26, after an exchange of hostages, four of Aske's party—Sir Thomas Hilton, Sir Ralph Ellerkar, Sir Robert Chaloner, and Sir Robert Bowes—crossed the bridge to urge

Norfolk to agree to the open conference upon it. They returned next morning with the Duke's consent to this, and after dinner the same four deputies, accompanied by Lords Latimer, Lumley, and Darcy, Sir Robert Constable and Sir John Bulmer, went upon the bridge and were met by an equal number of noblemen and knights from Norfolk's force. The conference lasted until darkness set in, and it was agreed that Sir Robert Bowes and Sir Ralph Ellerkar should carry the Pilgrims' demands to the King at Windsor; that the Duke of Norfolk himself should accompany them to intercede for their favourable hearing; and that meanwhile, until the King's reply was known, an armistice should be declared and both armies be disbanded.

Those who draw the sword in rebellion against a brutal, pompous, shifty despot should throw away the scabbard. How Aske and the other insurgent leaders could ever have expected a monarch like Henry VIII. to comply with their demands, unless they actually had him in their sure grip, passes comprehension. He delayed making his reply, of course, and sent right and left to all the great lords he could rely on to get fresh musters. The line of the Don was again occupied and by a much stronger force of the royal troops, and a depôt of artillery and stores established at Tickhill; while two distinct attempts were made to procure Aske's assassination. Aske himself lost patience when Sir Ralph Evers showed him a letter received from Cromwell, in which it was said that, 'unless the commons would be soon pacified, there should be such vengeance taken that the whole world should speak thereof.'[8] He threatened to end the truce and recall all his musters to the field. Henry thereupon sent back Ellerkar and Bowes. But before they could reach Yorkshire the insurgents had summoned a Northern Parliament and Convocation to meet at Pontefract, and the alarm bells once more rang 'so that the two assemblies might meet in perfect security.'

Ellerkar and Bowes arrived with a letter from the King to the effect that he 'took it marvelous unkindly at their hands, that, *knowing his Benignity*, they would rather rise in arms then (*sic*) petition him, and that they had left their Countrey open to the Scots.' He requested, however, that 300 dele-

[8] Aske's Narrative, *Rolls House MS.*

gates from them should meet with his generals in Doncaster 'for concluding all things' at issue. Norfolk carried with him a pardon 'to all except six named, and four unnamed, when the rest would submit,' as well as certain books—a Reformed 'Prymer,' issued under the royal sanction, omitting all reference to the Pope as head of the Church, as well as 'the Articles of Religion,' devised by Henry himself. The books were sent for consideration by the clergy associated with the Pilgrimage.

On Monday, November 27, Aske's Northern Parliament assembled at Pontefract, thirty-four peers and knights, gentlemen, and deputies of the commons sitting in the castle hall, and the Archbishop of York presiding over the convocation in Pontefract Church. The clergy drew up articles condemning each step taken in the Reformation. At the same time the lay assembly resolved upon another series of articles, each of which was received with shouts of 'Fiat! Fiat!' Ten knights were chosen to proceed to Doncaster, each attended by ten followers, to see the Duke of Norfolk and arrange for the conference. This was held on November 29 in the White Friars, Doncaster, 300 of the insurgent chiefs, including Aske and Lord Darcy, and all wearing the Pilgrim badge, meeting the Duke and earls. The popular party would hear of nothing but a general pardon and, among other demands, a Parliament for Northern England, to be held at York, as well as a Northern Court of Justice so that none north of the Trent might be cited to London in lawsuits.

Norfolk was unable to grant such demands, but, realising he could not hope to resist the mighty insurgent army which had reassembled, he sent Sir John Russell to the King, beseeching a general pardon. The debate continued until December 2, when Russell returned with a general pardon, as well as the royal promise of a Parliament at York, and that the abbeys and priories would not again be interfered with. The Parliament at York was to decide all the other points at issue. Believing that they had as good as triumphed, that their entire petition had been granted, Aske and the other Pilgrims present pulled off their badges, Aske saying: 'We will wear no badge nor figure but the badge of our Sovereign Lord.' He at once disbanded his great host, and there was

rejoicing on all sides, only a few of the more sceptical of their number distrusting the King, who now invited Aske, Darcy, and Sir Robert Constable to visit him in London to hold personal converse with him on the matters in dispute. Aske bravely went, Darcy and Constable found excuses; and from all accounts Henry received him most graciously, had several interviews with him, and gave him a posy-ring as a token of regard.

The rest of December passed quietly, but, although it was announced that the Northern Parliament, or 'Council of the North' as it was called, was to open at the end of January, under the presidency of the Duke of Norfolk, Henry was throwing large garrisons, with ammunition and cannon, into Newcastle, Scarborough and Hull, while royal officers spread over the country 'where the power of the nobles was adequate to protect them, compelling suspected persons to *sue out their pardons by taking an oath of allegiance constructed for the occasion*.[9] Outcries arose on all sides again, naturally enough. The people exclaimed that the pardon was a delusion, that they had been tricked by the King; as, indeed, they had. Aske, Darcy, and Constable urged them to have patience, but on January 12 Sir Francis Bigod, of Mogreve Castle, Blakemore, and some few others, took it on themselves to summon the people to muster again at Settington.

A considerable force did so, among others the eldest son of Lord Lumley. Young Lumley attempted to surprise Scarborough, and Bigod, Hull. They failed; but other disorderly armed mobs rose in various places and 'spread over the country, pillaging and burning, in place of the disciplined army which had been at Doncaster' (Froude). The Duke of Norfolk hurried upon the scene with a powerful army, proclaiming martial law and making arrests on all sides. Nevertheless, a rebel army, 8000 strong, under two leaders named Musgrave and Tilby, attacked Carlisle on February 12. They were routed and dispersed, some seventy who were captured being at once hanged on the town walls.

It was now alleged that Robert Aske had engaged his word for the pardon of some of the rebels; that he had summoned 'the captains' of various districts to hold meetings; had interfered at Hull to prevent the punishment of

[9] *Rolls House MS.*, 471.

the rebels taken in arms there; and, along with Darcy, was in secret possession of cannon belonging to the Government. Aske, Darcy, Constable, and most of the other late leaders of the 'Pilgrimage of Grace' were therefore arrested and held for trial, and Henry let loose his vengeance—especially upon the monks. The abbots of Barlings, Whalley, Woburn, Sawley and Kirkstead, the prior of Bridlington, a Dominican friar (Dr. John Pickering), and others were hanged, together with many laymen, practically out of hand. 'The whole of England north of the Trent became a scene of horror and butchery, and ghastly heads and mangled bodies, or corpses swinging from the trees' (*Cassell's History*). On May 9, Aske, Lord Darcy, Sir Robert Constable and others were tried in London, and, of course, found guilty. Lord Hussey was executed at Lincoln, Lord Darcy at Tower Hill: Aske was hanged in chains on a tower-top at York; Constable suffered the like fate at Hull gate; while Sir Thomas Percy, Bigod, the abbots of Fountains and Jervaulx, Sir John Bulmer, young Lumley, and others were hanged at Tyburn. Lady Bulmer (*née* Margaret Cheyne) was actually burned at Smithfield—that being the frightful doom of female treason.

Having thus once more overawed the people, Henry VIII. not two years later suppressed all the remaining monasteries in the land, to the number of 655 (of which 28 had abbots enjoying a seat in Parliament), 90 colleges, 2374 chantries and free chapels, and 100 hospitals. Their revenues amounted to £161,000 a year and he divided the spoils among his greedy favourites. In consequence pauperism was increased 'in a manner which astonished everyone,' and forced the later introduction of the Poor Law system: education suffered tremendously; literature and art likewise; and even religion, as 'none but poor and unlettered men would accept the miserable stipends now paid to the working clergy.'

JOHN G. ROWE.

WILLIAM TYNDALE

By R. S. T. HASLEHURST

THE quater-centenary of the martyrdom of William Tyndale, which falls on the sixth of this month, serves to recall to the English-speaking races throughout the world an indebtedness of which they are for the most part not cognisant. When the authorities of the British Museum decided to inscribe around the dome over the Reading-room the names of a few of the great masters of the English language, by way of inspiring the toilers at the desks below, their choice fell on two of the translators of the Bible—John Wycliffe and William Tyndale. Wycliffe, however important and in many ways excellent as his version was, left little or no mark on the literature of his fellow-countrymen. His work was, of course, in manuscript, and most of the copies were burnt. When Tyndale began his work he had never seen any of Wycliffe's rendering. 'I had no man to counterfeit [imitate], neither was helped with English of any that had interpreted the same or such like thing in the Scripture beforetime,' he declared. He was, in fact, as much of a pioneer as Wycliffe had been. He was no doubt familiar with the German translation of Martin Luther and the Latin rendering which accompanied Erasmus's own Greek text, but he never translated them or followed them at all slavishly. His translation was entirely his own, and, considering that he used an admittedly imperfect text in an age when the knowledge of the newly-discovered Greek was in an embryonic stage, and far less developed than it was sixty years later when the Authorised Version was made, his work was astonishingly accurate.

How little he owed to Wycliffe, and how much the translators of the Authorised Version owed to him, may be seen at a glance by the juxtaposition of his and Wycliffe's rendering of a familiar section in the Gospels.

And he seide, a man hadde tweie sones: and the yunger of hem seide to the fadir, fadir yeue me the porscioun of catel that fallith to me, and he departed to hem the catel, and not aftir many daies, whanne alle thingis weren gaderid to gidre: the yonger sone wente forth in pilgrymage in to a fer cuntre, and there he wastid his goodis: in lyvinge leccherousli, and aftir that he hadde endid alle thingis: a strong hunger was made in that cuntre and he biganne to haue nede. and he wente and drouye him to oon of the cite-seynes of that cuntre, and he sente hym in to his towne: to fede swyne, and he couetid to fille his wombe of the coddis that the hoggis eten: and no man yaf to hym.

And he sayde: a certaine man had two sonnes, and the yonger of them sayde to his father: father geve me my parte of the goodes that to me belongeth. And he devided vnto them his substance. And not longe after, the yonger sonne gaddered all that he had to gedder, and toke his iorney into a farre countre, and theare he wasted his goodes with royetous lyvinge. And when he had spent all that he had, ther rose a greate derth thorow all that same londe, and he began to lacke. And he went and clave to a citesyn of that same countre, which sent him to his felde to kepe his swyne. And he wold fayne have filled his bely with the coddes that the swyne ate: and noo man gave him.

The average reader will hardly realise that he is not listening to the familiar Authorised Version, if Tyndale's rendering is read to him, until his ear is arrested by the word 'coddes,' whereas if he hears Wycliffe's translation he feels at once that there is something very unfamiliar in the story. It has indeed been calculated that the Authorised Version is 85 per cent. Tyndale, and consequently every reader of that Version (and how many millions have read it since it came out in 1611, not in this country or continent only!) is in Tyndale's debt. Others, far better known to the average man, have done work that is better known and has won them a greater fame, but it was ephemeral compared with that of the lonely scholar who was martyred before he reached middle age after a life as undistinguished and monotonous as that of the scholar must needs be. As he himself rendered the words: 'Geve to every man therfore his duetie. . . . Honoure to whom honoure pertayneth.'

But it is not men's lives only that the Authorised Version has moulded: it has moulded their language also. The author of the preface to the Prayer Book of 1928 says of the book of 1662: 'Nothing save the English version of the Holy Scriptures is enwoven so closely in the language and

leepest thoughts of our people at home and beyond the

A man may never read the Bible and seldom hear it ; but in his boyhood he had to study some portions of it commit much of it to memory, and it moulded and oned him as surely as the less objectionable 'gym' or .' However badly it was taught, however dull and me Joshua's campaigns and the exploits of certain later archs may have been, he was drinking all the time from .vell of the best and purest water. He may not have rstood the opening verses of the fourth gospel—who, :d, does ?—but at least he never read that 'At the com- :ement was the Utterance, and the Utterance accompanied ipotence and the Utterance was Omnipotence.' And yet is the thought in the writer's mind, and even if the ier does not point out the glorious simplicity of the ering of the Authorised Version it cannot fail to make its ession on the mind of a child.

is to Tyndale's credit that he steered the ship of the ish language out of a channel that led to wreck through owness to one that led to safety through depth. 'The age of our English Bible,' wrote Bishop Lightfoot, 'is he language of the age in which the translators lived, but grand simplicity stands out in contrast to the ornate and affected diction of the literature of that time.' It is a of great thankfulness that in an age when sesquipedalian iisms were threatening to mar the simplicity of our ue the Bible should have been rendered into those stic cadences that are simple without being homely and ss without being banal. The Authorised Version has i as a double hedge—to keep the young student of English plain and straightforward high road and prevent him wandering aside into adjacent meads of ornate and ery Latinism.

The greatness of any man's work can be best appreciated iat most lucid demonstrator, contrast. Thirty-five years Tyndale's death appeared the first edition of the nish Bible, which was the result of a demand for Scriptures in the vernacular among Roman Catholics. . it was the translation of a translation, the Vulgate, objection that lies against Wycliffe's work, but it was written in the English language, in any real sense of

the term. Let the following extracts be cited in proof of this:

> Our wrestling is not against flesh and bloud: but against Princes and Potestats, against the rectors of this darkness, against the spirituals of wickedness in the celestials. [Eph. vi. 12.]
>
> Beneficence and communication do not forget, for with such hosts God is not promerited. [Heb. xiii. 16.]

It is only fair to say that in later editions of this Bible the text approximated far nearer to that of the Authorised Version, and little exception can be taken to the Douai Bible of to-day on the score of its English, but such extracts can hardly be called the work of a good translator.

But it may be said, What is a good translation? It may be defined as the result of an attempt to convey the best of the thought of the original writer in the best language of the reader. It is, of course, frequently possible to give the whole of the thoughts conveyed in the original tongue in a good rendering of the reader's language. Page after page of the narrative portions of the Bible do contrive to give the whole of the Hebrew or the Greek in magnificent English. But a translator may be so anxious to convey to his reader every shade and nuance of his author that the result is the kind of bastard language which we associate with the fourth-form schoolboy. Passages such as those just cited from the Rheims version (it is not claimed that they are typical of the Version as a whole) are a kind of bastard English, intelligible, but nothing more, and not always even that. They are excellent if it is desired to retranslate them back into the original, but for private or public reading they are, to say the least, most unsuitable. The attempt to render the whole of the thought of any writer into the language of another nation is bound to produce a verbosity combined with baldness that it is very tiresome to listen to.

Conversely, the translator may be content to give the reader in really good language a mere paraphrase, like Fitzgerald's *Rubayat*. This is unobjectionable provided that the reader is told that it is a paraphrase and not a translation; but the person who wishes to read or hear read the sacred writings of his faith will not be content with a mere paraphrase, but will demand something nearer to the original. It is to the credit alike of Wycliffe, Tyndale, and the forty-seven scholars

who compiled the great Version of 1611 that in English the splendour of which is universally acknowledged they gave us, for the most part, the cream of the thought of the original writers.

'For the most part'—the words explain the Revised Version of the last century, which was due to a desire to amend the errors and defects of the work of 1611. That this great work is defective, particularly as regards the New Testament, was proved to demonstration by Bishop Lightfoot in his book *On a Fresh Revision of the New Testament*, which was published in 1871, just after the revisers had begun their work. He did not fail to do full justice to the pioneer work of Tyndale, pointing out many passages in which the scholars of 1611 might have done well to preserve Tyndale's rendering instead of altering it for the worse, though he did not stint his praise of their work as a whole, in which some of Tyndale's blunders and inadequate renderings were put right. But he was able to state a very powerful case for revision, and added

> It does not seem to be necessary, and it is perhaps not even advisable, that the new Revised Version, if successfully completed, should at once authoritatively displace the old. Only let it not be prohibited. Give it a fair field, and a few years will decide the question of superiority.

The Revised Version has not been prohibited, it has had a fair field, and fifty years have decided the question of superiority. They have decided that the Old Testament is better in the Revised than in the Authorised Version. Hebrew scholars in the commentaries occasionally demur to a rendering here and there; but the gains far exceed the losses, and the average individual can never tell, unless it be when the first chapter of Genesis is read, or on the morning of Christmas Day, which version is being used. But it is far otherwise with the New Testament. From the day when it was published it was attacked, not merely by the ultra-conservative man in the pew, with no knowledge of the original, but by scholars and men of letters. That it was in many cases nearer to the Greek was not disputed, but it was and still is urged that this greater accuracy was attained at too great a cost, and English and euphony alike were sacrificed on the altar of pedantry. Nor can it be denied that later researches, particularly in the rubbish heaps of Egypt, have shown that in some respects the translators of 1611 were more correct than their suc-

cessors. We know much more to-day than men could know in the seventies of last century about the Greek that was spoken and written in the first century of our era, and this has made parts of the work of the revisers out of date. The result is that the Revised Version is not in general use, so far as the New Testament is concerned. Twenty years ago Bishop Talbot stated that it was read in only 11 per cent. of the churches in his diocese, and there is no reason to suppose that it was used more frequently elsewhere. With respect to the Revised Version, so far as the New Testament is concerned, Bishop Lightfoot's words have come true, though in a very different sense from that in which he wrote them—'a few years will decide the question of superiority.'

It remains to ask what Tyndale would think of all this. It may be hazarded that his thoughts would express themselves in some such terms as these:

> I was a pioneer, working with antiquated tools on virgin soil. But at least I was enabled to give my fellow-countrymen a translation which combined a faithfulness to the original with good, strong, simple English. That, at least, was my ideal. How far I succeeded it is for others to say. Later scholars followed in my steps, and the great Version of the reign of James I. had all the advantages which forty-seven scholars have over one without, by the grace of God, any of the disadvantages. Later scholars again, after the lapse of two centuries and a half, trod the same road. The labours of those who translated the more important part of the Bible have been, sad to say, to a large extent fruitless. Their work may be satisfactory to scholars, though it is less so as time passes, but it has conspicuously failed to establish itself in the hearts of the English-speaking world. If in these hearts there still lingers any sense of indebtedness to me and those who followed me, they will endeavour to carry on my work, and mark the four hundredth year after my death with the plan, the first beginnings, of a new translation of the New Testament that shall combine all the fruits of the most recent scholarship with the best and simplest English that the age is capable of writing.

If such be the thoughts of William Tyndale at this time, it only remains for the leaders of the Churches to select their scholars and bid them start work. But there is one grievous omission, made in the last revision, that must not be repeated. Some shrewd critic of the work of the revisers (the remark has been attributed to various persons) said that they should have summoned to their meetings John Bright, who had little or no knowledge of Greek, but a wonderful mastery of the best and purest English. He would have saved them from

many of the criticisms that fell on the heads of the scholars of fifty years ago. He would have attended one of their conferences and said to them: 'Gentlemen, you have spoilt one of the most glorious passages in the whole of our literature. "God is a spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth," I have read, and the words are the most glorious music in the world. Cannot your own ears tell you how your translation has marred them? "God is a spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and truth." Listen to it, gentlemen, only listen to it!' 'But, Mr. Bright,' one of these great scholars might have said, 'the little word in Greek that means "in" is not repeated before the word that means "truth," so we have felt bound to leave it out in our translation.' 'Very good, gentlemen, you know Greek, and I don't. But permit me to say this: if you let your translation stand, the whole English-speaking civilisation will rise up and say with one voice, "These men may be great Greek scholars, but they do not value their own language."'

It would be premature to suggest the names of the scholars or of the assessors whose duty it would be to perform the part that John Bright could have undertaken so successfully. It is sufficient to say that there are Greek scholars and masters of the English tongue who are only waiting for the word to be given by the Churches to begin. William Tyndale combined, in an almost miraculous way, the *rôles* of scholar and assessor, as his own work proves. It is only fair to him that his work should be carried forward.

R. S. T. HASLEHURST.

SOME THOUGHTS AT A PRIZE-GIVING

By Cyril Norwood, D.Lit.

Shortly before Christmas I had the not altogether unfamiliar experience of distributing prizes to boys, and the rarer experience of learning something fresh, something, in my opinion, of more than individual interest. The occasion was the prize-giving and Christmas concert of the training-ship *Mercury*, to which Commander and Mrs. C. B. Fry have given so much of their lives. There were about 100 boys present, who had for the most part been trained for less than two years, and, considering their diverse and yet ordinary homes and the shortness of their course, I had no high expectations of them. But I found them to be much above the average—alert, upstanding and intelligent, able to give, as the result of their ordinary work, a performance of unusual interest, in recitation and song, in dancing and orchestral music. They had a high *esprit de corps*, and I was told by an admiral that it was a very rare thing in the Navy to find a *Mercury* boy among the defaulters. Before the war 90 per cent. of their entrants passed into the Navy, in the advanced class, and a number of these have reached commissioned rank; one of them is a commander. Since the war many have turned to the merchant service, and are creating a parallel record in the best shipping lines. It seemed to me that if a short course could elicit so excellent a performance from quite average material, there must be something in that course itself which it would be worth while to discover. I looked into it, and was not disappointed. The reason of my special interest was that we are about to keep the whole boyhood of the nation in school until the beginning of their sixteenth year, and, unless I am mistaken, have none too clear an idea of the way in which we are going to handle them. Here were boys starting out at sixteen obviously to some real

extent fitted for life and their own particular job. It must therefore be of general educational interest to see how this desirable result has been attained.

I can perhaps reveal the secret more clearly if I say that the prizes which I was called on to distribute fell into several categories. There were first those awarded for school—for Divinity, English, Geography, Mathematics, Science, Drawing and Recitation. There was next a group of vocational subjects—Navigation, Seamanship, Gunnery and Signals. A third was for Physical Training, and included swimming, boxing and dancing. A fourth was for Music, which is not a subject for the few, but is, and always has been, a course for all. Then came a small group called Duty Work, being prizes given to boys for doing the jobs of the place with their own hands. And last came a very unusual group, being prizes for the possession or development of definite qualities, such as Sea Sense, Initiative, Cheerful Obedience, Perseverance, Unselfishness, to quote a few of them. Some would criticise these as likely to produce priggishness and hypocrisy, or as definitely falling short of the high ideal by which virtue is, and ought to be, its own reward. Others more indulgent, and perhaps more wise, would argue that it is no bad thing to put clearly before the young the qualities which make up the character which not only brings happiness and leadership to its possessor, but well-being to the society in which it finds itself.

Such was the balance of the various elements in the education given, and I have only to add that a brief inspection showed that it was the habit of the place for the boys to do things for themselves, and that every day each boy had his own particular job assigned to him. More spacious buildings could have been imagined; but at any rate, there was a theatre for acting, recitation, song and dancing; there was a room for physical exercises, a spacious deck of the ship itself, where it lies in the Hamble river, only to be reached in boats which the boys man themselves. And in the grounds there was a chapel, which loving hands had sought to make beautiful, and which at any rate meant that a purely secular education had not here been thought enough, nor the vain attempt made to produce something to stand the wear of life without religion.

It is perhaps not surprising that in an institution of which C. B. Fry is the head one outstanding characteristic is that they know how to keep their eye on the ball—I mean that they see their object clearly; and they direct all their means to that end. They prepare for life in general, and a sailor's life in particular: a certain type of character, a certain amount of general education, and a certain amount of special knowledge are wanted, and this they set themselves to bring into existence. In addition, by what seems to me to have been a happy accident at the outset, but which may be the result of reason and foresight, they have put music in its proper place. But they have not made the mistake of thinking that education is a matter of book-learning: they have not thought that it consists of a series of subjects to be eventually tested by an examination, wherein proficiency shall be rewarded by a certificate; they have not been betrayed into the belief that it does not matter whether what a boy studies has any relation to his future life or not, or that a subject must be educationally sound if a boy hates it.

Having said so much, I say good-bye to the *Mercury* and wish them the continued good luck which they deserve. I turn to apply the lesson to the wider problem with which everyone who cares for our national education must be much concerned to-day. We are going to raise the school age by a year: we are going to work out a curriculum that shall cover the years eleven to fifteen for all that vast number who are not going to carry their education any further; we are going to cater for Tom, Dick and Harry, good, sound fellows, who will not come out anywhere near the top on an academic intelligence test, or ever shine in a written examination paper. They are that large majority who are not 'good at books.' We ought to think out their education fresh from first principles, keeping, if I may repeat the metaphor, our 'eye on the ball.' What we have to try to do is to put them in the way of becoming healthy, happy and honest, and, in due time, good husbands, good workers and good citizens. Ought not the first characteristic of this new education to be this—that it should be simple and direct?

Now the danger at the outset will be that it will not be simple and direct. The danger will be that it will be thought of as a subsidiary and inferior form of secondary education,

something, therefore, to be modelled on that as a type, a course primarily intellectual to be tested by an appropriate examination. It is surprising to see how deep now go the roots of the instinct implanted by our nineteenth-century educationists that nobody can be counted as really educated unless he has passed an external examination, and no course of school education is worthy of the name unless it leads to such a test. Examinations have been, however, somewhat blown upon of late by Sir Philip Hartog and Dr. Rhodes, and, though I regard their conclusions as far too sweeping, they will have done good if they have undermined the national faith in the examination system as the supreme and only test. For it is expedient, and indeed essential, that in this new education there should be no examinations at all, save internal tests of the pupils by their own teachers. And this for a simple reason, that the greater part of what the boy learns, if taught in the right way, will not be capable of being examined at all. What are commonly called the academic subjects will be a part, and only a part, of the whole course.

A second danger from the outset will be a tendency to overload the curriculum. Partly this will be due to pressure from eager specialist teachers, to make their results better and better, and the inability of most specialists to see the wood for the trees. Partly it will be due to the ambition of 'heads' to show that their four-year course is yielding results as good as those of a full secondary school, though they ought to be attempting something which is essentially different. And partly, also, it will be due to what I regard as the besetting sin of the schoolmastering profession, rampant in many secondary schools to-day, which leads them to draw ambitious and pretentious syllabuses which impress the world without and confuse the boy within. And so one can see boys taking a course of comparative religion at the age of sixteen who do not know the simple facts of the Christian Gospel, and others being taught world history who know nothing of their own country. So one hears of courses of Training for Citizenship in capital letters, by which we are given to understand that boys of sixteen study political economy, political science, currency, banking, local and national government, with all Geneva and the League of Nations thrown in, so that they apparently leave school with a greater knowledge

of the modern world, and how to run it, than most of our legislators at Westminster. There is a commendable side to all this, since it denotes keenness. But it means trying to teach boys to run before they can walk, which is as bad for their mental as it is for their physical legs. Let us at any rate resolve that we will learn to walk first.

Let us take what we may call the ordinary school side of the work first. The pupils have obviously to learn to use their own language; let them learn to use it by reading it, by writing it, by speaking it, by elocution, by acting, by simple debate. Let them prepare no English texts of any sort for any examiner, and let them take no courses in the history of literature. Let them be encouraged to read for themselves as much as they like, and let the master draw on English literature as much as he likes, but all in order that boys may learn to fill their minds and use their language. Let them experiment to the top of their bent. Keep the language before their minds as an instrument of living use, and never kill it by examination.

Let all the pupils take both history and geography, and so obtain an incidental advantage over a number of their contemporaries in the established secondary schools. Geography at this stage should be the process of learning what the world is like and the place of our own country in it, why things are as they are, and why they cannot be otherwise. History is the process of learning how our country and Europe and America have come to be what they are, and how related to each other. Geography should be a plain study of the facts of the world as it is to-day, and not a backdoor approach to science; history should be a study mainly of what has happened since the Seven Years' War, and the whole of the last two years at school should be devoted to the story of the modern world. All these boys will be voters in a very few years, and an outline knowledge of the sequence of events which have shaped Europe and America is essential to the intelligent use of the vote. It is one of the delusions which we owe to the examination system to think that any dose of history is for practical purposes as good as any other. So it is, for examination purposes; but for the needs of citizenship and modern life such a view is obviously contrary to common sense.

Mathematics and science must have a place, but the full secondary school standard should not be attempted. Even in the secondary school mathematics as a subject is carried to a level that is, to say the least, exacting, and I suggest that it is not fair to demand of the non-academic majority more than an accurate knowledge of ordinary arithmetic and an acquaintance with simple geometrical forms. Science in the secondary schools has too frequently failed because it has been taught as if every boy was going to be a physicist or chemist, so that he leaves school with a mere foundation of studies which he neither understands nor continues. Things are changing for the better, and we may confidently anticipate that the scientists will devise a course which will teach boys something of what is meant by a scientific law, and something of what is meant by a scientific method. The examples may be drawn from physics or chemistry or biology, or indeed any branch of science, but for general education biology seems to be the most important. From the point of view of Science with a capital S, it will be a smattering, but for all that it will be something of real value for life.

I think that, if we are wise, we shall attempt no more of the academic curriculum than has been now described. It is as much as the children's heads will hold, and a foreign language will make the burden too heavy. For there is much else to be attempted in the form of subjects too often treated as Cinderellas of the curriculum which have been pushing their way into schools during the last forty years, and have proved their value. In the first place, there is all that can be taught under the headings of handicraft and art. It is natural to young people to seek to draw and paint, to try to make things; more and more it has come to be realised that it is a fruitful method of self-expression and self-development, and a way in which a sense of achievement, and so a grasp upon life, first comes to an individual. How often is a boy who is slow with his head good with his hands? What an interest and what a practical advantage for life is it to be able to work in wood or metal? Such training for ordinary people should certainly run through all their school years.

Another subject, equally valuable, and long neglected and misunderstood, is Music. It is still far too much regarded as an extra. But it is true to say that there are very few who are

so tone deaf that they cannot learn to sing, very few so lacking in musical sense that they cannot learn to appreciate. Very many can with profit learn an instrument and take their part in a school orchestra. Good judges—and I agree with them—hold that you cannot enter into musical study, in however elementary a way, without quickening the general intelligence. For these reasons, which I have not space to develop or to argue fully, I claim that elementary musical training should be a part of the curriculum for everybody. Such a step would in itself be educationally sound, and would lead to great advantages in the social life of the community.

It may seem like forcing an open door to stress the importance of physical education, for there now seems to be so general an agreement that there may be a danger of going too fast and incurring disappointment because we have not as yet trained the trainers. I will only say that there should be physical exercise under supervision every day, that the classes should be graded by physical fitness, just as in other subjects they are graded by academic fitness, and that there should be rising standards of achievement to which the boys should be encouraged to attain. It should be education, and not mere training, and the end should always be the foundation of character and the quickening of intelligence. Alertness, self-control, initiative, poise and a sense of rhythm should be the fruits of a good physical education, and not merely a strong and supple body. For all through the school course, whether it be in the school subjects in the old sense, or handicraft, or art, or music, or physical education, the object should be to develop the whole personality, in which mind and body are indissolubly united, and to produce the good man and the good citizen.

To save misunderstanding, I should like to enter two cautionary statements. The first is that the education which I have sketched is not intended to be a substitute for technical education, but its necessary groundwork. We need in this country the very best technical schools that can be devised, but the age for this training is from fifteen to sixteen, and a general education is needed first. The second is that it is not intended to be a substitute for the secondary schools, which have a leaving age of eighteen. We need these as much as we have ever done, and they should be recruited from all those

who show real academic promise at the age of eleven, twelve and thirteen in order that they may work with the right sort of material. There are, I think, as a matter of fact, enough secondary schools in existence already for those who are qualified to profit by them, and we do not want more. But we need a great number of schools for those not so qualified, who are by no means inferior to the academic type of boy on any just reckoning of personality, but are at present not rightly provided for.

It is not easy to cover so much ground in a brief article, and I must leave it to my readers to judge whether the education which I have sketched is simple and direct. My claim is that it is, and that at every point a boy would feel that he was either doing or learning something with direct reference to the business of living, and that he would therefore be interested and remain alert and curious. We cannot confidently assert that this is even commonly the case with our pupils now, and it is a sign that there is something wrong. We have been pouring new wine into old bottles too long, and it is our great educational opportunity by following a practical ideal and by fixing our eyes on the true end, which is the preparation for citizenship and life, to frame courses and to create schools which will give to the whole nation a common foundation of thought and ideals, and make our talk of 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness' something more real than it is at present.

CYRIL NORWOOD.

LOVE AT CAMELOT

By Llewelyn Powys

It is possible from the main line of the Great Western Railway to get a very clear view of Cadbury Camp. It is a fairy hill that can awaken in late afternoon sunshine levels of consciousness different enough from those provoked by the importunate reality of a practical railway-carriage with its cheerful smell of dust and imprisoned sunshine—levels of consciousness transforming in a flash the urgent pressure of modernity into dim visions of a Celtic world, eldritch yet substantial. And this silent testimony of the wooded hill may truly be regarded as a valid one, for love between men and women will always have a power of transmuting the common cocksfoot-grass acres of the familiar earth to parcels of enchanted ground, to parcels of magical dust as immaterial and airy as a blackbird's twilight whistle, and yet as warrantable as the smell of mushrooms, or the taste of September blackberries hooked down from an actual hedge in the Blackmore Vale. The mere presence of this storied hill standing out of the valley solid and aloof, through winter weather and through summer weather, is a refutation to those who contend that moments of an absolute happiness, 'Stay, stay, thou art so fair,' are for ever out of our reach.

I have not been to Cadbury Camp since my school days, but I remember it as clear as though I were looking at it on an old parlour engraving. I can see the homely grey wall that lies about it like a serpent, and Arthur's Well on the side of the slope, facing towards Glastonbury. When we were boys my brother Willie and I used often to refresh ourselves at this forest pool, after having run there from Sherborne on a Sunday afternoon, with little enough time to waste if we were to be back at the regular hour to study for our evening preparation Dr. Stokoe's large-printed and small-

printed notes upon the Old Testament. Kneeling to drink, with our top hats on the ground by our sides, we would listen for echoes, as though the hill were a huge hollow fossil, resonant of antiquity as a Gargantuan spiral conch might be of the sea, a conch left stranded on some Lilliputian plain of vernal grasses.

> A grave for March, a grave for Gwythur,
> A grave for Gwgawn of the ruddy sword,
> Not wise (the thought) a grave for Arthur.

It must have been in some such credulous mood, when he was entertained by the bards on his way to Ireland, that the original Plantagenet listened to the Welsh rumour which told how Arthur was buried in the monk's graveyard plot at Ynis-wytren, as the British called Glastonbury, a rumour which resulted in the finding of Arthur's bones in the reign of Cœur de Lion, bones of 'a great bignesse' lying in a hollowed-out tree-trunk close by those of a woman whose platted hair was in colour 'like to the gold.' This singular discovery was made in the actual presence of the historian Giraldus Cambrensis, who himself saw the leaden cross that was dug up, and which was to remain one of the Abbey's most treasured relics until the scattering of all such toys by Henry VIII.

It was the intermingling of the Cymric legends, fantastic and supernatural, with the courtly notions of mediæval chivalry, so strongly appealing to the Normans, which inspired the genius of the Lancastrian knight, Sir Thomas Malory, to compile his tales, tales wnich have ensorcerised subsequent generations into a very ducdame circle, as though they were being summoned by the echo of Rowland's horn coming to them as clear as ever, over the vineyards of Roncesvalles:

> Roland has gone over the hill forever,
> And Oliver lies beside him on the plain,
> Nothing is left but a horn in the distance blowing,
> Charlemagne . . . Charlemagne. . . .

By Malory's art fragments of the Arthurian legend were woven together as plain as scenes on a tapestry, so that the old book can render the love passions of that dreaming past at one with those that now take place in our own fugitive period.

Never does a troop of Sherborne hunters pass along the straight drives of the Leweston or Honeycombe woods, with the hoofs of their horses treading in the litter of the musty pheasant straw, without these emotions being present, present as inevitably as the smell of the frosts, not severe enough yet to leave any 'bone' under the rain-soaked sods of the tough wintry grasses. Such gay privileged companies riding out into leafless woods from warm breakfast rooms could scarcely hope to be free of it, being a folk who have never known what it is to have an empty pot upon the fire, or indeed to be in any way stinted of their victuals. A nervous hand, deliberately laid upon the arched neck of a high-spirited horse, or a single protracted glance, and, before a field gate swings open, the life of a man is shaken to its foundations. How many Iseults and Queen Gueneveres, leaving their horses to trig subservient stablemen, glide back to their houses as eager for the refreshments of love as they are hungry for food, their tired limbs, white as elder flowers, deep lapped in furs! Do these idle provocative ladies of the West Country who follow so nonchalantly, so unmindfully, the merciless pastimes of a savage ancestry ever give a thought to Sir Tristram and the debt they owe to him? 'For,' as books report, 'Sir Tristram was the noblest blower of a horn of all manner of measures; for of Sir Tristram came all the good laws of venery and hunting, and all the sizes and measures of blowing of an horn that all manner of gentlemen have cause to the world's end to praise Sir Tristram and to pray for his soul.'

How vividly Sir Thomas Malory evokes the legendary stories of these impassioned lovers from the days in Ireland when Tristram 'learned Isoud' as a maid to 'harp and carp'; even to the fatal hour of his death at the hands of King Mark 'as he sat harping afore his lady La Beale Isoud.' And between those two harpings, how many snatched meetings—long winter nights transformed under the ordinance of a fairy space-time 'to the third part of a minute,' hours in screened garden alleys when a whole rose-blown summer afternoon would scarce measure a digit movement on the blithe face of the terrace dial.

Malory's narrations have an innocent way of sliding out from under accepted proprieties. They are profoundly

amoral—'Goose if I had you upon Sarum plain I'd drive you cackling home to Camelot.' When King Arthur is besieging Joyous Gard, Sir Launcelot looks down upon him from the castle wall, and though he has 'purfled' his own mantle with the king's beard more wantonly than even King Ryence had threatened to do, calmly assures Arthur that Queen Guenevere is 'a true lady unto your person as any is living unto her lord.'

And what a wealth of poetry there is in the prose account of Tristram and Iseult's drinking of the fatal cup! 'When they were in their cabin; it happed so that they were thirsty, and they saw a little flasket of gold stand by them, and it seemed by the colour and the taste that it was noble wine. . . . Then they laughed and made good cheer, and either drank to other freely, and they thought never drink that ever they drank to other was so sweet nor so good. But by that their was in their bodies, they loved either other so well that never their love departed for weal neither for woe. And thus it happed the love first betwixt Sir Tristram and La Beale Isoud which love never departed the days of their life.' And over and over again after this dramatic prelude to their trance the same ballad-like chime sounds through the book's pages. It is indeed impossible for Iseult to open her lips without her breath—breath fragrant as the garden pinks called sops-in-wine—carrying upon it the indefinable airy spirit of one of the old gestes. In a mood of passionate despair caused by the report of Tristram's death she goes into the orchard of Tintagel intending to kill herself; to stab herself under a plum tree was her plan. Before taking her into his arms to carry her back to her chamber the distracted husband hears her say 'Sweet Lord Jesu, have mercy upon me, for I may not live after the death of Sir Tristram de Liones, for he was my first Love and he shall be the last.' There is something gracious and free about the relations between the two Queens. Who indeed was likely to be more conversant than the Dame Guenevere with complexities incident to emotions gone awry? At each stage of Iseult's story King Arthur's Queen is ready with encouragement or consolation. 'And in this meanwhile La Beale Isoud made a letter unto Queen Guenevere, complaining her of the untruth of Sir Tristram, and how he had wedded the King's daughter of Brittany. Queen Guenevere sent her another letter, and bade her be of

good cheer, for she should have joy after sorrow.' And again when Tristram returned secretly to Tintagel and the two lovers were once more together the news of their happiness came as glad tidings to the Court of Camelot. 'Fair damosel,' said Iseult to her messenger, 'how fareth my Lord Arthur, and the Queen Guenevere, and the noble knight, Sir Lancelot? She answered, and to make short tale: Much the better that ye and Sir Tristram be in joy. God reward them, said La Beale Isoud, for Sir Tristram suffereth great pain for me and I for him.' Perhaps we may find Sir Malory's own attitude to such perplexing entanglements reflected in the bold words uttered by Sir Palomides when Sir Tristram 'that daffish knight' began narrowly challenging him concerning his love for Iseult. 'I have done to you no treason, for love is free for all men, and though I have loved your lady, she is my lady as well as yours; howbeit I have wrong, if any wrong be, for ye rejoice her, and have your desire of her, and so had I never, nor never am like to have, and yet shall I love her to the uttermost days of my life as well as ye.' Though he had no disinclination himself to fish in his neighbour's lily pond, such a declaration was not likely to be hospitably received by Sir Tristram. Nor could one so deeply in love be expected to acquiesce when Sir Dinadan, twitted by Iseult for being fancy free, uttered his capital heresy. 'God defend me,' said Dinadan, 'for the joy of love is too short, and the sorrow thereof, and what cometh thereof, dureth over long,' a sentiment hardly in accord, be it said, with the impassioned manners either at Camelot, Tintagel, or Joyous Gard!

Even Merlin, who was wise enough to warn King Arthur 'covertly' that the maiden Guenevere, daughter of Leodegrance 'The gentilest and fairest lady' was not 'wholesome' for him to take to wife, himself became utterly besotted by his love for the enchantress Nimue, 'the damosel of the lake' as soon as ever she set her light and artful foot on the stairway of King Arthur's Court. 'But Merlin would let her have no rest . . . and went with her ever more where so ever she went. . . . And always Merlin lay about the lady to have her maidenhood, and she was ever passing weary of him.'

The case was no better between Sir Lancelot and the Queen. In vain the knight, by making a confession of his

madness to a holy hermit, thought to rid himself of the fever in his blood. It was of little avail.

'Then, as the book saith, Sir Lancelot began to resort unto Queen Guenevere again . . . ever his thoughts were privily on the Queen, and so they loved together more hotter than they did to-forehand, and had such privy draughts together, that many in the Court spake of it.'

How often have gleaning-bells and market-bells sounded in Sparkford Vale since those amorous, froward, and aristocratic days! It is in the month of May when the hawthorn is in bloom that true lovers should wander over the green orgulous hill and through every meadow that lies about it; till they come to know each shadowed alder-nook along the banks of the River Camel, and every hedge-shelter of this charmed section of Somerset. Let them leave their lamp-lit cottage lodging after their supper of eggs to drink living water from this paved fountain when the constellation Cygnus hangs high over head through the white nights of Midsummer.

> Lovers, haste! the dusk has come;
> Why do you waste these pretty hours?
> Everything has gone to sleep,
> Sheep and lambs, and birds and flowers.

Let them lie together listening to the winds in the ferns and to the midnight murmurs floating up from the wide dewy fields eastward of Avalon.

Leland in his travels questioned the local country people of his day about what they knew of 'this very torre or hill wonderfully enstrengthened of nature,' but they could tell him nothing beyond the fact that a horse-shoe made of silver had been found there not long before, and that they had always heard 'that Arture much resorted to Camalot.'

It has often seemed to me that the finest prose in English literature was written in the seventeenth century, and yet when I read the opening chapter of Sir Thomas Malory's nineteenth book I can scarce imagine sentences better contrived, sentences that can conjure before us with more art those days in early spring most favourable to love-making.

> And thus it passed on from Candlemass until after Easter, that the month of May was come, when every lusty heart beginneth to blossom, and to bring forth fruit for like as herbs and trees bring forth fruit and flourish in May, in like wise every lusty heart that is in any manner a

lover, springeth and flourisheth in lusty deeds. For it giveth unto all lovers courage, that lusty month of May. . . . For then all herbs and trees renew a man and woman, and like wise lovers call again to their mind old gentleness and old service. . . . But nowadays men can not love seven nights but they must have their desires. . . . Right so fareth love nowadays, soon hot, soon cold: this is no stability. But the old love was not so; men and women could love together seven years, and no licours lusts were between them. . . . Wherefore I liken love nowadays unto summer and winter; for like us the one is hot and the other cold, so fareth love nowadays; therefore all ye that be lovers call unto your remembrance the month of May, like as did Queen Guenevere, for whom I make here a little mention, that while she lived she was a true lover, and therefore she had a good end.

LLEWELYN POWYS.

BOOKS RECEIVED

A History of Ireland, by Edmund Curtis, M.A., Litt.D., Professor of Modern History in the University of Dublin (Methuen, 12*s*. 6*d*. net).

Dublin under the Georges (1714–1830), by Constantia Maxwell, M.A., Litt.D., Lecturer in Modern History, Trinity College, Dublin (Harrap, 12*s*. 6*d*. net).

These books differ widely in their manner of approach to Irish history and in the scope of their treatment. Together they constitute two of the most valuable contributions that have yet been made to the study of this complex and dangerous subject. In the true spirit of historical investigation their authors combine scientific objectivity with human sympathy, and walk tactfully over volcanic ground. '*Incedunt per ignes suppositos cineri doloso*,' and yet they do not burn their feet, or raise hot ashes for the winds of political passion to scatter. Rather they help both Irish and non-Irish readers to understand why the ashes of the past are still so hot.

Dr. Curtis traces in the course of 389 well-written and well-documented pages the main currents of our political experience from the earliest times until the present. One would like to say that he traces the political development of the Irish nation during the millennium and a half of its known history. An Irish nation, as he points out, has indeed emerged from the crucible of Irish history, but it is not his fault that there is no continuity of political development to trace, or that the self-conscious Irish nation fails to include an important minority of the inhabitants of the island. The self-conscious Irish nation of to-day, in its political aspect, is a product of the confiscations of Irish land and of the disestablishment of the traditional Church in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Before that date

Irish politics were essentially parochial. Indeed, since the jealousies of provincial dynasties destroyed all hope of the revival of a native high kingship, one might almost say that for centuries the instinctive effort of a half-conscious nationhood was to find and keep an external Ard Ri, who would out-top all native rulers in dignity, but leave them to enjoy their local privileges, provided that they behaved and kept the peace. The submission to Henry II. was on this tacit understanding, and the summons to Edward Bruce was accompanied by a remonstrance setting forth the various ways in which Henry II. and his successors had failed to perform their obligations, and inviting the former to assume the office of Ard Ri.

Right down to the eighteenth century both the depressed masses and surviving Catholic leaders of the Irish and Anglo-Irish tradition were instinctively monarchist in their outlook. 'The King's grace was in their tradition.' The present very apparent divorce of Irish national tradition from the monarchical institution can easily be accounted for by the events of the eighteenth century in both Irish and English history. From the battle of the Boyne in 1690 till 1821, when George IV. visited Ireland and obtained a more royal welcome than he deserved, no British monarch set foot on Irish soil. 'While the Crown had formerly been the supreme power for Ireland, the Parliament of England now shared the sovereignty with it,' and used its power to penalise the religion of the vast majority in Ireland and destroy the commercial and industrial conditions of prosperity, not only for the Catholic masses, but for the commercial and industrial 'English interest' as well. Chance after chance of reconciliation was lost. 'A more unattractive figure than George the First could hardly have been found for the throne of these kingdoms,' but George III. destroyed the possibility of the Union with Ireland being a political success by his objections to fulfilling the promise of Catholic emancipation—objections which, it is fair to remind ourselves, had widespread support among his Ministers.

The present anti-monarchical tradition in Ireland dates only from the time and circumstances of the French Revolution, and no impartial reader of Dr. Curtis's or Dr. Constantia Maxwell's books can wonder if Wolfe Tone and his associates, despairing of redress from a British Crown which was

powerful only for evil in Irish affairs, embraced the heady doctrines of the French revolutionaries.

Dr. Maxwell gives an excellent account, descriptive and analytical, of social life and conditions in the Ireland that was governed by the eighteenth-century ascendancy Parliament. For all its outward brilliance, she makes it quite clear that the roots of this exotic civilisation were fixed in social and economic injustice. It could neither become part and parcel of an Irish nation, nor remain a permanently satisfactory instrument of English domination.

There is one important omission in the account. She fails to explain fully the peculiar currency and credit conditions that prevailed in eighteenth-century Ireland, and show their relation to the general economic chaos that prevailed in the first half of the century, and was the direct result of the commercial restrictions imposed by England, as part of her general mercantilist policy. The commercial prosperity of the second half of the century also seems to require some fuller explanation. Both writers are inclined to accept this prosperity, real enough up to a point, at its face value, and attribute it to the legislative wisdom of an Anglo-Irish Parliament, now developing a spirit of Protestant nationalism. The present writer is convinced that the economic legislation of these decades furthered the immediate financial interests of landlordism rather than the permanent advantage of either the nation, its landowners or cultivators, and that the acute economic diseases of the early nineteenth century were due, in no small degree, to the inevitable Nemesis of a wheat-growing soil-impoverishing agricultural *régime*.

It remains to be seen whether the present anti-monarchical mood of the Irish nation is permanent, or whether a fuller understanding of the Statute of Westminster, and of the true position of the Monarchy in relation to the Commonwealth, will yet provide a satisfactory conclusion to the age-long instinctive quest for an external Ard Ri. If monarchy has failed to become a satisfactory symbol of Irish national tradition, it was more often the fault of the English monarch than of the Irish nation. It is to be hoped that all those whose constitutional duty it is to advise His Majesty King Edward VIII. on Irish affairs will read Dr. Curtis's and Dr. Maxwell's books.

JOSEPH JOHNSTON.

Justice in a Depressed Area, by Charles Muir (Allen & Unwin, 6*s*.).

There are two characteristics of English Justice that are not to be found outside our island to any similar extent. These are the influence of the legal profession, and its profound complacency. The influence is shown not so much in active opposition to proposals for reform, as in an atmosphere of hostility that prevents reform proposals from being prepared and introduced. Legal complacency is apparent at every city banquet and on every occasion when lawyers meet together. Reference to our glorious legal institutions will always evoke a cheer. Reference to the cost of civil proceedings or to defects in our criminal procedure is very seldom made. In this atmosphere Mr. Charles Muir, a barrister of the Northern Circuit who both lives and works in the 'depressed area' of the North, has produced a book which has very real value. There could be no more stimulating tonic, no greater antidote to complacency.

In this book we read what the wage-earners really think of our system of administering justice, not what is thought and said by those who hover on the outskirts of judicial pomp and ceremony. Much of the ground from which the author derives his experience I have covered myself, though in metropolitan, not 'depressed,' areas. If only influential legal circles would read the views reported in this book and realise that generally the author presents a true view of the wage-earners' beliefs, then legal reform might develop into something really valuable and noteworthy, and no longer be limited to such matters as will benefit, or at least not threaten, legal vested interests. I cannot agree with Mr. Muir on some points, but in general his book presents a point of view that is shared by vast numbers who are as yet silent.

Two points will suffice to show Mr. Muir's outlook. A good example is the case of the Assizes. The recent Royal Commission on the Despatch of Business at Common Law (1936, Cmd. 5065) reported that 'we found a very strong body of opinion in favour of keeping the present county basis,' so High Court judges are to continue to visit 'many of the present assize towns [which] are neither of great importance in themselves nor of any particular convenience as centres,' while 'thirty-eight out of the fifty greatest county

boroughs, boroughs and urban districts are excluded from the benefits of assizes': the latter quotations come from the same Report. What is this 'very strong body of opinion' that bars the road to such circuit reform as was advocated a few years ago by no less an authority than Lord Wright? Let Mr. Muir answer: 'To many working men who know something of the [assize] system and its history it is a relic of an oppressive age. . . . The ceremonial and the bowing and scraping are repugnant, although there is a middle-class minority which likes the titles and the ceremonial.'

Again, on the question of our county courts Mr. Muir has refreshingly vigorous things to say. No stipendiary magistrate can fail to see every week where our county courts fail. Police courts really are Poor Men's Courts. We magistrates are accessible; we are not kept aloof from the public by wig and gown; no heavy court fees bar access to us; humble people can plead their own causes before us without any feeling of being on sufferance. But county court costs and procedure are relatively an even greater barrier against justice than are the ways of the High Court. Mr. Muir would like to see county courts remodelled on the lines of courts of referees under the Unemployment Insurance Acts, which have lay colleagues assisting the legal chairman—one representing the employer type, the other the employee type. I, too, have experience and a high opinion of these tribunals. 'Most county court judges,' he writes, 'begin to show distinct signs of boredom with their work after five or six years of office. A composite tribunal would tend to correct those faults.' From London experience I cannot endorse the first sentence, but Mr. Muir's criticisms of the system of entrusting all local litigation to a single judge, especially as regards Workmen's Compensation cases, are stimulating, though the following statement is probably too sweeping: 'The majority of county court judges have no industrial or commercial experience and have lived their lives in the residential suburbs of London and on becoming county court judges have adopted the existence of country gentlemen.'

Apart from details there is only one substantial criticism that I, as a Law Reformer, would wish to make against Mr. Muir's book. He does not appear to realise that most of

the defects that he points out originate in our defective legal education. So long as the professional education of barristers lies solely in the hands of the Inns of Court and that of solicitors with the Law Society, so long will the present un-scientific and un-analytical mentality of the English lawyer continue. In 1934 (Cmd. 4663) rather timid reforms were recommended by a Lord Chancellor's Committee presided over by Lord Atkin. A 'Standing Advisory Committee' representing the universities and the professional bodies was to be set up. This might have led to big reforms whereby such subjects as comparative law, medico-legal jurisprudence, penology, etc., might have become part of the training of the English lawyer. But, though preliminary soundings were made, the scheme has been shelved; and Professor Harold Laski's independent addendum to the Report has been ignored. Until English lawyers are given a better legal education it would be idle to hope for much constructive legal reform.

Books on legal reform are increasing in number and their tone is becoming increasingly bitter. There were no complaints when in 1931, while still at the Bar, I published my *In Quest of Justice*. I purposely wrote so as not to offend, as did also Mr. C. P. Harvey in his small book *Solon, or the Price of Justice*. A harsher note was struck by Mr. C. L. Hodgkinson ('Solicitor') in his *English Justice*. Mr. Muir has gone farther and has said some things that may offend. If the pace of legal reform is not accelerated—and at present it is rather diminishing—there may well come attacks that really hurt. When this happens, the true cause will be the complacency and inertia of the legal profession.

CLAUD MULLINS.

CORRECTION

We much regret that in a review of *The New Industrial System*, by Dr. Hermann Levy, which appeared in our August number, 1936, both price and publishers were wrongly given. The publishers, to whom our apologies are due, are Messrs. George Routledge & Sons Ltd., and the price is 10*s*. 6*d*.

WALKS AND TALKS

Germany Revisited

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

The first questions that a visitor to one great country from another always asks himself to-day is what is there to fear and, less often, what to learn? A week spent at Nuremberg during the annual Nazi Party Congress in September affords all comers a variety of replies. I here record some impressions derived from such a visit, the seventh to Germany in three years, during which I have watched the tree, which I saw sprouting in 1933, grow quickly in almost precisely the form intended by those who planted it: it has begun to flower, and will soon bear fruit.

To outward seeming the new Germany is more prosperous than that of 1928–31. The figures of public health are gratifying: the death rate in infancy and adolescence has dropped quickly, and is well below ours; there is far less tuberculosis and other diseases; the courts have never had so little to do; the prisons were never emptier. The physical well-being of the nation's youth is a pleasure to see: the poorest are better dressed than of old; their faces bear witness to a psychological change for the better. I could not say that of the masses in Paris and Strasburg, where I spent some time on my way to Germany.

There is something like a boom in internal trade, quite apart from rearmament; unemployment has reached a figure which Sir William Beveridge would probably regard as a low-water mark. Can it last? No one knows. All realise that the question is one to ask: many believe that the self-sufficient State, if well-disciplined and organised, can remain largely immune from financial depressions originating in other lands; others hold that all that is possible on these lines has already been done, and that more international trade is

essential to further progress. A few believe that the State should take control of banking, and issue an internal currency, distinct from that used in international transactions. I heard all these views expressed. The conflict between Right and Left wing policies is still being waged within the party, by experts, behind closed doors, not in public. But Dr. Schacht, under the wing of General Goering, was never in a stronger position; and he will countenance no adventures.

Meanwhile, the German people are content to hold that money is confidence, which means faith in themselves and their leaders. To renew that faith, and to give expression to it, is the object of the annual party congress at Nuremberg, attended by a quarter of a million pilgrims and as many official participants, including the Hitler Youth, of either sex, representatives of German womanhood from every part of the Reich, in traditional costume, the Public Works Service Corps, the S.A. and S.S.—brown and black clad special constabulary, and detachments of every branch of the armed forces, which come under a single Ministry. Each group of 40,000 or 50,000 persons assembles in turn in great buildings or in one of several magnificent stadiums, specially erected for the purpose, to see and hear Herr Hitler, with his principal Ministers, and to derive mutual encouragement from the imposing spectacles of which they are an integral part. The foreign visitor, to quote Horace (*Epistles*, II. i.):

> Would eye the mob more keenly than the shows,
> And find less food for thought in these than those.
>
> *Spectaret populum ludis attentius ipsis,*
> *Ut sibi praebentem nimio spectacula plura.*

Public attention abroad is, inevitably, focussed upon the principal speeches delivered, and upon descriptions of the military displays, recorded by foreign correspondents with an eye to high lights and with little space and scant sympathy for other aspects. Some correspondents, indeed, resemble that ingenious machine which records upon a paper scroll, and exaggerates, as a car moves over the road, every furrow crossed and every jolt received, regardless of the direction and speed of the vehicle. I was at pains to spend more time among 'the mob' than in the grand stand.

After a week in touch with observers of many nations, witnessing every parade in turn, I will attempt to give details

of only one—that of 43,000 men of the *Arbeitsdienst* (Public Works Service Corps). It was the first of the series, as that of the army was the last. All alike were spectacular: each was perfectly staged and faultlessly executed, with the self-adjusting precision of a living creature. Each was marked by scenes of endurance, of emotional enthusiasm, and of sustained patriotic fervour, such as I have not witnessed elsewhere. Whatever opposition may exist underground, it causes no anxiety, for the Chancellor, standing erect an hour at a time, day after day, in a slow-moving car in narrow streets between seven-storey houses, whence the poorest in the land watched him from their own windows, was running risks which few of the world's rulers, other than our own King, would care to take.

The parade of the Public Works Service Corps, representing over 250,000 young men, some in tented camps but mostly in permanent barracks scattered all over Germany, merits special attention because it stands for a wholly new ideal, now an integral part of German life. It existed in embryo before the Revolution, the leaders of which saw in it the seeds of a movement wholly consonant with their aims. It grew very rapidly, and has not been curtailed, as some expected, by the adoption of universal military service. For university graduates six months in these camps is compulsory: no man can obtain employment in the public service who has not served thus. For others it is in part compulsory; but there is still an element of selection, and of voluntaryism.

The ceremony opened with a march-past which would have done credit to any regular army: the simple drill, to the order of one man, his voice amplified by a hundred loud-speakers, was equally good; the Bands reached a high standard. But these things were overshadowed when the parade reached its climax and the whole force entered the arena as a series of battalions in line formation, their burnished spades, the only weapon carried, flashing in the sun as they turned.

In the middle of the front line was a cenotaph; in front of it stood one of the forty-three Bands; around it were massed some 500 young men, shortly destined to be leaders in the corps, and specially trained to this end. Bare to the waist, and hatless, they carried only a spade.

Then began a memorial ceremony and service of dedication in which all on parade played a part—so simple, so solemn, so moving, and so sincere as to merit, better than many customary religious rites, the title of worship. The note of trumpets brought the silent and reverent multitude of 70,000 spectators to their feet. A hundred flags dipped. Then followed the Order of Service: sentences, spoken by one man, were followed by responses, uttered sometimes by the 500 leaders, sometimes by every man on parade.

The rite occupied fifteen minutes, and it had not been previously rehearsed as a whole: the leaders and the chorus knew it by heart, for they carried no paper in hand. I have tried to reproduce below, however imperfectly, the spirit of the original, which was in verse.

[*Fanfare of Trumpets: Flags are waved.*]

Chorus of Male Voices:

Dear to our hearts is the land of our birth,
For the State is us all
And we are a wall
Surrounding the Kingdom
Protecting its freedom
With heart and with hand.

The whole Corps:

Now is the hour when we men who labour,
With spades that shine brightly
And flags that fly proudly
With eyes that are clear
And hearts without fear
Come forth to the nation and march past our Leader.

One Voice:

Once in the year spades must rest for a day,
Once in the year comes the time when we may
Come forth to the Leader to whom we are true,
And in this great hour our faith plight anew.

The whole Corps:

We are ready.

Chorus:

The writers and smiths
Stand shoulder to shoulder
With plough-boys and joiners,
Alike in their habit,
Of dress and of work,
They stand in the ranks,
No labour to shirk.

One Voice:

Is any too noble
Is any too humble

All:

To work for his land?

One Voice:

To all is the right
To each is the duty

All:

To work for his land.

One Voice:

O Fatherland dear!
No words can reveal
The love that we feel.
In our hearts we conceal
The love that we feel

All:

O Fatherland dear!

One Voice:

As we stand at the lathe
In the noise of the forge
It is you we would serve

O Fatherland dear!

One Voice:

We know the command
That work is a duty.
By this we will stand
Of comrades a band.

All:

O Fatherland dear!

One Voice:

For are not our spades
Doing service to you?
And are not they making
Our dear land anew?
And is it not holy
Such duty to do?

All:

We are true to the Leader, where e'er he may go,

One Voice:

For he will give peace to the world, that we know!

Chorus:

The weapons of peace are the spades that we wield,
The camps that we live in, of peace are the shield.
No longer divided by class and by station,
The spade has united us all as a nation.

All:

Behind the Leader that we know
We work with spade and pick and hoe.
The road to peace he'll surely show.

Chorus:

All honour to the hoe,
By which the corps shall grow.
All honour to our camp,
Set among marshes rank
Where once no corn would grow,
To-morrow we will sow.
Uplands will laugh and sing
Which once no food would bring.

Chorus:

Our camps throughout the land
Like watch towers shall stand.
The faith our spades proclaim
Firm-rooted shall remain.
The love we bear the State
Shall bury deep all hate.

One Voice:

We of the Ems reclaim waste land,
By wind and sun our bodies tanned.

Another:

Standing knee deep in weed and slime,
Soaked to the skin, we tame the Rhine.

A third:

And icy streams from Bayern's peaks
Wreck in an hour the work of weeks.

A fourth:

Wet are our clothes and cruel the cold.
Scarcely a spade can our numbed fingers hold.

Chorus:

Yet still with heads erect with pride
We look back to our comrades who early death defied,
Those German youths, a glorious band,
Feared not to die for their dear land.

All:

For which we live, for which we strive.

[*A roll of drums; the sound of trumpets. Standards are dipped. Four wreaths are placed on the cenotaph. All heads are bowed.*]

Chorus:

A hero's wreath for those who fell in fields of war and strife,
A martyr's wreath for those who died when civil feuds were rife.
Lift up the wreaths! And raise two more for them
Whom sickness took or died at work like men.

While we have life their names we'll cherish
Never shall their memory perish.

Our turn to go too may be near,
We'll march to meet death without fear.

For death must come to all,
But still our banners tall
Shall wave to heaven above.

One Voice:

The Cross aloft doth mark
The road to freedom dark.

The shadow it doth throw
On mortal men below
Shows that the sun on high
Shines now on Germany.

[*Trumpets sound.*]

One Voice :

This is our two-fold law
With every breath we draw

Our land and homes our children shall inherit
We by our work their gratitude shall merit.

Thus shall we do, and thus by Germans led
In honour die, striving for work and bread,
Leaving the earth our forefathers have made
The better for our toil, and for the spade.

The Chorus :

O Leader, we are workers true
We dedicate our life anew,
To serve the Fatherland, and you.

All :

We swear it.

All in unison sing the fireside song of the camps :

God, bless the work which we've begun !
God, bless our Leader and the course we run !

Stand by our side, O God, to bless our toil !
With all our strength enriching German soil !

God, bless our task ! God, bless the spade !
Which turns to wealth what Thou hast made,
That every stroke of spade may be
A fruitful prayer for Germany.

I watched the earnest faces of the audience as they listened, and of the men as they sang. If this is propaganda, it is for peace, and it is for German ears, and not ours, for no translation has been published. It is not akin to our National Anthem, *Rule Britannia* or *Deutschland über alles*. It is as near pacifism as any normal man can get. The last verses are known throughout all Germany by every youth who has passed through the camps.

Such a ceremony would have satisfied the early saints, who held that *Laborare est orare*: it is in the tradition of the *Enchiridion* of Erasmus and of Kipling's *Recessional*. If we cannot understand and value it we are the poorer thereby.

I was not surprised to hear Herr Hitler begin his speech with the words 'I find it hard, at such a moment, to address you.'

* * * * *

I believe the ceremony, which was broadcast to every corner of Germany, to represent truly the feeling of the vast majority of Germans. It is a matter of sentiment, almost of ecstasy; a manifestation of that 'enthusiasm' which in religion our ancestors deplored. If it can find an outlet, however small, in colonial expansion, it may well become a sober, enduring feature of German life. If thwarted by a refusal on our part to consider afresh the colonial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles it may ferment, and in so doing change its nature. The ultimate responsibility is ours, though we share it with the Dominions and France.

No people in our lifetime—none perhaps since the days of the Antonines—have so revered their ruler as do the people of Germany to-day. Compared with them, Italians are lukewarm in their attachment to Fascism—or, at least, in the public expression of their beliefs. Herr Hitler's hold on the people is such that whoever he may nominate to be his successor on his demise will be accepted without question by the rank and file who have come under his influence, and his testament, if he leaves any, will for a generation be a decisive influence on national life.

This has been borne in on me by very many things seen in the past three years. It was symbolised at a second parade on Sunday when the auxiliary forces, 100,000 strong, paraded before him.

When the service of remembrance began the red banners of various units slowly filed out of the arena by a hundred channels in thin streams. Then followed the tribute of the living to the dead, and the re-dedication of all present to the cause for which their comrades had died. The Leader, watched by some 200,000 persons, walked some 300 yards to the cenotaph, where, in a silence as deep as of a forest in

summer, he invoked the living, by the memory of the dead, to be worthy of their land and race.

He walked slowly back. What followed was designed to symbolise 'the miracle' of which he spoke a few minutes later. The banners came back to the arena, not in rivulets but in broad streams which flowed through the great mass past and round the memorial, up to and round the Führer and, to the sound of music now as full of life as it had been of death at their leaving, brought fresh life to the whole body. A hymn followed, to Haydn's tune of 1797 which we in England sing to Hymn 292 (Ancient and Modern), and a broadcast organ recital, relaid from a church.

Such ceremonies have a universal appeal; this description may serve to explain a trend of modern German opinion which probably flows deeper and stronger beneath the surface than others of which we read and hear more. The National Socialist movement is complex: it has its bad as well as its finer aspects, of which latter, the Works Service Camps, with the *Wintershilfwerk* or National Voluntary Winter Relief System, are perhaps the most notable. Both are something we might adapt and adopt to our own needs.

Whatever direction German policy may take, this movement, which has a strong distaff side, and the junior organisation of Hitler Youth, will remain; their value transcends, perhaps, that associated with any other organised bodies in the new Germany, and may fairly be called spiritual, for they are the outcome of the spiritual, and not of the material, aims of the people.

ARNOLD WILSON.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 *&* 12 *Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.*

NOVEMBER

[illegible] Currency Position
By SIR GEORGE SCHUSTER, K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G.

[illegible] at the Yosemite Conference
By CHARLES [illegible]

[illegible] of the People

[illegible] : or One as Bad as the Other

[illegible] of 1936
By LIEUT.-COLONEL H. DE WATTEVILLE

[illegible] Britain's Defensive Policy ? . . . By SIR [illegible]

[illegible] Acts . . . By SIR GERALD [illegible]

[illegible] and the Modern Problem . . . By [illegible]

[illegible] in Australia . . . By [illegible]

[illegible]—1936 . . . By [illegible]

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THE

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AND AFTER

No. DCCXVII—NOVEMBER 1936

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENCY POSITION

By SIR GEORGE SCHUSTER

'TEMBER 26, with the Anglo-American-French currency laration, and the devaluation decisions of France, Switzer- d and Holland, marked the opening of a new phase. thout indulging in undue optimism, one may welcome ıerica's consent to 'play ball' with us and Europe— ıreciating, too, the courage of taking this step on the of the Presidential election—and see in this and the ısequent events in Europe a cheering new gleam of ity in international economic relations. Since then so ch has been written on the subject that the ordinary der may well be weary of it. Moreover, the reactions up are still continuing, and the situation may have de- ɔped and changed with new significance before this article ı print. Its purpose is merely to sort out the implications

in plain terms and to put forward some reflections on our own position and policy in the new conditions.

At the outset it may be well, even at the risk of repeating what is familiar, to summarise the facts as they stand to-day.

France has left, but intends to come back to, a true gold standard. The Government has power to fix a new gold value for the franc between points representing a devaluation of 34·3 and 25·2 per cent. Until a new parity is fixed there is no gold standard in France, the export of gold is to be controlled by the Bank of France, and the franc is to be maintained between the new limits by the operation of an Exchange Equalisation Fund, controlled by the Government.

Several social measures have been passed for the purpose of protecting certain classes from the effects of devaluation, while reductions have been made in import duties for the primary purpose of preventing an undue rise in the level of franc prices. M. Blum has, however, stated emphatically that he also takes account of a secondary purpose—the general relaxation of barriers to international trade.

Switzerland has followed exactly the same course as France. There is the same intention to return ultimately to a new gold standard with limits fixed between points which represent a devaluation of 34½ to 26 per cent. The situation in the meanwhile is to be controlled in the same way by the use of an Equalisation Fund, and there has been a similar lowering of import duties, and a similar declaration in favour of freeing trade.

Holland has followed a different course, and copied the British Government's action in 1931. No new gold parity has been indicated and the exchange is left to swing free, subject to control by an Equalisation Fund. It looks as if the rate would settle down at a devaluation of something over 20 per cent. Holland has also declared for freer trade, and has lowered import duties.

Czechoslovakia has taken a second bite of the cherry, and in form followed France and Switzerland. She has followed up the 16⅔ per cent. devaluation, made in 1934, by legislation authorising the fixing of a new gold parity for the crown between limits which mean a further depreciation of 10·6 to 15·98 per cent. The Government has declared itself in favour of removing obstacles to trade, and it is to

e hoped that reductions in import duties made in this pirit will follow.

In all these countries exchange operations can now e freely carried on, though the market knows that the Equalisation Funds can at any time be operated to catch nere speculators.

Italy has followed yet another course and in form exactly opied the United States. Power has been taken to refix he gold value of the lira at between 50 and 60 per cent. f its former value, and, under this power, a new level has een definitely fixed at 59·06 per cent.—*i.e.*, a devaluation of ust under 41 per cent. But all exchange and trading perations remain under such strict control that, although a ew gold point has been fixed, Italy cannot be said in any rue sense to be on a gold standard. The devaluation has een followed by an all-round reduction in import duties; ut this does not indicate any move towards freer trade, or the primary object is to prevent a rise in internal prices. No secondary object, as in the case of France noted above, as been stated and no relaxation of Government control ver imports is indicated.

Three other changes may be mentioned. *Greece* (formerly egged to the Swiss franc) and *Latvia* and *Turkey* (formerly egged to the French franc) have now decided to base their urrency on sterling. The 'sterling group' has thus been urther enlarged, and it is important to recall that it now ncludes the following countries which have attached their urrencies closely to sterling: The British Empire (excluding Canada) and the Mandated Territories, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Esthonia, Portugal and Egypt. It also n effect covers a still wider area, for Canada, Japan, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and China are all following sterling in ome degree.

Of the other important European countries, *Russia* emains a law to herself, and *Spain* is out of the picture for he moment; the remaining significant decisions are those f *Germany*, *Austria* and *Roumania* to make no change.

To complete the picture as regards the currency position t remains to record the well-known facts (*a*) that the United States remain with their one-sided statutory tie to gold in heir obligation to purchase at $35 per ounce, which has

just been supplemented on the other side by the agreement (announced on October 13) to sell gold against dollars for export to England, France and any other country which accepts a reciprocal obligation in respect of its own currency, and (*b*) that, as Mr. Chamberlain reminded us at the Mansion House on October 6, 'Sterling is still free.' But this freedom is subject to self-imposed limitations which have been expressly confirmed in the tripartite Currency Declaration. It is freedom to behave decently according to jointly accepted 'rules of the game,' not the licence of a libertine. It means that monetary policy is to be used for its legitimate objects of regulating internal equilibrium, not, to quote another phrase of Mr. Chamberlain's, to take part in a sort of Dutch auction of currency depreciation undertaken for the purpose of chasing a fleeting advantage in export markets. It is freedom to be exercised subject to regard for 'one constant object . . . to maintain the greatest possible equilibrium in the system of international exchanges and to avoid to the utmost extent the creation of any disturbance of that system by British monetary action.' While this is reaffirmed as a constant object of *British* policy, it is to be noted that the United States and France have endorsed it for themselves by recording their own support for such a policy as one which 'will serve the general purpose which all Governments should pursue.' This endorsement is important in the case of the United States, for it must be remembered that the President still has discretionary power to effect a further reduction of one-sixth in the gold value of the dollar.

Outside the actual currency arrangements, two other situations should be recorded to complete the picture. First, after debates which showed how urgently the need was appreciated, the Assembly of the League at its recent meeting has expressed its satisfaction at the Currency Declaration and passed two resolutions, one which 'urgently recommends all States . . . to organise without any delay determined and continuous action . . . to reduce excessive obstacles to international trade and communications, and in particular to relax and, as soon as possible, to abolish the present systems of quotas and exchange controls,' and the other which recommends the setting up of a committee by the Council to study the question of access to raw materials. Secondly, the

vitation to the Locarno Powers for economic discussions tended at the end of the London meeting in March in a nse still remains open, though, as the prospect of the pporting political conference fades almost daily into a inter outline, the economic invitation, if it remains, will on be suspended in air like the grin of the Cheshire cat. the proposals drawn up the Powers declared themselves eady to support the introduction at the Council of the ague of Nations of resolutions proposing to invite all the tions concerned to an international conference which would particular examine International arrangements having as eir object the extension of economic relations and the ganisation of commerce between the nations.' The question the suggested International Conference has been on the enda of each Council meeting since the issue of the March hite Paper, but no action has been taken, as the Council awaiting the result of the 'conversations' taking place tween the Governments concerned who have been asked keep the Council informed of their progress.

What are the implications of the facts thus barely recited? hey fall into certain main divisions. There are the implica-ons in the field of monetary policy on the one hand, and, the other, the general implications as regards freeing ternational trade. Again, to adopt another basis of division, ere are, on the one hand, the effects of devaluation in the ontinental countries, and, on the other, the implications of e *entente* declared between ourselves and the United States.

Mechanism of Monetary Policy

The technical implications in terms of currency and onetary policy are numerous and interesting. One may ote at the outset with satisfaction that all the devaluing untries have shown that they, too, eschew the 'Dutch iction' idea of currency depreciation. None has attempted ore than to step down to effective parity with the sterling-llar line. If there is a doubt as to the correctness of their easure of descent, it is rather as to its adequacy in certain es. The lessons of the past years seem to have dispelled e false glamour of currency depreciation as a method for creasing competitive power in export markets (the most ective of these lessons having been the ease with which

countervailing measures in the form of import duties and restrictions can be taken). If that position can be maintained, it would be a real gain, for one of the potential stimulants to the creation of new restrictions would have disappeared. It is to be hoped that Japan, whose course is still uncertain, will not manœuvre differently with the yen, and that Germany will not wait till general stability has been attained on the new level and then undercut it with the mark.

A second interesting point is the further extension and standardisation of the new technique, with currency not anchored tight to gold or any other external standard, but to be managed on the lines of having its international exchange value maintained between fairly wide limits by the use of an Equalisation Fund specially created and controlled by Government. A new first line of defence against currency instability is thus created, behind which (so long as it is held) the internal monetary system can be operated to suit internal needs and regardless of effects on the currency's external exchange value. This new technique raises many interesting questions. Some see in the secrecy with which the Exchange Equalisation Funds are operated a source of danger, for they argue that a growing weakness of the currency position may be long disguised, and then, when perforce suddenly revealed, may produce a real catastrophe. Others, on the contrary, feel that secrecy is a safeguard, for the public is relieved from the possible anxiety of seeing large drains on its currency from time to time which may be the result only of quite exceptional and temporary movements of speculative capital. Such anxiety, it is argued, might lead to loss of confidence, which would itself aggravate and intensify the draining process and convert a manageable adjustment into an unmanageable panic. These issues are not merely academic, but have a real bearing on the practical implications of the present position. The proper conclusion seems to be that so long as the Equalisation Funds are kept to their legitimate purpose, so often stated by our Chancellor—namely, to even-out temporary oscillations and not to bolster up a fundamentally unsound position—it is better that their operations should remain secret.

The question of how they are likely to work in the present situation is another matter, and we may approach the con-

ideration of this by considering the position of gold under he new arrangements. It is a curious reflection that, as a esult of these, the single effective thread by which at present he currencies of the world are attached to gold is the onesided obligation of the United States to purchase gold at $35 er ounce (less the customary mint and handling charges).[1] t is true that this one-sided obligation is now supplemented y the Agreement announced on October 13 to sell gold (at he same price plus mint and handling charges) for release irect to central banks in England and France or other ountries that accept a reciprocal obligation, but it must be emembered that this Agreement is one which can be cancelled t any time. And, while there is only this single slender hread connecting currencies with gold, it may further be sserted, first, that, unless this thread were fairly elastic, it vould be broken, and, secondly, that the pound sterling is nore truly than gold the real fixed point in relation to which ther currencies will be regulated—the real yardstick of niversal measurement.

These assertions rest on the belief that America will ot—and, indeed, cannot afford to—allow sterling to get out of alignment with the dollar, and that her own vast tocks of gold give her such scope for elasticity as to ensure ier ability for this without breaking her own present tie with gold—so long, at least, as sterling continues to be managed easonably according to the 'rules of the game' accepted in he tripartite Declaration. And when all the theoretical lisquisitions and devices have been analysed and assessed one nay turn with relief to the conclusion that this simple working rrangement for the relation between gold, the dollar, and terling, represents a practical device well fitted to the world's needs at the present stage. On the one hand, the world needs o retain sufficient confidence in gold to enable gold to serve s a medium for adjusting differences in international balances of payments. On the other hand, the world will not yet—or ndeed ever—consent to allow gold again to be an arbitrary egulator of its currency position or an absolute yardstick for

[1] The mark and lira, it is true, remain technically based on gold, but the rigid ontrol makes them such artificial symbols that their connexion has no practical significance. France, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia have accepted a statutory obligaion to return to gold within certain fairly wide limits, but that is only a prospective link.

measuring the value of commodities. These two conflicting positions can be reconciled on one condition only—that gold should be made to behave sensibly. And that can best be achieved by the present arrangements as interpreted above, with the dollar 'straddling' elastically between gold on the one side and sterling on the other. Sterling in concert with the dollar can thus fulfil the *rôle* of making gold 'behave sensibly.' The importance thus attributed to sterling may be considered a conceited British view, but the facts of the growth of the sterling area and the development of trade within that area seem to bear it out. At any rate, the writer does not apologise for the belief that confidence in sterling is a tie of vital importance in the world's present currency and exchange structure, and that, if it were removed, something like chaos might again supervene. That points to the heavy responsibility carried by the British authorities and the vast importance of maintaining a sound financial policy and position in this country.

That leads us to the next question: 'How will the mechanism of the new arrangements work?' Some thinkers see difficulties and dangers ahead. They anticipate a serious weakening of the sterling exchange position owing to a prospective heavy return of 'flight' capital from London to the devaluing countries coming on the top of the present weakening position as regards our balance of trade payments. Against this one may argue that the balance of payments which affects sterling is not that of the United Kingdom only, but of the whole Empire; that America has an equal or greater measure of 'flight' capital from the Continent to lose, on top of which may be added British speculative investment capital; and that, in any case, it is the sterling-dollar rate that matters, which, as already stated, America cannot afford to let run away. The pessimists discount the first two answers, and as to the third say that this factor in itself may lead to a breakdown, for, supposing America goes to great lengths in supporting sterling by buying sterling currency, she can then, under the new Agreement, claim that gold should be given for sterling at the current rate. The British authorities might then say to the Americans: 'For your own purposes you are maintaining sterling at a value in relation to dollars which we consider excessive. Why should we part with our

ıld in order to enable you to pursue this policy without risk
· yourselves?' That would mean a breakdown of the
reement.

It is to be hoped that all these theoretical dangers are mere ›geys of the imagination. Of course, our balance of pay-ents position wants careful watching; but that is another tter, and, so far as the arrangement with America is con-rned, the practical view is that it will work if it is used ith common sense and not abused. If America tried to aintain sterling at a value manifestly not justified by the trinsic economic position, the '*entente*' would break down. qually, it would break down if the British authorities carried a policy which artificially depreciated sterling. It is all a iestion of observing the 'rules of the game' already referred ; and there is no reason for destroying the hope that they ll be observed with common sense and a real spirit of ıtual co-operation. But, in considering what can be done, count must be taken of popular opinion on both sides. In is country the idea of jeopardising our internal recovery by ırsuing a restrictive and deflationary policy merely for the ce of maintaining the dollar value of sterling at an arbitrary ure would not be tolerated. One may feel confident, for ample, that the Chancellor would not feel himself bound the 'rules of the game' to abandon his 'cheap money' licy for such a purpose and without any internal reason of r own. On the other hand, we must appreciate that in nerica the old parity value of £1 = $4.86⅔ has immense ychological significance, and that alone constitutes a strong actical reason for allowing the *de facto* parity to settle ound this as a middle point. The psychological effect both sides would guarantee confidence and permanence ıich could not be attained by any other rate.

Does that mean that we should at once return to this as a ed point, allowing for fluctuation on either side only within e margin of the old gold points? Some people are already essing for this further step—a narrow *de jure* stabilisation tead of an elastic *de facto* stabilisation. But surely that is ost unwise. To take one consideration alone, would not e discussion of *de jure* stabilisation raise the whole issue of r debt to America? For could we bind ourselves to main-n a particular rate without assuring ourselves that we should

not at any time be called upon to make huge transfers outside the ordinary commercial balance of payments? Public opinion in America is not even yet ripe to give this assurance, and it would not be fair to ask for it. Quite apart from that, there are other strong reasons why *de jure* stabilisation should not be effected until the underlying conditions in the whole world are ready for it, and even when that time comes we shall need a greater flexibility than was permitted between the old gold points. For the present we may well practise running in step together for a bit, before we tie ourselves together for a three-legged race.

Effects in the Devaluing Countries

Exigencies of space prevent a full discussion of many other aspects of the recent changes. One may note the following as important: the prospects of a large flow back of 'flight' capital to the devaluing countries, with its possible dislocation on the London and New York markets; the prospect of internal recovery as a result of abandoning the attempt to counter the difficulties by mere deflation, and the chances of increased competition in export markets owing to the stimulus of devaluation. As to the first, it is clear now that this will not take place with any sudden rush, and the Equalisation Funds, which must have acquired great strength by the inflow, ought to be able to meet the outflow. As to the second, some benefits must undoubtedly accrue—as witnessed by our own experience and that of Belgium. These may be expected to improve not only the condition of the devaluing countries but of all those who are dependent on trade with them. Doubts as to the extent of these results must depend chiefly on whether the devaluation proposed is adequate, and, in the case of France particularly, whether a mere currency measure can cure a much wider and more deep-seated disease. As to the third heading it is important not to take an exaggerated view. The Continental export industries badly need a higher profit margin, and they may tend to be satisfied with this rather than attempt to increase the volume of their sales. Again, the highly specialised manufactured exports from Holland and Switzerland do not in the main compete with British manufactured exports,

while in France, which is attempting a sort of New Deal on American lines and aiming at Reform simultaneously with Recovery, rising labour costs are likely to affect competitive power. At the most these stimuli to export competition are, according to all experience, likely to be temporary and may be classed among the short-range effects. Their potentialities are not comparable in importance with those of the long-range effects—the potentialities of a real revival in international trade as a result of a general 'change of heart.' To this, which is by far the most important aspect of the recent move, we may now turn.

General Effects on International Trade

Familiar though it may be, one may start by quoting the first paragraph of the tripartite Declaration:

> His Majesty's Government, after consultation with the United States Government and the French Government, join with them in affirming a common desire to foster those conditions which will safeguard peace and will best contribute to the restoration of order in international economic relations, and to pursue a policy which will tend to promote prosperity in the world and to improve the standard of living.

The most ardent idealist could hardly have asked for a more heartening declaration. But the question is to what extent it will be realised in fact? To that question there is already one answer in the Currency Agreement between the three countries. That is a real achievement. But co-operation in currency policy alone, even if it achieves substantial stability of the main currencies, will not be sufficient to restore international trade or to fulfil the wider purpose of safeguarding the peace of the world by removing its economic discontents. If we are interested in this result—and there is no country in the world which is more vitally interested than our own—it behoves us to ask what we can do to promote it. That is much more important than preaching to other countries what they should do. One must emphasise this obvious and elementary point of our self-interest, because there appears to be a tendency to ask 'Why should we alone make sacrifices for the general good? Let others, whose barriers are higher than ours, make the first move.' That is a very unfortunate attitude and may

well lead the British public astray. No one would ask our statesmen to put the matter on a higher plane than that of the interests of this country. It is not sacrifices that are needed, but breadth of view and the courage to disregard selfish sectional interests in the promotion of the good of the country as a whole. The need for this warning is emphasised by the impression conveyed by the abbreviated Press reports of Mr. Morrison's recent speech at Geneva when he quoted, apparently to illustrate our righteousness, the fact that our average imports represent £15 per head of the population, which is two and a half times that of France, three times that of Germany, and nearly five times that of the United States. A perusal of the full text of Mr. Morrison's speech shows that Press reports have been somewhat unfair to him, for he was, in giving the figures quoted, emphasising the magnitude of our present *adverse* balance and making the point that we cannot afford to increase that. But the figures are, in any case, misleading, for (*a*) we are a creditor country to a far greater extent than the others, and it is only through an adverse trade balance that we can receive interest on our loans, and (*b*) with our present policy the adverse balance to be considered is rather that of the Empire as a whole than of the United Kingdom alone. Also, the practical problem for our statesmanship is not whether our present adverse balance can be increased, but how, without involving this result, we can increase our share in international trade.

Before coming to this, the main practical problem, a few words may be said as to our own interests. One need not join the ranks of those pessimists whom Mr. Chamberlain criticised in his Mansion House speech to feel some anxiety as to our present situation. The reason for this anxiety is that our internal boom may be making us forget the importance of preserving our export trade, and that this internal boom, even though it may go on for two or three years, cannot be permanent. Mr. Chamberlain may be right that the exceptional feature of armament expenditure has not yet played an important part as a stimulus, but no one can surely doubt that the present is a period of exceptional re-equipment—catching up arrears of replacement and betterment accumulated through a long period of low

profits and difficult industrial conditions. It has all the features of a cyclical boom—an intensification of expenditure on capital equipment. It began with a boom in domestic housing by private enterprise supplemented by a reviving demand for durable consumption goods (motor cars, radios, etc.), for which the margin of available purchasing power was increased by the low cost of food and necessaries. It is being, and will be for some time, continued by house-building by public authorities (slum clearance) and a flow of industrial building and equipment, as also of rearmament. But already there are signs of a rising cost of living which may diminish one of the earlier favourable factors, and, apart from this, there must inevitably be a serious ultimate recession when the abnormal capital equipment slackens off. Although this may to some extent be evened out if the Government keep back some of the public expenditure programme, the best hope for filling the gap must lie in a revival of international trade. It is of vital importance that we should remember this, and not be misled by our present internal prosperity.

On what basis can a constructive policy be framed? What are the realities to be faced? We need to guard against easy optimism based on the new currency arrangements and the declarations in favour of removing barriers. Vested interests have grown up behind these barriers the sacrifice of which would cause internal dislocations which no Government could face. The whole structure of international trade has been changed in the last few years. To give only one striking illustration, France, Germany and Italy, which up to 1928 were importing on an average over 200,000,000 bushels of wheat annually, have now, as a result of their agricultural protective policy, made themselves entirely self-supporting. Failure of harvests, as at present in the case of Italy, may temporarily modify this condition, but, as a normal reality, this particular restriction on international trade is a *fait accompli*. And that points to one important conclusion—that little will be achieved to relieve the embarrassments of the exporting countries in this kind of case unless the general standard of living can be raised so as to increase the volume of consumption and thus create a *new* demand. The *existing* demand will remain

satisfied in the present way. Therein lies the great significance of such policies as the plan for improving standards of nutrition which was started by Mr. Bruce at Geneva last year. But a rising standard of living can only be based on an increase of wealth, and the surest way to approach this is by relaxing exaggerated policies of self-sufficiency and deriving fuller benefit from national specialisation and international trade.

Then again, quite apart from private vested interests, policies of economic self-sufficiency cannot be easily revised in countries where they are based on emotional and strategic appeals. Germany, of course, is the chief example of this. To a very large number of Germans iron appears really more important than butter, and the standard of living is of little account compared with independence. The problem of bringing Germany into a peace-promoting system of international economics—of giving Germany a vested interest in peace—is obviously a vital part of the whole problem under discussion. No attempt can be made to deal with the special features of the German case in the present article, but it may be said that it is above all one which requires close factual study and a facing of realities. It may be that Germany herself will make its consideration impossible, and certainly no economic approach to Germany could be made except as part of a satisfactory political accord; but, if only to satisfy our own consciences, we ought to be ready to make a genuine approach, and that cannot be made without honestly facing what are Germany's requirements and making an honest attempt to meet them.

Another aspect of realities to be faced is that it is no use talking of giving the so-called 'have-not' countries access to raw materials except as part of a much wider policy which will provide them with effective purchasing power. There is no difficulty about access for those that have power to pay.

Lastly, we must face the reality that, however self-righteous we may feel at the great volume per head of international trade that we maintain in comparison with any other country, the changes in our own fiscal policy since 1931 have had a wider reaction on international trade than the policy of any other country. This statement is made in

no spirit of criticism, for the writer is one who believes that the British policy was fully justified and indeed, in its main lines, vitally necessary for our interests; but it should make us realise that we have it in our power now to bring about a correspondingly great effect if we are prepared to move in the contrary direction, and that it is our duty to consider whether, in our own interests, the time has come for us to do so.

In very brief and elementary terms the following is the thesis for our consideration. What is needed now is to restore the pre-crisis system of multilateral trade exchanges. We need to bring Europe in once more to play her full part in the system of exchanges between us and the primary producing countries, who are also, incidentally, our debtors. The simple basis of this multilateral exchange was that our adverse balance with Europe enabled the European countries in their turn to use the sterling balances which they thus obtained to support unfavourable balances with the primary producing countries, who in their turn again used the sterling balances, thus transferred to them from Europe, to meet their debt charges to us and to pay for our exports to them, visible and invisible. The largest changes in our foreign trade in recent years have been in the reduction of our adverse trading balances with Europe, and this has been accompanied by a proportionate drop in Europe's adverse trading balances with the rest of the world. The one sure way of helping to increase international trade is to move back towards the old position; the main power to break the ice-jam remains in our hands. But this means increasing our adverse balance with Europe, and that must mean modifying our fiscal policy so as to admit more European manufactured or semi-manufactured products. Can we afford to do this? That is the key question, and it must be honestly answered in the interests of the country as a whole.

No attempt will be made to answer it here, for the purpose of this article is not to dogmatise, but to plead for a frank approach to these problems, based on comprehensive factual study. But a possible answer may be indicated by putting some very elementary questions. Are we not much better able to afford such a course to-day than when we were fighting for our very existence in 1931? Is there not a real danger

that by our fiscal policy, unless modified, we may do ourselves serious harm? Let us consider a concrete illustration. Supposing a manufacturer of galvanised sheets (mainly for export) who used to import his sheet bars from Europe is now forced to buy these bars instead from British manufacturers, how will he fare in the long run with his export trade? Is he not up against two dangers—first, the danger of creating new competition because his failure to provide a market for the sheet bars of Continental manufacturers will force them to extend their process up to the stage of making galvanised sheets themselves; secondly, the danger of competing at a disadvantage because British sheet bar prices under the cover of protection are high and delivery in the midst of our present internal activity is slow. If that is so, would it not suit the interests, not only of the country and Empire in general, but also our own manufacturing interests, that we should consider a modification of our fiscal policy? Let it be emphasised that the case as stated above is merely put up to illustrate a line of thought, for it is in practice impossible to isolate the facts so simply, and there are many 'variables' and confusing influences affecting each particular branch of manufacture and trade. But as an illustration it may stand in order to give point to the questions first put.

There is one other line of action which requires careful study—encouragement of a revival of foreign lending. The conditions which have set the stage for our own present internal boom, immense arrears of expenditure on renewals and capital equipment, must exist in many of those countries which have in the past looked to us to finance their capital expenditure. Their conditions are now such that even a slight improvement in the outside world might put them again into the position of good borrowers. We must be prepared for this, for, in the long run, the power of these countries to meet the charges on their debts to us, and, at the same time, take anything like a pre-crisis measure of our exports, depends on a continuance of the lending process.

Conclusion

There has been one unifying idea running through these somewhat disjointed observations—the necessity for England

to play a leading part. That is dictated not only by her influence but her interest. We cannot escape this responsibility. An important question is how we should proceed. The first need is, as stated, a complete factual study of the position. We want to see exactly how our position can be made to dovetail into that of the European industrial countries on the one side and the primary producing countries on the other. Preliminary discussions based on these facts should then be carried on with the countries concerned. It is important that they should be private discussions—if only to prevent lobbying. Mr. Morrison's speech at Geneva has shown us how difficult it is for a Minister to speak on these subjects in public. The first steps should be modest and tentative. There can be no question of a sudden drastic change in our fiscal policy. But even moderate steps may have a great effect in starting a process of recovery which may gather acceleration as it goes and gradually provide solutions for problems which, if tackled at the outset, would have proved insoluble. The stage is well set for recovery. What is needed is a start. No country can give so effective a start as ourselves.

One final question may be put to our leading statesmen. We need not grudge them the credit which they indeed deserve for our present recovery of prosperity, but we may ask them, 'Are you making the best use of this recovery to ensure that it may last?' The *Economist* recently remarked that Mr. Chamberlain's speeches were becoming unpleasantly reminiscent of Mr. Hoover's 'prosperity' speeches in the last eighteen months before the crash. A leading New York financier who had come over to London to check up his appreciation of New York remarked in conversation with the writer a few days ago that London reminded him of New York in 1928. When questioned whether the boom psychology had really gone so far he said, 'Well not a day later than the end of 1927.' We should take note of such warnings, and what we chiefly need to consider is whether the time has not come for us to plough back some of our prosperity into the wider field of international trade for the sake of a surer and more lasting crop.

GEORGE SCHUSTER.

FAR EASTERN ISSUES AT THE YOSEMITE CONFERENCE

By Charles Roden Buxton

The Institute of Pacific Relations arranges every third year an International Conference of an exceptional character. The central organisation is in New York. Each of the countries bordering on, or having possessions in, the Pacific Ocean has a subsidiary organisation of its own. The Royal Institute of International Affairs performs this function for Great Britain. A group of from fifteen to twenty representative men and women—who must all be unofficial—are selected to attend the Conference. A kind of regional parliament is thus formed, which may provide suggestions of some value for the international constitution of the future.

Considerable preparation is made in the form of 'data papers'—studies of various aspects of the questions to be discussed, ranging in size from short pamphlets to solid books such as *Eastern Industrialisation*, by Mr. G. E. Hubbard—the principal contribution of the 'British group.' All the questions at issue between the nations concerned—not excluding the most delicate and the most burning—are frankly and fully discussed. The internal economic and political conditions of each country are studied with some minuteness. As an opportunity for learning about international affairs, the Conference is unique. Close personal contact not only leads to valuable friendships but enables the listener to 'size up' the speaker and understand more of what weight his words carry than could be discovered by reading speeches in a newspaper.

The procedure is peculiar. Apart from plenary sessions, the Conference is divided into 'round tables,' each of which, instead of specialising on a particular subject (like the committees or commissions to which we are accustomed in

Europe), covers the whole field of discussion. This appears to be an American notion. As a means of reaching conclusions it would be futile; but the Institute has decided that it is a mistake to aim at formal conclusions; and that being so, there is something to be said for a system which gives everybody a chance to talk about everything. The various topics are taken in turn, and when each is concluded a *rapporteur*, who has gleaned from subordinate *rapporteurs* what has happened in each 'round table,' sums up the results, as best he can, to the plenary session.

On this occasion the Conference met in the Yosemite National Park, in California—each of us living in a small wooden or canvas cabin, under the shadow of huge fir trees, and assembling for meals and conversation in a 'lodge,' consisting of dining-room, lounge, office, and veranda. This, in American parlance, is a 'camp.'

Among the many interesting issues raised at the Conference, that of Japanese policy of course stood out as the most urgent. One naturally asked oneself how far the Japanese group represented governmental views. They included an ex-Foreign Minister, of the Seiyukai Party (Mr. Yoshizawa); an elderly general (General Banzai); a member of the House of Peers who attended the London Naval Conference of 1930 (Dr. Yamakawa); a Seiyukai member of the House of Representatives (Mr. Tsurumi); Professors Takayanagi, Nasu, and Uyeda; and representatives of banking, of the textile industry, and of the South Manchuria Railway Company. They were obviously men of very varied opinions.

An observer not intimately acquainted with the national character finds something inscrutable about all Japanese utterances; but it seemed reasonable to assume that, as they all presented the same general thesis, they were acting under fairly precise instructions and were saying what the Japanese Government wished to be said,

What was their thesis? It might be put somewhat as follows:

Japan has no quarrel with Great Britain, the United States, the British Dominions, or any of the Powers outside East Asia. *Vis-à-vis* the outside world, we want, above all, greater freedom for our export trade; but this is a matter which can be settled amicably; war is

unthinkable. The restrictions on our export trade, suddenly intensified in recent years in more than thirty different countries, have been a serious blow to our whole national economy. The same applies to raw materials. Our shortage in this respect, especially in the event of war, is serious, but could be remedied by agreement. The essential thing is the export trade. As to migration, greater facilities for emigrants would not by themselves solve our population problem, but they would help to do so. The main point is one of status rather than substance, of the method of exclusion rather than exclusion itself. We resent discourteous discrimination against our race. Generally, we feel that the outside world makes little attempt to understand our difficulties.

With regard to China and Soviet Russia, the position is different. These are areas of vital interest to us. If military measures are ever necessary—we do not say that they are inevitable—it is here that they will be used. In our political expansion, we are only doing what other Powers do, and would do if they were in our case. We cannot be indifferent to what happens in Eastern Asia, any more than a householder can be indifferent to a fire that breaks out in his neighbour's house. Our claims in this sphere are quite independent of our claims in the sphere of trade. The latter would exist anyhow, whatever the political situation, owing to the economic necessities of our people. The idea that trade advantages could be bartered against continental expansion is a popular idea with Western people, because they can understand it; but it is too simple; it does not fit the facts of a complex situation.

As to China, she has obligations as well as Japan. China has broken treaties guaranteeing Japanese interests. Injury to Japanese trade, and outrages on Japanese subjects, are tolerated if not encouraged. China must keep the door open for Japanese enterprise as well as that of other Powers. She must prevent subversive anti-Japanese movements. More active measures must be taken against the Chinese Communist movement, which is ever extending northwards, and stretching out a hand towards Soviet Russia. It is essential to us that China should have a Government, or Governments, of a kind not hostile to Japan. There is at present no central Government which can be relied on to conduct effective negotiations, or fulfil agreements. The autonomous Governments in the north represent genuine and spontaneous Chinese movements.

Japan does not want any annexation of Chinese territory. She has never thought of this, or even of a 'protectorate.' The importance of the Amau Declaration [sometimes described as a 'Monroe Doctrine for Asia'—April 10, 1934] is much exaggerated. It was merely an informal summary made for the benefit of Press correspondents. In economic matters, we recognise that Japan cannot have a monopoly of the Chinese market. The interests of other Powers, so long as they are only economic, will be fairly dealt with. We do not want a veto on all Chinese economic arrangements. But Japan has a special position, apart from strict treaty rights, and this may involve some exceptions to

the principle of exact equality. We cannot approve of business enterprises, undertaken by foreign Powers, which may involve political consequences at some future time, and be used to back up China in resisting legitimate Japanese claims. We have a special interest in seeing that no other Power obtains political influence over China, which might be used against us; hence we ought to have a voice in the granting of concessions of this character.

As to Soviet Russia, what we resent is frontier violations, which cause perpetual unrest in Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia. More serious still, we are deeply concerned about the influence of Communist propaganda among our people, and in the mainland adjoining our country. The Russian proposal of a pact of non-aggression is unacceptable: there are too many causes of friction; these must be settled first, before the proposed pact would have any reality. We are not opposed to Collective Security. We recognise that the principle is sound, and that peaceful machinery for the settlement of disputes is most desirable, But the League of Nations system is too rigid and uniform; it must be adapted to particular cases, and must recognise changes in the *status quo* In particular, we cannot accept a system of sanctions.

With regard to the proposal of a regional pact for the Pacific, something in the nature of the Washington Nine-Power Treaty [dealing with the 'open door' and territorial integrity in China, and also with consultation among the Powers concerned—made in 1922] is desirable. That treaty is not abrogated; but it needs to be revised in the light of the new situation. The fundamental point is that a new situation has arisen in the Pacific since the Washington treaties of 1922; and this must be taken into account. Russia's military measures in the Far East have altered the balance of forces. Our own position on the mainland has been consolidated. A new system of security must be devised to replace the old.

We do not wish to start a naval building race. But we cannot sign any treaty of limitation, unless it accepts the 'common upper limit' as between Great Britain, the United States, and ourselves. This is a matter both of national defence and of national dignity. It does not follow that we should build up to the limit; but the principle must be recognised.

Such, as I gathered it, was the thesis. What are the facts? This is a much more difficult problem. And in answering it I must make it clear that this is a purely individual impression. Taking the Chinese question first, the situation in China was evidently misrepresented. It is true that negotiations with the Chinese Government are extremely difficult, and the Japanese are not alone in finding the process exasperating. Normal diplomatic relations presuppose a Government which can speak for the whole area which it claims to represent, and is at least able, even if not willing,

to execute its engagements. These conditions exist in China only partially. But it is fair to say that they are coming into being as fast as, or even faster than, could be expected. The worst way of helping on the process is the bullying way at present adopted by Japan. The sense of national unity in China is growing. The various reforming and modernising movements generally described as 'the reconstruction of China' are making rapid headway. If misgivings are allowable, it is not as to the reality of these movements, but as to whether they do not savour too much of dictatorship and compulsion. China needs disinterested help from other Powers, especially in the work of financing the 'reconstruction.' We heard nothing but good of the technical assistance afforded by the League of Nations.

There was a gulf between the Japanese and Chinese spokesmen which seemed unbridgeable. The latter, to a man, were virtually hopeless of any peaceful solution. To me the most impressive speeches of the Conference were those of certain young Chinese speakers, who disavowed any bitterness towards the Japanese people, and appealed to the rational and sober elements in Japan. But even these regarded armed resistance as the only remedy now open to China, and only differed as to the time when the appeal to arms should be made.

We were told that there is in modern Japan little knowledge of Chinese culture, and little respect for it. Such an opinion seemed to be confirmed by the want of understanding between the two opposed groups of spokesmen. They were sharply contrasted. The Japanese put their case clumsily, the Chinese efficiently. The Japanese were evidently speaking in a foreign language; the Chinese with perfect command of English. The Chinese had so much the best of the argument that one could not help, at times, feeling sorry for their antagonists. But a doubt remained. In what sense were these highly competent Chinese, with their Western culture—so like ourselves, that even their witticisms sounded English—representative of the Chinese Government? I found myself asking, not once or twice, 'What would Chiang-kai-shek say about all this?'

The first condition of any new system of security in the Pacific, said the leader of the Chinese group, Professor

Hu Shih (Peiping University), is that all aggressive acts on the part of Japan must cease, and all Japanese military activities must be withdrawn. Japan has aroused a hatred which cannot be allayed otherwise. He himself, he said, was never anti-Japanese until the day (June 10, 1935) when Japanese troops advanced within ten miles of the gates of Peiping, and he saw his own Government compelled by force to 'prohibit anti-Japanese activities.' Any new system must be within the international framework, with Great Britain, the United States and Russia taking part; there must be a lasting agreement between Russia and Japan; there must be a prospect of peace for at least twenty or thirty years. He and his colleagues had hoped that the Conference might suggest some way of understanding, 'but the feeling deepens that very little hope now exists of arranging any new system acceptable to the Chinese people—probably none at all. What is left must be done, if done at all, by the aggressor nation.'

On the Russian situation, too, the Japanese picture was unconvincing. The able representatives of the U.S.S.R. made out a strong case to the effect that Russia had no possible motive for aggression against Japan. They emphasised the fact that their military position in Eastern Siberia was now impregnable; but its whole conception and execution was purely defensive. Communism was not an exportable commodity; different social systems could co-exist peacefully; if Japan was afraid of the infiltration of Communist ideas, it could only be because her own social system was unstable.

Turning now to the general position of the Japanese Government, my strongest impression was that we make a great mistake in comparing it to the 'dictatorships' of Italy and Germany. There is no single party, it seems, behind the Government. There is no uniform policy or 'ideology'—repeated parrot-wise by every good young Japanese—as there is in the case of every good young Nazi, Fascist, or Communist. Student life is a seething pot of conflicting opinions—Nationalist, Fascist, Republican, Socialist, Communist. As to the actual political situation, the young Japanese seem to be completely ignorant of what is going on in North China, and united only by some

vague idea of the inevitableness of 'expansion'—not by any common view of things.

And the forces which directly influence the Government are various also. The army, in a general sense, is certainly dominant; but what is the army? The respectable generals? The compromising colonels? Or the young subalterns, burning with a new gospel, raging against big business, 'urbanisation,' and Western influence generally, and keen for the strenuous life and the 'national spirit'? And the army may not be dominant to-morrow. It may be the navy, which envies the army its 'show' on the continent, and aspires to a rival 'show' in the South-West Pacific. It may be the powerful business community of Osaka and other industrial centres, which will perhaps come into its own when unbalanced budgets and mounting loans have begun to squeeze the Executive seriously. It may even be the Liberal forces which brought about universal suffrage after the war. The Parliament cannot call the Government to heel, it is true; but the Parliament still exists and continues to function—the Constitution has not been suppressed.

'As to how we are to realise our aims, we do not really know,' said one of the spokesmen. 'We have never had a definite plan,' said the laconic old General Banzai; 'we have done things piecemeal in each case.' The Japanese do not seem to know, from month to month, which of the forces behind the Government will be uppermost. I had the impression that some of the current explanations of Japan's policy were too simple. This was especially the case with what are variously termed the 'dynastic,' 'religious,' or 'mystical' elements in Japanese policy. That the *Kodo*, or 'Imperial Way,' and the worship of the Emperor as the embodiment of the nation, are universally preached, and represent a deep spiritual movement (incidentally raising formidable problems for the Christian community), cannot be doubted. But to emphasise these elements so as to throw the ordinary economic, strategic and political motives into the shade would seem a mistake. As Professor Takayanagi remarked with some humour, 'We are not a queer nation; though there are some queer people among us. We are an ordinary nation just like any other.'

And at the back of the minds of all the delegates was the haunting fear of social revolution—starkly revealed by their statement of the case against Soviet Russia. There is a prevailing sense of uneasiness. The confusion that exists is concerned even more with internal problems—such as the livelihood of the peasants—than with external ones. The Government vacillates in its home policy; it has not even been able to make up its mind whether to foster industrialisation, with its prospects of wealth and of balanced budgets, or the rural interest, the backbone of the 'true' Japan, with its simply loyalties and its devotion to the person of the Emperor. Capitalism in its most extreme form, concentrated in a few hands, dominates the life of the towns—kindly and paternal in many of its practices, but still at bottom dictatorial.

I do not draw the conclusion from all this that the policy now being pursued by the army is not going to continue, nor that the Japanese Government is so unstable as to shrink from violent and aggressive foreign policies. It is deeply committed already in North China. There are dangerous elements which may at any time force its hands; and the fact that a given course is economically or politically suicidal in the long run is no guarantee that it will not be pursued. The conclusion to be drawn, as it seems to me, is rather the following: Japan is not irrevocably committed to any single form of 'expansion,' though it must be admitted that there is a unity of national feeling as to the need of 'expansion' of some kind. The Japanese Government, at any given moment, is not the slave of its own past propaganda, as Mussolini and Hitler are. There are several different forces and tendencies to which it can appeal, and upon which it can, if necessary, rely. Within certain limits, therefore, it can 'switch off' from one policy to another at will.

To put the matter more concretely, there are influential supporters for several different policies—(*a*) for a firmly-built empire on the Asiatic continent, with an 'economic *bloc*' including North China, and a resolute resistance to Russia; but also (*b*) for a policy looking instead to an empire 'on the seas,' possibly with territorial annexations—the Philippines, Borneo, the Celebes, New Guinea—even a

footing of some kind in Siam; and also (*c*) for a policy which rejects both militarism and navalism, and would base prosperity upon industrial expansion, with a vast export trade, and greater facilities both for migration and for the exploitation of natural resources in undeveloped areas.

I am therefore entirely unconvinced by that part of the Japanese 'thesis' above described which avers that trade claims and territorial or continental claims are independent of one another. If Japan is 'bottled up' in one direction, she will inevitably 'expand' in another direction. Conversely, if her 'expansion' is facilitated in one direction, her urge to expand in another direction will be diminished.

It is true that comparatively little stress was laid on raw materials or migration problems, and even the claims in respect of export trade were put forward in the most conciliatory manner. But the reason seemed to me, at least, to be fairly obvious. The delegates had been definitely instructed to be as conciliatory as possible towards all the Powers except China and Russia—with the idea that, if they gave as little trouble as possible to the outside world, the outside world, in its turn, would give little trouble to Japan in her proceedings on the continent of Asia.

In actual fact, it is unquestionable that frustration and restriction in the sphere of trade and migration has had the effect of forcing Japanese policy in another direction. In particular, the more Japan was thwarted in her efforts to build up a great export trade, the more she was driven into the policy of 'expansion' in Manchuria and North China. The practical motive of the present policy is apparently the building up of a regional economic *bloc* under Japanese control—with Japan developing her manufacturing industries, and Korea, Manchuria and North China turned by Japanese control into the great purveyors of raw materials—above all cotton, coal, and wool—at the same time serving as a market for Japanese exports. The whole continental policy is bound up with, though not entirely motived by, this conception of economic self-sufficiency. More generally, it may be said that Japan's aggressive Asiatic policy is the reflection of her underlying sense of isolation—her sense that every man's hand is against her. Ever since she was robbed, as she thinks, of the fruits of victory in her war

with China in 1895 she has been acutely conscious of opposition, on every hand, to her efforts at expansion.

In proportion as the other Powers would frankly recognise her difficulties, would make a big effort to meet all her legitimate claims, would seriously attempt to remove her fatal sense of isolation, the brutal policy of aggression, either on the continent or to the south, would lose its driving force. This attempt has never been made. True statesmanship would grasp the nettle boldly, inviting Japan herself to frame a reasonable policy of economic adaptation and co-operation throughout the world. We must recognise that, if Japan's present policy is incompatible with modern international ideas, so also are the past actions upon which the existing empires are based; and that if we condemn those who practise the former, we must also condemn those who continue to enjoy the fruits of the latter, while refusing to consider a fairer distribution of the world's resources.

To meet Japan's claims with far-sighted generosity would involve large concessions and heavy sacrifices on the part of important and well-organised interests, such as the textile trade. The British, French and Dutch Empires, and the United States, would have to bear the brunt of these sacrifices. I am convinced that compensation would be provided in the course of a very few years. Shareholders will suffer, but will survive: but what of the employees, especially the older? In what market can they sell their skill? A further growth of unemployment in the textile trade is a risk which no Government will readily face: but it must be met, and might be met successfully by bold measures.

Assuming, however, that no large or sweeping changes are possible, there are smaller concessions which might have an appreciable effect. Such is the suggestion of a series of 'Gentlemen's Agreements,' whereby the Japanese trade organisations would undertake to limit their exports in certain respects or in certain areas, in return for the lowering or abrogation of tariffs and quotas directed against them. While still requiring restrictions, we should offer a method less provocative of bad feeling—restriction by the exporting country rather than by the importing country. This would not be unimportant as a means of showing the readiness of other countries to recognise Japan's needs, and

the possibilities of a steady commercial development not liable to be upset by sudden shocks. Even such partial concessions would strengthen the hands of those in Japan who dislike the army's policy, and, in so far as it mitigated economic distress, would deprive the militarists of some of their power of appealing to the masses.

It is possible, nevertheless, that even minor concessions of this kind will be refused. If this is going to be our only policy, a painful question suggests itself. Are we, in effect—however much we repudiate the charge—saving ourselves at China's expense? Are we content to 'bottle up' Japan, so far as we are concerned, because we know that the explosive force will be directed, not against us, but against Japan's immediate neighbours? It is practically certain that if we were prepared to make some sacrifices in the sphere of trade, we could save China from Japanese aggression.

If Great Britain and the United States are not prepared to make any sacrifices for the sake of China, then the statesmen must look around for expedients and make the best of a discreditable predicament. The 'new situation' to which the Japanese so constantly refer does in fact exist. To them it means chiefly one thing—Manchukuo. To base our policy on the idea that the *status quo ante* in this region can ever be restored seems to me to be wanting in realism. But—and this is noteworthy—the Japanese regard the acceptance of this 'new situation,' or in other words the recognition of Manchukuo, as so important that they would be prepared, I believe, to pay a very heavy price for it. Suppose for the sake of argument that the price were the complete withdrawal from all interference in North China and Inner Mongolia, and a guarantee of economic equality in China for all the other Powers, would it not be a mistake to throw away such a chance for the sake of the abstract doctrine of 'non-recognition'?

The questions to be faced are: How much will Japan give up? And how much will China compromise? Japan's position must be to some extent recognised. But China's real interests must not be sacrificed. Every section of British opinion will support this view.

These reflections have led me far from the peaceful atmosphere of the Yosemite Valley, where men and women

of ten nations, including many Japanese and Chinese, met for a fortnight in friendly intercourse. A witty French colleague, M. Etienne Dennery, in summarising the work of the Conference, observed that 'ideas are like stones; we may employ them either to build a house, or to throw at each other.' Neither of these alternatives was adopted at Yosemite. We did not build a house; no formal conclusions of any kind emerged from our discussions. On the other hand, there was no controversy for controversy's sake. Ideas were exchanged and compared, with a genuine desire for conciliation; there was no shirking of the real issues: the Japanese, who were more consciously on the defensive than any other group, displayed on the whole a praiseworthy frankness, even where they failed to convince. 'I welcome this cross-examination,' Mr. Yoshizawa remarked genially in the closing session. The nearest approach to the controversial spirit was on the baseball field, where an international team, led by a British admiral, met with a not inglorious defeat at the hands of the Canadians.

No one who attended the Conference can have failed to come away with a far more sympathetic understanding of the case presented by countries other than his own. Each will be in a position to spread knowledge in his own country, however great or however small his influence may be. Each has added to his stock of personal friendships, and has probably found his sense of racial differences less acute than it was before. That is perhaps the most that can be said; the rest is a matter of speculation and hope, on a background full of obscurities and overclouded with impending dangers. I came away with a sense that I was faced with a situation almost desperate, and with a problem which I had not solved.

Charles Roden Buxton.

'THE OPIUM OF THE PEOPLE'

By Peter Hutton

To the ordinary man in the street there is no possible doubt about which side the Catholic Church is supporting in the Spanish Civil War. Without hesitation the Catholic Church —priests, Press and people—has been wholeheartedly, and even fanatically, on the side of the insurgents. Only the Pope has remained comparatively silent, and this silence is as easy to interpret as that which he so jealously guarded when Mussolini marched with poison gas and high explosives to civilise the Abyssinians.

From nearly every Catholic pulpit the people of Spain are now damned as cordially as once they were blessed. What used to be thought of as perhaps the most Catholic country in the world is now held up as an example of all that is evil and dangerous. In nearly every Catholic newspaper the atrocities committed by the 'Reds' have been described in the grossest detail. Innumerable pictures of 'Red' soldiers outraging sacred objects have been scattered liberally over their front pages. Articles and phrases of almost incredible malignance have appeared even more frequently in the columns of journals professing the Catholic Faith than in the ordinary secular capitalist Press. If Catholic voices are uplifted against the outburst, as one or two have been, they are silenced with an unmannerly sneer, a brutal accusation, or silent contempt. It is forgotten that these 'Reds,' these men and women who are committing sacrilegious and bestial atrocities, are, nine-tenths of them, baptised Catholics.

Two events of prime importance have now occurred in Europe in each of which the Catholic Church has sided with a party undeniably representing the ideas of the deified State, secular dictatorship, extreme nationalism, and extreme

militarism. The invasion of Abyssinia and the Spanish Civil War are both events which are likely increasingly to be recognised as turning-points in the history of Europe. In the case of Abyssinia the Supreme Pontiff condoned by silence, and the Catholic Press openly encouraged, the support by Catholics of an invader who not merely waged an unjust and unprovoked war, but who broke international promises and the laws of God and man by using poison gas upon a primitive and defenceless people. Similarly in Spain, the Church supports the heathen African troops, against whom the greatest crusade in history was fought and won, instead of her own erring, Christian, Spanish children. Catholics in England or elsewhere who do not support the insurgents are suspected of Communism or reviled as traitors and fools.

Spain, once the champion of the Faith, is perhaps lost to Catholicism. Can the Faith be reinstated there, except it be imposed upon the majority of the proletariat by a military dictatorship? Catholics generally, and the hierarchy in particular, are ready to accept a reinstatement on those terms. Indeed, they appear to be eager for its swift fruition. So fearful of the workings of Communism among the people has the whole Church become that she is apparently ready to make any possible terms with literally any individual or party against that enemy. Even now it is reported that the Vatican is chaffering with the representatives of the ex-Catholic Hitler for an alliance against Communism. The rich, once her contemned adversaries, are to be her faithful allies. The tyrants, once anathematised, are to be her champions. While the poor, her ever and still suppliant children, are to be cast out and their murderers extolled if they fall in their misery into the Socialist error.

Karl Marx declared that religion was the opium of the people. Nothing could be more untrue of the Catholic religion. Yet, by her present cowardice, the Church is reducing her divine message to being neither more nor less than that—the instrument used by the rich for keeping the poor quiet. Every day Marx's aphorism becomes more nearly true. From the earliest times the Church was known, to her enemies as well as to her friends, as the champion and leader of the poor and oppressed. In the early centuries

: persecution she was known as an organisation of slaves, nd was hated and feared by the rich on that account. Now 1at Europe has returned to what is to all intents and pur- oses the condition of a slave State she is failing in her uty; she is failing to take up her rightful position as leader f 'the wage slaves.' Her only effort has been to condemn 1ose who, on account of unbearable discontent and a rplus of vile indignities, have fallen into the errors of ocialism and Communism. With all her attention focussed n the condemnation of Communism, a negative effort, she ils to emphasise her own divinely inspired positive teach- 1g on human rights and privileges. The right to own roperty and the right to strike, affirmed by Papal encyclicals, :e scarcely heard of amid the din of anti-Communist hysteria hich rages in Catholic pulpits and the Catholic Press, and ren in the halls of audience at the Vatican or Castel Gandolfo.

For perhaps the first time in history the Church has penly come down on the side of the rich and the oppressors their eternal war on the poor and weak. Instead of leading he wage slaves' in their struggle for human rights and ecessities and brandishing the banner of the great encyclicals, *erum Novarum* and *Quadragesimo Anno*, in the faces of the pitalists, she has allowed a Catholic proletariat to be 1snared by the anti-Christian ideas of revolutionary Com- unism. She complains of a 'leakage.' Most of that eakage' goes to swell the ranks of Socialism, not to other ligions. Just as the hierarchy betrayed the laity at the eformation in England, just as a parish priest is responsible r all the souls in his parish and will have to give an account them one day, so will the whole Church in general, and e Church in Spain in particular, have to answer for thousands lost Spanish souls. And not Spanish only; the evil is mpant through Christendom.

All those Catholics, driven by necessity or ignorance into pport of the Popular Front, will have to be answered r to God by the Church, that divinely inspired Church 1ich has had in Spain an uninterrupted opportunity and a ivileged position for nearly a thousand years. When at day of reckoning comes it will not be the souls of the or who will suffer, but the bishops, priests, monks, friars d nuns, all those Catholics in fact who, with knowledge

and privilege and the ever-ready Grace of God inspiring them, could not raise a finger to lead a Catholic proletariat out of its intellectual and physical plight.

The Church is like a city set on a hill which cannot be hid. No one can be unaware of the Church. Yet many could claim that they did not know her social teaching, that all they knew was that the Church was sublimely indifferent to all politics and economics except Communism. Even some rulers of countries could be excused for not knowing more. In her hysterical and undignified terror of Communism the Church has tacitly condoned the evils of the time. She has accepted Capitalism and its complement, 'wage slavery,' as she has in practice at last accepted usury. It is practically impossible to find anything on the Church's social teaching outside rather obscure pamphlets, Papal encyclicals which only a heroic few seem to take seriously, and an occasional article in a learned monthly. To learn what the average Catholic actually thinks about politics, society and economics, it is only necessary to hear a few Catholic sermons or to open any 'popular' Catholic paper. The evils of the present *régime* are passed over in silence by clergy and Press alike, when it is in fact largely those evils which are the cause of the immorality, the birth control, the revolutionary propaganda and those similar matters which seem to interest clergy and Press to the exclusion of everything else. By what heroic action, by what splendid word, has the Church ever in this century demonstrated her positive, as opposed to her negative, social teaching?

It follows that there has been no condemnation of, nor any attempt to eradicate, 'respectable' Catholicism. The Church's entirely modern fear of any outside criticism, of appearing in any way divided, her desire, above all things, to show a clean face to the world however unpleasant a situation may really be developing inside, this Pharisaical hypocrisy is entirely unworthy of her tremendous claim. With a third-rate capitalist Press, pettily parochial, with archbishops and bishops who go in perpetual fear of a 'scandal,' with a people so disciplined that any healthy internal criticism is regarded as mortal heresy, it is hard to believe that this is the same institution which bred a Hildebrand, an Innocent, a Bernard, a Francis, a Thomas Aquinas,

even a Leo XIII., and not at all surprising that the Spanish working class in its desperation turns to other, more masterful, leaders.

This extraordinary and tragic situation has arisen as direct result of the Protestant Reformation. Most of the spiritual and social maladies from which we are suffering to-day are directly traceable to that great disaster. Since the Reformation the Church has been existing in a world which has day by day become more alien, until at the present time an atmosphere so unnatural to the Church and an environment so estranged from the pre-Reformation world has come about that the Church in the twentieth century has to face, not hatred or fear, but complete, utter, blank incomprehension. The average man to-day is willing to appreciate the Faith as a museum piece, as he might be interested in or attracted to some ancient weapon of the Stone Age in a glass case, or a queer carved idol from Central Africa. But ask him to consider it from a serious, practical and, above all, a personal point of view, and he will be as innocently dumbfounded as a child when the conjurer triumphantly produces the rabbit out of the hat. A habit of mind has grown up in which the truth of Christianity is hardly even a remote possibility to the average thinking man. Naturally this statement is more true of the Reformation countries than of Italy or Spain; but the Spanish Civil War itself furnishes the example of what the results of the Reformation—Materialism, Capitalism, Industrialism, 'wage slavery'—can do to transform the most Catholic countries, even though the Reformation was geographically exterior to them.

The Reformation has not been the liberating, progressive, unimpeachable revolution which some Whig dons still preach. It has been an economic and philosophic disaster. It has put in train forces which have undermined all good values, spiritual, moral and material—forces which have thrust men back into the slavery from which Christianity had gradually liberated them. It has turned to dust and ashes the achievement of a thousand years. Even the Church bears to this day the ineffaceable scar of that appalling cataclysm. The military centralisation which has increasingly disciplined and now almost petrified Catholic thought is

entirely due to the 'state of war' declared by the Church at the Reformation. That defensive reaction, which began with the Council of Trent, and caused all Catholics to turn their weapons on the enemy outside the walls, has produced a fear of internal controversy, a priest-craft, and, above all, an inferiority complex within the Church which are to a very considerable extent the cause of the present miserable state of affairs.

A brief historical outline will lay bare the bones of the matter.

Before the Reformation the bourgeois, a useful and necessary individual, had been strengthening his position in the towns. By means of the dissolution of the monasteries the most powerful members of the bourgeois class enriched themselves to such an extent that they and, in a sense, their whole class were transformed and the whole social balance of the nation was revolutionised. For the first time the bourgeois obtained a grip upon the greater part of the land. The death-knell of the peasant had sounded, for that grip has never relaxed. Owing to his great wealth the bourgeois became the governing class. He was soon to demonstrate his power and develop into a tyrant. Under the evil genius of the great bourgeois leaders, chief of whom were the Cecils, the religious revolution followed the economic revolution and the position of the bourgeois was reinforced. In England the Protestant Reformation came to mean before all else an economic and philosophic revolution. The economic side has been very briefly recounted; it produced an entirely new class which became immediately the ruling class, and was to become what we know to-day as the middle class.

Philosophically, the Reformation meant the expulsion of the supernatural from the life of the people. In place of the Catholic religion was substituted the Protestant heresy. But this change turned out, in effect, to mean the substitution of materialism for Catholic realism. From the moment when men ceased to believe in the Catholic Faith, a vain materialism built up on the misconstrued discoveries of the Renaissance began to take its place. Men to-day wonder how it is that the Church of England, which has had a totally unobstructed, State-subsidised opportunity for three hundred years, appears only to have succeeded in turning

England into a country of pagans. The reason is that Protestantism has never been more than a cloak for a materialism of as deep a dye as any Communist's. Catholicism in Spain has committed a similar mistake and so failed to secure the confidence of the proletariat. By banishing the supernatural from life the Reformation effected a spiritual and philosophic revolution for each individual who came after it. After the Reformation, man's conception of himself in relation to the universe was totally different from what it had been before. And it was totally wrong.

Fortunate as always, the English bourgeois upon coming to power found a new economic idea waiting to be developed —Capitalism. Thus, the new men with the new money and the new philosophy found the new economy ready to their hands. So armed they set out to destroy their first enemy. Within little more than a century they succeeded. They 'bourgeoisified' the monarchy. Within the next hundred years they destroyed the peasant and raised up a new kind of class—'the wage slaves.' Industrialism was an instrument to their choice. Gradually—as they foresaw that their dominion would one day be threatened by a revolt of 'the wage slaves'—gradually they are succeeding in 'bourgeoisifying' even their 'slaves,' until to-day they have almost produced a world where, spiritually, all are bourgeois, all are equally middle class. Communism is only the next step in the process—the complete bourgeois State. Thus, the bourgeois, who rejected the supernatural at the Reformation, has imposed his materialism upon everything in life. 'Economics' has taken the place of religion, and every human or social relationship is reduced to being a commercial or economic relationship. The Popes also in their encyclicals recognise the Reformation as the source of the evil.

But the Faith stands firm. The Church cannot fail. The question is, Are Catholics going to fail the Church—and the world? It is very hard for a Catholic, unless he be an enclosed religious, not to fall into the habit of unconsciously taking for granted a thousand things in this bourgeois make-believe which are totally anti-Catholic and absurd. It is on account of this deplorable mistake that Catholics have done so little to forward, seem almost ashamed

of, their heritage of social philosophy. What does the Church really stand for in the modern world, in practice, relative to all our everyday twentieth-century problems? The answer is drastic. In a world which is as antagonistic to her as it is alien, she must be 'against' nearly everything. Yet how many perfectly good Catholics completely fail to realise this? They are told without ceasing that the Church is 'against' Communism. But what they never seem to learn—and it is because so few Catholics have ever taken the trouble to analyse Communist philosophy—is that if the Church is 'against' Communism it is because its philosophy is dialectical and materialist while hers is metaphysical and realist. But in this case the Church must be nearly, if not quite, as violently 'against' bourgeois Capitalism, which is equally materialist from her point of view. So far as the law of property is concerned, Capitalism has deprived millions of men and women of the power of owning property just as effectively as the Communists could ever hope to do. The only difference is that the capitalists discriminate in their own favour. And, if Communism and Capitalism have erred by Materialism, Fascism errs equally villainously by Idealism whilst retaining all the sins of Capitalism about the law of property. Furthermore, whether it is materialist or idealist, a State which claims the attributes of God, as does the Fascist State, must surely be anathema. Or is the Church really secretly on the side of the rich and the oppressors and the war-mongers? Does she really only use religion to keep the people quiet, to comfort them with idle notions of a better life to come where the rich shall burn eternally? Is she merely an instrument used by the ruling class to stave off the revolution of the masses? Is it all really a lie? That is what the Communists try to prove; and so long as the Church continues in her present cowardly and unworthy policy, they will find it remarkably easy.

On philosophic grounds alone it is easy to see the fundamental antagonism between Catholicism and Communism. This antagonism goes right back to the essential beginnings of both theories. But Communism is in fact only Capitalism carried to its logical conclusion, the perfection of 'the slave State.' Fascism, on the other

hand, is merely a variation on the same theme, and is as likely to come to true Communism in the end. The vital fact which Catholics of all classes have failed to realise is that the struggle now proceeding is not merely one between Catholicism and Communism. It is a four-sided duel of all against all, and the duellists are Catholicism, Capitalism, Communism, and Fascism. The last three—Capitalism, Communism, and Fascism—all lie nearer together, are less mutually contradictory, than any one of them to Catholicism. Even Capitalism and Communism are fundamentally in alliance when it comes to a struggle with the Faith. Catholics have made the fatal error of attacking Communism to the exclusion of all other effort, with the result that they have completely lost the confidence of the proletariat. If only Catholics knew a little more about Communism they might not take so seriously a philosophy which says not merely that 2 plus 2 does not make 4, but that it makes 4 *and* 5, both at the same time. Careful study would reveal not only the proper way to attack dialectical materialism, but the grain of truth which even Communism itself contains.

Over and above this, it is quite easy to demonstrate the fundamental antagonism which separates Catholicism from Capitalism, and therefore Communism and Fascism also, on the grounds of the Church's social teaching. For a full study of the great encyclical letters much time and space would be necessary. It must suffice here to outline only the main points of that teaching.

It is taught that all power comes from God. Therefore the Church, while condemning no form of government and believing that a say in the government can even do the people good, is not ardently democratic.

The basic unit of civil society is the family.

Every man, without exception, has the natural right to own property. Anything which denies man that right or attempts to deprive him of it is wrong. The Church is, therefore, more reactionary than any Tory; so reactionary as to be revolutionary.

The laws of the State must be obeyed, and revolution against the State is revolution against God—except when the law's commands are evil or unjust, in which case to obey

them is wrong. But even then, in the last resort, revolution can hardly be justified. (This alone throws an unhappy light on the Catholic support of the Spanish insurgents.)

The primary principle governing all this teaching is the law of justice. Thus, if they are unjustly treated, workers have the right to strike. (It is worth remarking that certain conditions attach to this right: the cause of the strike must be both grave and just, there must be hope of success, other satisfactory solutions must have been tried and have failed, the rights of the public must be respected.) In the same way the Church teaches the responsibility of owning property and the responsibility of employers toward their work-people. All wealth is held in trusteeship from God. In the Catholic Catechism the sins of defrauding labourers of their wages and oppressing the poor are classed as 'sins crying to Heaven for vengeance' and on a par with wilful murder and the sin of Sodom.

While it is impossible to describe here the full Catholic social teaching, these few principles will disclose the sources of it; and it may be worth while to include below some brief extracts from Papal encyclicals which will give a deeper insight into the tone of the whole teaching.

On treating workers as 'hands':

> Religion teaches the wealthy owner and the employer that their workpeople are not to be accounted their bondsmen; that in every man they must respect his dignity and worth as a man and as a Christian; that labour for wages is not a thing to be ashamed of, if we lend ear to right reason and Christian philosophy, but is to a man's credit, enabling him to earn his living in an honourable way; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical strength. [*Rerum Novarum*, Leo XIII., 1891.]

On the rights of the State over the family:

> The contention, then, that the civil government should at its option intrude into and exercise intimate control over the family and the household is a great and pernicious error. [*Rerum Novarum*.]

On the causes of the social problem:

> In any case we clearly see, and on this there is general agreement, that some opportune remedy must be found quickly for the misery and wretchedness pressing so unjustly on the majority of the working class: for the ancient working-men's guilds were abolished in the

last century, and no other protective organisation took their place. Public institutions and the laws set aside the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that working men have been surrendered, isolated and helpless, to the hard-heartedness of employers and the greed of unchecked competition. The mischief has been increased by rapacious usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is nevertheless, under a different guise, but with the like injustice, still practised by covetous and grasping men. To this must be added that the hiring of labour and the conduct of trade are concentrated in the hands of comparatively few; so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the labouring poor a yoke little better than that of slavery itself. [*Rerum Novarum.*]

On ownership:

We have seen that this great labour question cannot be solved save by assuming as a principle that private ownership must be held sacred and inviolable. The law, therefore, should favour ownership, and its policy should be to induce as many as possible of the people to become owners. Many excellent results will follow from this; and first of all, property will certainly become more equitably divided. For the result of civil change and revolution has been to divide society into two widely differing castes. On the one side there is the party which holds power because it holds wealth; which has in its grasp the whole of labour and trade; which manipulates for its own benefit and its own purposes all the sources of supply, and which is even represented in the councils of the State itself. On the other side there is the needy and powerless multitude, sick and sore in spirit and ever ready for disturbance. If working people can be encouraged to look forward to obtaining a share in the land, the consequence will be that the gulf between vast wealth and sheer poverty will be bridged over, and the respective classes will be brought nearer to one another. [*Rerum Novarum.*]

On democracy:

Again, it is not of itself wrong to prefer a democratic form of government, if only the Catholic doctrine be maintained as to the origin and exercise of power. Of the various forms of government, the Church does not reject any that are fitted to procure the welfare of the subject; she wishes only—and this nature itself requires—that they should be constituted without involving wrong to anyone, and especially without violating the rights of the Church. [*Libertas Praestantissimum*, Leo XIII., 1888.]

On liberty:

We must now consider briefly liberty of speech and liberty of the Press. It is hardly necessary to say that there can be no such right as this, if it be not used in moderation, and if it pass beyond the bounds and ends of all true liberty. . . . In regard, however, to all matters of opinion which God leaves to man's free discussion, full liberty of

thought and of speech is naturally within the right of every one; for such liberty never leads men to suppress the truth, but often to discover it and make it known. [*Libertas Praestantissimum.*]

On Church and State:

The Almighty, therefore, has appointed the charge of the human race between two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one being set over divine, and the other over human, things. Each in its kind is supreme, each has fixed limits within which it is contained, limits which are defined by the nature and special object of the province of each, so that there is, we may say, an orbit traced out within which the action of each is brought into play by its own native right. But inasmuch as each of these two powers has authority over the same subjects, and as it might come to pass that one and the same thing—related differently, but still remaining one and the same thing—might belong to the jurisdiction and determination of both, therefore God, who foresees all things, and who is the Author of these two powers, has marked out the course of each in right correlation to the other. *For the powers that are, are ordained of God.* Were this not so, deplorable contentions and conflicts would often arise, and not infrequently men, like travellers at the meeting of two roads, would hesitate in anxiety and doubt, not knowing what course to follow. Two powers would be commanding contrary things, and it would be a dereliction of duty to disobey either of the two. [*Immortale Dei*, Leo XIII., 1885.]

On the aims of Christian democracy:

For with the exception of certain persons whose ideas regarding the force and virtue of this kind of Christian democracy are not free from extravagance or error, surely there will be no single person to find fault with an endeavour, conformably to the law of nature and of God, to do merely this—to make the lives of labourers and artisans more tolerable, to enable them gradually to make some provision for themselves, to make it possible for them at home and in the world freely to fulfil the obligations of virtue and religion, to let them feel themselves to be men, and not mere animals, Christian men and not pagans, and so enable them to strive with more facility and earnestness to attain that 'one thing needful,' that final good for which we came into the world. This is the aim and the task of those who in a Christian spirit would have the working classes on the one hand suitably helped, and, on the other, preserved against the contagion of Socialism. [*Graves de Communi*, Leo XIII., 1901.]

These examples of the Church's teaching should afford some clue to the real state of affairs. They certainly explain why the Church has lost the confidence of the proletariat in Spain, for they show what was needful to gain it. Had these principles been energetically translated into action, Europe at this moment might have presented a very different

appearance. In England especially, where the Catholic Church is chiefly made up of proletarians, a tremendous opportunity has been missed. Most of these encyclicals were written about forty years ago; that fact alone demonstrates how much warning was given, how great a chance was lost. But the warning was not heeded and the chance has gone.

A priest, however, Fr. Gillis, writing in the *Catholic World*, has dared to point out something of the truth. He wrote:

Why have we in certain countries lost the masses of the people? Perhaps the chief reason is that we have not made it clear that to-day, as in primitive times, the Church has a love and predilection for the poor. Not many wise, says St. Paul, not many mighty, not many noble, but the foolish and the weak and the base and the contemptible and the things that are not, hath God chosen. To say it in one word, our primary obligation is to the proletariat. Ugly word? Not at all! The Pope uses it again and again in his epoch-making encyclical on the social question. And it is not half so ugly as the word St. Paul uses, 'Peripsema.'

Now if we have lost the proletariat, if they turn against us at the first opportunity, something is wrong, perhaps with them, but surely with us. Something is wrong, also, tragically wrong, with the Capitalistic system. If we hesitate to say so for fear of losing millionaire support, if we kowtow to the rich, defend their injustices, seek their companionship while avoiding that of the poor, we are renegades from our calling. The poor see that fact if we do not. Their instinct in this matter is in the long run infallible. 'I know mine and mine knows Me,' said the Poorest of poor men. And He declared that to the poor God reveals what is hidden from 'the wise and prudent.' One explanation usually alleged for our not favoring the poor is that we dread to 'stir up class against class.' But to align ourselves frankly with the poor is not to do injustice to the rich. If a rich man is irritated when we fight for the poor man, that is the rich man's mistake. Yet our fear of stirring up a class-war is almost pathological. Jesus Christ had no such phobia. He said, 'Blessed are ye poor,' and He didn't hesitate to add, 'Woe to ye rich.' Take it or leave it; like it or lump it, such is the original, primitive, authentic Gospel. If we insert weasel words to suck out the marrow of those terrific texts, if we are too mealy-mouthed to say what Christ said just as He said it, without adding a flock of 'ifs' and 'ands' and 'howevers,' the poor, whose intellectual capacity may be mediocre, but whose instinctive recognition of friend and foe is all the sharper on that account, 'get wise' to us. And when in a riot or a revolution their inhibitions are released, they set fire to our ecclesiastical palaces, pillage our accumulated treasures, shoot us down and fling us into the blazing ruins. . . .

But such an effort is rare. Such a voice is drowned in the waves of rage and hate and indignation that echo everywhere from the pulpit and the Press. And meanwhile Marx's aphorism sticks closer every day: 'Religion is the opium of the people.' More and more men and women turn to Communism and Fascism as a respite from Capitalism. More souls are lost. In 1934 the editor of *Colosseum*, a Catholic quarterly, wrote:

> Nearly everything Marx said about the condition of the working classes is true; under the Capitalist system men do not and cannot lead lives which do justice to their dignity as human beings. It is necessary to see the truth in Marxism while rejecting its common bond with one of the most evil of all systems, *laissez-faire* Capitalism—namely, raising economic organisation, a necessary part of the machinery of existence, into the whole of life, its purpose and its end, ignoring man's immortal destiny.

The world drifts nearer to a complete elimination of all divine values and human relations, nearer to the final victory of materialism. It does not matter much whether that materialism is of the Communist, Capitalist or Fascist variety; in the end it will be all one: what we understand by the 'bourgeois,' that mean and greedy mediocrity, will have conquered humanity and civilisation.

PETER HUTTON.

SIX AND HALF-A-DOZEN: OR ONE AS BAD AS THE OTHER

By Ian Colvin

We all contrive to be philosophic about the misfortunes of our neighbours. I notice, for example, that the Bishop of Bristol, writing on Spain, dismisses the 'appalling atrocities' as 'the work of one side equally with another.' Again, at a Conference of Modern Churchmen held in England some time ago, one of the speakers expressed his 'grave doubts whether a Church could suffer, as the Spanish Church was suffering, without having created for itself, in some strange way, hatred.' 'Why,' Dr. Bouquet went on to ask, 'was the Church in Spain hated, and was the English Church in danger of being hated for the same reason?'

Now the Church in Spain lay, at that moment, like the rich man in the parable, beaten and stripped and lying half-dead in the ditch. Is it not, then, a little as if the Pharisee or the Levite, as he passed by on the other side, should say: 'Ah, the wretch, to be beaten like that! He must have got himself hated somehow or other! I must take care not to get myself hated in the same way.' And he might add with a shrug of his shoulders, as he proceeded on his journey: 'No doubt one side was as bad as the other.' And that, in effect, is what the Archbishop of York has been writing on the same subject.

As I read these impartial disquisitions an image flashed across my mind of what I had seen when I was last in Spain. It was on a Sunday morning, and the porch of a large village church was crowded with young men waiting outside for the reason that there was no room inside. Again, in a town near by, on another Sunday, I saw great crowds streaming to Mass in the city churches—such a sight as we do not often see in England nowadays. May it not be that the Church in Spain

is being attacked, not for her faults, but for her virtues, or because the people without their priests would be as sheep without their shepherds? It might even be part of the technique of the class war. For example, a recent Spanish broadcast from the Soviet Comintern station issued the following command: '. . . the ruthless extermination of all Monarchist priests and other allies of the Fascist rebels is vital and must be continued uninterruptedly.'

What atrocities, then, had these unfortunate clergy committed equal to the atrocities of the other side? Our impartial critics will no doubt reply that it was not, of course, the Church which committed these balancing crimes, but the Spanish army, which, as the Bishop of Bristol judiciously points out, has risen against 'the lawfully constituted Government of the country.' It is, I suppose, a progressive form of justice that the priest should suffer vicariously for the sins of the military—and even before these sins were committed, for many of the churches in Spain were burnt and some of the priests and nuns were killed *before* the army rose in revolt. Suppose the church of St. Mary Redcliffe and the cathedral of Bristol were burnt down by the Bristol Socialists. The Government condones, even approves of, the outrage; but the local garrison rises and severely punishes the mob. Would the severities of the garrison justify the burning of the churches (and the slaughter of the clergy of the diocese)? As for the equally wicked Fascists, whose crimes, or whose mere existence, are also held to balance the account, I am informed that they were nearly all killed or thrown into prison *before* the military rising in Spain. Are we to argue, then, that the mere existence of these unfortunate Fascists was an atrocity which justified the martyrdom of the Church in Spain?

We come now to the atrocities committed by the Spanish army, which are held, upon almost all hands, to balance the atrocities committed by the Government or its partisans. I have seen only two definite charges made against them. One is that they 'let loose black troops upon white Spain.' Here let us note the no doubt healthy colour prejudice suddenly developed in unsuspected quarters. Not Herr Hitler himself could be roused to greater fury by some forcible nigration of his Nordic race than our Radicals and Socialists by this importation of Moorish troops into Spain. I suppose General

Franco would plead that desperate necessity obliterates such fine distinctions. So in like case England employed Indian troops, the United States of America negro and France Algerian and Senegalese troops against white Germany. When a man is fighting for his life he does not pause to scrutinise the complexions of his levies, and no doubt General Franco would also point out that these Moroccan auxiliaries are under the discipline of white officers. As for the shooting of the garrison of Badajoz, or part of it, after the storming, we may judiciously condemn it at this distance. Yet it has been defended as a measure of reprisal, stern and terrible but salutary, for the hideous outrages committed by these people on citizens of the town and the countryside.

Our intelligentsia are still proclaiming that this is a war between a 'military despotism' and a free and Liberal Government. Let me ask them to put themselves in the place of those 'hostages' of whom we hear so much. Who are these hostages? They are not 'Fascists' or 'Militarists,' or even priests, they are merely ordinary citizens, of the professional class or people of property, who are seized by the partisans of the Government and thrown into prison, without any process of trial, to be shot if the attack is pressed by the other side. Suppose London to be threatened by a rising in Kent. A list of proscribed bourgeois, just such a list as signed a recent roundrobin in the Press, beginning with Lascelles, Abercrombie, Norman Angell and Ernest Barker and ending with Ralph Vaughan Williams, Leonard Woolf and Virginia Woolf, respectable people taken at random, might be seized and thrown into prison. Would these good people, under the shadow of death, be so enthusiastic in defence of the Government under which they suffered? Or would they begin to take another view of the situation?

May we not say that a Government which allows such things to be done, or which cannot prevent them, is not a Government which can be defended upon any constitutional principle?

IAN COLVIN.

THE GERMAN ARMY OF 1936

By Lieut.-Colonel H. de Watteville, C.B.E. (late R.A.)

Since the declaration, made by Herr Hitler less than two years ago, to the effect that Germany must return to her former system of universal compulsory service, the German military authorities have been working strenuously to recreate the great instrument of war which took the field in 1914. The German army of 1933 had, of course, been reduced to the status of the *Reichswehr*, that military organism imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles, by which, moreover, the weapons permitted to the *Reichswehr* had been drastically limited. The *Reichswehr* then consisted of 100,000 men, voluntarily enlisted on a twelve-year engagement. In proportion to its numbers and armament, it might well have been regarded at that time as one of the finest military forces in Europe; it was chiefly remarkable for its physical and mental qualities and formed, in fact, the repository in which had been stored all the military traditions, doctrines and technical standards of the pre-war German army.

The problem of expanding the *Reichswehr* was not new. After the tentative declaration concerning Germany's rights to rearm, made by M. Briand as far back as 1927, which had led to no tangible result, the Germans had already put forward a demand for an increase of the establishment of the *Reichswehr* from 100,000 to 300,000 men. It can be assumed, therefore, that behind the scenes every preparation was being made for a total change in the military armament of the nation. Consequently, when, in accordance with the Decree of March 1935, the first contingent of recruits was raised for the new army, the ground had been already fully prepared. At that moment two courses stood open to Germany: she could either retain the *Reichswehr* as it stood and create a new army by its side, or else she could fuse the *Reichswehr* into the new organism.

It seemed as though the former course might have been adopted; indeed, this procedure might be said to have been in consonance with the published opinions of that eminent soldier and administrator, General von Seeckt, who can with justice be regarded as the moving spirit in the creation of the *Reichswehr* after the Treaty of Versailles. But too much abuse had been lavished in public utterances on the long-service or 'mercenary' soldier to permit of the retention of a professional army and the consequent establishment of two parallel types of armies, just as in England the Regular and Territorial Armies exist side by side. After the consolidation of the Nazi *coup d'état* in Germany there was but one course left open; that was, the organisation of an army after the pattern of that of 1914. This was done, and so the new army of 1936 has come to be an amalgamation of the *Reichswehr* with the new force raised by universal recruitment. At first this fusion might seem to have been a dangerous experiment—one which might expose Germany to a period of military weakness fraught with risks difficult to avoid. In spite of this, however, the ground had been so thoroughly prepared that Germany decided to face the danger, and it would now be difficult to admit that she has taken any unjustifiable risks in the process. Moreover, it has to be remembered that the German air force was then already a virile and powerful organism, fully able to assume its share in the task of national defence should any international crisis arise. Nevertheless, the net result of this fusion, and of the necessary dissolution of the *Reichswehr*, must be that Germany is passing through a period of transition in her military affairs; and this period must occupy at least a few years. That is obvious, for at this very moment, when the duration of service of the man in the ranks is being raised from one to two years, there are many other conditions that militate against the German army yet being fit to take the field as it was in 1914.

The spectacle of any German military unit is, in this respect, instructive. It needs no practised eye to note the scarcity of officers, particularly of the junior ranks. Commanding officers of a good stamp are there, and in adequate numbers; but of those younger men who would replace casualties in time of war there are but few. Of senior non

commissioned officers the same might be said, though nothing like to the same extent. In their case the old *Reichswehr* has been drawn upon to its full extent, so that what might be absent in numbers is certainly compensated by quality. Indeed, judging by what can be seen at peace-time exercises, the professional standard of the present non-commissioned officer cadre in Germany stands very little, if at all, behind that of 1914. Nevertheless, the same difficulty must arise in the event of replacements being necessary. Where are they to come from? At first it might seem that the subaltern cadres of the new army would have been wholly provided from the ranks of the old *Reichswehr*. Yet this has not been the case. Preferring to work very gradually and progressively, the German military authorities have not drawn heavily on this source for their supply of junior officers. They have thought better to leave in the newly created units a thorough leavening of non-commissioned ranks, and to find the officers by degrees. Accordingly, only a few hundred men were granted officers' commissions from the old *Reichswehr*. Such a process is thought more likely to preserve the high standing of the military officer, whilst avoiding a certain block in promotion before many years should elapse. Serious efforts are now being made to supplement the subaltern and non-commissioned cadres of the army.

The rank and file of the new army appear young, and by comparison with the men of 1914 exhibit a boyish demeanour, which is accentuated by the all but universal practice of clean shaving: a complete departure from the traditional pictures of the matured bearded reservists of a generation or so ago. But the spirit that animates the present-day German soldier is amazing. The earnestness displayed in all military exercises must be seen to be credited. The physical exertions of which the infantry units proved capable during the recent manœuvres were remarkable. The cult of physical training and of physical fitness which is so marked a trait of modern Germany nowhere finds more complete expression than in this new army. Indeed, it could scarcely be otherwise, since the whole national movement in favour of physical education, and of its attendant *Wehrsport*, turns on this matter of the production of efficient soldiers. Moreover, although the present military units are in every case of entirely modern creation, the

traditions, titles and trophies of the regiments of the old imperial army have been made over to the existing formations of the new army. In so far, then, the German army of 1936 may be regarded as a direct and worthy successor of that of 1914. It is no raw nor improvised body of troops. The manner in which the difficulties have been surmounted is truly remarkable: the concrete results are no less striking.

So far, then, it may be said that the new army is, roughly speaking, being built up on the foundations and after the pattern of its predecessor. But there exist very considerable differences in the two organisms—that is, so far as two entities existing at so great an interval of time are susceptible to such a comparison. This arises from the changes in military armament and in the tactical doctrines to which this modern equipment gives rise. The German infantry regiment on the march offers a very different spectacle to that presented by a similar unit in 1914. Machine-guns have multiplied; anti-tank guns, mortars and the modern adjuncts of the infantry unit are strongly represented: every platoon possesses motor vehicles. It is clear that Germany is in this respect no whit behind any other European army of the present day. Indeed, it may be said that the disarmament inflicted upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles has, in the end, proved no handicap to her in this matter of her rearmament. Having been subjected to a clean sweep of everything that was obsolescent, the German army is now in a position to make a fresh start, and also to profit from all the tentative work that, in the intervening years, has been carried out in foreign armies. If there be nothing startlingly original in what can be seen of a German division on the march, with one exception which will be referred to below, there seems to be a quality about the construction of the new vehicles and the new weapons, a businesslike adaptability in the use made of them in the field, which is impressive. The division itself, besides its very modern equipment, does not betray many outstanding changes from the formation that was in the field at the end of the Great War. Three infantry regiments form its backbone, together with a normal proportion of supporting troops. The artillery, however, seems to have abandoned the field-gun in favour of the field-howitzer and a heavy battery; corps and army artillery, in particular, have been greatly

strengthened and consist largely of modern long-range guns, amongst which is a remarkable type of high-velocity 6-inch gun. The new-comer in the division is the 'reconnaissance detachment,' a formidable armoured unit of most modern type. All units of this class that were to be seen during the recent manœuvres were composed of armoured cars, both four-wheeled and six-wheeled, anti-tank guns and light mortars, the whole accompanied by a machine-gun company, together with two infantry companies conveyed wholly in lorries, which, it is possible, may be exchanged for motor bicycles and side cars. Altogether a remarkably mobile and serviceable combination of fire-power and of armour.

How soon the reconstituted German army may be fit to take the field in defence of the country is a question that arises after the first glimpse of this new army. Does it possess the necessary experience, the solidarity, the skill to take its place in the field to-morrow if need be? Taking into account the youth of the majority of its units, the scarcity of officers and the lack of experience of the troops as a whole in the employment of really modern weapons, it might appear rash for Germany to think of pitting her young army against an older opponent who may have enjoyed opportunities for acquiring experience with the modern arms that have long been denied to Germany. On the other hand, it is obvious that a military nation, such as the Germans unquestionably are, possesses a fund of martial qualities, and an inherited military instinct, that readily adapt themselves to meet the needs of a national crisis. The higher commands and staffs possess considerable war experience, the commanding officers are of a high standard, the rank and file is of good quality and instinct with a militant patriotism that makes the soul of a good army. With an armament such as may be seen in the hands of the troops there would seem little doubt that the German army, as it now stands, would prove a formidable enemy to any foe except such as might enjoy an overwhelming superiority in armament or in numbers. And this inequality, if indeed there be any, must tend to decrease year by year.

Every twelve months, after the autumn of 1937, a whole annual contingent of trained men will pass to the reserve. As their total rises, so the prospect of making good wastage

and the creation of new units improves. It will not be long —say, five or six years at most—before Germany will once more possess a fighting machine of the pattern and of the excellence of her magnificent army of 1914. In the meantime, it has to be admitted, the deficiency of officers is still felt; and in some ways it is undoubtedly retarding progress. Nevertheless, Germany, although straining every nerve to achieve her purpose, is not spoiling her new creation by dint of over-hurry. It is but a week or so ago that General Kress von Kressenstein[1] was appointed to the command of the XII. Army Corps, this being the last of the twelve corps that were authorised to be formed by the Rearmament Decree of 1935.

The next problem that presents itself to the inquirer as to Germany's military views must be that pertaining to the doctrine which may govern German policy and strategy in time of war. Will this new army be employed as was that of 1914? What *rôle* may be assigned to the new air force? What armoured formations will be placed in the field? These and similar considerations are very difficult to answer. In addition to a perfectly natural and legitimate desire to keep certain matters secret, there is the fact, as the Germans themselves say—and this may be assumed to be the bare truth—that there still exists a considerable degree of uncertainty, if not of ignorance, as to what the capacity of the new armies may be. To that must be added another circumstance, which is openly admitted by the Germans—namely, that they do not know in what type of country they might be called upon to undertake military operations. It is for the latter reason that there exists considerable justification for the slowness with which the internal combustion engine is replacing the horse in the new army. It is true that during the recent manœuvres not a single cavalry regiment was to be seen, that all artillery except field-howitzer batteries were mechanically drawn. But a surprising proportion of the machine-guns remains horse-drawn, whilst a mass of first and even second line transport remained 'hippomobile,' to use the French expression. How far this may be a result of the desire to curtail expense is not altogether clear, but it is assuredly an

[1] Kress von Kressenstein was the organiser of the Turkish raids on the Suez Canal in Sinai during 1915.

article of faith in German military circles that a campaign conducted in the muddy levels of the valleys of the River Vistula and of the River Dnieper must rely on a high proportion of horse transport. And of horses Germany still possesses a large supply apt for such uses. Therefore the horse survives.

Little is known of Germany's ultimate views as to the employment of armoured formations in the field. At the recent manœuvres some 140 small two-man tanks played an important *rôle*. But these were used rather as cavalry would have been employed in the eighteenth century. It is stated that three armoured divisions of a most potent type, as regards both armour and engine-power, are now in existence and complete; rumours also of the expansion of these three entities by the creation of two more are to be heard. If it be admitted that such intentions may take material shape, it is not unfair to argue that German military thought—and this conclusion is strengthened by a scrutiny of the military Press—tends to the belief that there must arise an army divided into three types. First, there must be formed a mechanised and armoured force, strongly supported by aircraft; secondly, and behind such a force, there would follow a larger and highly mobile body of troops, partaking rather of the nature of the present divisional 'reconnaissance' detachments; how far such a force might consist of motor-borne infantry, or what its true composition might be, must remain, for the present at least, purely speculative. Thirdly and lastly, there would remain a type of force which would in reality be no more than the present-day infantry division, dependent on the fighting and marching capacity of the foot soldier as we know him to-day. That there is room, under modern conditions, for the last type of force admits of no doubt; ground defence against raids carried out by air or by mechanised units is but one of many tasks that might accrue to the marching regiments.

For these and other reasons there seems no reason to believe that the Germans, for the present, intend to increase the peace-time strength of their infantry divisions and corps. Until now the gradual increase in their number, and of the corps up to twelve, has been entirely foreseen. But the actual form that the German army or armies might assume on any

mobilisation in the future is as yet impossible to forecast: it is most probably unknown, or at any rate uncertain, even in Berlin. There are, however, two circumstances which are limiting plans for the future very considerably. The first of these is finance. It is true that Germany is spending prodigious sums on her rearmament. It is difficult to see how she could do otherwise. Modern armaments are enormously costly. Once Germany decided to rearm, she ran considerable risks in being caught in some international imbroglio whilst still in a state of transition. Very wisely, once the die was cast, the German authorities decided to cut short the time which the process of construction and arming the new forces might occupy. Besides arming thirty-six divisions, creating a formidable and most costly mechanised arm, Germany has called into being a formidable air force, she is constructing a number of new ships, she is rearming many of her fortifications, and spending large sums on naval equipment, on vast new aerodromes, not to mention munitions, new barracks and military stores of every description.

There can be nothing abnormal nor surprising about the total of £800,000,000 which, it is commonly assumed, is being spent on rearmament in Germany, if there be taken into account the diversity and extent of the material necessary to equip three fighting services on the scale and in the space of the time during which the German Government has decided to conduct that process. The nature of the problem demanded that the operation should be conducted with extreme rapidity and lack of hesitation; the period during which Germany could be regarded as being 'vulnerable' must be reduced to a minimum. Accordingly, the moment when Germany decided that such rapidity in rearmament was essential, she knew that she must be prepared to pay the price. The vast sums that are being spent on armaments are the necessary corollary of such a decision. Still, there must be a limit to what can be regarded as feasible in this respect, and it does not follow that the German army of 1936 has assumed a final or definite shape, nor that it can be increased much further without straining her finances beyond the limit of safety. It may also be accepted that any increase of her land forces will be directed towards a multiplication of armoured divisions.

Another circumstance affecting the reintroduction of universal service into Germany is the future relation between fighting troops and the war industry of the State. In nearly every great military Power—Russia, France, Italy, even in the United States and Belgium—far-reaching schemes for pooling man-power and sharing the resources of the country between combatant forces and manufacturing firms have been evolved. Even in the United States and in Belgium—there is no necessity to speak of the other countries named above—these plans have been supported by carefully devised legislation, some provisions of which are actually operative at the present day. In Germany the same process has necessarily been at work. So long as the smaller *Reichswehr* was the only armed force, outside a small navy, the problem of the allotment of man-power was not difficult to solve. But the recent enforcement of compulsory recruitment for the new army was speedily seen to be productive of difficulties. Industry, having had for many years past a more or less free hand in laying its plans for war-time production, suddenly found a rival arising in the field of labour. A *modus vivendi* will assuredly soon be found. But any further expansion of the German army in peace-time can only be undertaken on the assumption that a number of the reservists so trained will be needed for industrial work in time of war. This, in Germany, is no small matter. During the Great War there arose an antagonism between the combatants at the front and the sheltered munition workers that has not yet been forgotten. Any future armed conflict could only demand a greater need for high industrial production: manufacture would thus establish a still stronger claim on labour. How Germany proposes to legislate for such a state of affairs is not yet clear. It is, however, not a circumstance that is likely to favour any rash increase in peace effectives.

On the other hand, the new German army has come to occupy a position in that country which is without parallel in modern Europe. Nowhere else is the army regarded more in the light of a school; nowhere is military service regarded more in the light of a moral and political education: not even in Fascist Italy, where the army is now regarded as the great instrument for national regeneration. Universal service is therefore an essential part of the Nazi plan for the

education of every male German. All exemptions have been swept away; the *Einjähriger Freiwilliger* (the one-year volunteer of higher intellectual attainments) has vanished. Moreover, the two years that are now to be spent in the ranks by every young German of twenty years of age have to be preceded by six months in a unit of the *Arbeitsdienst* (labour service). As the organisation of this latter service is strongly tinged with a military bias, it can be said that the German army of 1936 has become an even more formidable instrument of national military education than was the army of imperial Germany of pre-war days. For political reasons alone there is little prospect of the terms of service being altered. But the numbers of trained men which the system will eventually supply may not all find employment in the field in time of war. Neither does it follow that German plans of campaign may resemble those of the past. Modern armament, the chemical arm, and, above all, a powerful air force might well alter all preconceived views as to any possible future use that Germany might choose to make of her armed might. It is indeed idle to speculate as yet on such possibilities.

One central fact, however, remains outstanding in modern Germany. There is prevalent a wave of patriotic enthusiasm in the country as a whole which surpasses all that can be seen elsewhere in Europe. Army and nation are bound together by bonds of sentiment that are as real as they are general. The spectacle of the welcome accorded to the troops by the country population during the recent manœuvres came as a revelation to strangers. That these demonstrations are symptomatic of really deep feeling admits of no possible doubt. An army with such support at home is likely to be a most formidable adversary in war.

H. de Watteville.

WHAT IS BRITAIN'S DEFENSIVE POLICY?

By Sir Norman Angell

The purpose of what follows is to suggest that in its international relationships this country is drifting, or being pushed, into positions which make its effective defence, or that of the Commonwealth, a practical impossibility, whatever degree of armament we may decide to maintain ; that of late we have again and again retreated from positions which only a few years ago we should have regarded as, beyond any question whatever, indispensable to the Empire's security, and their surrender as acts of supine treachery ; and that this retreat has been led by those political groups whose especial task and pride has heretofore been the security of the Empire.

This does not imply that the surrender has been conscious or deliberate, the result of any planned policy of retreat. Rather has it been due to the fact that we have had no consistent policy at all, and that the line followed has been the result of confusion, indecision, oscillation, division of counsel, irrelevant animosities and sympathies, attempts to apply virtually contradictory policies. We have been unaware of the general direction because each step has been regarded as an isolated act, not as making a link in a chain, every addition to which binds us more helplessly, making the next surrender more difficult to resist.

And with the drift has gone a very amazing change of mood on the part of large sections of the British public. Such psychological transformations are often the most important factors of politics, for on them depends the way we read facts, the conclusions we draw from them. And in politics opinions about the facts are more important than the facts themselves, since it is on our opinions that we act. In one mood, state of mind or feeling, a nation will draw from a given event conclusions as to policy the exact contrary of those they will draw in another state of mind.

Thus, when in 1919 some of us suggested that the Treaty of Versailles would prove an unwise and unworkable document, inimical to Britain's best interest, we were silenced by one great universal shout: 'What kind of peace would the Germans have made if they had been victorious?' The reply to which, of course, is that they would have made pretty much the kind of peace settlement we were then proposing to make; which was one good reason why we should not make it, in view of the fact that for years we have been declaring German political ideas and methods to be the enemy of civilisation. We were in a mood in which the badness of a given line of conduct or policy was our reason for imitating it.

So with Reparations. It was of little avail to show that a policy which would bring about the collapse of the monetary system of Central Europe would be disastrous to the economic welfare of Great Britain, because the great mass of the British people were not at that moment much interested in the welfare of Great Britain. They were much more interested in indulging a hungry emotion of retaliation, the desire to hit back at Germany. Because the anti-German passion was inflamed to fever heat (by the self-same newspapers which to-day sing the praises of Nazi Germany as our natural ally) our people were indifferent to any incidental or relatively remote damage the hitting back might do to themselves. At Lord Rothermere's suggestion they took their 'hats off to France' for invading the Ruhr, indifferent to the subsequent cost of such a 'day out.'

Something of the same order of motives—with the difference that an entirely new and different villain has been discovered—undoubtedly enters into the causes explaining the strange situation outlined below. The most ardent patriot, who would be totally incapable of any conscious betrayal of the interests of his country, is quite capable of unconscious betrayal of the most disastrous kind in the ardent desire to hit at some scapegoat for whom fanatical dislike has been conceived.

The fact is often indeed proclaimed as inevitable. 'Men are not guided by logic, by reason,' the implication usually being that in discussing national policy it is futile to talk reason. But, precisely because men are so seldom guided by reason, it is important to talk reason where one may. And

logic has its use even in emotional storms. The sight of the man who has vilely betrayed me does indeed provoke an emotion that no 'logic' can subdue. But the 'logic' which the next moment enables me to see that, because this man has five fingers on his right hand and my enemy had one missing, he cannot be my enemy but someone else, has after all some influence on the degree and direction of my passion.

We are all agreed—all nations and most parties—that defence of the nation should be our first care. Armaments are the instrument. But whether they can be used effectively depends on factors that are not military but political, mainly upon the answer to this question: Who when the time comes will be with us, and who against us? A degree of armament effective if our enemy is one State becomes automatically ineffective if he is half a dozen; a degree which is effective if we have powerful allies becomes ineffective if we are to face great combinations alone. And an enemy can make alliances more rapidly than we can make armies or navies. What is our policy in respect of this vital—and determining—fact?

For long it was the Balance of Power. We deemed it indispensable to the security of Britain that no one nation should be so powerful as to dominate the Continent, in a position to close the narrow seas by occupying the Channel ports (thus our interest in the defence of the Low Countries and of France); deemed it indispensable to the security of the Empire that no Power should be able to close the Mediterranean or command the Suez Canal by occupation of Egypt, or, by the domination of Asia, threaten India, or Australia; and, as indispensable to the whole, insisted upon the need of open sea communications. Such for generations have been the axioms of British policy—were still the axioms, say, ten years ago.

But during the last few years great sections of the public —and extremely influential sections—have thrown them all overboard. Those who saw in the power of pre-war Germany, the Germany of the Kaiser, of a European monarchy related to our own, of parliamentary institutions, of political parties organised freely in opposition to the Government, of a Press relatively free, the deadly enemy of Britain; who deemed the Treaty of Versailles far too lenient, who were

supporting the Foch plan for the permanent occupation of the Rhineland, who would listen to no arguments for the reduction of the Reparations claims, who applauded the invasion of the Ruhr—it is these mainly who suddenly find in the Germany of Hitler (much stronger relatively and potentially, as we shall see, than pre-war Germany) a Power that we need not fear, the friend of Britain, a potential ally.

If the second view is indeed the right one, it seems a pity we did not discover the reasons which justify it in 1914. Much of our Press is indeed to-day implying—or declaring—that in going to war with Germany we backed the wrong horse; that our people feel this in their bones and would to-day flatly refuse to fight for France against Germany, and point, among other things, to the fact that at no time since the war was Germany so popular in Britain as upon the morrow of the occupation of the Rhineland in defiance of French protests.

But this is perhaps the least of the strange somersaults of British opinion recently in the matter of defensive policy.

Take our position in Asia; notably in respect of China. For over a century we have always recognised the importance of China in our economic and political scheme of things. Britain's dependence upon foreign trade makes the future of the greatest potential market and field for investment in the world—that of 400,000,000 civilised, sturdy, industrious people—a matter of fundamental, of primary importance. The political are as important as the economic considerations. Our position in India, rendered already extremely difficult by the growth of a nationalism which resents the presence of European rule, as well as considerations connected with the defence of Australia and New Zealand, makes us concerned with the Balance of Power in the Far East, with such developments as the growth of a great Asiatic Empire at the expense of the integrity of China.

With a view to protecting our position we had built up an elaborate series of treaties, political, military and economic, particularly with reference to the future of China. In the two objectives of the 'open door' and the integrity of China we had had the close co-operation of the United States. Choosing a moment when Britain had just been forced off the gold standard and was in the throes not only of a grave financial

crisis but of a political one as well (when the first National Government was being formed), Japan took the first step in what was in fact a comprehensive defiance to the West—which included the United States—and the assertion of Japanese hegemony in Asia, tearing up treaties, announcing that the Far East was her pigeon and asking us what we proposed to do about it. Note the degree of Japanese defiance. By 1934 the Japanese Government was able formally to give notice to the world that 'Japan reserved to herself a special position' in China; that she would oppose energetically any move towards interference in or assistance given to that country by the Western Powers; that, in effect, an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine would be applied in full by Japan in her relations with the Asiastic mainland. On the occasion of Japan's formal withdrawal from the League Mr. Matsuoko informed the Press that

> Anyone will recognise that no power on earth can check our advance. The sooner it is realised and the world Powers recognise it, the better it will be for the welfare of the world.

A year later a high official in Tokio sums up the position:

> Europe and America possess no more political interests in East Asia than we possess in the European or American continents.

The assertion of this Japanese Monroe Doctrine has been marked by a tone of challenge which in pre-war relations between States of equal power would have been regarded as equivalent to a declaration of war. The Japanese ambassador in Washington stated in December 1934 that

> Japan hopes that Great Britain and the United States understand her policy, but . . . if, however, the United States and Britain failed to understand and attempted forcibly to swerve us from our course, then Japan would be forced to fight.

Britain accepts submissively. And note the political situation in which she surrenders—many British Imperialists applauding—to this Japanese summons.

It is commonly argued that Britain could do nothing but submit owing to the hopelessness of her strategical position. That is as may be. But, as we shall see presently, the United States did not regard it as hopeless and was urgently desiring the co-operation of Britain in resistance to Japan; the co-operation of Russia to that end was no less certain, as

was that of the bulk of the Chinese people; and the attitude of some fifty other nations may be judged by their subsequent condemnation of Japanese policy. So this is the 'hopeless' situation: On one side is Japan; against her potentially, or actually and actively, are the United States, Russia, China, and some two score other nations, with Australia, New Zealand, and Canada particularly interested in resistance. If the British Empire is powerless to defend its interests in that situation, in what situation can it ever effectively defend itself?

British acquiescence in Japanese Far Eastern hegemony has affected not only Britain's position in Asia. It has affected her relations with America. Among those who found the British attitude in the Far Eastern crisis completely inexplicable was Mr. Stimson, the American Secretary of State (whose recent account of that crisis ought to be read by every Englishman who believes that future co-operation between the British and American democracies is indispensable to the security of either).

In his memoirs Mr. Stimson points out that not only was America prepared to co-operate with Britain and other States in resistance to Japan, but that again and again the United States took the lead in initiating policies of resistance, going far beyond League proposals. Not only (Mr. Stimson makes it clear) would League States have had nothing to fear from the United States in measures designed to restrain Japan, but could count upon active American co-operation.

He recites in his book (pages 89, 90, 91) the reasons for the American willingness to be associated with Britain and the League: America's interest in the 'open door' policy in view of the vastness of the potential trade of China; the sacrifice of American prestige if Japan 'got away with it,' and these two points:

> The immense blow to the cause of peace and war prevention throughout the world which would inevitably be caused if without protest or condemnation Japan were permitted to violate and disregard the group of post-war treaties which she had ratified and upon which so many hopes of our race and of our part of the world had been predicated [p. 89].
>
> The future of the Far East will be very largely dominated by the future of the four hundred and fifty million people of Chinese blood. For several centuries Eastern Asia has owed its character mainly to the peaceful traditions of this great agricultural nation. If the character of China should be revolutionized and through exploitation become

militaristic and aggressive not only Asia but the rest of the world must tremble [p.91].

If this last consideration is important for the United States, what shall we say of its importance for the suzerain of India, the Protector of Australia?

Mr. Stimson goes on to sketch how he sought the co-operation of Britain, particularly in supporting the enunciation of what has since become known as 'the Stimson doctrine' of non-recognition—the notification to Japan that no change brought about by military force in violation of treaties would be recognised by the other signatories to those treaties.

Whatever other effects that 'diplomatic sanction' might have had, it would have had this: to commit America to much closer general co-operation with ourselves in common resistance to aggression; to make the Kellogg Pact a political reality; to secure from the United States acquiescence in the British view of sea rights whenever naval action was invoked on behalf of treaties like the Kellogg Pact. (It should be noted, incidentally, that at that moment the President of the United States, Mr. Hoover, and the Secretary of State himself, Mr. Stimson, were both familiar with the Far East, both having lived there. Mr. Hoover had also lived in Australia, many years in England.)

Mr. Stimson explains why he had counted with so much assurance on the co-operation of Great Britain. He recalls the immense importance Britain had always attached in the past to the maintenance of the open door in China, the efforts that had culminated in the Nine-Power Treaty, and finally with what care President Hoover and the British Government had in the preceding two or three years prepared the way for making the Kellogg–Briand Pact, not merely a 'declaration of good intention,' but a treaty possessing clear obligations for common action. The note to Japan was 'the most signal effort' ever made by the American Government to carry that policy a stage further.

And then the British Government turned the whole thing down—coldly, curtly, refusing, in effect, further co-operation. The contents of the *communiqué* to the Press renouncing rejection of the American offer were such, says Mr. Stimson, 'as to be taken by most readers, including—what was most

important—the Japanese Government, as a rebuff to the United States.' Japan saw immediately that Anglo-American co-operation had broken down, and began to use in justification of her aggression the very arguments which the British Government and the British Press (Mr. Stimson quotes at length from *The Times* leaders) had used concerning the American proposals. It was not surprising that the Japanese reply to the American note was conceived, as a British historian has noted, in 'a vein of elegant irony which came within an ace of insolence.' Mr. Stimson notes the effect which the general line taken by the British Government and Press had upon Japan:

> The imperialistic group of Japanese statesmen who for years had cherished the hope of a military and economic hegemony over China, but whose hopes had been suppressed by the enlightened policy at Washington in 1922, joined in by the Japanese Government of that day, could have asked for no more effective assurance in their favour [p. 104].

Thus, at the very moment that our power and influence in the Far East were declining and threats to our position there growing daily, we were deliberately rejecting an Anglo-American co-operation and weakening an Anglo-American solidarity which might have served as a counter-balance to that tendency.

How were 'Imperialist' circles in Britain accepting this development?

They were rejoicing. Every day one might read leading articles in the London Press in praise of Japan and in dispraise of any effort to restrain her, of any interference from busybodies, any representations even that might annoy 'an old and faithful ally.' Sir John Simon announces to the House of Commons that the conflict between China and Japan is 'a distant dispute' which does not concern us; a member announces to considerable applause, 'I am for Japan.' At a little later stage an important commercial delegation visits Japan and one of its members tells the world that everyone who counts in England is in favour of Japan, in favour of renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. It is this jubilation which the future historian will find inexplicable. The decline of Britain's power, her retreat before new empires, even Asiatic ones, might be part of the inevitable processes of history. But how explain the rejoicing of

British Imperialists thereat—the glee of British Imperialists at the decline of the Empire?

If the Far Eastern instance stood alone it would be striking. But it does not stand alone. That it is part of a general attitude and tendency on the part of British Imperialists is proved by what follows.

Even before the cutting of the Suez Canal the Mediterranean was recognised as an artery of Empire. With the construction of the Canal it became vital, and Egypt as important as Gibraltar. For, in addition to being still the greatest Asiatic Power, we are also the greatest African. In both cases a small minority of Europeans are confronted by an overwhelming native majority. When in September of last year it looked as though Britain was about to take the lead in preventing the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, a whole host of foreign commentators, notably American, argued, cynically it may be, but plausibly enough, to this general effect: 'Now at last we shall see the League do something and become a reality. For it is the obvious instrument for Britain to employ in the protection of a plain Imperial interest. She cannot afford to see a Mediterranean Power straddle the Canal, a veritable life-line of Empire, as on numberless occasions British Imperialists have publicly declared it to be. For Italy to establish herself in Abyssinia, organise great black armies (as France has done), so that Abyssinia can become a base for operations against the Soudan, Egypt and Palestine, is to give away a key position, to render the command of the Mediterranean of little effect.'

If the reader cares to examine the American Press of October and November of last year he will find literally hundreds of leading articles, comments by American journalists, to that general effect. An Anglo-Italian struggle for the domination of the Mediterranean was now inevitable.

The present writer, who happened to be in America at the time, warned one or two of these commentators that they would find they had left out of account certain psychological factors that had never before played any considerable *rôle* in British policy; that they would shortly find the old guard of Imperialism in Britain not urging opposition to

Italy in her threat to the Soudan and the Canal but cheering her on, and giving her every assurance that she would never really be interfered with.

This suggestion was regarded as so fantastic by a group of American journalists in Washington to whom it was made that they immediately began to discuss what subtle device of British propaganda lay hidden in nonsense of that kind. Yet the event was not long in confirming with disastrous amplitude this prognosis.

Early in the negotiations spokesmen of the British Government announced that the Cabinet would be no party to any action against Italy which might lead to war. From that moment the conversation might just as well have ceased. Italy had only to say that she would fight in the event of any specified sanction being applied for that sanction to go into the 'inapplicable' list. An eminent Italian professor has pointed out that from the moment the British Cabinet announced 'it would be no party to a policy involving war' the real chairmanship of the Sanctions Committee passed to Signor Mussolini. Mr. Winston Churchill has recently made an analysis which shows quite clearly that the dominating consideration in the choice of sanctions was this: 'None which would really embarrass Italy must be chosen.' The greater part of the British Press was indeed proclaiming this principle daily. 'Sanctions mean war,' the implication being that as war was ruled out, so were sanctions.

With as much truth the Press could, of course, have proclaimed that 'defence means war.' If Italy had invaded Kenya we should immediately have provoked a state of war by defending Kenya, fighting Italy. But as Italy knew this she did not invade British territory. Had Italy believed that Britain would defend the Covenant in the same way that she would defend territory, the international sanction would no more have meant war than the national sanction means war. There would have been no Abyssinian War and our position in the Eastern Mediterranean immensely stronger than it is as the result of the retreat before Italy. Needless to say, our Imperialist Press rejoiced at that retreat.

Meantime the future power of the British Navy was being crippled and circumscribed by an incident of these negotiations the significance of which seems to have been all but

completely missed by British opinion. Once more it had relation to an offer of American co-operation, which was once more, in fact, rejected.

A large part of the value of sea-power resides in the fact that command of the sea enables a nation to secure outside resources for itself and deny them to the enemy. In the exercise of that function, however, the British Navy has again and again been brought into conflict with America. The conflict has resulted in one war with America and brought us near to several more. Naval parity with America has not made this 'freedom of the seas' claim, maintained ever since America became an independent State as a sort of political religion, of less importance. When in September of last year it looked as though Britain and the League meant business, the President and Secretary Hull interpreted the Neutrality Act (which had only a few months' validity) in this way: Supplies on the peace-time scale could be sent to both belligerents, *but at the trader's risk*. Now, in notifying American citizens that they did trade with belligerents at their own risk, the President was doing three things: (1) acting in line with public feeling in America, which did not desire once more to see vast war trades established which would end by embroiling America in the dispute; (2) throwing over the whole of the 'freedom of the seas' doctrine; and (3) making America the economic ally of Britain and the League.

For note the effect of this new line of policy. Assume that Britain, acting on behalf of the League, had blockaded Italy. American shippers would under the ruling just quoted be free to send normal peace-time shipments to fifty nations, which those nations, presumably, would be free to distribute among themselves as they pleased. Consignments to Italy would be stopped by the blockading Powers, but the American Government would be unconcerned. It would be 'trader's risk' trade. So long as the League Powers commanded the sea, they would be able to draw upon the resources of America, and the blockaded State would not. The effect of that interpretation of the Neutrality Act was to concede practically every point for which Britain in the past had contended, and to make British sea law world law. The American 'rights,' maintained sometimes at such bloody cost for a century and a half, were suddenly surrendered on behalf of

world action against aggression. What British power had not been able to do during a century and a half, the American Congress did suddenly of its own free will, even if it did not quite realise just what it was doing.

Here, surely, was a heaven-sent opportunity to make British sea law world law. And once more the offer, or the opportunity, was rejected. It soon became apparent that there was no intention of restraining aggression by blockade or otherwise; the United States shared the disillusionment that came with the Hoare–Laval proposals; the offer has lapsed, and no man can tell what character future neutrality legislation in the United States will take.

Thus, in the retreat before Japan we had sacrificed the opportunity of positive co-operation amounting to alliance with America; in the retreat before Italy we sacrificed the chance of coming at long last to agreement with America on the one point which has been a cause of division between us, of putting our sea-power in a position for which we have struggled for 150 years to place it.

The Japanese and Italian affairs are of course related. That the Italian dictator was encouraged to gamble on the African venture owing to the immunity enjoyed by Japan he himself has avowed. He has repeatedly appealed to the fact of that immunity as one of the justifications for his own course. But if one success gives rise to a second attempt two successes are still more likely to give rise to a third attempt. The Duce had made it clear that you could get away with it. Should the German Führer show less resolution than the non-Nordic Italian Duce? The next step in the sequence of events was the occupation of the demilitarised zone by Germany in violation, not alone of the Treaty of Versailles, but of subsequent treaties which Britain had devised as an indispensable part of her political apparatus of defence. For several years the Prime Minister had been proclaiming to the world that 'Britain's frontier is the Rhine.' The phrase was presumably intended as a slogan embodying the policy by which the Government stood. Germany crosses that frontier in violation of undertakings freely given to us, and immediately we indicate to France that . . . well, our frontier is no longer the Rhine. (She had always doubted just how we interpreted that slogan, and

her doubts explained her hesitations in the Italo-Abyssinian matter.)

Our Imperialists having applauded the retreat before Japan and disparaged American co-operation in resistance to her, having applauded the retreat before Italy and the failure to secure the British position in sea rights by taking up the American offer in that connexion, applauded loudest of all when Germany crossed our frontier—what we had declared to be our frontier—and by acquiescence therein had weakened our alliance with France.

But the story does not end even there. A large section of our Press have become violent partisans of the rebels in Spain—violently hostile to the Spanish Government, normally described in that Press as 'the Reds.' By what process of reasoning does a consideration of British defensive interests, particularly in the Mediterranean, indicate that we should thus so warmly champion the cause of the rebels? Franco's victory with the help of Italy and Germany is likely to give those Powers a position in the Western Mediterranean as dangerous to British communications as Italy's victory will prove to be in the Eastern Mediterranean. This prospect, like the other similar ones, seems immensely pleasing to our more corybantic Imperialists.

The motives underlying the strange conception of British interests implicit in the policy and attitude just sketched deserve exploring. I must content myself here with bearing witness to the facts, adding only this: If, while declaring daily, as we have done, that our policies were based upon the League, our real purpose was to discredit it and get it out of the way, then we have had a large measure of success. But we have succeeded at the cost of undermining the security of Britain and the Empire. The League could have been disposed of more cheaply. If we believe it to be mischievous, our course is to say so, to say why, and retire from it. This we have feared to do. We have equally feared to make it a success. Between these two fears our country is condemned to paralysis and impotence.

NORMAN ANGELL.

THE FACTORY ACTS

By Sir Gerald Bellhouse, C.B.E.

It is thirty-five years since the last major Factory Act was passed; and though there have been several supplementary Acts since then, these have not been for the most part of an amending character, but have dealt with various new points which called for legislative action. At the same time, this period has been one of rapid change and great industrial development. It is hardly surprising, then, that the law has become in many respects defective, out of harmony with modern industrial conditions, and to some extent confused. Let us examine some of its more important provisions and compare them with present-day practice.

Take, first of all, the question of hours of employment. The Factory Acts have never directly concerned themselves with the hours of male adults; they apply only to the hours worked by women and young persons of both sexes between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. Nevertheless, the limitation of the hours worked by young persons does automatically affect the hours of men employed in the same factory, since the work of each class is as a rule mutually dependent on that of the other. There can be no question, moreover, that the hours permitted by the Acts have in fact, in the past, set a standard which has been followed in industry for workers generally. To-day the standard provided by the Acts has fallen very much behind that adopted in modern practice. At the present time there is in operation in this country what amounts to a universal eight-hour day, or forty-eight-hour week, established, not by law, but by voluntary agreement between employer and worker. This was an outcome of the war, and it was indeed remarkable to observe how almost simultaneously, in industry after industry, this new system of hours was adopted. The eight-hour day for which workers had been clamouring suddenly became an accomplished fact. Rarely can so revolutionary

a change have been brought about merely by voluntary action and without statutory assistance.

But what about the Factory Act? How many people realise that under that Act the ten-hour day which was being fought for nearly a hundred years ago, and which was finally gained by the Act of 1847, is still perfectly legal for women and young persons employed in textile factories; that, further, they may be employed for ten and a half hours in non-textile factories and workshops, where also the weekly half-holiday need not begin till 4 o'clock in the afternoon if work does not commence before 8 o'clock in the morning? No responsible organisation would countenance such hours as a normal system of work for industry generally to-day. Yet there is still danger of such hours being exploited. The Chief Inspector of Factories, in his recently published Annual Report,[1] sounds a note of warning. 'The improvement in trade,' he says, 'has resulted in a tendency to increase the hours of work of women and young persons in a wide variety of industries'; and he goes on to quote individual cases, more particularly from the Midlands, where the hours worked can only be regarded as excessive. 'One firm with 200 workers has been employing protected persons, including girls of fourteen or fifteen, for the last three years from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. and on Saturdays from 8 a.m. to 1 p.m. or 4 p.m., according to pressure.' He gives instances, on the other hand, that prove the truth of the old adage that long hours do not always result in large production, and he makes one very significant remark which shows the attitude of the workers towards long hours. 'A distressing fact,' he says, 'about these long hours in the Midlands is that they are generally worked by the least physically fit portion of the industrial population. The best workers tend to go to the best employers and the weakest to drift to the factories with longest hours and the least good conditions.' There is, too, undoubted evidence of fatigue where the full hours are worked.

It is time that legal requirements in this respect were brought more into conformity with the practice adopted in the best conducted factories. On the other hand, with a reduction in hours there will come a need for greater elasticity in their arrangement. The present law was necessarily made

[1] Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories, 1935, p. 64 (Cmd. 5230).

very precise to enable a small band of inspectors to enforce a novel and unpopular Act. Things to-day are different. Workers are better able to look after themselves. Experience gained during the war, too, when all kinds of variations in the arrangement of hours were sanctioned by Home Office Orders and enforced without difficulty by the inspectorate, proves that elasticity can now safely be permitted.

There will probably have to be some provisions permitting limited overtime to meet periods of seasonal pressure or other trade activity. There can be little objection to this, for overtime on the top of an eight-hour day is a very different proposition to overtime at the end of a ten-hour day, and it is perhaps worthy of note that the draft convention relating to the eight-hour day which was adopted at the first Conference of the International Labour Organisation of the League of Nations, held at Washington in 1919, contained provisions in article 6 allowing temporary exceptions so that establishments may deal with exceptional cases of pressure of work.

Elasticity is provided also by the two-shift system, which has become through the Act passed this session an established element in our factory system. Under this Act the Secretary of State may, upon application of the occupier of any factory or workshop, authorise the employment of women and young persons over sixteen years on a system of eight-hour shifts between the hours of 6 in the morning and 10 in the evening, though in the case of existing works this power can only be exercised when he is satisfied that the workers have been consulted and arrangements made for ascertaining their opinions by secret ballot in a manner to be prescribed. Another point in which the present law lags behind general practice is in relation to those industries, such as iron and steel, where work must necessarily be carried on continuously day and night. The present law still allows boys of sixteen to be employed on twelve-hour shifts, though it is now the universal practice to work on a system of three eight-hour shifts.

There is yet another question which might well be considered in a new Bill. There are certain occupations which are closely akin to or are definitely related to factory occupations but which are still subject to no control. It was my duty a number of years ago to carry out an inquiry

in regard to the hours of work of van and warehouse boys, and the Committee over which I presided made recommendations for their control in different ways. No doubt things have greatly changed since those days, and the whole question has recently been the subject of inquiry by another Committee whose report is not yet available. There must be a strong case, however, for the control of the hours of at least those boys who work in warehouses, or in occupations connected with a factory though outside factory premises. So much for hours of employment. Next let us look at the 'safety' provisions of the Act. We shall find here, too, hardly less striking deficiencies.

There can be no doubt that there has been immense improvement in the safeguarding of machinery and plant in recent years, and great credit is due to the inspectors of factories for the rise in the standard of safety which has taken place. But can anyone be quite satisfied with a position which shows that last year there were 149,696 reported accidents, including 843 fatalities? The solution of the accident problem is not perhaps quite so easy as may appear at first sight. One is inclined to say, 'Provide adequate safeguards for the machinery and accidents will automatically disappear.' There is no such easy remedy. In fact, three-quarters of the reported accidents have no connexion with machinery at all, but are due to such causes as falls, being struck by falling bodies, handling goods, use of hand tools, and so on. Accidents of this kind cannot be prevented by statutory enactment except in so far as they may be due to neglect to keep premises and plant in proper repair. They can, however, be greatly reduced by properly constituted safety organisation within the factory, on 'safety first' lines. Such organisations, though, are likely to give the best results if established on a voluntary rather than on a statutory basis, and the system need not, therefore, be further discussed here.

Whatever may be accomplished in the way of accident reduction by the above means, the provision of adequate safeguards for machinery and plant must always be a matter of great importance. It is with this side of the question that the Factory Act is most immediately concerned, and there are numerous points where the present law needs to be

strengthened. It is true that the Act requires that all dangerous parts of machinery must be securely fenced, or be in such position or of such construction as to be equally safe as if they were securely fenced, and that the courts have interpreted these requirements very strictly and very literally. But there has been great advance in recent years in the types of guards available, and many ingenious devices have been invented for the protection of the worker. There are, for example, the interlocking guards, such as are now commonly in use on cotton-spinning, laundry and baking machinery, which render it impossible to expose dangerous parts while the machine is in motion; there are the 'trip' motions, used on such machines as calenders in laundries, which automatically stop the machine if the hand of the worker approaches too near to the danger zone; there are the devices, used more particularly on power presses, which sweep the hand away from under the plunger before it descends.[2] Such guards are a modern development and are coming increasingly into use, but the present Act contains no provision relating to them.

Then, again, there are certain types of accidents which occur with great regularity year after year on particular classes of machinery, many of which might be prevented by better fencing. Lifts are a case in point. An instructive table has been included in the Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for the current year (Cmd. 5230) giving a detailed analysis of lift accidents and their causes, from which the following figures are extracted:

HOIST ACCIDENTS, 1935

Causation.	Accidents.	
	Fatal.	Non-fatal.
Falls down hoist well . .	6	39
Fall of cage	3	42
Falls of persons or articles .	1	20
Crushes.	9	213
Miscellaneous . . .	6	63
Repairing, cleaning and oiling .	—	14
Total . . .	25	391

[2] Numerous examples of devices of this kind may be seen at the Home Office Industrial Museum, Horseferry Road, Westminster, S.W. 1.

In addition 15 fatal and 326 non-fatal accidents were brought to the notice of the department, though they occurred in premises not coming under the Factory Acts.

In his remarks on these accidents the Chief Inspector says:

> The hoist accidents again presented the feature commented upon last year, namely that in nearly every case some better form of safeguarding or construction according to modern standards would have prevented the accident. Automatically interlocked doors or gates at all openings are of course the greatest need, as without them it is nearly always impossible to ensure that the doors or gates will be kept closed except at the opening at which the cage is at rest.

The present law merely requires that every hoist shall be securely fenced, and is satisfied if gates are provided at the entrances to the hoist well, *and are kept closed.* In practice it is impossible to ensure that they will be kept closed unless they are provided with interlocking arrangements which prevent the doors from being opened unless the cage is stopped at the floor concerned, and which render it impossible to start the hoist again until the door has been shut. Another very necessary safeguard, more particularly for hoists in which persons are allowed to ride, is that they should be subjected to regular periodic examination. Without this the risk of accident due to failure of the ropes or other part of the apparatus is greatly increased.

This brings us to another notable omission in the present law. Though the special regulations which apply to docks, buildings in course of construction and shipbuilding all contain provisions relating to the testing, examination and registration of chains and ropes used in hoisting and lowering of goods and to the issue of certificates regarding their safe working loads, there are no provisions in the Act of a similar kind relating to chains and ropes generally, though, obviously, the danger is the same wherever the chain or rope is used. This is an omission which ought to be made good.

The reference to buildings in the last paragraph recalls another very serious anomaly in the present law. The buildings that are brought within the present Act for certain purposes are 'premises on which machinery worked by steam, water or other mechanical power is *temporarily* used for the purpose of the construction of a building, or any

structural work in connection with a building.' Now, it frequently occurs that while machinery is used in the early stages of the construction it is all removed considerably before the building is complete. The result is that the building during one part of its erection comes under the Act, and during the other part does not do so. Yet all the dangers arising, for example, from scaffolding and other plant remain the same after the machinery has been removed. This can never have been the original intention. The purpose was no doubt to limit the application of the law in the first instance to buildings of considerable size where the dangers are most obvious. It is wrong that such a loop-hole should be allowed to continue, and this is particularly so having regard to the dangerous nature of the work. There were 109 fatal accidents (the highest total for any industry coming under the Acts) and 3993 non-fatal accidents reported from buildings in course of construction last year, of which 86 fatal and 1248 non-fatal cases were due to falls.

Another class of machinery that has long given cause for anxiety is the transmission machinery, or mill-gearing as it is called in the existing Act. The strict interpretation that has been given by the courts to the present requirement that all such machinery shall either be securely fenced, or be in such position as to be as safe as if it were fenced, has made it clear that, whatever the position of the shafting, it is illegal to permit any person to approach it while it is in motion. These legal decisions have unquestionably had a beneficial effect, for the number of shafting accidents has fallen between 1924 and 1934 from 312 (44 fatal) to 164 (21 fatal). It is strangely difficult to persuade either employer or worker that there is anything dangerous in the innocent-looking, smooth revolving shaft. Similarly, belts hanging loosely from overhead shafting are a great temptation to young people who will use them as a swing. All may go well for a bit, when suddenly the belt seizes, the boy is drawn up to the revolving shaft and wound round it, and a fatal accident has occurred. There is nothing in the law to meet this point; but it is an important one, for not only may accidents occur in the way described, but such belts have been known to catch against adjoining pieces of machinery and to pull them from their foundations, thus wrecking the

plant and probably causing accidents to persons working in the vicinity. There is no need for such accidents to occur. The provision of a simple belt perch to hold the belt off the revolving shaft removes all risk, and, incidentally, the perch affords valuable aid in mounting the belts on the pulleys. It may be mentioned in this connexion, again, that numerous safeguards for this class of machinery may be seen at the Home Office Museum.[3]

The passing of a new Act would afford opportunity, too, for dealing with other omissions. At present, though there are provisions relating to steam boilers, there is nothing to guard against risks of explosion from steam receivers such as steam-jacketed pans and calendering cylinders, nor against similar risks from compressed-air receivers. There is nothing to require the protection of open vats containing hot or corrosive liquids, though this point was dealt with in the old Act of 1878, but by some oversight, presumably, was dropped in the Act of 1901. The regulations in force in chemical works require special precautions to be taken regarding the entry by persons employed into vats and other structures where dangerous fumes are liable to accumulate. But this risk is not confined to chemical works, and the requirement to take precautions should be made general. Lastly, steps might well be taken to secure that new machinery should be provided with guards by the maker before it is put on the market. It is so much easier to provide guards for certain parts of machines while they are under construction than to fit guards to the machines afterwards. An excellent example of what can be done by the makers is afforded by the machine tool manufacturers, many of whose machines are turned out with all the dangerous parts adequately protected.

These, then, are the more important points where the law requires strengthening in its safety provisions. It may be suggested, perhaps, that the Secretary of State already has power to deal with them by means of special regulations, such as those which have been so successful in reducing risks from dangerous types of machinery in particular industries and from the risks of industrial poisons in what are known as the dangerous trades. No one can deny the

[3] Home Office Industrial Museum, Horseferry Road, Westminster, S.W. 1.

success of these codes, but the machinery for establishing them is complicated and quite unworkable where the danger to be guarded against spreads over industry as a whole. Consider the procedure. Before the Secretary of State can make regulations, he must publish, in such manner as he may think best adapted for informing the persons affected, notice of the proposal to make regulations, and of the place where copies of the draft regulations can be obtained, and of the time within which objections may be made. Objections must then be considered, and if not met the regulations must be the subject of a public inquiry. In practice it has been the custom to issue copies of draft regulations to all trade associations, whether of employers or operatives, and to all individual firms likely to be affected. The objections are then discussed with the trade associations, and an effort is made to meet them or to secure their withdrawal. This is often a long process, but nearly always results in an agreed code which is highly advantageous, since an agreed code is much more easily enforced than a code imposed upon industry after a public inquiry. But even when agreement has been reached with the trade associations, it not infrequently happens that there remain outstanding objections from individual concerns, and unless these are withdrawn, or can be treated as frivolous, the regulations may still be held up. This is wrong; where it is evident that a majority of an industry accept a draft code the Secretary of State ought to have power to ignore objections from individuals. Apart, then, from the general proposition that matters which affect industry as a whole ought to be dealt with in the Act itself, the whole machinery for making regulations is too complicated to be used to make good deficiences such as have been described above.

There is yet another point closely related to this question of accident protection in which the present law has been found to be defective. I refer to the provisions relating to means of escape in case of fire. This subject was discussed at some length in the Report of the Royal Commission on Fire Brigades and Fire Protection, 1925 (Cmd. 1945). 'These provisions,' they said in reference to the Act of 1901, 'afford valuable safeguards against loss of life from fire, but they do not appear to include all the precau-

tions which might reasonably be required.' The Act at present requires that every factory constructed after 1891 and every workshop constructed after 1895 in which more than forty persons are employed must be furnished with a certificate from the district council that it is provided with such means of escape in case of fire as can reasonably be required in the circumstances of each case; further, a duty is imposed on the district councils, in the case of factories or workshops to which the foregoing provisions do not apply and in which more than forty persons are employed, from time to time to ascertain whether all such factories or workshops in their area are provided with reasonable means of escape, and, if not, to serve notice on the occupier to provide it. Power is also given to them to make bye-laws providing for means of escape in the case of any factory or workshop, but in practice a relatively small proportion of such councils have made use of this power.

As might be expected, great variation is to be found in the standard of sufficiency and suitability adopted by different councils. In many of the larger towns the standard is high; but evidence was placed before the Royal Commission by Mr. R. E. Graves, the then Chief Inspector of Factories, and by Miss Constance Smith of the miserably inadequate arrangements accepted by some authorities. A case quoted as an example consisted merely of a vertical ladder with no handrails and approached by a narrow platform—an obviously unsuitable means of escape, more particularly where women are employed. 'It seems to us imperative,' say the Commission, 'that the existing provisions with regard to means of escape should be strengthened.' They recommended, therefore, that the obligation to provide reasonable means of escape to the satisfaction of the local authorities should be extended to (1) all factories, whenever constructed, in which more than twenty persons are employed, reasonable time being allowed for existing factories to conform; (2) any factories which, after the requirement becomes law, are constructed or adapted for use as a factory where ten or more persons are employed on any floor above the ground floor; and (3) any factories or classes of factories scheduled by the Secretary of State as dangerous on account of explosion or specially inflammable

materials handled therein. They also recommended that the Secretary of State should have power to make regulations of general application as to the requirements to be observed in providing means of escape, the keeping of exits free from obstruction, and any other matters incidental thereto.

Another matter to which they attached considerable importance is that of the instruction of the employees in factories in fire drill and discipline and the orderly use of the means of escape provided. They recommended that compulsory fire drills at regular intervals should be required by general regulations applicable to all factories where more than twenty persons are employed above the ground floor and to all factories where any explosive or highly inflammable material is handled or stored, irrespective of the number of persons employed.

There remain the health and welfare provisions of the Act. There is perhaps less to be said on this side, but some of the provisions relating, for example, to cleanliness and air space look a little primitive in the light of the standard now set up by the new factories and might well be tightened up. But the most notable omission is the absence of any clause relating to lighting. This subject was exhaustively studied by the Departmental Committee on Factory Lighting appointed in 1913, which has issued three Reports.[4] Their recommendation was that there should be a statutory provision requiring, in general terms, adequate and suitable lighting in every part of a factory and giving power to the Secretary of State to make Orders defining adequacy and suitability. The standard of adequacy will vary according to the nature of the work carried on—whether it is fine, very fine, or otherwise—and on the kind of material in use. Much higher illumination is necessary where dark materials are being handled than where the colours are bright. As regards suitability, the important points are that the light should be constant and uniform and so placed as to prevent glare before the eyes of the worker and avoid the casting of extraneous shadow on the work.

[4] First Report of the Departmental Committee on Factory Lighting: Vol. i., Report Appendices (Cmd. 8000), 1915 (out of print); vol. ii., Minutes of Evidence (Cmd. 8001), 1915 (out of print); vol. iii., Results of Observations, 1915. Second Report (Cmd. 1418), 1921. Third Report (Cmd. 1686), 1922.

A great deal of work has been done since the Committee reported, both by the Factory Department, who have collected much information regarding the conditions prevailing in different industries, and by the Industrial Health Research Board, who have carried out a number of inquiries relating more particularly to the effects of eye strain in fine work. Conditions vary considerably in different works; many cases of unsuitable lighting exist. Yet the importance of good lighting is generally admitted, for it not only affects the health of the worker, but also his output. It is to be hoped, therefore, that provision will be made in any new Bill for giving effect to the recommendations of the Departmental Committee.

One last point must be considered—the question of welfare. Now, welfare covers a very large field. In its general aspect it is a movement which was aptly described by H.R.H. the Duke of York, in his message to the recent Annual Conference of the Industrial Welfare Society, as establishing 'voluntary provisions for conserving health and promoting happiness.' It aims at re-establishing in the factory that intimate touch between employer and worker which was largely lost when the privately owned firm was replaced by large joint-stock companies and at securing a humanising of conditions of employment. In other words, it is the recognition that care for the well-being of the workman is an essential part of good works management. In this sense, then, welfare is not a matter for statutory regulation.

But there is another aspect of welfare in which the State can, and in fact does, intervene. Power is given to the Secretary of State by the Police, Factories, etc., Act, 1916, to require, in particular industries where conditions of work are necessarily dirty or otherwise exacting, provision to be made for the comfort of the worker in the way of protective clothing, washing conveniences, mess-rooms, cloak-rooms, first aid, and so on. Orders under this Act are now in operation in more than twenty trades. The power to make these Orders is limited, though, to trades in which the Secretary of State can be satisfied that the conditions are such as to necessitate exceptional measures of this kind. It is time that many of these provisions should

be given more general application. Can it be denied that reasonable welfare arrangements, such as a proper supply of drinking water, arrangements for first-aid treatment, facilities for sitting, a supply of protective clothing for persons engaged in dusty or dirty operations, and washing conveniences, ought to be required in all factories?

Such, then, are the principal points in which the existing law has fallen out of date and where amendment is called for. There is nothing idealistic in any of the suggested changes. Many are in fact already in general operation, and there are none which have not been adopted in the well-conducted factories. But the defects can be made good only by an amending Act. Mere consolidation of the present Acts, such as has been suggested in certain quarters, would do nothing to remedy the present troubles and would only prolong an unsatisfactory state of affairs. Fears have been expressed, again, that a new law will introduce revolutionary changes and throw an impossible burden on reviving trade. I have no means of knowing what the intentions of the Government may be, but nevertheless I can see no grounds for such fears. There has been no demand for revolutionary changes from any quarter. It will be recalled, too, that during recent years two Factory Bills have been introduced—one by a Labour Government, the other by a Conservative one. They differed from one another only in detail. The last Bill, introduced by Sir William Joynson-Hicks (Lord Brentford) in 1926, was brought in mainly in order that its provisions might be thoroughly discussed by all interests concerned, and it was in fact discussed in great detail with representatives of the employers' organisations, with satisfactory results. Is it unreasonable to anticipate, therefore, that the new Bill will be framed on very similar lines to its predecessors?

To those of us whose interests have been wrapped up in factory legislation, and who cannot help feeling that the present Act is not worthy of a country whose pride it is that she has led the world in matters of this kind, the announcement by the Government of their intention to introduce the oft-postponed Factory Bill in the near future is much to be welcomed.

GERALD BELLHOUSE.

THE ENGLISH NOVEL AND THE MODERN PROBLEM[1]

By Douglas Jerrold

Novels acclaimed as important works of genius are as common as blackberries, and it is the most serious of the penalties we pay for the poverty of our criticism that really significant books are missed or that their significance is ignored. This last is notably the case with the two books considered in this article.

In what sense can any novel—a mere story at the best—be significant? Certainly not because it is true to life; still less because it is, as are most of our so-called masterpieces, a piece of propaganda for views in hot debate. Verisimilitude may interest and propaganda may excite, but the interest and the excitement will be determined by the life or the views reflected. This second-hand kind of interest is characteristic not of literature but of journalism. The significance of novels depends, we must conclude, not on their success, however brilliant, in reflecting life or in solving a problem which already confronts us, but on the insistence with which they pose a fresh problem. It may be said, and with truth, that there are no new problems, only new errors in the approach to old difficulties. But the character of our own age, as of earlier ages, will be determined, none the less, by the problems which it elects to face, just as the character of the coming age will be settled largely by the problems which we refuse to face. In that sense fresh problems are always being posed, and in that sense the two novels to which I draw attention are significant. They are the first to face our modern problem, which is not that of reforming other people's lives or making better terms with our neighbours, but of living our own lives in terms of our destiny as immortal souls.

[1] *Sparkenbroke*, by Charles Morgan (Macmillan, 8*s*. 6*d*.); *The Angel in the Mist*, by Robert Speaight (Cassell, 7*s*. 6*d*.).

The revulsion from 'revolt' and 'reform' was long overdue, but it had to wait until the masquerade was played out, and had been disclosed for what it was—not a sham, nor a dream, but an irrelevance. To-day the mind of our people is becoming more satisfied in its social but much less so in its spiritual conscience. These two novels, written by men already distinguished in other spheres of life, will deepen and give direction to this dissatisfaction where it exists, and will arouse it where it does not exist. The plethora of critics have served their public ill in regard to these books, because the modern reviewer is not interested in the creative activity of the modern writer, but only in his views. Critics review with interest, and even with enthusiasm, books which are propaganda on behalf of the kind of world in which literary people flourish most easily, but they are quite indifferent to the more important problem, which is whether a world congenial to literary people is likely to be a world which itself flourishes. Yet it is when the world in general feels its intimate interests out of harmony with the dream of its professional mentors that younger novelists have their chance. So, in their time, Mr. Wells, Mr. Galsworthy and Mr. Bennett, apostles of brave or good or rich new worlds, beyond the ken of middle-aged Edwardians who looked round the Victorian reliquaries and found them good. And so, to-day, Mr. Morgan and Mr. Speaight.

Mr. Morgan's long and careful Portrait in Lord Byron's Mirror received the respectful measure of attention demanded by its commercial importance and justified by the high quality of his earlier novels. Mr. Speaight's more important book should have received an equal welcome, and reviewers had no excuse for missing their opportunity, for his first novel, *The Lost Hero*, with its brilliant South American setting, was a powerful and moving study of loss, of that *pœna damni* which is the fate of a civilisation rooted in a faith which it has lost, in contradistinction to that mere frustration, ending in a petulant gesture of disgust, which is the Nemesis of a civilisation like our own, essentially indifferent to death or judgment, hell or heaven.

Without this anchorage the English novel has moved fast if not fruitfully in the present century. We have, indeed, all the standard phases of the twentieth century novel still

parading before us. The novel of revolt, staged in the country house, the parsonage, the po tteries, the mines or the manufacturing north; novels of the dawn, paling to-day before the red sunset, full of sentimental imprecisions hardly to be dignified by the name of hopes, and hovering uneasily between the dream of universal peace, in which literary men will be safe, and the hope of universal war, in which their enemies will be confounded. Also still with us are the novels of despair and disgust and the novels of escape, where cultivated spirits search for a past in which they can bury their disillusion and their fears, long sagas of peaceful and thrifty ancestors, slowly building up the England of our childhood's memory, destroyed in our own day, and, so largely, by our own hands.

Now, at last, more hopefully comes Mr. Speaight, whose theme is judgment, and Mr. Morgan, whose theme is death. Mr. Morgan, the practised story-teller, is superficially more at ease; Mr. Speaight's romantic certainty pierces nearer to the heart of the problem: 'So, if you ask me how to be . . .' For that, precisely as for Conrad's Marlowe, who asked the question of Stein amid his butterflies and received so memorable an answer, is the problem to which our age, perhaps at the eleventh hour, perhaps altogether too late, is returning. It is a problem to which an answer cannot be found in an imaginary future or in an imagined past. Conrad's answer, put in broken English into the mouth of Stein, the German philosopher-merchant, is one of the memorable things in our literature: 'In the destructive element immerse.'

'"So, if you ask me how to be?" His voice leaped up extraordinarily strong as though away there in the dusk he had been inspired with some whisper of knowledge. "I will tell you. For that, too, there is only one way!"' And then, we are told, 'the austere exaltation of a certitude seen in the dusk vanished from his face. "There were things," he said mournfully, "that perhaps could never be told, only he had lived so much alone that sometimes he forgot—he forgot. And yet, it is true, it is true. In the destructive element immerse!"'

Both *Sparkenbroke* and *The Angel in the Mist* are planned, it seems, in elucidation of this essential solution, the 'need of the soul for perilous adventure,' the search, as Mr. Speaight finely says, for that 'mysterious calm . . . which attends the

accomplishment of the greater miracles, and that loneliness too which is ours when we enter the world and when we leave it, or when we behold it, for the first time transfigured.' These are memorable accents, with which one is tempted to compare Mr. Morgan's academic felicity, not wholly to Mr. Morgan's advantage. Yet that, perhaps, is unfair, for Mr. Morgan is fatally handicapped from the start. His book is an attempt at exegesis, not a thing lived. It is not art, but good writing, albeit a fine conversation piece on a high theme.

Sparkenbroke, the dilettante philosopher-poet, a great lover and a man of magnetic personality, as we are told—words and again words—is a man with a theory. And 'So, if you ask me how to be?' cries Mr. Morgan, in effect, 'Sparkenbroke will tell you.' And indeed Sparkenbroke had, we infer, the pervasive quality, in the world of his day, of a well-advertised specific. In his life he was always good copy: in death he attracted tourists from all the suburbs of the world. It was just, perhaps, a little too easy. The prophet of art, love and death, not without honour on the Continent but the object of censorious criticism in his own country, and the great lover on whose tomb was written, 'Blessed are the pure in heart,' a quotation much misunderstood by the philistines. 'Single-mindedness,' we are told, is the real implication of this hitherto obscure beatitude. Yet, for all this *panache*, Mr. Morgan has equipped himself with a hero in whom he cannot bring himself to believe, and in the mouth of his *alter ego* the village doctor, who plays a too-intelligent Watson to Sparkenbroke's too-aspiring Holmes, he puts one shattering question which should have saved the critics a lot of trouble. 'To be searched by him,' says Sparkenbroke's neglected but understanding wife, 'is to be searched by a god.' 'Which god?' asks Dr. Hardy.

The question suggests the answer. Mr. Morgan's Sparkenbroke does not, in fact, immerse. He goes through life, on the contrary, looking for something to catch hold of, and he finds nothing more reassuring than the family vault. He is as far outside his own problem as the author is outside the skin of his hero. Sparkenbroke's theory—fulfilment through release, finality through creation, the end in the beginning, art, love and death—is no more than a kind of spiritual diet which he administers to himself at convenient intervals, and

its inadequacy as a tonic is made all too plain. Sparkenbroke, as Mr. Morgan proudly proclaims on his title-page, is an aristocrat fortunate enough to inherit great responsibilities. He is revealed, however, in the body of the book, as nothing more remarkable, for all his philosophy, than the stereotyped superman of nineteenth-century fiction, the 'eccentric English Milord' of the Byronic pattern. His love affairs are placed on the Continent, and he writes his poetry in a hut, assisted by a valet who has the servility of Jeeves without his sense of humour. That, indeed, was a fortunate thing for the valet, who would certainly have been given notice if he had dared to say what so often, in these sometimes splendid but always humourless pages, needs saying, but it is unfortunate for the reader. Sparkenbroke, certainly, has 'taken up' literature, as English aristocrats have for centuries 'taken up' other forms of eccentricity, but he is palpably never at ease with it. Who could be, writing in a hut, with one eye on the Continental Bradshaw, and the other on Bissett, the valet, 'standing motionless beside the table'?

Yet it is not for lack of trying on the part of Mr. Morgan. 'Three times a man can speak the language of the gods, in his love, in his contemplation, and in his death.' 'There is a divine essence of man which art and death liberate.' Sparkenbroke also, we are told, quotes with understanding Emily Brontë's ecstatic conviction, 'my outward sense is gone: my inward essence feels'; and Mr. Morgan underlines the moral when he tells us that 'All things seen began, in their contacts with him, to lose their intrinsic values and acquire new values in relationship to art,' that art which is 'not a means but an end,' and which is only less important than death, 'the final masterpiece' of the great soul.

It will be noticed from these quotations—and they are as representative as quotations can be—that Sparkenbroke has doubts about love, is puzzled about art and its relationship to life, but is quite certain about death, not as a release, not even as a fulfilment, but as an achievement, the final *pièce justificative* of the soul's adventure. Does all this make sense? That is the brutal, necessary question. The answer is, as they say at Westminster, in the negative.

To say that art is not a means but an end is true only in its negations. The artist must possess an intuitive perception

of reality, a perception which cannot be conveyed from the outside, but must have been experienced in the process of creative activity by the artist. Art, in other words, is pure act. It is neither thinking about things, nor experiencing sensations, still less explaining them, but an experience of truth achieved by the personal creative effort of the artist. The artist neither writes, nor paints, nor carves from earlier experience. But from this follow two important things: First, the quality of the experience depends on the quality of the creative activity; and, secondly, the value of the creation depends on the quality of the creator. This means nothing more subtle than that the value of art is dependent upon technique, but is not mere technique; is dependent on the value of the artist, but not on that value alone. The artist for this reason must be an integrated personality, with a technique: he cannot be a brilliant eccentric who, like Sparkenbroke, 'takes up' literature.

Sparkenbroke, in fact, is one of Nature's amateurs. He tells beautiful stories; he utters elevated, if unnecessarily complicated, sentiments, but he does not live *in* but *for* his art. His liberation comes, quite obviously, not in experience, but in anæsthetising his experience by putting it on pieces of paper, sedulously collected by Bissett. Sparkenbroke, in short, is not an artist but a connoisseur, which accounts for his desire to possess women without a desire to experience them. It is the desire to have experienced, not to know in experiencing, which drives him to write his dreams instead of living them. Mr. Morgan does not, however, let us see this clearly, because he has not wholly seen it himself. 'We are aware,' he says, 'of a continuity in ourselves,' but he is saying it to remind himself; instinctively it is the last thing he is aware of. Yet man is a creature with an historical destiny. Man outside history is not significant at all. Man of whom God demands love, but who by his destiny must love of his own free will, is not divine essence, but mere man. If it were otherwise, tragedy would be impossible and triumph undeserved. There would be no heaven because there would be no hell.

Mr. Morgan, in the very structure of his story, appears to deny man's historical destiny. He makes man judge in his own court. Sparkenbroke is, in fact, neither more nor

less than Spengler's 'man of intellect' as opposed to the 'man of race,' the apostle of civilisation as opposed to culture, of the thing thought about as opposed to the thing lived, of the disintegrated as opposed to the integrated personality—the man outside his age, not the man living in and through his age. Sparkenbroke in the ultimate analysis is pure romantic, a belated apostle of a humanism claiming death as the final triumph because it has already bankrupted the world of faith and hope. There is nothing else left in a godless world which man can successfully achieve. Yet if there is no justice, there is no life in death.

> Only the actions of the just
> Are sweet, and blossom in the dust.

Mr. Morgan is not without anxiety about this, and hints, if only tentatively, that the artist may be a law unto himself. Though he forbears to state in its crudity the belief that people who write are not as other people and can therefore do what they like as long as they turn out a sufficient number of words each month, he puts into the mouth of Sparkenbroke's wife the confession (already quoted) of the immense privilege conferred by the occasional condescensions of the rare genius whose infidelities, we are told, startled half a continent. (Incidentally, one wonders where is the continent which can be startled to-day by anything less exceptional than fidelity. Mr. Morgan should re-read Mr. Belloc's lines on *The Man who kept his Word*.) The theme of the artist as lawgiver is, happily, not persisted in, but its mere emergence is disquieting. So many lines of defence are prepared for this being who towers so pontificatingly over Mr. Morgan's 553 pages that a critic can hardly resist the conclusion that Mr. Morgan is, in truth, no more at ease about his hero than the hero is about himself. This shows Mr. Morgan's wisdom. Sparkenbroke, if the sad truth be told, was an impostor. That the book which bears his name is an imposture would be a logical conclusion, but there is, happily, more to it than that. The author has seen through his hero long before the end, which is the psychological explanation of the heroine's countless escapes from Sparkenbroke's desire to 'search' her.

The failure of Sparkenbroke's philosophy is inevitable, because his creator's theme, the supreme need of the soul for dissolution from the body, is valid only on premisses which

Sparkenbroke denies. Humanist man, man as creator, passes a stultifying judgment on himself if he finds fulfilment in death, and the reconciliation achieved by calling death a masterpiece is, with all respect to Mr. Morgan's usually careful analysis, mere verbal jiggery-pokery. Only to man as a created being, to man in history, to man with a destiny, can death be significant, but historical man cannot separate death from judgment or salvation from suffering, and for securing judgment leading to salvation man requires not only a technique but a true sense of values.

Mr. Speaight, knowing this, starts with an advantage over Mr. Morgan. His heroine, Helena Vaughan, the actress who became an artist, finds in discovering her love a moment of fulfilment, but can yet write, in the long letter to her friend which is the centre of the book :

> I have sometimes thought that the union of man and woman is among the many delusions which are part of the discipline of life, that it is the merest counterfeit of that dissolution which is the soul's supreme necessity. But if there are ever moments of real union, then I am willing that we were united then. I had no thought of self that was not equally a thought of him, no memory or hope in which he was not the perfect crown.

'What is love,' she had asked much earlier of another friend, and had been told that 'the love between a man and a woman is something like the love between the soul and God.' Not a release, you see, of the 'divine essence' in man, but a foretaste of that release from the trappings of mortality, which is perfected, not in the family vault, but in the mind and heart of God. 'How can I love God,' asked Helena Vaughan of the same friend, 'since I do not know Him?' She is told that she can at least be grateful for His gift : 'He has given you the privilege of pain.'

In his approach to the problem of the artist, Mr. Speaight is also wiser, I think, than Mr. Morgan in the machinery he has chosen, for Helena Vaughan, though she had never acted when the story begins, was descended from generations of famous actors and becomes a professional actress. Can an artist, in fact, ever be anything but a professional? Is this not fundamental to any consideration of the nature of art or the duty of the artist? Just as prayer is not a spasmodic invocation, but an attitude of mind, so Art is the life of the

artist, not a by-product of his working hours, still less of his leisure hours. The craftsman need not be an artist, but the artist must be a craftsman. Otherwise he is a mere commentator on someone else's life and work. He may leave the world clearer, but he cannot leave it richer than he found it.

Helena Vaughan the artist is Sparkenbroke as Mr. Morgan intended him to be, but by a very amazing literary coincidence—truly our critics sleep at ease, and I only hope their editors do so also, else they must be much troubled—Simon Ware is Sparkenbroke confessed to the world for what he really is, Sparkenbroke as seen by everybody except Mr. Morgan. Simon Ware, eldest son of Lord Daylesford, whom he succeeds in the course of the book, is admittedly a critic, and he admittedly has a theory, not a practice, of life.

Simon Ware finds in Helena Vaughan the actress a supreme æsthetic experience; the twin themes of the novel are that this experience, like the love of Helena Vaughan for Simon, can give at best only a momentary and counterfeit release to the soul. Simon Ware, the connoisseur of experience, is thus set over against Helena Vaughan, who begins as an actress inspired by the love of a man, and ends as an artist brought to the knowledge of heaven and hell by the love of God.

This is not the place to tell the story. Indeed, Mr. Speaight does not tell much of it himself. The story begins and ends with Helena Vaughan's return to the stage after twenty years of retirement and solitude. 'I don't pretend to know what experiences her solitude gave her, but it gave her an intuition of God.' In between is the story of her love and her disillusion, told by herself in a letter to the dramatic critic who had first proclaimed her genius to the world. The first of the years of disillusion and the whole of the twenty years of exile are left in the shadows. *The Angel in the Mist* is the story of the Loss, and the Finding in the Temple after three days: the story of an end and a beginning. That is why it is significant, as Mr. Morgan's *Sparkenbroke* is significant for the opposite reason, because it is the story of an end without a beginning.

The interest of both books lies in their relation to the living mind of our times. *Sparkenbroke* is an ambitious attempt to solve the problem of conduct without admitting

the necessity of a technique of living, and to give purpose to life in a godless universe. It is English amateurism and English empiricism at their best, and their devastating failure is reflected in this book as surely as in the world in which we live. The design for living has become, because the theme required it, a design for dying, and not all its poetry and grace can make it anything more. Yet *Sparkenbroke* marks the first stage on the necessary return of the English novel from the shallow Utopianism which placed the Kingdom of God on earth, in a future barren of history, emptied of religion, and deprived of the power of growth. It was as a refuge from these idle follies that our age—because we are an old people—has been so often recently driven back on its past; but Mallock's pointed question 'Is Life worth Living?' could not be answered merely by the demonstration that it was worth living once. You cannot dissipate the clouds of glory and find a substitute in a cloud of ancestors. We have tried to build a civilisation without prophet, peasant or priest; we have destroyed the throne and the altar and we have to face the consequences. That is the significance and importance of these two novels. They face the modern problem, which is always and inevitably the problem, not of efficiency but of human dignity, not of contract but of status, not of becoming but of being, not of man in relation to man but of man in relation to God.

To misunderstand this problem is to misunderstand the whole intellectual movement of our age, and particularly the new, almost febrile, romanticism of race which is sweeping away thrones and parliaments in a search, not for raw materials or a higher standard of living, but for a new vehicle of sublimation, for a new faith. Alas, the satisfaction of the soul will not be easily achieved. The world has got to face the problem of living in the destructive disappointments of the present, not in the future, and the problems of freedom and of faith are one. Mr. Speaight knew this before he began his book: Mr. Morgan suspected it before he had finished his. The reading public will be well advised to read both their books, and to try, unlike the critics, to understand them.

Douglas Jerrold.

CULTURE IN AUSTRALIA

By Randolph Hughes

LITERARY productions emanating from Australia do not usually arouse intelligent attention in civilised quarters of the globe, and this is not to be wondered at.[1] There are, however, a few—a very few—notable exceptions to what may be regarded as a rule of mediocrity or badness. Unfortunately these exceptions are very ill known, or known not at all, in England, even to readers of wide-ranging curiosity. For instance, it is still a legend here that Adam Lindsay Gordon is the supreme poet of Australia, and not long ago he received official (including the highest ecclesiastical) consecration as such, *The Times* applauding in a leading article that certainly did not lack weight. And there are no doubt a number of English people who know by heart the verses (quoted by *The Times* in illustration of the author's powers) in which Gordon conveys the valuable information that life is mostly froth and bubble, and other

[1] What is true of Australia is—on the negative side—still more true of New Zealand. This country, so far as creation or criticism goes in the domain of the well-named humaner studies (which very properly do not include science), may without any exaggeration be pronounced a nullity. In this connexion at least, it cannot be pleaded—although it often is—that Australia and New Zealand are 'young' countries and therefore that they are not yet in a state to produce work of the first importance. In respect of culture, they are not young in the true sense of the word, as England, say, was in the first few centuries after the Roman withdrawal. Educationally, a boy in Christchurch or Melbourne has no less advantages than a boy in Edinburgh, Manchester or Liverpool. In any case, in pictorial art no small amount of admirable work has been done in Australia.

Mr. Logan Pearsall Smith, in his timely pamphlet on *Fine Writing* (S.P.E. Tract No. XLVI., Clarendon Press, 1936), says that 'from the point of view of Style' 'the whole' of his native America—nay more, the whole American 'Continent'—'could sink beneath the sea,' without any loss whatsoever to civilisation. This irrefragable judgment applies equally to New Zealand; it applies indeed, with very little qualification, to all the world of Oceania, to all the Australasian-American Pacific group of polities (ever more homogeneous in their divergence from European traditions), that some suppose destined to be the preponderant and master force in the history of the future.

protreptic or hortatory matter of the kind that figures in the noble literature of the almanach.[2] But who in this country knows of Christopher Brennan and Hugh McCrae, the two most considerable Australian poets (although Australia itself has not yet recognised the fact), whose work will one day, when the due assessments are made, occupy an honourable place in the corpus of poetry written in the English tongue? Brennan, to mention only one of his titles to respect, is the only writer who has consistently applied in English the technique of esoteric Symbolism as enunciated and practised by Mallarmé; and the result is not only highly interesting as an experiment, it has intrinsic importance as an achievement in pure poetry.[3]

In criticism, too, noteworthy work has appeared in Australia—like the poetry sporadically, in pathetic isolation, almost in defiance of the environment; a brave upthrust of growth in a land that is an intellectual waste. Who in England, for example, remarked Professor W. J. Woodhouse's critique in the *Australian Quarterly* of Lawrence of Arabia's so-called translation of the *Odyssey*: a gloriously drastic and definitive showing up of one of the most ill-founded reputations in the history of letters, artificially created and fostered by a conspiracy of pious puffery—despite, it is only fair to add, the subject's or victim's own very judicious disclaimer regarding his literary abilities.[4] And one could

[2] It perhaps should in justice be remarked that not all of Gordon's work is of the kind so highly rated by his official and semi-official panegyrists; and that he was a very gallant and lovable personality.

[3] Miss Margaret A. Clarke's shamefully written, ignorant and totally wrong *soi-disant* 'Appreciation' of Brennan published in the review *Art in Australia*, February 15, 1933, is not unrepresentative of by far the greater part of the exiguous production of university teachers in Australia. 'A splendid lucidity decorates his work': this is a fair specimen of the writer's mode of expression and of her knowledge of Brennan's more distinctive poetry, which is enveloped in a sibylline obscurity, in a penumbra of far-reaching suggestion, deliberately cultivated in accordance with the fundamental principles of Symbolism.

[4] *Australian Quarterly*, March 14, 1934. Professor Woodhouse occupies the Chair of Greek in the University of Sydney, and is one of the most distinguished of contemporary scholars, especially in the department of archæology. The following is Lawrence's own evaluation of his powers as a writer; it is not one thrown off hastily or casually or in that spirit of perverseness into which he allowed himself to fall at times; on the contrary, it occurs in a considered—a very carefully considered—estimate of his achievements and his capacities: what he would doubtless have wished to be taken as the last word in this matter:

'I was then trying to write; to be perhaps an artist (for my long account of the Arab revolt had pretentions towards design, and was written with great pains

safely wager that Professor A. R. Chisholm's very acute critical work on French and German literature is practically unknown in this country.[5] Or, to speak of things that belong more to the last generation than to this, what English reader has heard even of the name of A. G. Stephens, the most masterly of Australian professional critics (and practically the only one of them worth mentioning), a prose-writer of exceptional endowment, and the founder and editor of the *Bookfellow*, the most intellectually alert of all the literary organs that have appeared in the Southern hemisphere?

The preceding reflections have been provoked by two recently published Australian books that have come into my hands: each in its own way, the one on the positive and the other on the negative side, might serve as a text to what I have said about the worth of literary productions in the antipodes. Moreover, apart from their individual merits or demerits, they are symptomatic of a collision of values in Australia (and probably in other parts of the British Empire) that should be of real interest, if not actually of grave concern, to thinking people in England, but which is all too imperfectly appreciated by the latter, if indeed they are aware of its very existence.

The one of these books is Mr. Carl Kaeppel's *Off the*

> as studied prose) or to be at least cerebral. . . . Well, I failed in that. By measuring myself against the people who really could write or really could paint, I knew that I was not made out of the same stuff.'

This judgment—as sure in its penetration as it is resolute in its modesty (or rather in the integrity of its self-criticism, for it is something better and bigger than modesty, as this term is usually understood and esteemed: there was no silly humility about Lawrence)—this judgment does honour almost as much as his military exploits to its author. A striking anthology might be made of his opinions on a variety of matters; it would show him to have been in an eminent degree a man with a true sense of fundamental values, for the most part sharply at variance with the predominant ideas, fancies, fashions, velleities, tastes and standards of his own epoch or generation (he had not developed along the most approved Public School lines). For example, this thought on the progress of the technique of flying:

> 'It is the airmen, the mechanics, who are overcoming the air, not the Mollisons or Orlebars.'

And this on the apparently immedicable vulgarity and artistic and other ineptitude of the craft or trade of the cinema:

> 'My rare visits to cinemas always deepen in me a sense of their superficial falsity—vulgarity, I would have said, only I like the vulgarity that means common man, and the badness of films seems to me like an edited and below-the-belt speciousness.'

[5] *E.g.*, his paper on 'Oswald Spengler and the Decline of the West,' published in the *Australian Quarterly* of September 1935.

Beaten Track in the Classics,[6] and the other is Mr. P. R. Stephensen's *The Foundations of Culture in Australia*.[7]

Mr. Kaeppel's work is altogether in the traditional line of European culture at its best; it might have been produced in Cambridge, Paris or Bonn: it nowhere bears any distinctive sign of the land of the author's birth, domicile and education.[8] It consists of eight essays, geographical or anthropological in their immediate scope, dealing with different epochs of the ancient world. Four of the essays have to do with voyages. One treats of the *Periplus of Hanno*, a Greek version of the explorer's own record of what Mr. Kaeppel regards as 'perhaps the greatest achievement of ancient seamanship'; conformably to this judgment, he doubts whether 'any single document is of greater importance historically or geographically' than this Greek translation of the Carthaginian captain's log on the subject of a venture into the unknown made about 500 B.C. After reading his own disquisition on it, one is inclined to agree with him. A second essay is occupied with the Periplus of the *Red, or Erythræan, Sea*, an account of the voyage of Hippalus to India in the second half of the first century A.D., and the results of that voyage; Hippalus was 'the first man of the classical world to sail his own ship direct into Indian waters, the first to open up direct trade relations with the Far East.' A third is chiefly concerned with the Marseillais Pytheas, who, towards the end of the fourth century B.C., circumnavigated Britain, being the first to do so, went on to the Baltic and the North Sea, and finally touched at Norway, which, under the name of Thule, he was the first man to describe. The final one of this category is devoted to the *Periplus of Scylax*, the earliest of the extant professed geographical treatises, which gives a picture of the Greek world about 350 B.C., and particularly of the lands bordering on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Another of Mr. Kaeppel's papers deals with Gaius Julius Solinus (*floruit circa* 230–280 A.D.), the collector of the wonder tales of the ancient world; another with Aristarchus

[6] Melbourne University Press, 1936, 6*s*.

[7] Published by W. J. Miles, Sydney, N.S.W., 1936, 2*s*.

[8] Mr. Kaeppel has travelled in Europe. He served with distinction in the Great War.

of Samos (third century B.C.), the Copernicus of antiquity, who before any other astronomer put forward the heliocentric theory; another with some early Greek writers on India, and especially with Megasthenes (beginning of third century B.C.), whose work became the basis of all subsequent Greek knowledge of that country; and, finally, another with the poison-damsel legend or *motif* which reappears so often in literature in different parts of the world.

These subjects might be made interesting, but they equally, treated by certain persons of learning, might be insupportably dull, or at least no more than an occasion for the somewhat barren exercise of what its practitioners solemnly designate the technique of scholarship. Now it is obvious from the outset that Mr. Kaeppel is nothing if not a scholar; the range of his information is unusually wide, and his learning is distinguished by acumen and profundity just as much as it is by extension. But at the same time he is something more and better than a scholar, and that makes his book eminently readable for people who have no professional interest in the subjects he treats. On almost every page there is something that will attract the attention of the reader who is sensitive to the odd, the picturesque, the strange, the adventurous, or who likes to note the emergence of forces that have gone to the making of human history. The great majority of those who open this book will doubtless find the essay on Solinus the most attractive of all. Here we read of 'sardonic plants that kill men with a horrible grinning lockjaw'; of the milkstones which, 'tied about the waist of a woman who giveth suck, cause abundance of milk, and which, taken into the mouth, melt, but therewithal perisheth the gift of memory'; of 'valuable springs of healing waters that knit up broken bones, drive away diseases of the eyes, and even discover thieves' (springs worthy to be ranked with those described with exquisite wit by Mr. Norman Douglas in that masterpiece of humour *South Wind*; and not a few things in Mr. Kaeppel's book recall the spirit or temper of Mr. Douglas when he is at his classical best; which is not surprising, seeing that both these writers are above all devotees of the civilisation that shaped the world before the advent of Christianity).

Here, too, we read of 'a creature like a mule, but with

so long an upper lip that he cannot feed except when walking backward'; of 'great tigers that live a long while after their bowels be taken out'; of 'the Hercynian birds whose feathers give light in the darkness, be the night never so close and cloudy'; of the cattle in Ireland that are 'so fat that they must forcibly be kept from bursting'; of the 'little Thanet earth' that was sufficient to 'expel snakes from any quarter of the world'; of lions 'who never look asquint and cannot bear that any should look asquint upon them'; of hyænas 'whose backbones have no joint' and 'whose shadow robs dogs of their bark'; of the cockatrice or basilisk, 'that unique horror, which dries up and destroys the very earth and infects the very air'; of dragons, both true and false ('the true have tiny mouths and sting with their tails'); of 'crocodiles without tongues, who keep a sacred truce with men during the seven days of the Apis festival, are killed by Pharaoh's rats, and are trained to be river-horses by bold men of small stature'; of chameleons that 'have the raven for their mortal enemy, and the bay-leaf as an antidote for the poison of their flesh'; of the ants, large as mastiffs, found in the sands of the Niger; of poisonous worms, in Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily and elsewhere, 'that lie in the shade and sting those who sit down upon them'; of apes 'who daub their eyes with bird-lime in imitation of hunters washing theirs with water, and so are more easily taken'; of those engaging and half-pathetic creatures 'the shaggy-haired sphinxes and satyrs, gentle and docile, and easily taught to forget wildness, very sweet-faced, and fond of toying continually'; of the one-eyed Arimaspi of the Rhipæan Hills, 'who hunt better with one eye than most men with two'; of men who live on the milk of the dog-headed apes; of men who have a dog for king; of men whose faces are 'plain without a nose,' and of others without tongues, who use signs instead of speech; of others 'with lips all grown together, except for a little hole through which they suck in sustenance through an oaten pipe'; of headless men, with eyes and mouth in their breast; of 'horse-hoofed and long-eared men who are clothed and sleep within their own ear-flaps'; of strange regions, such as the land of feathers, 'a damned part of the world, drowned by the nature of things in endless darkness,

and utterly shut up in extreme cold as in a prison, even under the very north pole: alone of all lands it knoweth no distinction of times, neither receiveth it anything else of the air than endless winter'; or that other land where 'all day long there is no noise, but all is whist, not without horror; but in the night he blazes with fire, and resounds on every side with the choirs of satyrs, and all along the seashore is heard the sound of shawms and playing upon cymbals.' [9]

In the following, a touch of Voltairian humour adds piquancy to one of the items in the repertory of marvels:

> South of the Syrtes live the Snake People, who hiss rather than speak, and whose voices are not to be heard without fear. Genuine members of this race cannot die from snake-bite. 'But if their women bear offspring of adultery, they perish in this way.' So they have an easy test of virtue. They throw all new-born children to the serpents, and the sin of the mothers or the privilege of the fathers' blood is punished or proved accordingly. Unfortunately, adds Solinus, this interesting people is fast dying out!

J'en passe et des meilleurs; but I have quoted enough to show that Mr. Kaeppel's pages on Solinus really do belong to that category of very rare things that children and adults alike find delightfully entertaining. These fantastic creations were gathered by Solinus from numerous texts of the most divers provenance: Pliny, Varro, Pompilius Mela and King Juba are among the sixty or so sources he names, while there are many others to which he does not explicitly refer. They constitute a valuable body of examples of the romantic side of what may be called the classical Mediterranean, and particularly the Græco-Roman, mind, and (together with other matter, of course) they might be used to determine what part the two very different though often undistinguished or confused things, fancy and imagination, played in the literary or quasi-literary creations of the ancient world; this would be a valuable contribution to the elucidation of one of the most fundamental questions of æsthetic philosophy; but Mr. Kaeppel has not allowed himself to be detained by considerations of this sort. But he does

[9] In these last two passages, and elsewhere, Mr. Kaeppel has given us Arthur Golding's version of Solinus (1587), and we are grateful to him for bringing us into contact with one of the most felicitous pieces of work of a Tudor master of prose who is practically a *grand méconnu* to-day.

insist on what he calls the profound and mischievous influence exercised by Solinus' book on subsequent times, and particularly on the Dark Ages. There is no attempt at scientific discrimination on the part of Solinus; his object was simply to bring together as many interesting cases as possible of wonder or mystery, disengaging them from any context that might have helped to rationalise them; but men in the Dark and later ages accepted his tales as being literally and fully true, and in many cases used authority to enforce this acceptance on others. St. Augustine, for instance, borrows four of Solinus' fantasticalities, and imposes them upon his readers as gospel; Isidore incorporated over 200, and other Fathers and Christian teachers did not lag behind. This, and similar credulity on the part of secular writers, Mr. Kaeppel points out, greatly impeded the spread or recovery of knowledge, and thus the advance of civilisation was held up. Considerations of this kind lead Mr. Kaeppel to formulate a thought that is very much in season in the times in which we live:

> From the study of the Dark Ages, particularly of their geographical science, a truth emerges, unwelcome, but profound, a truth that must be faced now and at all times. It is this: Neither knowledge nor civilization is stable or assured; they must be kept so by those to whom they are entrusted.[10]

The influence of Solinus, with other than regrettable results, extended into far later times, and is found in Mandeville, for instance, as Mr. Kaeppel points out; and he might have added that there are strong traces of it even in the text of Shakespeare.[11] Mr. Kaeppel has performed a real service in drawing attention to a writer who is interesting in himself and in addition counts as one of the forces that governed the development of later imaginative creation in Europe.

[10] One of the very few of Mr. Kaeppel's dicta that perhaps call for qualification is that in which he affirms that 'The Dark Ages are characterized more than any other period in history by the degradation and weakness of the human intellect.' This is not wholly acceptable in the light of the latest authoritative research, as Mr. Kaeppel himself would probably agree after reading Mr. H. St. L. B. Moss's admirably competent and excellently written *The Birth of the Middle Ages*, which was published last year. Many also would, up to a point, demur to Mr. Kaeppel's statement that Egyptian civilisation did not reach any considerable degree of spiritual advancement.

[11] *E.g.*, in Othello's account of his wooing of Desdemona, parts of which appear to come directly from Golding's version of Solinus; it is highly probable that Shakespeare was influenced by other of Golding's translations of classical authors.

Mr. Kaeppel's other essays are marked by the same qualities, and not one of them can fail to hold the attention of the lay reader. In these, too, we read of quaint or monstrous animals, both real and mythical; of the intrepid faring-forth of explorers into unknown reaches of sea, and even into the far mists of the North, of contact with new races or tribes, mild or terrible, of the foundation of new outposts of civilisation; and of such things as the lovely deadly woman who was sent to seduce Alexander to his doom, and of what led him, desperately amorous as he was, to have her beheaded and her fair body burned and scattered to the wind. We are glad to learn that Pytheas of Marseilles, in the fourth century B.C., was very favourably impressed by the inhabitants of this island; he found them 'unusually hospitable; for they have become gentle in their manners owing to their intercourse with foreign traders.' It was not only in virtue of their contact with the foreigner that they had advanced to this amiable condition; by natural constitution they appear to have been socially estimable, for, says Pytheas in another passage, 'they are simple in their habits and have nothing of the knavishness and cunning of civilized men, and their diet is plain and untouched of that luxury which wealth begets.'

To what extent, if any, now that we are 'civilised,' have we lost these qualities of our autochthonous forefathers? Such information as that the coins of Apollodotus and Menander, two kings of Bactria, were still current in the first century A.D. in the markets of so remote a spot as Barygaza (in India) is of arresting significance: it bears witness to what Mr. Kaeppel calls 'the splendid though losing fight' that the isolated monarchs of Bactria put up over a long period of time for the civilisation of Hellas. How many people know that the first mention of sugar as an article of commerce occurs in the *Periplus* of Hippalus? Or that in the latter's time there was made in India, as there is to-day, a clarified butter that will last for years? Or that the chief asset of the Roman Empire in its trade with the East was the red coral of the Mediterranean? Or that of all the articles of import from the East prized by the Romans the most desiderated was pepper? In this connexion Mr. Kaeppel points out that one of the most serious economic

problems of modern times was already in existence in the ancient world; this is the drain of specie to the East, which to-day leads every year to the disappearance from circulation of £2,000,000 into treasure-houses that are completely unproductive. The Romans were avid of silks and spices, and the East took in return for them a certain amount of coral and wine, but very much more gold and silver. In Mr. Kaeppel's view the effect of this was calamitous, and he says that it certainly must be looked upon as one of the contributory causes of the decay of the ancient world.

Such, then, are a few of the things in Mr. Kaeppel's book (accompanied by an unobtrusive or at least never pedantic apparatus of scholarship upon whose merits we have had no time to touch). It is a good book; it proceeds from European civilisation, and it is written in a spirit of service to that civilisation; if it were typical of the condition of culture in Australia there would be no need of misgivings regarding the future of that continent.

Unfortunately it is far from being typical; much more typical is Mr. Stephensen's fumy elucubration, and it is simply because the latter is typical, or at any rate very largely symptomatic and so instructive, that it merits the attention of English readers. For intrinsically it has barely anything at all to commend it; it is clumsily conceived and barbarously written; it is the product of a mind that is muddled and ill-furnished—if indeed it can be said to be furnished at all. But, in its crude Calibanish way, it puts forcibly a point of view that is fanatically pro-Australian, to the extent of being anti-English and anti-European, and this point of view is likely or, rather, certain to prevail more and more in the future, and the chances are that it will not be limited to Australia. The book therefore has its importance; besides, in many places it is really very funny, although it was not the intention of the author that it should be so.

In Mr. Stephensen's loftily superior view, England is a contemptibly 'small Island in the North Sea,' and it has the further disadvantage of being 'bleak' and 'damp.' What could you expect of so wretchedly endowed a corner of the earth? It is assuredly not propitious to the production of those supreme things of which Mr. Stephensen constitutes himself the vaticinator. It is disfigured by

'castles and ruins,' it is 'staled by history and tradition' to a degree that is oppressive. Industrially, it is 'in decline,' and culturally, too, it is 'in decline.' English literature is sinking lower and lower, and is rapidly approaching a time when it will be of no account; American literature is at least as 'strong' as it, 'and some think it stronger'—Mr. Stephensen, it is clear, belongs to this elect 'some' whose judicious discernment finds saving greatness in America. Englishmen, and educated Europeans in general, will be tickled by this pronouncement of relative values. In other respects, too, Mr. Stephensen stands agape with admiration before the supremacy of the American genius. The fact that 'Manhattan Island contains more art treasures than any other similar area in the world' leaves him with scarcely any breath; and he imagines that the ostentative amassing of pictures and statues is a sure guarantee of taste in art.

In music, too, we are almost barbarous compared with America; we can run to no more than 'seasons,' whereas in many parts of America they have music on the grandest scale the whole year round. It inevitably follows that Americans have much more gift for, and much more concern for, music than the natives of this small, damp and bleak island. It is the same with regard to criticism and education; 'education and criticism are *alive* in America,' Mr. Stephensen informs the world with all the emphasis at his command, helped out with the use of italics. Those who have had anything to do with the matter in more than a superficial way would have thought that American education, judging from its results, hadn't yet succeeded in coming to birth. As for criticism—well, perhaps Mr. Stephensen thinks that certain gentlemen we had better not name are masters; and it is only natural that he should think so. Mr. Stephensen devotes gruesome paragraphs to the portraying of English history as an accumulation of grossly immoral horrors, unrelieved by anything sweet or bright or good or great. He tells his readers of child slaves who 'were beaten and preached at and sent straight from work on shift to a bed still warm from the previous child slave occupant,' and reproduces, with an intensity that is almost sadistic, other rigmarole of the same sort as if it summed up the total

achievement of these islands. This cannot be called falsification, but it most certainly can be called distortion of history; and it should be noted that it is being done not in any so-called 'enemy' country, but in one of the chief dominions of the British Empire. The picture is filled out by touches relating to the British 'desire to conquer, subjugate, and exploit coloured peoples, and to be mixed periodically in Europe's brawls.'

Europe in general is no better than poor declining crime-besmirched England. On this subject Mr. Stephensen rises to the summit of his own peculiar form:

> Europe is the world's cockpit and bearpit, the bloodiest and dirtiest continent in the world, the continent which, after two thousand years of 'civilization,' produces types like Mussolini, Hitler, Hoare, Laval and Zaharoff!

And that is all there is to it: all the large and varied story of Europe is comprised and judged and damned and dismissed in that one oracular pronouncement of Mr. Stephensen's. 'Barbarous and sub-civilised' are other epithets with which he characterises this continent; and he would dissuade his fellow-Australians from wasting their time in visiting so unredeemed a place. Herr Hitler has the honour (a real honour, if only Mr. Stephensen knew it) of figuring among the types produced by two millennia of European civilisation (we say nothing as to the felicity or otherwise of Mr. Stephensen's choice in the matter of the other representatives whom he has included in his list. As we have already indicated, his mind is a chaos rather than a cosmos.) Elsewhere he singles out Herr Hitler for special attention, and lays it down that he and other 'Huns' like him are 'intrinsically lacking in culture,' and that they have the mental equipment of a 'school bully.' Mr. Stephensen of course knows all about it, viewing the affairs of Europe from his Olympian point of vantage on the other side of the world: he cannot be said to be wanting in detachment. But he considers Herr Hitler to be one of the arch-forces of what he vaguely calls 'Fascism,' and Fascism in his eyes is one of the agencies of the devil. It appears that there are a certain number of 'sneaking little Fascists and bureaucrats' in Australia, and he enjoins it

upon his fellow-citizens to watch their activities narrowly. 'These Fascist tykes' is another of his elegant ways of referring to them. He hates any suggestion of discipline being 'imposed from above,' although he is precisely one of the persons who, if they could not be expected to benefit from such a *régime* (that might be too much to hope), would certainly be rendered less noisome by it. Perhaps he knows this, and so he tells us that he much prefers Bolshevism to Fascism: Bolshevism, it appears, is a highly estimable and delectable thing:

> Bolshevism at least has a humanitarian goal, a cogent philosophy and a professed respect for ideas and the raising of cultural standards in the community-in-general.

And yet in another passage he pokes fun at the central doctrine of Marxism: 'the price of spuds,' he tells us in his customary choice language, 'does not ultimately regulate human destiny, despite what Karl Marx proved in regard to the Materialist Conception of History.' And so, by a piquant feat of self-contradiction or self-stultification, he stumbles into one of the exceedingly rare pieces of sense or truth that relieve the monotonous ineptitude of his volume.

So much for the tragic condition of England and Europe. Australia, on the other hand, is an earthly paradise. It is not only 'vaster' (Mr. Stephensen, as we have seen in the case of America, is much impressed by vastness, even when it is vacuous) than this poor little island; not only is it 'sunnier' and 'healthier' and 'more diversified,' but it is also more 'beautiful.' No one who has seen Australia (I myself have seen large areas of it) would agree for a moment that it was more beautiful than England; in seeking to define what is most distinctive or characteristic of the Australian landscape, one would look for another word than beauty—but that would lead us into too long a digression. This marvellous land, Mr. Stephensen avers, with its 'spaciousness, clarity, health, beauty and variety,' must necessarily produce a greater literature than that which England has been able to eke out: the logic of this is absolutely invincible. Australia, by divine luck, has, with its 7,000,000 inhabitants, just about the right number of

people to make a true nation; it is not 'a vast amorphous mass in which the individual ceases to exist.' 'Individuality,' says Mr. Stephensen with due solemnity, 'still matters in Australia.' Presumably it does not in countries with a population the size of that of England and France. This is a unique thing in history: 7,000,000 people, all of whom are well-differentiated individuals and of all of whom it can truthfully be said that they 'matter.' Only there does not appear to be anything to show for this: where are the great creations of this race of privileged individuals? This is an awkward question, and it would not be polite to press it too far. Let us follow Mr. Stephensen in his ecstatic divagations.

The denizen of this paradise, 'the typical Australian,' is not unworthy of his habitat; from all points of view he is a grand fellow. Mr. Stephensen, presenting him to us, describes him as 'a democrat, a free-thinker, an individualist to the core, a believer in Australia,' and who but a barbarian could fail to be impressed by such credentials? The men of this race gave a signal proof of Australia's superiority to other nations by their conduct as soldiers in the Great War; they 'defied every precedent regarding soldiering,' proclaims Mr. Stephensen (was he a soldier himself, and is he an expert in military science?), 'and put militarism to ignominy by its examples of battlefield discipline.' He compares them with a poor stunted 'Tommy,' 'five feet three in height,' who 'had no knowledge of geography, of history, or of world politics,' and who spoke the most atrocious English (it is difficult to imagine any English quite so ugly as that of Mr. Stephensen's typical Australian; and a reading of Mr. Stephensen's book shows that he himself is no better informed than this poor Tommy whom his splenetic imagination has created). This is all of a piece with his malignant distortion of English history; it is not only gratuitously mischievous, it is despicably petty and vulgar; and we imagine the Australian 'diggers' themselves would be the first to resent it, and to wish to impress forcibly upon Mr. Stephensen's mind and body that this time he had gone too far. They stand in no need of such wildly irresponsible patronage as he takes it upon himself to extend to them.

So great a nation as Australia, proclaims Mr. Stephensen,

although it is a newcomer on the scene of the world, has already to its credit a history whose grandeur is immeasurably out of proportion to its small length in time. The 'rhythms' of the histories of other lands are 'calculable in centuries'; that of Australia is so 'packed with lore and legend and significant national experience' that it calls for nothing less than calculation in decades. It 'is and has been a gigantic pageant played on a vast stage,' and the wisdom of Australian statecraft has been consonant with the majestic movement of this drama. Australian politicians in their superlative wisdom have been able to achieve what barbarous and sub-civilised Europe has never been able to effect: they have removed 'all feuds and grounds of disunion,' and have given Australia Federation and all the miraculous felicities that go with it. But this almost awesome pageant, so packed and over-packed with lore and vast significance, has by no means attained the fulness of its development. Far greater things are in store. 'Our destiny is to become a great nation, and we know it,' shouts Mr. Stephensen almost savagely; 'greater than local England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, or the four of them combined' (one would have thought that already in Mr. Stephensen's estimation Australia overtopped these four sorry little backward provincial areas of the earth). Nor is even this all; Australia's ultimate destiny is far greater than that vouchsafed to any nation in history; it is the greatest that imagination or ambition can conceive; for Australia 'is destined to be the future home of the white race,' the master country where that race will reach 'its fullest maturity,' and from whence no doubt it will dominate the rest of the world. And in order to hasten this immense and culminating event in human history, Mr. Stephensen, quite seriously and with much turbid emotion, invites the whole English race to 'abandon their bleak little Island' *en masse*, now, and transfer themselves and their effects to the vast sunny land of Australia. So overcome is he by this vision that he forgets the fine individualities who matter and other advantages ensured by a small population.

But owing to some strange failure in the logic of things, this magnificent country, with its splendid individuals, its

unmatched history, its wealth of legend and its superlative vocation, has produced barely anything important in the way of literature, not to mention philosophy and other intellectual pursuits. Certainly the specifically 'national' literature distinguished by 'a spaciousness, clarity, health, beauty and variety greater than that of English literature,' which, according to Mr. Stephensen, *ought* to issue from these exceptional conditions, has not yet made its appearance. We have already ventured to touch lightly on this point, and we return to it the more boldly as Mr. Stephensen himself admits it and spends much of his energy in lamenting it. At all costs this literature must be created; for Mr. Stephensen falls into the not uncommon error of supposing that a 'national' literature can be deliberately created; he does not realise that what is national in truly great art is only an incidental and even accidental element which is subordinate to some much more important thing in virtue of which the work of art is supra-national. A craftsman in any line who concentrates his attention on this accessory element may evolve something that will please critics like Mr. Stephensen as being 'national,' but he is doomed to a very minor position as an artist, and of its nature his production cannot be anything but parochial. However, Mr. Stephensen, having obstinately averted his head from such considerations, or being blind to them in any case, insists that the great Australian literature-to-be must be created out of the precious 'lore' which is an object of his religious regard.

The immediate and urgent task, therefore, of Australian men of letters and scholars is to occupy themselves with this lore ('our fair-dinkum lore,' as Mr. Stephensen calls it in one of his more inspired moments), to force it upon the consciousness of their contemporaries, and above all to make it the chief instrument of education in the schools and universities; thus will the generations of the future grow up in it, and derive their substance from it, and the land will be rich in works of genius. One naturally asks what is this lore, this gigantic glamorous pageant which renders Australia's so far brief history superior to any other, and calls for calculation in tens instead of in hundreds of years. Alas! having raised our expectations to the highest pitch,

Mr. Stephensen disappoints them cruelly, and leaves us almost with the sensation that he has been pulling our leg, as he would no doubt put it. This wonderful lore and pageantry is simply somewhat dismal journeyings 'through lonely hills and gullies,' the monotonous meanderings of 'patriarchal Shepherd Kings' across dreary stretches of plain, the 'knocking down trees with axes,' and the erection of sheds and other rude forms of human habitation. But most of all it is 'Bullock-wagons—horses—locomotives—automobiles—aeroplanes—one after the other in five decades: *all in a lifetime*,' adds Mr. Stephensen in italicised type that doubtless denotes a state of admiration well nigh bordering on speechlessness. Yes, he obviously imagines that the things composing this sublime list, and the rate of their development, are peculiar to Australia, and make its history incomparably grander than that of any other country. We can breathe again, and feel that the story of Europe is in no immediate danger of suffering eclipse; and we gladly give Mr. Stephensen a full monopoly of the stuff out of which is to be created the greatest of all literatures.

Perhaps Mr. Stephensen's own writing is a sample of this literature—for he is fully charged with the 'lore,' and there can be no doubt regarding the intensity of his effort. With his literary prowess we have made incidental acquaintance, but we have not seen him at his very best. The dreary plains we mentioned are 'enormous lyrical wildernesses' for him; how precisely a wilderness can be said to be 'lyrical' is one of the arcana to which only genius such as Mr. Stephensen's has the key. Locomotives for his imagination become sublimated into 'iron parrots.' This, my masters, is a select specimen of the art of the great Austral future, when the white race in the happiest of all climates shall have attained its apogee. Mr. Stephensen's powers as a logician are no less striking than his aptitude as an artist. We have already drawn attention to his feats in this line, and we shall only say that his book abounds with others of the same magnitude. In his sense of history he is absolutely *sans pair*; recent happenings in any country are always more important than all preceding history, and this latter can be dismissed as not being a 'vital study,' and as having no more than a purely academic interest.

A nation's 'entire calibre' can be changed radically within the space of a century and a half, new species of human beings can be evolved just as new species of sheep have been evolved in a few decades in Australia (here no doubt Mr. Stephensen speaks from the fulness of inner knowledge).

In mere factual knowledge, too, he is out of the common; he does not know that Federation is far from having worked successfully in Australia, as has been strikingly shown by recent events; and in any case, nothing can be more absurd than to compare in this connexion the homogeneous States of Australia with the heterogeneous units composing Europe. He asserts that the universities of Australia are nothing but 'outposts of Oxford and Cambridge,' whereas in fact they are (alas!) in very large part modelled on the universities of Scotland. Seeking some one telling detail which shall convey a just notion of France to his readers, he declares that Frenchmen 'micturate in public,' which is nothing less than a lie. Or perhaps it would be kinder to say that in his blundering way Mr. Stephensen has here confused France with Italy. Of his taste in the use of language we have given examples, and many others of the same category might be quoted. Like many ill- or un-educated people, he is fond of using imposing-looking words of whose meaning he is ignorant. Thus, he has an inordinate fondness for the term 'hypothecate,' and resorts to it several times: 'I seek to hypothecate the foundations of a national culture'; 'the painters who have hypothecated Australian landscape'; for the reader who knows that 'hypothecate' means nothing but 'mortgage,' sentences such as these have absolutely no meaning at all. Nor have they, for the matter of that, for the reader who is not blessed with so much knowledge.

To put things succinctly, Mr. Stephensen, in his mental strength and his cultural acquirements, is a typical Rhodes Scholar. For he was a Rhodes Scholar, and, strange as it may seem to some, he actually did spend a part of his life at Oxford. Has anyone ever met a Rhodes Scholar who was really educated—and by educated I do not mean versed in dates or torts, or genes or pistons or beetles, or any other subject of like spiritual reach? The Rhodes Scholarships are as grossly overrated by the world at large as is the commercial adventurer to whose so-called vision their

foundation was due. The conditions of election are such that it is hardly possible to choose the best available minds in the respective countries: people like Mr. Stephensen are chosen. A man with true vision, consulting the best interests of England and civilisation, would have given scholarships to Frenchmen rather than to (or at least as well as to) Colonials and Americans, the more especially as he did not limit the grant to 'Anglo-Saxon' races, but included Germans among the beneficiaries. A millionaire who brought Englishmen, Frenchmen and Germans together in educational fellowship would render an inestimable service to Europe.

Mr. Stephensen is stormily bitter in his condemnation of those of his fellow-countrymen who have elected to take up their residence in Europe (chiefly because they find they can do their best work there, which, after all, is the only consideration of any moment—even for Australia herself in the end). They are traitorous 'shirkers,' they 'funk their job,' and if he had his way (this anti-militarist and anti-Prussian and lover of sweet liberty) he would forcibly hale them all back to Australia and set them to work at the hard labour which he in his wisdom approved. In this case the fox does not only decry the grapes he has failed to reach, he also calumniates the more successful foxes. If a talent such as his essayed to make its way in any truly intellectual avocation in the competitive conditions of Europe it would be upon the poor rates before the year was out. He is no less severe on those Australians who, while remaining in Australia, have an affection for the spiritual traditions of Europe, and make them central in their lives, and give to them their allegiance and such services as they may command. We come here to that collision of values of which I have spoken, a collision that cannot be a matter of indifference to those who have the cause of civilisation at heart. Thus, Mr. Stephensen berates Mr. Norman Lindsay, the most notable of living Australian pictorial artists, for giving his preference to 'European' subjects, instead of working for the greater glory of 'Australian realities.'[12]

[12] Mr. Lindsay does sometimes, in varying degrees, incorporate certain 'Australian realities' into his work, and it is noteworthy that in these cases the result is nearly always a marked and deplorable decline from the very high artistic standard of his

He must therefore be very angry with Mr. Kaeppel for turning his back on these 'realities' and devoting himself to such trifling bagatelles as the foundations of the history of Europe. (And yet, in one of his frequent lapses from logic, he speaks [18] with almost reverential respect of the work of Christopher Brennan, although that work is entirely 'European.' It cannot be too forcibly insisted on that all of the little first-class literature so far produced in Australia is European in its derivation, and not in any sense specifically Australian.)

This distempered hostility to European traditions is the most noticeable—and the most significant—thing in Mr. Stephensen's book; and the hostility is most acrid where England is concerned. He is hard set, almost to the point of hatred, against anything in the way of English culture. Australia has no use for it, except perhaps as a brick 'in building up its own indigenous culture'; apart from that, English culture is a pernicious thing that can only operate to the detriment of the fine flower of the Australian genius. 'It is necessary to inform the English' (whom Mr. Stephensen in this matter classes with the Patagonians) 'and all their agents, ambassadors, spies, apostles and missionaries here' that they must be careful not to encroach too much on the sacred preserves of Australia. One reason, and perhaps the chief reason, why English culture enjoys so much prestige in Australia is that the English are such masters of the tricks and wiles of trade. It is a '*superior salesmanship*' (Mr. Stephensen's agitated italics) which has secured primacy of place for the 'ubiquitous overseas culture-stuff' in the charmingly ingenuous and unsuspecting new Eden which is to be the home of the white race. Indeed, Australia's cultural dependence on Britain is only a consequence of her economic dependence on the unscrupulous mother country. This brings us to a very sinister story, the full truth of which Mr. Stephensen is determined at all costs to proclaim to the world. The history of Anglo-Australian relations is very largely a history of victimisation. For a century and a half

best productions—those in which he draws inspiration from Roman, Mediæval, Renaissance and other subjects that Mr. Stephensen would extrude from his ideal State.

[18] Ineluctably constrained, in spite of his theories and fancies, by a book on the genius of Brennan published some two years ago in Australia.

England has looked upon Australia almost exclusively as a place to be 'exploited.' The latest illustration of this is England's policy in the matter of emigration; she has deliberately set herself against helping to increase the population of Australia, for this would mean a rapid increase of that country's industries, and would make of it a formidable commercial rival of Great Britain. 'British interests require that Australia should have a small population': and so the iniquities of English history go on increasing apace, to the considerable damage of Destiny's elect country.

Let us, then, urges Mr. Stephensen, have done with 'imported culture of the haw-haw kind' (what is a 'haw-haw' picture, or a 'haw-haw' statue, or a 'haw-haw' poem?). 'These British Islanders are foreigners,' and if Australians treat them as anything else they will only endanger their souls thereby. It is absurd, continues Mr. Stephensen, to refer to England as 'home,' as a certain number of Australians do; it can never really be home to anyone from the antipodes. The ties between the two countries are far from being what they are often declared to be, and it is best to recognise this fact frankly.

Having come to this conclusion, Mr. Stephensen does not hesitate to affront the delicate question of separation in political as well as in spiritual fact, and on the whole he would be in favour of 'cutting the painter.' One of the great advantages of union with (and even of subordination to) England has hitherto been the protection afforded by the English Navy against more or less probable aggression. This purely utilitarian consideration is practically the only one that has any force with people like Mr. Stephensen, and now he advances what he considers sufficient arguments to show that it no longer need be taken into account. It is most improbable, according to him, that Japan will wish to subjugate Australia, for it would be very much to her disadvantage to do so. She is already, with Britain, Australia's best customer for wool, and if she conquered the country she would still have to pay the 'Japanese-Australian' exporters world parity prices plus freight for whatever of that commodity she received from them. And this is true, not only of Japan, but of any nation that might be supposed to cast covetous eyes on Australia. 'Australia is too vast

and too isolated to be a pawn in anybody's game.' And even if, contrary to this prevision of wisdom, Australia were attacked, it would not need to have recourse to the services of the British Fleet. (In any case, the attack would be almost certain to be launched while that Fleet was retained in home waters by a European war.) Aeroplanes will be quite enough to protect Australia against any conceivable attack. Mr. Stephensen calculates that 2000 of them would defend the whole continent 'for all time against all comers.' 'Aeroplanes, as far as the defence of Australia is concerned, have made the British Navy obsolete, or, from our point of view, *unnecessary*.' I simply reproduce these arguments, and leave others to comment on them. The important thing is that they are going to influence a considerable section of opinion in Australia.

Such, then, is Mr. Stephensen's central thesis: Australia has no need of England, from cultural or from practical points of view. Nay more: continued dependence on England can only be to the very serious detriment of Australia.

It is to be feared that the state of things revealed by Mr. Stephensen's book is virtually unknown in England, and it is of the highest importance that it should be known. It will no doubt be said that there are in Australia people the opposite of Mr. Stephensen, and that he is only one of a very small number, who may be viewed as being negligible. I know perfectly well of the existence of this other class of people, and I have drawn attention to the importance of the work of a certain number of them; some of them are good friends of mine, and I am in no danger of undervaluing them. But they are no more than a very small *élite*, and their efforts run counter to the main line of development of the country, which in the end is bound to prevail against them. This main line of development is well represented by Mr. Stephensen; he and his brethren are already a majority, and the majority increases rapidly every decade. The only difference between him and his 'fair-dinkum' companions-in-arms is that he is more obstreperously vocal than they. A book such as his, which will probably meet with no effective answering voice in Australia, will undoubtedly add very largely to the ranks of these malcontents.

Because of this, I have thought it worth while to make more than a passing and cursory reference to it, and to place it well in view, so that there can be no mistaking its features and their significance. It should be remembered that it is not written by a poor benighted devil who has never left the limits of the bush or the limbo of the Never-Never, and so might be expected to know no better; it is the work of a man who is a graduate of Oxford, and who (as he informs us) has spent no less than eight years in this country.[14]

This manifestation of anti-English sentiment is no new thing in Australia; it began in a large way about half a century ago with J. F. Archibald, whose ancestry was more cosmopolitan than his name suggests. Under his direction the *Sydney Bulletin* became the most powerful paper in the country. One of the many expressions of it was the resistance to conscription during the Great War (I do not say that only enemies of England opposed conscription[15]); and it went to its furthest lengths when it caused its devotees to spit upon soldiers who returned wounded from the war (Queensland was the scene of this edifying conduct). English people probably never heard of this; but they perhaps remember that a Roman Catholic Archbishop of Queensland was refused admission to these shores because of active collaboration in this movement.

There can be no doubt that Mr. Stephensen is perfectly right when he insists that 'a new nation, a new human type, is being formed in Australia,' and that this new race is something 'quite different' from the English. And was it not inevitable that, with climatic and other differences, there should be some considerable modification of the original British stock? Only, at the beginning of last century, it could hardly have been foreseen along what lines this modification would take place. We know now; and we see that it cannot, without doing violence to truth, be declared to be in harmony with England.

[14] Besides enjoying the high prestige attaching in the Dominions to the status of a Rhodes Scholar, Mr. Stephensen exercises the influence of a professional journalist and a more or less intermittent publisher.

[15] The Australian soldiers on active service, when a referendum on this question was held among them, voted in an overwhelming majority against conscription. They did not wish to have anything to do with coerced shirkers.

This is not a pleasant fact, but we have got to accommodate ourselves to it. It is not the sort of thing that usually reaches the cognisance of governors; the official world in general remains ignorant of it; least of all does it penetrate to the consciousness of those political travellers who pay agreeable visits to the country and are the objects of much hospitable entertaining. It is glozed over or disguised or denied in after-dinner speeches when much sentimentality is expended and evoked on the theme of 'hands across the sea' and 'blood is thicker than water.' But this is a *suppressio veri* that is unhealthy and in time may become dangerous. The truth should be taken to heart particularly by those who, misconceiving or misrepresenting the conditions of the British Empire, seek to lead England into a policy of isolation from the affairs of Europe. This policy, mistaken in any case, would be a little less pernicious if the Empire were truly a Greater England. That it is not that is one of the things that Mr. Stephensen's book helps to bring into prominence. Because of this, Mr. Stephensen's work should be counted as a public service, and in some measure we should be grateful to him for it.

We all sympathise with him when he complains of certain conditions that retard the advance of Australia. He indicts the moneyed class there as being illiberal and vulgar, and as having no adequate conception of public-spiritedness. And he protests with proper indignation against a censorship of Culture, the derision of all enlightened men the world over, which keeps out of the country a large amount of literature published and freely current in Europe, including such masterpieces as the *Decameron*. With good reason he deprecates the influence of incompetent third or lower class university professors (in many cases imported from Britain), whose grotesquely erroneous notions regarding the conditions of artistic genesis and development can only help to arrest or suppress local aspirations or tendencies towards literary creation. In this connexion he quotes certain public utterances of Professor G. H. Cowling, who occupies the Chair of English Literature in the University of Melbourne; we have room only for one of these choice specimens of wisdom:

There are no ancient churches, castles, ruins—the memorials of

generations departed. You need no Baedecker in Australia. From the point of view of literature this means that we can never hope to have a Scott, a Balzac, a Dumas . . . nor a poetry which reflects past glories.

As if the author of *The Two Drovers*, or the author of *Le Père Goriot* and *Les Paysans*, or even the resourceful author of *The Three Musketeers* (who would have liked bushrangers), depended for their artistic existence upon the presence in their countries of ancient churches, castles, ruins and other more or less dilapidated adjuncts to the landscape! And as if the only great poetry, the only poetry worth talking about, was a poetry that served as a mirror for past glories! Æsthetic nonsense such as this should be penalised and not remunerated.

While such a state of affairs prevails, the exodus of gifted members of the community to Europe, which Mr. Stephensen views with dismay, is bound to go on; and those who remain in the country and attempt to serve culture there will be condemned to oppressive discouragement and to a very large measure of frustration.

RANDOLPH HUGHES.

EDINBURGH—SCOTLAND—1936

By Lewis Spence

In these pages, more than nine years ago, the writer assailed the apathies of Edinburgh in matters civic, cultural and commercial, to the surprise and indignation of a section of his fellow-citizens who seemed unable to realise that the seeds of decay might be lurking in the Scottish Eden. Since that time—a period of struggle and recovery everywhere—a quite extraordinary regeneration in nearly every department of life has occurred in the affairs of the northern metropolis, and the statement may be risked, without having the least recourse to exaggeration, that Edinburgh at the present time has much greater cause to rejoice in a fuller share of commercial prosperity and general public well-being than any other British community, and perhaps than any community in the civilised world. The statement is in no wise one of fatuous compliment made out of a desire to smooth susceptibilities ruffled by past criticisms of which, in any case, the writer is care-free. But genuine pleasure may be expressed in a restoration to civic well-being after a season of grievous hardship. The most encouraging feature of the present happy condition is a return to that vitality of which Edinburgh could boast in her hey-day, and which, for nearly a generation, she seemed to have lost.

In practically every one of those departments of industry which she cultivates Edinburgh can presently congratulate herself on being in a most enviable position. It is probably because of the variety of her commercial interests that she has not continued, like other communities which specialise in certain industries, to experience the stringency attendant on a high incidence of unemployment. By an almost entire dependence on the heavier industries—coal, steel, and shipbuilding—Glasgow, her western *vis-à-vis*, has suffered badly.

But Edinburgh's fiscal position is impregnable and her insurance and banking chiefs the wisest and most far-sighted of men. Crowned by the golden citadel of an insurance system the second largest in the world in point of business annually achieved and reserves maintained, buttressed by her great banking headquarters, and rejoicing in old staple industries of brewing, printing, the manufacture of chemicals, and engineering, the Edinburgh of 1936 is assuredly one of the most serene of European centres. A great building boom has reached the first stage of its inception, and even the somewhat laggard departments of rubber and shipping are gaining ground. The Forth fisheries are in good report; the law in all its branches is in no jeopardy of unemployment; while chartered accountants have never been busier.

Existence in Edinburgh combines the decorous quiet of life in a larger cathedral city with the polite bustle of a bourse of the eighteenth century. The Transatlanticism which threatened her in the 'twenties has perished of its own innate vulgarity, and it is only in her somewhat noisy and crowded motor traffic that she pays homage to the modern divinities of clamour. The amenity of life in Edinburgh has, indeed, been reduced almost to a science. Its population now borders on the half million, and few cities so extensive are so pleasant residentially. Not only is Edinburgh enviably situated on heights many of which still retain some of their pristine greenness, but it is rich in gardens and in spacious parks. Surrounded by some of the most mellow courses in the world, it is a golfers' paradise, while, not much more than half an hour's footing from its centre, walks of classic rural loveliness stretch in all directions. The sea laps its base and the hills cluster above its head. It possesses nearly half a dozen princely libraries, a magnificent orchestra, botanic gardens which a Kubla Khan might have envied, historic streets and galleries replete with world-famous works of art. As far as a modern city may, it possesses all the dignified graciousness of that Athens to which it has so often been likened.

Its wealth and financial weight notwithstanding, salaries are not large in Edinburgh, and the majority of its people pursue a quiet and simple tenure of existence. It would, indeed, be difficult to discover a folk so easily contented,

so well-habited, so self-contained, so very much at its ease. The ancient conceit that all Scotsmen are descended from nobility or from French *émigrés* of distinction flourishes exceedingly. The house, furniture, clothes and car of the Edinburgh man are the best he can afford, and, as has often been remarked, not infrequently vie with those of the much wealthier Englishman, and he contrives to save and insure himself more or less heavily. But his alimentary wants are few, though in certain professional and moneyed circles a more lavish display is to be encountered. Yet, with all its advantages, Edinburgh has failed to cultivate a spirit of gaiety. Indeed, it has not done so since the sprightly days of James IV. The young must address themselves at an early age to the almost crushing burden of an educational curriculum which will achieve for them a good position at home or abroad. If this does not altogether extinguish youthful high spirits, it puts a sufficient brake upon effervescent gaiety. Edinburgh has little or no night life. We are still 'unco guid,' and the reprobate thrives not among us. And who shall say that this is not the secret of our communal success, our well-maintained balance, our discipline, orderliness and general comfort? In this place there is a spirit of deep traditional wisdom and long-established foresight which contemns the whole legend of Belial as childish and stupid, for Edinburgh, although in some respects simple and even puritanical, is the most grown-up city in the world, the very high place of the Sanhedrin and the Elder Brethren of policy and opinion.

Naturally there are drawbacks and deficiencies. The culture of the place is a little too educational and not sufficiently disinterested. Education is, indeed, one of its principal 'industries.' Its public opinion is sound but provincial, and, as a whole, not very vivid nor progressive. Its civic problems give rise to much petty intrigue. It is wont at intervals to infringe its almost Olympian peace by contentions over some minor question of amenity, such as the removal of garden railings or the disappearance of some landmark of comparative unimportance. Nor does it appear to have sufficient communal address or force to compel parliamentary or national attention to its most vital necessities, such as a road-bridge across the Forth, nor to

inaugurate such departures as a local airport. Concerning the first venture, it has been unduly neglected by our greater social forces and its demand has been voiced by a rather ill-knit and feckless committee, although the Lord Provost, Mr. Louis Gumley, has personally striven hard to arouse Government interest in the scheme. Had a gulf of such yawning magnitude as the Firth of Forth separated any English city of importance from its natural hinterland it would long ago have been spanned as the result of a local demand which would have brooked no denial. But where Government adopts its usual avuncular attitude toward anything of 'Scotch' provenance, 'Scotch' opinion evinces a craven spirit of beaten acquiescence. Who, indeed, shall 'fecht wi' Lunnon'? On the whole, too, Edinburgh's parliamentary representation is poor and dispirited.

If an Edinburgh man desires to fly to any North Sea port he must first proceed to London. A movement is now on foot to establish an airport near the city, but it is still in the incipient stage, and passengers from London by air must land at Glasgow. As the *Journal of the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce* remarked some time ago, there is a want of drive about the venture, while the financial risk appears practically negligible. The longer Scotland delays in the foundation of her airports and in the manufacture of aircraft, the more difficult it will be for her to participate in the air life of the future.

The great financial corporations and industries by which Edinburgh succeeds in retaining a large measure of prosperity are now nearly all in a more or less flourishing state, owing chiefly to the wise and temperate methods of the far-sighted class which is responsible for their management. Insurance is probably Edinburgh's strong suit. Indeed, few cities in the Empire enjoy such a reputation as she in this respect. Insurance companies operating in Edinburgh have an annual income exceeding £20,000,000, and their accumulated funds exceed a total of £125,000,000. The companies whose management is situated in the Scottish capital have through years of steady conservative operations attained an unassailable position. As a centre of banking Edinburgh is second only to London among the cities of the United Kingdom. The headquarters of five of the great Scottish banks are

situated here. It is a remarkable fact that, prosperity or no prosperity, in 1933 the massed deposits of the eight joint-stock banks in Scotland showed a total of £280,000,000, an increase of over £20,000,000 as compared with 1932.

Edinburgh's very considerable rubber goods industry has been for some years under a cloud which is now beginning to display a silver lining, and large consignments of rubber footwear are manufactured for the Eastern market, while the large demand for golf balls and motor car tyres is keeping many hundreds of workers, both male and female, busy. Edinburgh is the centre of an extensive mining district, and, according to Professor Henry Briggs, the Midlothian coal-fields contain sufficient coal to maintain the present rates of production for three or four hundred years. The industry in the neighbourhood employs about 13,000 men, and the coalfield in 1933 produced an increase in output even over the 'peak' year of 1913, yielding 4,785,000 tons of excellent coal. Engineering may justly be classed among the more important of those industries prosecuted within the city boundaries, and naturally reflects local manufacturing needs such as printing, building, and rubber manufacture, having thus developed along highly specialised lines. The variety of machines manufactured embraces such very different appliances as paper-cutting machines, auxiliary machinery for use in the shipbuilding industry, catapults for launching aeroplanes from British cruisers, while the industry has recently been responsible for the wave-making mechanism for the Empire swimming-pool at Wembley.

Brewing is one of Edinburgh's oldest industries, dating probably from the twelfth century, and owing its supremacy to the excellent local water supply and proximity to a large barley-growing area. A large export business is done with India, the Straits Settlements, and Burma. The home trade supplies practically the whole of Scotland, and much of the North of England. No less than twenty-three breweries are situated in Edinburgh, which makes the city the second largest brewing centre in Great Britain. The capital invested in the local breweries is nearly £6,000,000.

At the present time Edinburgh is probably one of the largest building centres in Great Britain, and a boom in the building trade is in full swing. Large housing schemes

have been placed in commission both by the Corporation and private ventures. On the Calton Crags the ground is being cleared for a great new terrace of offices which is to house the several Government departments under the Scottish Office. A vast block of Sheriff Court buildings is rising in the High Street, and the long-awaited new accommodation for the Scottish National Library will shortly be put in hand. Furthermore, an extensive range of Government buildings devoted to the work of the Income Tax Department is now nearing completion on a large vacant site in Lothian Road, which will also house a great new hotel. The proposal to name this 'Somerset House' aroused much loose wrath locally and it is to be known as 'Lothian House.

Edinburgh is the centre of an extensive fishing industry carried on on the coast at Leith and Newhaven. Cured herrings and dry salted fish are exported to the extent of 50,000 tons a year, whilst about 18,000 tons of fresh fish are sold in the Newhaven market. As a shipping centre Leith, the port of Edinburgh, after passing through a period of depression in common with other British harbours, is once more entering a period of activity.

Does Scotland, it may be asked, suffer in any way from Edinburgh's prosperity? Scotland as a whole cannot be regarded as prosperous; how, then, does Edinburgh contrive things? The variety of her industrial activities certainly provides part of the answer, but one good reason is that she has no Irish problem. This question of Irish vampirism in Scotland has been occluded for generations because of that odd characteristic in the Scot which loathes a fuss of any sort. But forthright speech has become essential. The Hibernian element in Scotland, from a mere nuisance, has become a blight and a curse; as citizens the Irish in Scotland, who now number about three-quarters of a million, are, as a whole, of low life and status, improvident habits, and prone to vindictive and outrageous vendettas. This applies equally to emigrants from both North and South, whose feuds have become in Glasgow the despair of the authorities, and these threaten to extend to Edinburgh, where not long ago serious riots of purely Irish origin took place, the disputants on either side mostly having been 'imported' for the occasion from the West. The majority in the Corporation

of Glasgow is pro-Irish and pro-Muscovite, and is aggressive and offensive to the Scottish minority. For generations Glasgow has treated the question of its large interloping population with pusillanimity. Now it is faced with a civic rate of 14*s*. in the £1, chiefly for the upkeep of a hostile element which is slowly but surely destroying it. Yet with a supineness which ill becomes the seed of the Covenanters, it bows patiently before the ebullient and contemptuous alien.

This is not the place to examine the Irish question in Scotland in its entirety, but it is certain that any British Government which does not face it is heaping up a fearful reckoning for the future. Glasgow has suffered grievously in her heavy industries, steel and shipbuilding, through post-war depression. All her eggs have been in one basket, but she has made the most gallant of struggles to recapture her prosperity. That she is slowly accomplishing this is due to the indomitable spirit of her splendid commercial class, which should in no wise be hampered in its efforts by the compulsory upkeep of a vast mendicant alien population of barbarous propensity and ignorant and fanatical outlook. Only a treaty with the Irish Free State and an agreement with Ulster regulating Irish migration to Scotland can put an end to a situation which is annually growing more laden with menace. Some Scots of pro-Celtic predilection plead for the Irish because of an ancient kinship, and affect to perceive a cruelty in any proposal to deport them wholesale from Scottish soil. On the other hand, they advance no alternative policy, for the excellent reason that none exists.

The population of Scotland is certainly decreasing, although the precise causes of this are difficult to ascertain. Vital statistics reveal a decrease of more than 80,000 since the last census. Post-war depression and small salaries have certainly retarded marriage among the middle classes. Indeed, salaries among business and professional assistants in Scotland are absurdly small when compared with those current in England, owing to the great number of young men of the working class who take university degrees, or who enter commerce and are content with very little so long as they can secure a 'white collar' job. The writer

is also of the opinion that the custom of buying a house at or before marriage, long current in Scotland and now more prevalent than ever, most definitely retards marriage and thus serves to lower the birth rate. Again, the Scot resembles his cousin the Fleming in this, that until everything in his new abode is complete he will not make a matrimonial start. Few people are so nicely particular, or evince such an extraordinary love of domestic window-dressing, as the Scot of the lower middle class, and I believe the falling birth rate of the country to be due more to pre-matrimonial efforts to penny-save preparatory to making a 'splash' than to emigration or the like. Moreover, the single-child family is now almost ubiquitous. The Scot is becoming a suburban dweller of the golf-*cum*-garden type, a typical Surbitonian, and the once numerous Scottish family would swamp him out of his 'modern' thirty-foot-square 'villa.'

If industry 'went South' in the earlier post-war years, to the detriment of Scottish economy generally, it is certainly not doing so any longer. Indeed, good authorities like Sir A. Steven Bilsland and Mr. George Blake assure us that it never did. The removal of one very large steel concern to the South recently gave the impression of the end of a landslide. In Scotland coal-mining figures have risen, while those in England and Wales have dropped, and in iron and steel production there was at the end of 1934 an improvement of 22·4 per cent. in Scotland, while England and Wales showed but 11·4 per cent.

There can be no doubt that national slackness and blindness to progress and an obstinate cleaving to obsolete methods hampered Scottish industry greatly after the war. Machines are now being employed in Clyde shipbuilding for riveting and so forth which are capable of overtaking the work in about one-sixth of the time formerly devoted to it. The writer's personal feeling is that the lesser Scottish business man of to-day suffers from what might be described as constipation of the mental processes. He is often a dull, wordless person, unenthusiastic and unimaginative, who appears somnolently unconscious of the passage of events. If we are inherently a stupid folk (as not a few believe), we shall, of course, be surpassed in the race for existence.

In youth, if seldom very brilliant, we are at least active mentally, but our elders (among whom the writer must number himself) appear much more comatose than their *vis-à-vis* in England and elsewhere. Youth should have its chance in Scotland. Scotland has been an old man's country much too long. But our heavy industries will at least partially regain their ancient prosperity. We possess the virtue of making an eleventh-hour change of heart; it is possible for us to see reason. Indeed, we do envisage it, but are sometimes too 'dour' to admit as much.

To summarise the industrial position in Scotland, it may be said that our productive capacity relative to the rest of the world has undergone a vast change; Scotland's advantage in certain native raw materials has passed away, and our old markets are to some extent closed to us. Moreover, our universities turn out too many half-baked professional folk, and too few industrial workers are being adequately trained. We have cultivated too much the old-established heavy industries, and too little those lighter manufactures which have followed upon the scientific development of electricity and the internal-combustion engine. But improvement is slowly making way, and if we once more evoke the spirit of invention and enterprise for which we were formerly world-famous we shall not be confounded. Nor is it in us to be so absolutely. As regards the question whether some form of self-government be not the specific for Scotland's ills, social and commercial, no doubt can exist that if devolution of some kind or degree were applied to her circumstances lasting good would eventually result. The outstanding deficiency in Scottish life to-day is the lack of some central authority situated in the capital of the country which would not only bring a collective and instructed wisdom to bear upon its problems, but initiate, direct and carry out legislation and action based upon its findings.

Scotland might long ago have been in possession of some deliberative and executive body of the kind had it not been for certain deficiencies inherent in her popular character and psychology. The national apathy concerning the 'Home Rule' Movement is more apparent than real. Countless thousands of Scottish people desire self-government, but are too apathetic or too fearful of local criticism to give

expression to their preference. But a very considerable section is manifestly of the opinion that everything good emanates from London, and that Scotland would suffer by the erection of a national Parliament which, they pretend to believe, would not have behind it the financial resources sufficient to allow it to function—a fatuous notion when Scottish contributions to the British Treasury fall to be considered. Many people, again, believe that self-government would alienate the English business classes and impoverish Scottish commerce.

But a more serious deterrent is the spirit of suspicion and jealousy which is the Scot's worst characteristic, belittling his every effort and ruinous of much that is progressive. He seems incapable of believing that an adequate leadership can arise out of his own ranks, and anything approaching strenuous or perfervid appeal on national subjects seems to lash a certain type of materialistic Scot into a frenzy of contempt. Scottish patriotic leaders, for this reason, have had to face a barrage of hostile comment and criticism which could scarcely have been manifested in any other country. Probably this vindictive hostility to any measure of self-government is due to the hysterical fear of the shopkeeper or business man that it might have a disastrous reaction upon Scottish commerce, and it is nearly always made by people who have not examined the problem and who steadfastly refuse to do so. Another explanation, the writer believes, is that many Scottish people have been taught to revere the giants of the past so deeply that the appearance of mere humans who attempt to pick up the patriotic threads left by these demigods infuriates them. The fear of the Clydeside parliamentary contingent attaining a balance of power in a Scottish Parliament alienates large numbers, as indeed it well may. At present the cause for self-government is getting nowhere because of a feebleness conditioned by the drawbacks already alluded to and because of the contempt for any movement of native origin which the Anglicised Scot so often displays. The loyalty of the Scottish voting public to the hereditary parties of English origin accounts for the consistent defeat of Scottish Nationalist candidates at the polls.

Though the writer was partly responsible, against his

better judgment, for initiating this newer phase of Scottish Nationalist effort after the war, he is thankful to be no longer associated with it because of the factious criticism indulged in by its adherents.

Mention should be made of the report upon the depressed areas of Scotland drawn up some time ago by Sir Arthur Rose for the Ministry of Labour. By his terms of reference Sir Arthur was instructed more particularly to report upon conditions in Lanarkshire, and the time afforded him was brief. It is impossible to summarise the whole in this place, but, among other things, Sir Arthur Rose found that no area in Scotland is actually derelict, that rationalisation has resulted in much unemployment, that land reclamation, improvement and utilisation and the low-temperature carbonisation of coal, small-holdings and allotments would increase employment. But he is conscious of the inadequacy of his suggestions. Scotland is suffering, and suffering badly, from lack of internal leadership and congressional control and from distant bureaucratic administration from London.

When Parliament discussed Scottish affairs last year, the debate took a tendency typical of such occasions. The usual impassioned speeches were made regarding the condition of small-holders in the North, Sir Ian MacPherson predicting an 'unexampled agitation' in the Highlands 'unless something is done.' This may sound all very well in the House of Commons, but Sir Ian will pardon a native Scot for somewhat cynically remarking that we have heard that sort of thing before, and that when 'unexampled agitation' occurs among a people so utterly comatose as the Highlanders we may expect members for the Clydeside divisions to cultivate a sense of humour at their own expense. As things are, anyone can dance on the Scotsman's chest at any time, and his apathy deserves as much. Edinburgh's is the better course. By proceeding on its own wise way it can at least display a façade of civilisation and much of the interior of the same, and may in the event send out new tissue to help in the reconstruction of the country. The rest of Scotland would do well to emulate its discipline, its foresight, the variety of its efforts and industries, and the manner in which it makes the best of its opportunities.

LEWIS SPENCE.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Chronological Table and Index of the Statutes covering the Legislation to December 31, 1935. Issued annually: Vol. i., Chronological Table of all the Statutes; vol. ii., Index to the Statutes in Force. (Stationery Office, 1936, £1 5*s.* for two volumes.)

The Statute-book, recently observed Sir William Graham-Harrison, stands in one respect in the same position as the sect of Christians at the time when the Apostle Paul first arrived in Rome: 'we know that everywhere it is spoken against.' The reason is sufficiently obvious from the bulky contents of these well-printed and admirably compiled volumes, for it may be asserted with confidence that in no other country in Europe are the statutes in force one-tenth as numerous, nowhere in Europe has so little consolidation been attempted. In no civilised country, except, perhaps, the United States, is it so difficult to ascertain what in fact is the text of the law, as apart from securing a judicial decision thereon. One of the consequences is that, whilst our judicial system is admired, no country seeks to adopt, or even to adapt, our legal system, and, as Sir Maurice Amos has observed, the formlessness of our law constitutes a formidable obstacle to the spread of a just measure of English influence in the world.

These volumes are designed, quite literally, to make the best of a very bad job. The first volume, of 750 pages, gives a list of, at a rough estimate, some 30,000 statutes beginning with the Statute of Merton, 1235, parts of which are still in force. Part of our law relating to 'distress' dates from 1267, as also in reference to landlord and tenant, and to leases. Nine statutes of 1275 are still the law of the land, and another eleven, passed between 1275 and 1285, survive, together with a score of enactments in the Magna Charta of Edward I.,

dating from 1297. In many cases, however, what really survives is, not the enactment itself, but judicial decisions based thereon, enshrined in text-books and familiar to lawyers, but scarcely susceptible of explanation to those who have to argue before our Courts in the Colonies.

Many of these statutes affect the daily life of the average man. The Jacobean statutes in force relating to Sunday observance are, like many others, really 'spent'; but they remain in force because there is 'no parliamentary time,' and not sufficient official energy, to replace them by an intelligible Act. Yet it is not a small thing that there should be 30,000 prosecutions a year for Sunday trading under obsolete laws. Respect for the law is not increased by thousands of prosecutions of boys for playing pitch-and-toss in corners of public commons and on the grass-covered verges of our country roads, under laws which describe them as rogues and vagabonds, before magistrates none of whom regard it as wrong to play cards for money or to have something on a horse.

The second, or Index, volume covers over 2000 pages and is a model of what such a book should be. It should be on the table of every lawyer, on the shelf of every town clerk, and within reach of every member of Parliament. For it shows with admirable clarity precisely where to look for the laws. What they mean is another question, for consolidation of recent years has done little to remove doubts.

But even these guides to legislative knowledge are incomplete without a third volume—the Index to Statutory Rules and Orders, which rival the Statute-book itself in variety and bulk. And none of these includes any reference to private Acts of Parliament, obtained by public bodies and others which govern our lives to an increasing extent. Each one creates new offences punishable with fine or imprisonment, and confers new and often arbitrary powers on county councils. There are volumes not now before us; it is enough for the beginner to study those now under review, if only to save him from complacent acceptance of the praises frequently lavished on our laws by those who make and administer them. A further volume, not yet before us, is the Index to Statutory Definitions. An up-to-date edition, due to appear shortly, will cut short a vast amount of ill-informed dis-

cussion in Parliament, and help to smooth the path of permanent officials.

The Klephtic Ballads in relation to Greek History (1715–1821), by John W. Baggally, M.A., B.Litt. of Hertford College, Oxford (Blackwell, 7*s*. 6*d*.).

This delightful little volume should be part of the classical library of every school and should be read by every student of current history. It deals with the long struggle of the Greeks against their Turkish masters, of secret societies of patriots, who risked and often endured the most terrible tortures in pursuit of their aim—national independence; for the modern cult of nationalism is, as the story of Judith shows, as old as written history. Trained to war by the vigorous pursuit of bodily fitness, they made up in valour and address what they lacked in numbers. Thanks to them, the Greeks are a nation to-day, and free. Those who imagine that we in Palestine to-day can play *vis-à-vis* the Arabs the part played in Greece by the Turks will find in this book grounds for doubt, and, perhaps, for dismay. The ballads are delightfully translated and the text bears every mark not only of erudition, but of an understanding of humanity. In these days, when the Professor of Greek in one University is one who was during the war a conscientious objector, and the Professor of Latin in another is an alien not yet naturalised, it is a matter for congratulation that the true tradition of humane studies is maintained by other scholars.

ARNOLD WILSON.

The Doctrine of Personal Right, by S. Hutchinson Harris (published by the Institute Patxot at Barcelona: London agents, The Dolphin Bookshop, 5 Cecil Court, St. Martin's Lane, W.C.2, 12*s*. 6*d*. net).

Mr. Hutchinson Harris' work was submitted as an essay upon the theme which was formulated for the XIII. Concurs of the Institucio Patxot. The subject which he selected is a vast one, affecting the relations between the individual and the State, and we cannot quarrel with him for restricting the scope of his inquiries mainly to the study of personal freedom in England. In his introductory remarks he tells us that he does not desire to establish a

case by appeal to authority, but merely to discuss the progress of a phase in the evolution of society; nevertheless it becomes increasingly clear as we examine his pages that he has, in fact, laid a charge to our social order which cannot remain unanswered. He traces briefly and with admirable clarity the growth of individualism from its early beginnings to the point in the nineteenth century when the oft-repeated resistance of the people to encroachments on their personal and public rights culminated in the transfer of the sovereign authority to the people themselves.

From this point onwards we observe the gradual rise of State absolutism and view with justifiable apprehension the evils that have arisen from the readiness of men to ground their philosophy on the divine right and infallibility of the State.

The dangers of such an outlook were well recognised in a passage which appeared in the Report of the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry:

> The most distinctive indication of the change of outlook of the Government of this country in recent years has been its growing preoccupation, irrespective of party, with the management of the life of the people. Parliament finds itself increasingly engaged in legislation which has for its conscious aim the regulation of day-to-day affairs of the community, and now intervenes in matters formerly thought to be entirely outside its scope. It is of vital importance that the new policy, while truly promoting liberty by securing better conditions of life for the people, should not, in its zeal for interference, deprive them of their initiative and independence which are the nation's most valuable assets.

Mr. Harris does, however, paint his picture in rather dark colours when he says in a fit of pessimism:

> Any majority of the House of Commons may now pass any Bill, however unconstitutional, and after three Sessions may lay it before the King for the Royal Assent without its being passed by the House of Lords . . . thus property and freedom are at the mercy of a chance majority in the House of Commons.

Although, undoubtedly, the House of Commons does possess, in a strict legal sense, the power which he attributes to it, yet unlimited sovereignty in the political sense cannot really be claimed, since, as Leslie Stephen has pointed out, the power of the Legislature is subject to limitations both internal and external—internal because the Legislature is the product of a certain social condition, and determined by whatever determines society; and external because the power of imposing law is dependent upon the instinct of subordination, which is itself limited.

It cannot be denied that Mr. Harris' warning is well founded.

The dangers of modern bureaucracy are clearly to be observed, and this work is a valuable contribution to the reaction that is taking place in England against what Professor C. K. Allen has called 'the ill-controlled whittling down of the rights of the citizen.'

If the individual suffers a drastic curtailment of his liberty in his relations with the State, Mr. Harris shows that both State and individual are alike subordinate to the widespread ramifications of international finance, and perhaps the greatest value of this essay is the precision with which this theme is illustrated. In the concluding chapter the subject of international affairs comes under review, and here we find that 'the foundations of international right are not different from those of public right within the nation.' The future will be brighter if 'in international disputes nations are assured in the first place of a verdict of disinterested justice and then as far as may be the power to enforce it.' These aims are to be secured by a strong Court which should be, 'not international, composed of delegates of the nations, but a-national, composed of judges who have consented to subordinate their nationality to the cause of international right.' The authority of such a court is to be supported by a kind of world-wide organisation of 'Volunteer Guardians of the Judgment of Right . . . recruited from men of moral fibre to whom it would appeal.' While all will sympathise with the eminently desirable ends which it is hoped to attain by these expedients, we cannot be blamed if in the light of recent events in the sphere of international relations we tend to regard them as Utopian.

William A. Beers.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

The present need for strengthening the armed forces of the Crown is now accepted by the principal political parties in Parliament. The negligence displayed in this matter by the leaders is blameworthy in proportion to the number of their years in office in the past decade, but it was the reflection of the spirit of the country at large, which is popularly supposed to look for enlightenment to the older universities. Twelve years ago Mr. Baldwin thus described the duty of statesmen in this connexion :

> Our work is more the work of the gardener than of the builder and architect. . . . We must remove noxious weeds, we must do the root pruning, we must prepare and enrich the soil. But we have to wait in faith for what comes later, and that is the flowers and fruit ; . . . we can never hope to gather grapes from thistles.[1]

This year saw the appointment, by the Prime Minister, to the Royal Chair of Greek at Oxford of one who during the war was a 'conscientious objector,' and still professes the same creed, and of a foreigner as Corpus Christi Professor of Latin. Both are distinguished scholars : the former a man of great personal charm, whose views command respect among those who differ most strongly from him. But classical professors have responsibilities to whom they teach which transcend the subjects with which they deal. Such appointments—and they are not unique—are ill-calculated to enrich the soil for the younger generation (the *ultimi Britanni*) to help them, in Mr. Baldwin's noble words, 'to base their lives on the stern virtues of the Roman character and to take to ourselves the warnings that Rome left for our guidance.'[2] It is well known that the Treasury circular of 1929, which allows

[1] November 28, 1924, *On England*, 1926, p. 162.
[2] January 8, 1926, *The Classics*, p. 108, *ibid.*

time spent in prison by conscientious objectors to count for pensions, is still in force; it is common knowledge that time spent abroad in the service of government or of commerce, or in the armed forces, has long ceased in practice to be recognised by most public bodies and by commercial firms as constituting a preferential claim to consideration. What is less generally recognised is that local authorities, public bodies, and heads of firms tend in such matters to accept inspiration from above: such guidance as they have had in recent years has been almost entirely negative. If public authorities, public utility companies with statutory privileges, and companies holding large contracts from Government were required (1) to be on the King's Roll, (2) to give preference to men who had served with the Colours, and (3) to give leave additional to a holiday with pay to those on their staffs who belonged to the Territorial Army, most of our recruiting difficulties would vanish.

Our Regular and Territorial forces can be maintained to-day on a voluntary basis only with the active co-operation and good will of employers, large and small, and that, to-day, is almost wholly lacking, especially in London, which, alike for the Territorial and the Regular Army[3] and for the Supplementary Reserve, has a worse record for recruiting than any other in Britain. Co-operation in these matters is possible to achieve only if it is consciously sought by those in authority. Recruiting speeches delivered in Paris by Mr. Duff Cooper and Mr. Churchill will not help.

Sir Thomas Inskip, the Prime Minister's right-hand man, said on September 5 at Rothesay:

> There are signs of an attempt to intensify this conspiracy against the liberties of this country. The attempt is not only to usurp the trades unions, but to hamstring the Government in their munitions programme.

He is thus answered by Sir Samuel Hoare:

> We fought and defeated Communism by prosperity. Trade recovery, and steady growth of employment, the constantly rising standard of health, housing and comfort, is our answer to Communism.

Our very modest achievements in these directions have had no appreciable effect upon the position in the depressed areas except Tyneside. There are 750,000 persons on poor

[3] Report on the Army, 1935 (Cmd. 5104).

relief—more than in 1931. Over 1·1 million males from ages sixteen to sixty-four are wholly unemployed. There are complaints of ill-feeding from South Wales, while at Milford Haven, 100 miles from Cardiff, herrings, surplus to the needs of the Midlands, were being virtually given away a few weeks ago because the Welsh boroughs do not take kindly to fish. Sir Samuel Hoare's complacency is no answer to Communism, which must be approached not only on the material but on the psychological plane, to which no Minister of the Crown has for many months past attempted to rise.

* * * * *

We rightly regard a 'free' Press as one of our national assets; but its value depends upon the observance of certain canons of taste, particularly in references to foreigners, who are apt to invest old-established journals with a greater authority than would be claimed by any editor or individual contributor. I am tempted to point to the moral of Mr. Belloc's 'A Few Kind Words on the Press,' in our October number, by two examples, culled almost at random, from casual reading.

Punch of October 7 contained a contributed article, entitled 'An Arab Calendar,' which, doubtless humorously, ascribed to the Palestinian Arab every sort of meanness in his conduct towards his neighbour and to Government officials, and several sorts of crime. In ordinary circumstances it would be harmless; but, at this juncture, when feelings run high, it prompts the query, 'Would the editor have accepted an equally humorous "Zionist Calendar," ascribing similar unlovely traits to what we must, unfortunately, describe for the moment as "the other side"?'

The *Daily Telegraph* of October 14—under the captions 'How Tank Corps made History in Palestine. Epic All-Night Defence'—describes an encounter between three tanks and an aeroplane and a band of Arabs, estimated at more than fifty, as 'one of the historic episodes in the annals of the Army, and a glorious page in the records of the Royal Tank Corps.' The Arabs, 'screaming like maniacs' and 'obviously fanatic,' came on fearlessly right up to the tanks, which were 'an easy target,' and were repulsed—one man killed. There was no lack of courage on either side, and to dismiss Arab

valiance as fanatical is misleading and unfair. The Arab strike, which has lasted as many months as our General Strike lasted days, is now over, but the problem which the Royal Commission has to face is far more intractable now than when the decision to despatch it was announced in July. To this fact every official in the Palestine Government whom I have met bears witness. We entered Palestine eighteen years ago and were welcomed as saviours: the 'fanatical' Arab, in his unequal contest with our war machines, part of a force as large as we sent to India in the dark days of 1856, is a portent and warning to us which we ignore at our peril.

* * * * *

The father of a secondary schoolboy who had failed to pass his higher school examination in French came to see me this month to record his protest, and to ask me 'to write to the papers about it.' The boy was well above the average in most school subjects, enthusiastic in work and at play, and diligent, for he had passed in four subjects with credit the year before. He brought me the examination paper to ask me whether, as a layman, I agreed with him that it was better calculated to display the limitations of those who asked rather than those who answered questions. It seemed to me, as to him, to be no test of literary appreciation or of genuine scholarship: many questions turned on trifling or irrelevant details. One typical poser, dealing with one of the set books, ran as follows:

Write notes on the words in italics in the following passage: 'Peut-être me suis-je rendu digne de cette insigne et royale faveur en siégeant *au tribunal consulaire*: . . .' [French Lit., Paper I.]

What reader or lover of Balzac could say off-hand what this tribunal was; and what does it matter to anyone? It is not mentioned in the ordinary dictionaries or histories, though it may well have been the subject of a footnote in the edition of Balzac prepared by the examiner or one of his friends. Nor does ability to give the answer add anything to the understanding or appreciation of the text. A boy with an eye to essentials would pass it by, and would be penalised for so doing. Such questions are what Milton describes as 'ferrets and mousehunts of an index.'

The paper included two or three misprints—not so

obvious as not to embarrass candidates—misprints which few invigilators could correct with certainty, *e.g.* Vigny's line 'sur la pierre des mo*r*ts croît l'arbre de grandeur' is printed 'sur la pierre des mo*n*ts croît l'arbre,' etc.

Worse still is the following question:

> In what way does César Birotteau confirm the impression derived from your reading of Lucas-Dubreton concerning the state of French society, under the 'monarchie de juillet'? [French Lit., Paper II.]

'César Birotteau' was born in 1779 and died in 1822. The novel which bears his name deals with society under Louis XVIII., two reigns before the monarchy of July!

The investigation into the reliability of examinations made by Sir Philip Hartog and his colleagues have lit a candle which will not be put out. The evidence against the present system of those with practical experience as teachers or employers of youth is virtually unanimous; less attention, however, has been devoted to the examiners and the papers they set. How far, if at all, is it fair or true to say—as young men are freely saying to-day—that the professorial body is, consciously or unconsciously, forcing youth to devote precious years to the study of dead matter—of things that bear no relation to life, or letters, or literature—because they themselves are living in a dead past? The contemptuous smile of a Frenchman, himself eminent in letters, to whom I showed the paper some weeks later, suggests that there is some justification for youth's complaint.

* * * * *

On my way from Euston to speak at Manchester I found myself in the company of three sailors, all from Chatham. The oldest, with eleven years' service to his credit, was of Blackpool; the others, able-seamen of one year's standing, were respectively from Preston and Fallowfield. They were taking ten days' leave before departing for the West Indies station. The older man was telling the younger how lucky they were to go to such a good station straightaway: his lot had been cast in less-favoured climates—the China and India stations. He produced for our inspection photographs taken by himself of a score of places. He was a leading stoker: he could be sure of a good job in civil life when he left the Navy, but was tempted to extend his service to twenty-one years.

He would leave the service with £1 a week for life and a sure job. He had already saved enough to buy the house his parents lived in—'not one of those artistic shacks miles away from anywhere, all tiles and plaster and glass and paint, which cost a lot to keep up, but a nice little six-roomed house in a good back street.' The young pair were almost speechless at first, but soon joined in. They wanted to be clear of Chatham. Barrack life was bad for sailors: they were glad they had joined the Navy; it would be good to see the world.

The eldest sailor produced a pack of cards and suggested a game. My conscience as a J.P. smote me: for a railway-carriage is a place to which the public are permitted to have access, and cards are mentioned in the Vagrancy Act of 1824 as amended in 1873, and many thousands of common (but not first-class) persons are prosecuted thereunder every year by a vigilant police. However, after reminding them, to their astonishment, that we were each liable to be dealt with as rogues and vagabonds and fined £2 each for the first and £5 for further offences, I took a hand, and lost a shilling in the course of an hour's play.

Then I called for a glass of light beer all round, to be served in the compartment, as the restaurant-car was full of tea-drinkers. This was another breach of the law, for, as the Licensing Commission emphasised, and Mr. A. P. Herbert has been at pains to remind us in his latest book,[4] the excise licence does not cover anything but the restaurant-car. Worse still, we should be drinking in a train at an hour when no man could buy a drink outside it.

However, we boldly broke yet another of our precious laws which 'lack of parliamentary time' allows to remain—objects of derision to the public and of wonderment to foreign visitors.

* * * * *

I returned to London by the midnight train: armed with two pillows, I found a vacant carriage. Just before the train started a young man entered. I gave him one pillow and he commenced to talk. Life was good these days. He was a very junior engineer, aged twenty-three, with seven years in

[4] *Mild and Bitter*, by A. P. Herbert (Methuen, 6*s*.).

the same firm, on his way to inspect machinery which his firm had installed at East Ham. He had left his secondary school at sixteen. His ambition was to be a draughtsman, but when his father died he had to take a job to keep a roof over his mother's head, for the other son was married; he had no sisters.

He was as well-dressed as any city clerk: only his hands betrayed him as a manual worker. I remarked on this. He was glad I had noticed it; it was his pride to dress as decently as anyone else; perhaps it was the tradition of his secondary school that made him want to. Anyway, he did not see why people who worked with tools should appear in public less well-dressed than those who could use nothing but a pen.

He was fond of dancing: he wore a gold ring on his third finger—9-carat, he explained; a girl had given it him. It was not his fault that he did not go with her now, but he kept it for memory's sake. What was the greatest day of his life? When he was made captain of the works football team. He owed the honour to favouritism on the part of his mates, not his merits as a player, but he was proud that they wanted him. He had kept the leadership of the team for three years, though they had 'not done so well'—as the fixture card for last year, which he showed me, proved—but they had good games, and they played a lot of 'away' matches. The firm helped in that: the partners often watched the games and sometimes 'stood in on' a bit of a feast and a visit to the theatre for both teams.

We slept soundly till we were turned out at Euston. I suggested a cup of tea and we went to the gloomy waiting-room. It was crowded—not a seat to be had: two youths were busy handing out cups of tea and biscuits—there was nothing else. He insisted on bringing and paying for the tea: with it he courteously brought a packet of cigarettes which he presented to me; so that we might be square on the journey, as I had paid for his pillow.

* * * * *

Leaving town by train one evening, I found myself in a crowded carriage opposite a young man, hatless, wearing a mackintosh and light flannel trousers. By his side was an

attaché case. He was tall, finely built, good-looking, with the high cheek bones and fair skin which, for some reason or other, we associate with 'Colonials.' His hands were clean and strong. I made up my mind that he was a Rhodes Scholar, or an undergraduate in his third year on his way to Cambridge. When he had finished his evening paper, I borrowed it, offering him Trevelyan's *Blenheim*—the first volume of the trilogy—which I was reading, having secured the three volumes in the new cheap edition at 10*s.* 6*d.* each. He accepted it with an easy smile of thanks, without speaking, and began to read it with growing interest, never lifting his eyes from the page. He must, I thought, be reading history thus to immerse himself in the book.

Presently he closed it and handed it back to me. 'I must read no more,' he said, 'or I'll want to have it for keeps': his accent contrasted sharply with his appearance. I asked him what his job in London was. He was a cabinet-maker, he said, just out of his apprenticeship. Trade was good now, and the firm, which only turned out first-class work, had a full order-book. He left his home, forty miles out of London, daily at 6 and returned at 7.30, except on Saturdays. He loved the country; 'and reading?' I asked. Yes, he was librarian for the county library service in his village, and wished he had more time to study. The books he had read included a lot of good solid stuff, the taste for which, he told me, grew on him. We reached his destination all too soon, and he left the carriage with the book in his bag, undertaking to return it before long, against my promise to exchange it for the other volumes.

I was left alone with an older man, who had listened to our talk. 'He's a chip of the old block,' he observed, 'with a bit of modern polish, but a good worker, mind you.' 'I'd like to have him in my lot. I'm a foreman carpenter on the St. Pancras Town-hall job—oak panelling and wood-block flooring and carved marble; a real beautiful place it's going to be—not shoddy and nothing scamped. It's not so easy to get men who can do the best work; they lost the habit after the war, for nobody wanted good work then.' But, he continued, business was better, and public bodies were putting up good buildings and putting in good material that it was a pleasure to work with. It was not right that money should

be lavished on hotels and cinemas and big offices while public buildings were allowed to remain dingy, ill-lit and ill-ventilated. Government ought to set an example like the Post Office was now doing. Some county courts, for example, were a disgrace: he had been on a job or two in them. Most employment exchanges were nothing to be proud of—enough to keep employers away, let alone decent men; they looked more like railway-stations—they were so neglected. He was firmly seated on his hobby-horse and rode it, as I walked alongside him out of the station and for half a mile or more down the road where our ways parted. 'You don't live here,' he concluded; 'who may you be?' I explained that he had sent me to Westminster ten months ago. 'I ought to have known you,' he said; 'I've seen your likeness often enough: but there, I've never troubled with politics myself, but my wife and girls, they enjoy meetings and go regular' —whether to one or both party meetings he did not indicate.

* * * * *

These conversations are but tiny flashes of light from the innumerable facets of the mirror of life and are, taken separately, of no importance. They are typical of the daily talk of millions, and are as much a part of real history as the volumes of *Hansard*. The speakers, one and all, implicitly trust their leaders and elected representatives, but have, and can have, no real voice in deciding the direction in which the country's policy is moving at home or abroad. This trust is a heavy responsibility. Is the machinery of government at our disposal adequate for the discharge of this trust? If not, who and what stand in the way of those who would devise better machinery?

* * * * *

My intervention was sought last month to 'do what I could' for a young Irishman who had pleaded guilty to larceny and, technically, to housebreaking, and was to appear before next quarter sessions for sentence. The sum involved was 15*s*. When he appeared before petty sessions, bail had been refused as the police wished to make inquiries; and had not the man with whom he lodged, who trusted him, renewed the application for bail a week later, he would have

been kept in Bedford Gaol for two months pending trial. He was a typical Southern Irish boy of eighteen—short, sturdy, with black hair, black eyes and heavy black eyebrows. His father died of war wounds when he was a baby. He was healthy, but otherwise ill-equipped to seek his fortune; he spoke English with a clipped accent so strong that he was not easy to understand, and was 'no scholar.' Hearing of a non-existent better job, he had thrown up another and had 'lost his benefit' for six weeks in consequence. He wanted desperately to find work in some place where he could meet and live with other Irishmen, for outside the clan he was as shy as a wild bird. He had stolen with one object only: to get back to Ireland, despairing finally of earning enough to keep himself in England. I did what I could, and quarter sessions wisely placed him on probation in the care of a representative of his own Church, with conditions of residence. He found a job a week later, but could draw no pay for a fortnight. How was he to live meanwhile? He had friends, but they lived twelve miles from the job—too far to walk, and omnibus fares ran to 10*s*. a week. That was his problem, formidable and apparently insuperable. A hostel offered no solution, for there was still the travelling to and fro. The probation officer was his sole stand-by, but not easily accessible.

I was able to find a constitutional solution of his problem after much telephoning; and one Saturday afternoon he hastened straight from his job, still in overalls, to tell me that 'everything was all right,' that the woman with whom he lodged trusted him now, and would wait for her money, and that he could, at last, write something to his mother to cheer her.

ARNOLD WILSON.

ALCAZAR

In those hot gates there was no lingering hell,
Where Spartans stayed the Persian hordes, and died
In the wide air of Hellas purified
By that one simple law for which they fell.

Death took them swiftly. . . . Here, beneath the spell
Of clangorous horror must you long abide,
Hearing the caverned rage of fratricide
Tear up the base of your grim citadel.

Yet, as the old abysmal fires that rend
The noble outer fabric of the earth
Still leave it purged and shaken but entire,

So this high valour, that no death can end,
Is not consumed by hate's eruptive fire,
But torn and tempered to a higher worth.

A. R. Chisholm.

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THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

No. DCCXVIII—December 1936

BELGIUM TO-DAY

By Paul Hymans [1]

Recent developments in the domestic and foreign policy of Belgium have drawn attention to the situation of that country. These developments have not been properly understood in all quarters in other countries, and it is desirable, in Belgium's own interest, that her economic and moral position and the tendencies resulting therefrom should be justly appreciated abroad. In what follows I shall endeavour to convey a faithful and objective picture of what is at present taking place.

Eighteen months ago M. Van Zeeland assumed control of the Cabinet in extremely dangerous circumstances. For six months the Theunis Cabinet had pursued a rigorous policy of economy and deflation, a policy which had already been initiated by the de Broqueville Cabinet. But public opinion had been disturbed by these measures. Out of

[1] Translated by Randolph Hughes.

deflation had come financial embarrassment and distress, a slackening of business activity, a devitalisation of the nation on its economic side. In certain quarters a campaign was begun in favour of devaluation. In March 1935 the flight of capital went on at a greater rate than ever. The banks felt that they were in danger, and the Government was obliged to exercise a strict supervision over the exchanges. This was the prelude to devaluation, which was fast becoming inevitable. M. Theunis resigned, and the King called on M. Van Zeeland to form a new Government. The result was a Government of national union, in which the three traditional parties—the Catholic, the Liberal and the Socialist—each had a part. The new Cabinet set about devaluing the currency. The value of the franc, which was tied to gold, was reduced by 28 per cent. And shortly after the Cabinet ordered the conversion of Government stock, of which the rate of interest was fixed at the uniform figure of 4 per cent. This conversion lightened the public debt to the extent of 600 million francs; and, like devaluation, it was acquiesced in by the nation with courage and composure. Thanks to a striking discipline, to which the commercial world did not show itself refractory, it was only slowly that prices rose, and the degree to which they rose was inconsiderable. Confidence was restored; the fog lifted; the spirit of initiative made its appearance again. And, last year, the Brussels Exhibition brought thousands of visitors to Belgium and, by its splendid display and the capacity for organisation which it revealed, bore witness to a magnificent awakening of the national energies.

In short, it may be said that there has been a considerable improvement in the economic and financial position of the country since M. Van Zeeland's Government first entered upon office. The Budget has been balanced, in spite of the fact that there have been abatements of taxation; the credit of the State is in a sound condition; Government stock is at par. Everything indicates that business has entered upon a new lease of life. Since 1924 the consumption of electricity has gone up by 20 per cent.; and the number of railway-trucks allocated to industry has increased by 23 per cent. The tonnage of vessels entering and leaving Antwerp harbour grows ever larger. The number of the unemployed

has been reduced by 40 per cent. or more. Business inside the country has been revived owing to the rise of wholesale prices. On the other hand, the cost of living has risen by 10 to 11 per cent. Finally, business with foreign countries is constantly on the up grade. The figure for the increase of exports during the third quarter of 1936 stands at 25 per cent. compared with that for the corresponding period of 1935, and at 63 per cent. compared with that for the corresponding period of 1934.

The social condition of the country has not been seriously disturbed. Since the war, and in spite of the trials incidental to a time of reconstruction and crisis, no upheavals have thrown the working classes into disorder. It is true that we have been worried by strikes, in some measure a consequence of the troubles which took place a few months ago in France, when the Front Populaire Government was established in that country, but these have been brought to a conclusion without any untoward incidents. They coincided with the reconstruction of the Cabinet which followed the elections of May last. These elections modified the constitution of Parliament and led to a change in the strength of each of the traditional parties.

A new party made its appearance, the Rexists, a label derived from Rex, the term applied to it by its creator and leader, a young political agitator named M. Degrelle. This party succeeded in gaining twenty-one seats, won for the most part from the Catholics. The Communists gained seats at the expense of the Socialists. Finally, the Flemish Nationalists, who stand for the autonomy of Flanders and are no lovers of the Belgian State, won a few seats. The Liberal Party was left practically as it was before.

But the Catholic Party, which before had been the most numerous of all, was from now on weaker than the Socialist Party. It had faced the elections in conditions that were far from propitious. Dissensions had split it up into sections. Of its former great leaders none remained. Several of the important figures under whose guidance it had advanced had become engaged in financial and industrial enterprises which had been ruined or severely shaken by the crisis; a sharp reaction of public opinion against the mixing up of business and politics had constrained them to withdraw into private

life. It is this weakening of the Catholic Party which led to the emergence of Rexism. A fervent section of the Catholic youth, wearied of the past, and seeking a leader and a direction, followed Degrelle, who has the gift of playing on the passions of people; his somewhat cheap eloquence is lively, telling and entertaining, and it is the sort that is very successful with crowds.

This new party began with a moral campaign against the members of Parliament who had been involved in banking and other financial transactions. And this healthy operation of cleansing aroused no small amount of public sympathy. When the elections followed, the attraction of novelty, the appearance of young men who held out vaguely glittering hopes of renovation, the discontent aroused in the lower middle class by the crisis, the disgust inspired in certain quarters by the combinations of party groups—all this drove crowds of electors towards the Rexists. M. Degrelle himself was not a candidate. Those Rexists who were elected were for the most part mediocrities with no political experience, and the outset of their career as deputies was lamentable. After the elections, M. Van Zeeland formed a new Cabinet in which he was obliged to increase by one the representation of the Socialist Party. But the Ministry retained its character of a national union, and in the two Houses it still possessed a majority ensured by an understanding between the three traditional parties.

The new Government began by introducing measures of a social nature, meant to better the living conditions of the working classes, and in particular a Bill granting workmen holidays on pay and another Bill establishing a forty-hour week in unhealthy, dangerous or excessively laborious occupations. These reforms were favourably received by the public. They proceeded from a spirit of generosity and social justice. People trusted the Government to give effect to the project of a forty-hour week, which will come into operation only by degrees, after due consultation of commissions and professional bodies representing all the interests concerned. Parliament passed these Bills in an impressive spirit of conciliation and good will. They quickly eased the tension caused by the strikes which had broken out, and which, at certain stages, gave rise to no small amount of

alarm. There was a fear that the stay-in strikes which had occurred in France might be imitated in Belgium; but the evil was obviated. The Government showed that it was resolved to forbid the occupation of factories by employees, and to enforce respect of property and to safeguard the freedom of labour. As a result, calm was quickly restored.

The Rexist Party, however, intent on discrediting the Government and Parliament, and on dealing a blow at established institutions, continued in its efforts to stir up unrest, and carried on its campaign of insult and slander; this latter objective is one of the most prominent features of its daily newspaper. Its leader declared that he would seize power, and gave notice of a huge meeting of his partisans at Brussels on Sunday, October 25: 250,000 Rexists were to concentrate in the capital for the purpose of sweeping the Government away! The manifestation was forbidden. The authorities took the steps required for the maintenance of order. The number of Rexists who turned up at the rendez-vous amounted to no more than a few thousands. The unlawful assemblies were dispersed by the police and the constabulary. Degrelle was even arrested, as were some of his acolytes, and they were detained for a few hours. The whole thing had fizzled out, and was nothing more than a fiasco. The Rexists, however, in order to increase their resources, formed an alliance with the Flemish Nationalists, who are conducting a campaign in favour of a State independent of Belgium. And this immoral move on their part aroused a storm of indignation.

To put things briefly, the utterances of the Rexists revealed tendencies hostile to the rule of freedom and democracy, a rule to which Belgium is bound in virtue of her traditions. Behind these tendencies is a leaning towards dictatorship and an imitation of the methods and the technique employed by Hitler. The Government and the traditional parties deemed that the time had come to exercise energetic and decisive action on public opinion, with a view to setting things right again in the body politic. An oratorical campaign has been launched; it is being conducted by several Ministers and by M. Van Zeeland himself, who has eloquently harangued audiences and stirred them to enthusiasm. The Socialist Party, the Catholic Party and the

Liberal Party (this last is now under the direction of M. Laveleye, a young man who has recently appeared on the political scene), following the lead given by the Government, are successfully carrying on the struggle against Fascist dictatorship and against Communism, in the name of order, liberty and national union. Everything indicates that this patriotic movement will win the approval of the immense majority of the Belgian people, and that the Government will be able to pursue in peace, and with the cordial co-operation of the traditional parties, the work of economic and moral purification in view of which it has been formed, and at the same time the consideration and application of certain political and social reforms called for by the spirit and the exigencies of our time.

The King, recently, in a speech full of wisdom, delivered on the occasion of the centenary of our provincial system of law, inculcated composure, discipline and concord. He drew attention to the possible danger resulting from a state of intellectual unrest prolonged beyond a certain stage, and pointed out that the desirable reforms could be achieved within the framework of the fundamental institutions of the nation. His noble call for toleration and moderation exercised a very salutary influence. Common-sense is one of the sound basic qualities of the Belgian character. Freedom has its roots in the very soil of the country. Belgium will courageously persevere along the path of strenuous labour, and will not allow itself to be led astray into chimerical adventures.

The orientation of Belgian foreign policy has given rise to various interpretations, some of which are erroneous and others, again, even malicious. The main lines of this policy were laid down as long as four months ago by M. Spaak, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a speech to the Press, and also enunciated in a royal address which caused a great stir both at home and abroad.

The King's speech, which was not originally meant to be made public, was delivered to the Ministers at the opening of a Cabinet Meeting summoned to secure the adoption by the Government of a Bill aimed at strengthening the national defences; and the Ministers, deeply impressed by the King's words, craved his permission to have them published. The

royal speech emphasised the new dangers to which Belgium is exposed:

(1) Germany's rearmament;
(2) The reoccupation of the Rhineland;
(3) The transformation of the science of war;
(4) Technical progress in the domain of aviation and of mechanisation in general.

It pointed out the way in which the foundations of international security had been shaken by infringement of treaties and by the difficulty of adapting the stipulations of the Pact of the League of Nations to the condition of the world as it is to-day. These various considerations (which are nothing more than the recognition of unquestionable facts), viewed as a whole, impose upon Belgium the necessity of making a large effort to render her military defences more adequate than they have been hitherto.

The Government has tabled a Bill which, proceeding from the deliberations of a special Commission, has in view the extension of the term of military service to eighteen months, in order to provide the forces necessary for the protection of the frontiers and for the covering of the operations of mobilisation, in case of sudden attack from any quarter. This project completes the items of expenditure earmarked for war material and fortifications; at the present moment it is under discussion in the House of Representatives.

But these Bills increasing military expenditure are naturally not very popular, and, particularly in the Flemish part of the country, they are meeting with a certain amount of opposition, arising from the fear that Belgium may be involving herself in the hurly-burly of competing international interests, and may thereby be dragged into a war that has no bearing upon any of the matters that concern her vitally. Moreover, the military agreement concluded in 1920 by the French and Belgian Governments has not ceased to engender suspicion in Flemish regions, in spite of the most definite explanations and assurances. It was thought that behind this agreement lay a political understanding, and perhaps even a secret alliance. In order to dissipate these fears, the writer, at that time Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared in the House on March 4, 1931, after securing M. Briand's assent, that the agreement in question had no

other aim than to bring the General Staffs of the two countries into contact with each other, in order that they might decide on the technical measures that should be adopted with a view to warding off an unprovoked aggression, in case the two countries should decide to act in common. This agreement, he pointed out, entailed no obligation of a political nature. The only political obligations incumbent on Belgium were those proceeding from the Pact of the League of Nations and from the Treaty of Locarno; and henceforth the military agreement took its place within the framework of this latter Treaty. M. Van Zeeland, in his turn, on March 11 last, announced, after conducting negotiations with Paris, that the Agreement of 1920 was no longer in force, but that the two countries had decided to maintain the contact between the General Staffs.

Suspicion, however, continued active in certain quarters. There is a fear that conflicts breaking out in distant territories may widen into a general struggle owing to the interaction of a system of pacts, and that Belgium may find herself engaged in such a struggle. That is why the Government has thought it necessary to define the position of Belgium in the present European situation. The policy outlined by the Government, of which the King's speech is the supreme expression, is by no means new. It would be a mistake to regard it as marking anything in the way of a break or an innovation. It represents an adaptation to the realities of the present time.

Over the space of the past ten years the state of Europe has undergone considerable modification, and we must be prepared to take an objective view of the facts. In 1925 Germany was no more than a second-rate Power, and, as a mark of her rehabilitation, she sought admission to the League of Nations, whose authority at that time was on the increase. The Locarno Pact, by mutual obligations solemnly undertaken, ensured the stability of Western Europe and thus appeared to be an effective guarantee of peace. The problems of Central and Eastern Europe had not yet arisen. It seemed that a period was at hand in which the relations between the countries of Europe would be less stained and more harmonious.

What a different picture is presented by the world to-day!

Germany has become once again a great military Power, and she makes a religion of Power and Race. Clouds are gathering in Central and Eastern Europe. The rivalry of States is intensified and made more complex by the collision of opposed political creeds. Moreover, two facts of considerable import render the state of affairs in general more delicate and more hazardous still, and are a cause of great anxiety in Belgium. The one of these is the repudiation of the Treaty of Locarno and the consequent loss of protection afforded to Belgium by the barrier of the Rhine. The other is the weakening of the League of Nations and of the guarantees afforded by the system of collective security. It would be idle to pretend that what has happened in Manchukuo and Abyssinia has not seriously diminished the authority of the League of Nations. It has been proved beyond all possible doubt that the working of the system is a lengthy and complicated affair. Twice action on the part of the League has ended in failure. And the League can grow, work efficiently, and retain its prestige, only in an atmosphere of international co-operation and good will. The spirit out of which it arose is at present undergoing an eclipse. The dangers resulting from this state of things is being felt everywhere. Everywhere are nations arming or rearming. This explains the state of opinion in Belgium and the attitude adopted by the Belgian Government. Belgium means to keep away from the clash of international rivalries in which her honour and her vital interests are not involved, to pursue an independent policy, and to take whatever steps may be necessary to protect her from attack. This policy is not new. It was enunciated in the House on March 4, 1931, by the Government of the day, and it met with universal approval. The present Government has done no more than confirm and define it still further.

Certain foreign newspapers have spread a damaging story to the effect that Belgium is preparing to throw over her friends. This is altogether untrue. Belgium remains faithful to her friends. She has not forgotten the war, the help given her by France and England, the emotions aroused by ordeals faced in common. But no more to-day than yesterday does she wish to have anything to do with an alliance or with any connexion that would subordinate her to the political designs of another Power.

She has also been represented as seeking to restore the state of neutrality obtaining before the war. Nothing could be further from the truth, as M. Spaak, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared in the House. The guaranteed neutrality referred to was imposed on Belgium in 1839 by the five great nations of that time who constituted the balance of power and who saw in Belgian neutrality an element making for the peace of Europe. The war put an end to this balance of power. Belgium has no intention of returning to her status under it. But she will go on applying a policy sometimes described as one of neutrality; this, however, is an ambiguous term, and it would be better to call it a policy of independence.

Again, it has been said that the Belgian Government means to withdraw from the League of Nations or to evade the international obligations of a general character imposed by the Pact on the members of the League. M. Spaak has given the lie to this accusation. We Belgians are suffering from the crisis which the League is at present undergoing. This crisis has caused us the keenest disappointment. We have energetically and wholeheartedly collaborated in the work of the League. We continue to regard the principles of the Covenant as an ideal to be striven after, and it is our wish that the nations should draw ever nearer to this ideal. And we believe that on several occasions of late it has been proved that the League is an international necessity. All the same, we cannot consider that, as things are at present, it affords a guarantee sufficiently sure or sufficiently rapid in its application. To sum up: no Belgian Government would dare to think of repudiating our international liabilities. We are in the habit of keeping our word.

But before long delicate negotiations will be begun with a view to replacing the Treaty of Locarno by a new international agreement. And the attention of Belgium at present is fixed on the problem of defining her position to-day and in the future. Her place geographically makes her a natural barrier. Thus history has given her a hazardous part to play, and she will go on playing this part. She is intent on ensuring, by her army and her fortifications, that her territory shall not be used as a base of operations or as a thoroughfare by a foreign army, and shall not become a battlefield for the

settlement of disputes between the great Powers. Her aim, as the King put it, is to avert the danger of war. Is it reasonable to expect her, in the present state of Europe, to remain, in accordance with the Locarno Pact, a guaranteeing Power with respect to two such powerful countries as France and Germany? Is it not legitimate for Belgium to think of adjusting her obligations to her actual means and resources? It would be absurd to imagine that she could, in any given conjunture, send a neighbouring State help in the shape of men or arms. All the strength she could put forth in case of attack would be employed in securing her own defences. By preserving the integrity of her territory, by averting war, by preventing other nations from attempting to use her soil as a base from which to launch an attack on an enemy, Belgium will render a service to the cause of international order and peace, and thus will she best fulfil all her real obligations.

Such are the problems which face us, and the ideas which inform the policy of the Belgian Government to-day. It is beyond all question that these ideas have the whole weight of national opinion behind them.

PAUL HYMANS.

RENEW OR DIE!

Renew or Die! Renew the agelong flame,
Or know that pride of race and crown of worth
Shall pass and leave the shadow of a name
To speak of our inheritance on earth.

By Sir Leo Chiozza Money

The suppression of life is the destruction of life, and that destruction has gone so far in the United Kingdom that nothing short of drastic action can check the many active agencies of destruction. There has been a certain conversion of opinion since, in August 1931, I contributed to these pages an article entitled 'A Declining People,' but the conversion comes late. The number of British boys and girls who will attain the age of twenty-one in 1956 was definitely settled last year, and no talk can now alter it. The number of young fertile women who will exist in England in the near future has been already decided by the small number of girl children born in recent years. The rapidity of the destruction is appalling. When I wrote in 1931, the children born in England and Wales in the previous year had numbered 648,811, as compared with 881,890 in 1913. In 1936 we know that the 648,811 of 1930 fell to 599,167 in 1935. So, in the twenty-two years since the World War began, the annual increment of new lives fell by no less than 282,723. In 1901 the births numbered 930,000. The children of a generation ago, adults to-day, are not reproducing themselves; roundly, each nine of them have given the nation only six successors: what will the six do in their turn?

It follows that the schools are emptying. In 1914–15, the London County Council reports, there were 727,052 children in the schools of London; for 1936–37 the estimates provide for 475,000! This incredible thing has taken the

liberty of becoming fact. Worse is to follow. In 1933 the Government actuary estimated that in the then next fifteen years the number of children in England and Wales would fall by a million. The Education Office is at last bestirring itself to suggest the building of model schools—an ironic effort when the need for schools is disappearing.

Vital statistics, as regularly published, make little impression upon the public mind. Few people realise that the present small excess of births over deaths results from the survival of the ageing survivors of a prolific generation, and that as the members of the older and larger families die out, the failure to replace them will reveal itself in actual decline. Virtual decline is already established. The prolongation of life by hygiene has helped to disguise the truth. The death rate has fallen, mainly because of the reduction in infantile mortality, which cannot go much further. If every person now living lived to be a centenarian, the nation would not be saved from decline if the present condition of natality continued. The essential point is replacement; and if there is failure to produce new lives, extreme longevity merely shifts the date of actual decline of the aggregate population. With the rate of fertility which has existed in the land since 1923, when the birth rate fell below the figure needed to replace the population, the English people must die out, no matter what may be done to reduce the death rate.

Between 1851 and 1881 the English birth rate hardly moved, ranging around 34. Between 1881 and 1901 the decline was not very great, from 33·9 to 28·5, still leaving the nation with a future. Between 1901 and 1914 there was a moderate decline from 28·5 to 24·1. The war years masked change, and in 1920 there was recovery to 25·5, only 3 points less than in 1901. Then followed rapid decline to the nadir of 1933, when the rate was 14·4. In 1934 there was a fractional recovery to 14·8; in 1935 there was a resumed decline to 14·7. Thus the average for the three years 1933–35 is about 14·6. Mr. S. P. Vivian, C.B., the Registrar-General, puts the birth rate needed, merely to replace the existing population without increase, at 19·5. Thus we are roundly 5 points *below replacement rate*. The last year in which the replacement rate was recorded was 1923, when the rate was 19·7. Thus already there have been twelve years of virtual

decline. For the United Kingdom as a whole the condition is much the same.

If an enemy had done this thing! An enemy did his worst in 1914–18, in which four years he succeeded in killing 574,354 British lives. (This number includes the officers and men who died from wounds or sickness down to September 1919.) Thus the Germans destroyed our soldiers at the rate of roundly 144,000 a year. The people of England and Wales since the war (to say nothing of Scotland and Ireland) have been suppressing lives (taking the natality standard of 1913 for comparison) by an annual number increasing from 150,000 in 1924 to 280,000 in 1935. In the last twelve years, again measuring by the same so recent standard, the people of England and Wales have suppressed over 2,800,000 lives, a number which makes the casualties of the World War look trifling.

If the birth rate is reckoned, not per 1000 of the entire population, but per 1000 of the women aged fifteen to forty-five, we get a 'fertility rate' which was 97·5 in 1913, 75·8 in 1924, and 59·5 last year. This is a crude comparison, because it does not take account of the variation in the average age of the women aged fifteen to forty-five within the period of comparison, but the fall is so startling that we need not trouble ourselves with statistical refinements; when a quart shrinks to a pint, no precise measurement is needed to establish the fact.

To state the problem in the simplest terms, let us suppose a nation to consist entirely of healthy, fertile, mated pairs, each pair having two healthy children who in their turn all live to be adults mating in pairs, each such pair again producing two healthy children. In such conditions of exact replacement, mated pairs succeeding mated pairs, the population would obviously remain stationary, neither decreasing nor increasing. If the pairs each produced three children, the population would increase by one-half in a generation. If the pairs produced less than two children, the population would fall. But to make good the wastage arising from lives that never reach marriageable age, and the many who never marry, it is roundly necessary for the married to produce three children if the population is to hold its own.

In England a large part of the population, for various

reasons, is unmated, and the mated pairs are largely infertile. The number of unmarried women of ages fifteen to forty-five is about 5,000,000. Of those who are married, a large proportion have no children; there are over 1,000,000 childless homes. A further large proportion of families are restricted to one or two children: there are 2,500,000 one-child homes; 1,350,000 two-child homes. For Britain this means a fast approaching decline in population. The date of the beginning of this certain decline depends upon the degree in which the existing low fertility rate remains stable, upon the possibility of still further reducing the death rate, and upon the degree of migration. There is, unfortunately, no guarantee that the birth rate will not sink to the 13 per 1000 which is alarming Sweden, or to the 10 or 12 per 1000 it has already reached in some English districts; a further reduction of the death rate can only operate within narrow limits and can do nothing to increase the number of women of fertile age in the near future; the resumption of migration on the pre-war scale would immediately and seriously reduce a population which has a present annual nominal increase of about 120,000.

To speak of migration is to remind ourselves of the peopling of the Britains overseas. The population of the Empire (1935) is roundly 480,000,000, or nearly a fourth of the world's population. Of these some 72,000,000 are whites, about 64,000,000 of the whites being English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish. *Thus the number of British people in the Empire is smaller than the population of the German Reich, which in* 1935, *with the restored Saar, was about* 66,000,000.

I give a brief analysis of the Empire's white population in round figures:

British Empire: White Population at end of 1934.

Europe	United Kingdom	46,700,000
	Irish Free State	3,000,000
	Others	260,000
Asia		300,000
Africa	Union of South Africa	1,850,000
	Others	200,000
America	Canada	10,700,000
	Newfoundland	280,000
	Others	50,000

South Seas	Australia	6,700,000
	New Zealand	1,600,000
	Others	5,000
	Total	71,645,000

Before the war the United Kingdom could furnish new lands with hundreds of thousands of migrants every year without diminution of domestic economic power. In 1913 the balance of passengers outward to non-European countries was 329,000. Now we are in the strange position of receiving a balance of immigrants from the poorly peopled Dominions. It is a primary interest of the Empire that there should be again set up a stream of migrants from the mother country to the overseas Empire. How is this crying need to be met when what is a remedy for Colonial sterility spells a nearer doom for England? Outside the British Isles there are some 22,000,000 whites in all the far-flung Dominions of the Crown. Stephen Leacock, the famous Canadian professor of economics, terms his land 'Empty Country,' and the expression is true of other great Imperial areas. The world's useful land area is very limited, not exceeding 34,000,000 square miles, and mankind as a whole needs its best use. The peopling of the Empire must proceed, and we are faced with the narrow restriction of families both here and in the overseas Britains.

Consider Australia, a great continent with a population of less than 7,000,000, where within the area of a circle of 400 miles radius, the circumference of which passes through Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, there are 500,000 square miles of territory abounding in fertility and minerals. This area is as big as England, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Hungary, and Czechoslavakia put together, and these countries have an aggregate population of over 200,000,000. The birth rate of Australia is down to 16·8, and in the first half of this year she had a migration outwards of 3928.

As Mr. J. A. Lyons, speaking as Prime Minister of Australia, said at Adelaide in March 1936, 'Australia cannot justify her position so long as she is not occupying her lands adequately. The time has come when we must re-examine the question of migration.'

Lord Bledisloe warns New Zealand that her economy is frustrated and her political future endangered because her rich area of 103,000 square miles, nearly as big as that of the United Kingdom, is the home of only 1,600,000 people, who are failing to reproduce themselves; the birth rate is 16·6. Canada has 3,729,000 square miles of area and a population of less than 11,000,000, about 4,000,000 of whom are of French blood, who, unlike the Frenchmen of France, are still fertile. The native British are not reproducing themselves. The Union of South Africa has still a very small population; the birth rate is 23, but the British are dying out. On an area of 473,000 square miles there is now a population of some 8,500,000. The Europeans number only 1,900,000, of whom some 725,000 are British, facts which are clearly reflected in the composition of the Union Government. The native population rapidly grows, for its birth rate is high and its death rate falling. By 1961, as things go, there will be 20,000,000 natives and a negligible number of whites.

Mr. C. W. Cousins, late director of the South African Census, has said:

> The whites must welcome, and indeed invite and attract, immigrants from Europe, or go under. Failing this, South Africa must for ever abandon the prospect of maintaining a white civilisation except as a proportionately diminishing minority and in face of an increasing, and at last an overwhelming, majority. It may then be forced to abandon its domination, or even to abandon the country. It may accept the solution of degeneracy, and perpetuate a Eurafrican civilization.

Dr. Holloway, successor to Mr. Cousins, has pointed out that the Union is losing native-born South Africans, and especially British citizens, the small increase in aggregate being due to foreign immigrants. The Union governs under mandate the great territory of South-West Africa, conquered from Germany, which has an area of 322,000 square miles, and aspires to the control of the bordering Imperial protectorates, with their aggregate native population of approximately 1,000,000. These ambitions are sadly at variance with the facts of white population.

We must bring ourselves to realise that race suicide is very much more effective than war as a means of changing

the status of nations and the history of the world. For observe what happened to France, the leader of national self-destruction. When, two generations ago, Napoleon III. put everything to the hazard of war, he was at least entitled to suppose that France could enter the struggle with high hopes of success. It was by no means certain that he would have to fight a united Germany, and all Germany counted no more than 37,000,000 people against the 38,000,000 of France.

France, having been beaten by Germany, then proceeded, in a most thorough-going way, to make it impossible for her ever to meet Germany again on level terms. An incredible thing embodied itself in cold fact. *Between Sedan and the opening of the World War—only forty-four years—the* 37,000,000 *Germans grew to, roundly,* 65,000,000, *while the* 38,000,000 *Frenchmen grew, with the aid of much foreign immigration, to* 40,000,000. France is no longer able to defend herself. That was why millions of English boys fought in France in 1914–18. They took the place of boys which French parents preferred to leave unborn. The process of self-immolation continues. In 1913, without Alsace-Lorraine, France numbered 39,700,000; to-day, despite the addition of Alsace-Lorraine, the entire population of France is roundly where it was in 1913.

There is a certain lack of vitality in France which has naturally arisen from her repression of life. Her population contains an undue proportion of the elderly and old. We are suffering in the same way. The burden of the aged increases; year by year England as an entity is growing old. As Mussolini has put it:

> It is true that even nations grow old, and at a given moment the inexorable law of Nature makes itself felt. These nations will witness the tremendous downfall of their populations, because although a hygienic way of living may be a means of prolonging life—and you have shown me that in Italy the average of human life has increased by 12—yet at a given moment the sickle falls.

What folly to speak, as some do, of aiming at *quality* rather than quantity when to fail in children is to rob a nation of its youth and of the spirit of adventure! The British Empire was founded and built by a great stream of adventurous spirits

who went out to subdue the wilds and to colonise them. To-day it is as difficult to make an emigrant as to enlist a recruit, and we read melancholy stories of disgruntled emigrants who find the wilds exceedingly rough and demand to be taken home again.

There is this to say about quality and quantity, that both are diminishing. It is not true that the masses are breeding too freely—for such a fall in the birth rate as has occurred within the last half generation is admittedly the result of mass limitation of reproduction—but the lead in birth control was given by the gifted minority and the nation must therefore have lost in quality even more than in quantity. The average number of children to the credit of the present Front Bench is two; to the credit of members of Parliament as a whole probably no more. It is unlikely that this article will be read by any appreciable number of readers with as many as four children.

It is small consolation to know that a falling birth rate is a general phenomenon of white civilisation. In 1925 I directed attention, in *The Peril of the White*, to the fact that in 1921 the world's population could be put at 1,852,000,000 (it is about 2,100,000,000 in 1936), and that less than one-third (603,000,000) were whites, and said:

> It is for ever true that we must renew or die. The European stock cannot presume to hold magnificent areas indefinitely, even while it refuses to people them, and to deny their use and cultivation to races which sorely need them.

Of the seven Great Powers, Soviet Russia, Japan and Italy are growing in population, while Britain (including the Britons of the oversea Dominions), Germany, France and the United States are in decline. Although America has only forty people to the square mile of a rich territory, her people are not reproducing themselves. As recently as 1915 the birth rate in the American registration area was 25·1; in 1934 it was 17·1.

While white decline has been so widespread, two nations, Italy and Germany, demand our attention as having apparently checked the march to extinction. The recent birth rates of England, Germany, Italy and France are here compared:

ENGLAND, GERMANY, ITALY AND FRANCE: BIRTH RATES SINCE 1900
(per 1000 of population)

England and Wales.		Germany.	Italy.	France.
Mean of				
1900–05	28·2	35·5	33·5	21·7
1912	23·9	28·3	32·4	18·9
1915	21·9	20·4	30·5	11·3
1918 (war)	17·7	14·3	17·9	12·1
1921	22·4	25·3	30·3	20·7
1923	19·7	21·6	30·0	19·4
1929	16·3	17·9	25·6	17·7
1930	16·3	17·5	26·7	18·0
1931	15·8	16·0	24·9	17·4
1932	15·3	15·1	23·8	17·3
1933	14·4	14·7	23·7	16·2
1934	14·8	18·0	23·4	16·1
1935	14·7	18·9	23·3	15·2

Italy and Germany, which as recently as 1900–05 were so prolific that their average birth rates for that period were 33·5 and 35·5 respectively, while that of England had already fallen to 28·2 and that of France to 21·7, suffered thereafter so serious a decline that in 1929 the Italian rate was 25·6 and the German rate 17·9. The German rate continued to fall heavily, and sank to 14·7 in 1933, while the Italian rate fell comparatively little—to 23·7. Then Germany made a sharp recovery to 18·9 in 1935—*i.e.*, nearly to replacement rate—while Italy after 1932 maintained her rate, within 0·5, at 23·3, or well above replacement rate.

While Italy and Germany thus checked a disastrous fall from a high fertility, England and France continued to decline from a poor fertility, so that last year the comparative rates became: Italy, 23·3; Germany, 18·9; France, 15·2; England, 14·7. These comparisons become the more remarkable when we remember that the Italian and German efforts, which we shall presently examine, were made in a period of acute world depression by deprived and frustrated nations, lacking colonies, raw materials, and, in the case of Italy, even native fuel. Few people realise that two-thirds of the small Italian area are naturally infertile. And we may well reflect upon what the birth rates of these two countries would have

become had social disintegration continued unchecked within their borders.

Fortunately, it is not true that nothing we can now do in England can prevent a continuing decline in population: what is true is that virtual decline already exists, and that we cannot undo the results of the recent fall in fertility, results which will be soon inevitably expressed in a period of actual decline; from that period we can make a new advance by a renewal of fertility. This brings us to remedies.

Italy and Germany (as I think, but 'for forms of government let fools contest'!) have been fortunate in finding leaders in two men who, differing in many things, are alike in realising the fundamental conditions of national vitality. Both resolved to arrest the growth of urban at the expense of rural life; both have accomplished much in creating new and retenanting old lands: in thus creating healthy employment, both have created life. There can be no possible doubt that this factor has played its part in checking depopulation in both countries. On the land there is a proper place for children (as soon as a child can walk he can rejoice in the knowledge that he is of some use: he is never 'unwanted'); in the town the child becomes too often an unhappy accident. In adding, in effect, millions of acres to their countries, Mussolini and Hitler have added millions of people to the future populations of Italy and Germany. Who makes land makes men!

Professor G. C. Baravelli has sketched in his *Integral Land Reclamation in Italy* the astonishing accomplishments of Italy in adding to her effective area. From 1870 to 1922 Italian land reclamation had dealt with 1,390,000 hectares. In 1923–34 4,300,000 hectares (over 10,000,000 acres) had been in large part reclaimed. Once fevered marsh lands bear flourishing farms. Mighty works have been completed in the Pontine area, the Adriatic zone, Ferrara, Apulia, Sicily, Venice and elsewhere. Thus Mussolini, speaking at Littoria, one of the new cities of the reclaimed Roman Campagna, in the great square where now citizens gather to hear splendid musical performances:

Reflect that here, only three years ago, the deadly marsh land reigned. We have pledged ourselves to a stern campaign. We had against us Nature, material conditions and—even worse—scepticism, the mental

inertia and moral cowardice of those who, before the beginning of the battle, wish to be mathematically certain of the victory; while for us the conflict is even more important than the victory, for when the battle is undertaken with resolution, victory is infallibly its crown.

Victory indeed, when we remember that the area of this redeemed new province of Littoria now maintains 215,000 people, an increase of 175,000. In many other districts the redemption of waste, the creation of the conditions of life, have not been less remarkable. I should make it plain that these reclamations are not exclusively concerned with agriculture. Usually they are associated with hydraulic power operations that create 'white coal,' establish new industries, and give economic balance to great domains. The Italian engineer makes his power cable the equivalent of a canal—an agent of irrigation.

How remarkable, too, the work of Hitler in adding at once to the fertility of German land and the fecundity of German people. He had to tackle the unemployment of 6,000,000, and by a series of commensurate operations he reduced this figure to comparative insignificance while inspiring those he led with devotion to the common good. Mr. Lloyd George tells how he found fine crops growing upon what was marsh before Hitler. We hear so much of the German soldier; we are told too little of the German spade. Yet even through the wall of prejudice there have broken reports of the recent parade of 43,000 members of the Labour Corps, 'each man shouldering a bright-bladed spade,' full of a proper pride and singing words of duty and devotion that only fools could scoff at. I well remember that years ago I ventured to speak of a time to come when labour battalions would march like good soldiers upon the waste to subdue it; I have lived, not to see this done in England, but to hear it reported from places abroad. No longer for Germany, declared the German Führer, 'are towns to flare while villages are sacked'; the German 'takes another path.' Hitler matches deeds with words. In a report on recent German progress, our Overseas Trade Department points out how the Nazi *régime*, making the land its first care, has created some 700,000 farms that cannot be distrained upon; has turned back a host of former agricultural labourers to the soil; has divided big estates to create small-holders; has recreated a great land population

and provided it with the means of scientific work, four out of five German farmers now using electric power.

Is the waste of British land to continue, with its concomitants of crowded town populations, condemned to deterioration? The law of Nature is relentless:

> *And now, within his walls, the Rebel pales*
> *And Nature is revenged. Denatured men,*
> *O'ertasked and weary with the work that fails,*
> *Refuse to breed them sons to share their pain;*
> *And women, robbed of birth right, seek to drown*
> *In mirthless pleasure what they owe the town.*

Dame Mary Scharlieb, the veteran gynæcologist, thus describes the effect of town life upon motherhood:

> The excitement of the life women lead and the practice of artificial control put their nervous systems out of order. They put off having babies, and then when they want them they cannot have them. They become nervously unfit for child-bearing.—*Daily Mail*, March 10, 1936.

We should not lightly gird at the only national leaders who face such essential facts and who have the courage to speak to great peoples of duties as well as of rights. In both Italy and Germany it is recognised that the woman is the fountain of the race and that the physical and moral power of the nation rests in the well-being of mother and child. Italy is justly proud of her National Maternity and Child Welfare Institution, which was legally established at the end of 1925 and greatly improved in 1933. This institution, working in every commune and village and using every scientific arm, protects and guides maternity. It cherishes mothers before, during and after confinement, and cares for the physical and moral welfare of children before and during school age. Its principle is that each new life is something to welcome and to treasure, and each mother a very precious thing. Who can doubt that such efforts, extended to every part of Italy, not only add to the number of children, but to the quality of the race by educating all that is best in it? The 'expectation of life' at every age from five to twenty-five is higher in Italy and Germany than in Britain. They are delightful pictures of happy child life that are coming from the Italy that is so often amusingly described as groaning in chains. And when I hear of maternity lectures to Italian women factory-workers, eagerly attended, I think of the schooling of the women

factory-workers of England. No such lectures are included in the programmes of our women's institutes; they are too busy with their 'jolly competitions.'

In Germany a great degree of success has attended a law of 1933 attacking several problems, including that of population by providing loans free of interest for healthy couples wishing to marry. While the free Briton goes to the hire-purchase merchant, who lends cheaper stuff than money, the enslaved German borrows £30 from his Government and repays it at the rate of a shilling a month for every 100 shillings borrowed; this 1 per cent. cancels capital, no interest being charged. When a baby is born—a baby inevitable in such charming and hitherto incredible circumstances—a fourth of the loan is cancelled and instalments suspended for twelve months. Need we wonder that the German birth rate recovered in 1934–35? By this time (October 1936) some 700,000 such loans have been made, and 1,400,000 young Germans set up in homes. That the homes are fruitful we need not consult statistics to discover, but the figures go far to prove what common sense would suggest.

By an ingenious provision, the home-making law affects employment. Young women, to be eligible for the home loans, have to be workers for gain, and to leave their work upon marriage. Thus hundreds of thousands of young women have been taken off the labour market to make room for men. (I would some power would take our women out of many of the dreadful jobs they do—file-cutting, for example; but are they not free women?)

In both Italy and Germany taxes are mitigated for family men, and bachelors frowned upon for State employment. It is more years than I care to think since the present writer first suggested in the House of Commons the relief of the married taxpayer and the penal taxation of bachelors as 'incomplete citizens.' (Cheers.) After some time the thing was done, after a fashion, by granting rebates; so much off for a wife and so much more off for each young child. The 'so much' has never yet become as wide as a church door, but it serves as recognition of a principle which should be put boldly into practice. England sorely needs families of three children merely to maintain the existing population; let Mr. Chamberlain encourage National Friend No. 3 by a very

liberal reduction of taxation, and let him apply this provision to all incomes under £1000 a year.

Akin in principle to taxation relief, but of much greater importance, is the 'family allowance' system—the remuneration of a man according to family needs. In the war we naturally related 'separation allowance' to the number of the soldier's dependants. So with unemployment benefit; so much (or so little) is paid for each child. Thus, while the workman, of whatever family or no family, pays a flat-rate premium, the benefit, paid out of the common stamp pool, varies with family need. These two illustrations, from war and peace, constitute the case for and embody the principle that wage should vary with the number of dependent children of the wage-earner.

The family allowance system has caught on in many places, but it is in France that most progress has been made. The French system was voluntary until 1932, and according to M. Bonvoisin, the Director-General of the Central Committee for Family Allowances, there were in that year 255 Equalisation Funds benefiting 1,850,000 employees. The Equalisation Fund successfully solves the difficulty that if an employer adopted the plan as an individual he might be tempted to give preferential employment to bachelors or married men with few dependants. The fund (*Caisse de Compensation*) pools the cost of family allowances. From the pool formed by a group of employers in an industry or place, the cost of the family allowances is distributed among the employers in the group in proportion to the size of their businesses and independently of the families of their employees. The institution of these funds has had happy and unlooked-for results in stimulating social services to mothers and children, and M. Bonvoisin declares that the birth rate in families receiving the allowance is 50 per cent. greater than that of the general French population.

In 1932 the French Government made the payment of family allowances obligatory upon all employers of manual workers, including farmers; the law recognised the established funds and fixed minimum payments varying for different regions. The average allowance for three children is 118 francs a month, or, say, 5*s*. 10*d*. a week. In 1935 the population affected by the new law numbered 5,250,000,

and the family allowances amounted to 2,000,000,000 francs.

It cannot be said that the family allowance plan has yet made any detectable impression on the French birth rate, although it must have mitigated decline. France, unhappily, is a land in which the suppression of life is an old social custom, which too frequently goes the length of abortion. Those who fight for the life of France have a hard row to hoe, and such expedients as bounties for a third child are doomed to failure. However, as we have seen, the good M. Bonvoisin takes a hopeful view of the results of the now legally established family allowances. And, apart from its effect upon population, the system amounts to a long overdue measure of social justice.

We have no excuse for not making every reasonable social experiment in the great issue here discussed, and, since it is useless to describe an evil without proposing a remedy, I put forward the following programme of action:

1. There should be established a Department of Maternity and Child Welfare, under a Cabinet Minister, generously financed, to assemble, co-ordinate, organise and reform all existing work of the kind at present done (as under the Maternity and Child Welfare Act), carrying its operations into every district and village, to promote respect for motherhood, to fit women to become mothers, and to make every necessary provision for the care of women before, during and after confinement, and for all children before and during school age. I see this Ministry erecting splendid maternity homes in every district, as is done in Italy.

2. There should be such a modification of the income tax law as to encourage family life in a section of the community that is leading the nation in race suicide.

3. The wage system should be modified by the payment of basic rates, supplemented by family allowances drawn from a pool furnished by employers. The allowances should be large enough to provide a fair proportion of the children's maintenance.

4. Marriage and motherhood should be directly encouraged by the provision of State dowries for healthy working women aged eighteen to thirty-five who wish to marry healthy men. The dowry, for approved expenditure,

to consist of two parts—(1) the sum of £20, not returnable, and (2) the sum of £30, advanced as a loan without interest, repayable by easy instalments over six years. In the event of a child of the marriage being born, one-half of the loan to be cancelled and instalments accordingly reduced; in the event of a second child being born, any part of the loan outstanding to be cancelled. The administration of the dowry fund to be a function of the Ministry of Maternity and Child Welfare.

5. There should be a frontal attack upon the waste and misuse of land, including a measure for the expropriation of land held out of cultivation.

This programme is certainly not for those who 'before beginning the battle wish to be mathematically certain of the victory.'

LEO CHIOZZA MONEY.

THE COWARDICE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

By The Rev. Edward Quinn

In the November issue of *The Nineteenth Century* an article entitled 'The Opium of the People' presents a severe criticism of the Catholic Church in the present age, particularly during recent months. Her past attitude over the Abyssinian question, her present views on Spain, and her constant policy in reference to the social problem are all held up as examples of cowardice and subservience to the interests of the wealthy and powerful. Coming as it does from the pen of a Catholic writer, the article will naturally arouse the interest both of the Church's friends and enemies and, if the accusations made in it are well-founded, those of us who belong to that Church, and particularly those who, like the present writer, have the task of guiding souls and teaching them their duties to one another, have good reason to weep for shame at our disgraceful neglect. Now it is certain that we have none of us done all that we might; we would indeed be guilty of the worst pride if we claimed that we had given ourselves with whole-hearted and unceasing devotion to the cause of God and of our fellow-men. God knows we are all imperfect, and we are only too ready humbly to admit that fact; but it is one thing to admit our imperfections and gently to rebuke one another for our neglect and quite another to present such an unkind and unjust criticism as that contained in the abovementioned article. The present writer, recognising his own failures and the negligence of many of his fellow-Catholics, proposes to reply to that criticism, not by commenting on all its details, but simply by setting out some of the efforts made by the Catholic Church and her members towards the solution of these problems. He is confident that the unprejudiced reader will see from this positive statement that the record of the Catholic Church, from the highest to the lowest member,

in the present age, is worthy to rank with that of any previous age.

It might seem like a Jesuitical subterfuge to insist on the distinction between the Church as a Divine Institution and the human weakness of her members, but it is true to say that the former can never fail, though her members may often be guilty of the grossest faults, and the Catholic Church as such is not in error or to be blamed if her subjects do not act in accordance with her teaching. The writer of the article recognises this, indeed, at one point, only to reject the distinction at another. 'The Church cannot fail,' he says. 'The question is, Are Catholics going to fail the Church—and the world?' Yet he holds responsible for driving Catholics into the Popular Front in Spain not other Catholics but the Church as such. 'All those Catholics, driven by necessity or ignorance into support of the Popular Front, will have to be answered for to God by the Church, that *divinely inspired Church* which has had in Spain an uninterrupted opportunity and a privileged position for nearly a thousand years.' (My italics.) Fortunately, it is not necessary to insist on the distinction. It can be shown that a representative number of the Church's members have recognised and fulfilled in an admirable manner their responsibilities to society. The official Church has not failed, nor have her leading representatives.

One would have thought that the Pope's attitude on the Abyssinian question had by this time been justified in the eyes of all who took the trouble to discover what he had actually said. Far from condoning by silence Mussolini's action, the Pope, three weeks after the Wal-Wal incident when all Europe was discussing the possibility of war and Italy had begun preparations for it, expressed his anxiety at the increase of armaments, said that he was trying to believe that they were not intended for actual war and repeated: 'We invoke peace, We bless peace, We desire peace, We pray for peace.' Then he added an unmistakable condemnation of those who preferred war to peace: 'We have another prayer. . . .' Scatter Thou the nations that delight in wars.' Impressed by the rumours of war, growing daily more prevalent, he called it, on April 1, 1935, 'a manifestation of folly so mad, that We regard it as absolutely impossible.' 'But if,' he added, 'anybody should dare to commit this crime, We shall

not be able to do otherwise than pray to God with bitterness of heart: "Scatter Thou the nations that delight in wars."' On August 27 he stated that 'a war of sheer conquest would evidently be an unjust war,' and pointed out that even a war of defence must be carried on under the strictest limitations; he was convinced, he said, that a way of solving the difficulties could be found without recourse to war of either kind. On the very eve of the opening of the war, on September 26, he expressed his hope that the needs of the Italian people, 'a great and good people—my people,' would be satisfied, 'but always with justice and peace.' It is clear that all these declarations were not merely general, but had in view a particular application—the Italo-Abyssinian question; and by no stretch of the imagination could the condemnation of war-mongers be applied to the Emperor of Abyssinia.

Large numbers of French ecclesiastics wrote and spoke against the war, and the attitude of our own Archbishop Hinsley was made sufficiently clear in his article 'White against Black in Africa' in the *Month* of October 1935, afterwards reprinted as a pamphlet.

The Catholic Press abroad, especially in France, condemned the war on the grounds of Catholic Moral Theology, and our own Catholic Press, while calling attention to the case for Italy, which had not been adequately presented in other sources to English readers, gave prominence to articles and leaders denouncing the war. The *Catholic Times* published a summary of the Pope's pronouncements, with a commentary indicating that these were especially condemnatory of Mussolini's action. The *Universe* and the *Tablet* were more or less definitely committed to opposition to the invasion, and the *Catholic Herald* admitted articles presenting all sides, but gave ample space to those which condemned the war as unjust aggression on the part of Italy. The last-named journal published an article by the present writer, claiming that the war must be judged from the standpoint of strict morality and coming down heavily against Mussolini. The *Month* and the *Christian Democrat* (read by large numbers of Catholic workers) were also very clearly against the Italian policy.

In view of this evidence, whether we sympathised with Italy or not, we must admit the injustice of the statement:

'In the case of Abyssinia the Supreme Pontiff condoned by silence, and the Catholic Press openly encouraged, the support by Catholics of an invader who not merely waged an unjust and unprovoked war, but who broke international promises and the laws of God and man by using poison gas against a primitive and defenceless people.'

Before considering the Church's attitude to the Spanish Civil War, it must be pointed out that this problem is vastly different from that of the Abyssinian invasion. It is admitted now on all sides that the Government of February of this year was elected by a minority, that, having attained power, it failed utterly to maintain order, that the Popular Front was a means adopted by Moscow to establish a non-democratic proletarian dictatorship in Spain, that the success of the Communists would have meant not only atrocities and the destruction of churches but the complete destruction of religion in Spain as in Russia. In view of the widespread disorder between the election of the Popular Front Government and the opening of the revolt, the hundreds of crimes which the Government failed to prevent or punish, it would seem that the revolt had at least as much justification as any in the course of history. Revolution, as the writer admits, is sometimes justified, and Catholic teaching, far from throwing 'an unhappy light on the Catholic support of the Spanish insurgents,' can scarcely have a practical application at all if not in the present situation.

Nor can the insurgents be justly described as 'a party undeniably representing the ideas of the deified State, secular dictatorship, extreme nationalism, and extreme militarism.' Even if Fascism be said to represent these ideas, the fact is that Fascists form only a small section of the insurgents, who include Monarchists, Conservatives, Radicals, Socialists and Republicans. They explicitly claim to be inspired by genuine national and religious ideals, to be defending Spain and the Catholic religion from a force which hates both; they promise a firm rule and a corporative government inspired rather by the example of neighbouring Portugal than by that of Italy. Where they have been successful, they have established order and tranquillity and, though demanding respect for the State, have not deified it nor governed in a spirit of secularist dictatorship. It is true that we have to wait to see

whether they will put these ideas into practice when they gain complete power, but at present all the evidence is against the suggestion that they will deify the State, become imbued with secularism, let loose the forces of extreme nationalism, or even be more militarist than is necessary to maintain order in the State or defend it against external enemies. There is every hope that Spain will become, like Portugal, a State inspired by Catholic principles, and, though vastly different from the English democratic system, its government will represent the best interests of the Spanish people.

It is misleading, too, to represent the Church as supporting 'the heathen African troops, against whom the greatest crusade in history was fought and won, instead of her own erring, Christian, Spanish children.' A sincere Mohammedan is not, strictly speaking, a heathen and, from the purely spiritual aspect, is more worthy of respect than an apostate Christian who is not content with attacking priests and nuns for real or supposed crimes against the proletariat, but who rejects all religion, commits acts of the most appalling blasphemy, and professedly hates the very name of Christ. The fact that those who commit the atrocities in Spain are baptised Catholics, far from being a ground for gentle treatment, only increases the heinousness of their crimes. Actually, the Church does not blindly support the attack on the 'Reds,' but expresses her pity for her erring children and endeavours to secure gentle treatment for them.

The Pope is widely quoted as having blessed the rebels, but few have taken the trouble to quote the beautiful words at the end of his speech to the Spanish refugees on September 14, in which he expresses the most sublime charity towards even the Church's enemies. They are worth quoting in full:

And what of the others? What is to be said of all those others who also are, and never cease to be, Our sons, in spite of their deeds and methods of persecution, so odious and so cruel, against persons and things to Us so dear and sacred?

What of those who, as far as distance permitted, have not spared Our person, and who with expressions and gestures so highly offensive have treated Us not as sons with a Father, but as foes with an enemy, who is particularly detested?

We have, beloved sons, divine precepts and examples which may seem

too difficult for poor and unaided human nature to obey and imitate, but which are in reality, with divine grace, beautiful and attractive to the Christian soul—to your souls, beloved sons—so that We cannot, and could not, for one moment, doubt as to what is left for Us to do—to love them, and to love them with a special love born of mercy and compassion, to love them, and since We can do nothing else, to pray for them; to pray that the serene vision of truth will return to their minds and will reopen their hearts to the desire and quest in brotherly love for the real common good; to pray that they may return to the Father who awaits them with such longing, and will make a joyful festival of their return; to pray that they may be one with Us, when shortly—of this We have full confidence in Almighty God and in the glorious encouragement of this present feast of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross, '*per Crucem ad lucem*'—the rainbow of peace will shine forth in the clear sky of Spain bearing the news of peace to the whole of your great and splendid country—a peace glad and abiding, the comforter of all sorrows, the healer of all wounds, the fulfilment of all just and kindly aspirations that run not counter to the common good, the harbinger of a future of ordered tranquillity and of honourable prosperity.

While blessing those 'who have assumed the difficult and dangerous task of defending and restoring the rights and honour of God and of Religion,' he warns them that defence may go beyond due limits and that a bad intention may vitiate the goodness of the act. He recalls with gratitude those 'who have sought to intervene in the name of humanity.' Here he obviously refers to those who have tried to mitigate suffering and prevent excess on either side. Far from blindly condemning international Communism, he places the responsibility for its progress on those who 'through deluded scheming and self-interest and because of disastrous rivalry and egoistic pursuit of personal supremacy, . . . do not hasten to repair the breach.' Undoubtedly many Catholics are included in that condemnation. He admits that many of these sad happenings find 'their explanation and source' in the negligence and inertia of Catholics. But these things are not the Church's responsibility; rather are they 'in full and constant opposition to, and contradiction of, all that the Church teaches and tries, with all means in her power, to have worked out in practice.' He then makes a manifest reference to the German persecution, complaining that if the Church's teaching is not effective it is largely due to the way in which it is prevented from reaching the people. The Catholic Press is restricted, he says, while free circulation is

allowed to that which vilifies the Church and discredits ecclesiastical persons and institutions and 'does not hesitate to proclaim a new Christianity.'

In the light of the above, we can estimate the value of the words at the commencement of this article: 'Only the Pope has remained comparatively silent, and this silence is as easy to interpret as that which he so jealously guarded when Mussolini marched with poison gas and high explosives to civilise the Abyssinians.' In both instances the Pope has only said a little, but he has said more than enough to repudiate the implication in this statement.

Peter was rebuked by Christ for drawing the sword in His defence, but the act was the expression of spontaneous human love, unenlightened by the infinite wisdom possessed by the Son of God. It is not to be expected that all the members of the Church will maintain the careful reservations of Christ's Vicar. In the face of attack, their whole instinct is to defend the Church even by earthly weapons. They are confirmed in that attitude by the fact that, even if Peter was not justified, there are times when justice and self-defence permit the use of the sword. It is not surprising, therefore, that 'Without hesitation the Catholic Church—priests, Press and people—has been wholeheartedly, and even fanatically, on the side of the insurgents.'

But it is an exaggeration to say: 'From nearly every Catholic pulpit the people of Spain are now damned as cordially as once they were blessed.' Here and there a preacher may have spoken of persons rather than forces, but the general trend has been to praise those who were defending the Church and attacking Bolshevism. It is, indeed, true that the Spanish insurgents have not been attacking abstract theories, but the concrete individuals who held them and put them into practice. In the pulpit, however, attention has been called to diabolical powers which misled the Spanish people, to the unquestionable threat to Christianity and all civilised order from Communism, and, in not a few cases, to the culpable neglect of Catholics in regard to the bad social conditions which give rise to Bolshevism.

The Catholic Press, for the reasons already given, was for the most part on the side of the insurgents, but the French Dominican weekly *Sept* was blamed for not singing the praises

of the Spanish rebels, and gave publicity to varied and opposed views on the war, including an article by a Spaniard condemning the army for putting itself in the wrong instead of offering itself to the incapable Government to maintain order. The English *Catholic Herald* published without comment an article by the Italian priest, Don Luigi Sturzo, which condemned both rebels and Basque Catholics for putting politics first.

Finally, on the Spanish question, it is untrue to say that the Church 'has had an uninterrupted opportunity and a privileged position for nearly a thousand years.' For the past hundred years the Church has been limited, barely tolerated, and often actively persecuted by successive Liberal Governments. For half a century before that, Gallican-minded rulers were trying to subordinate the Church to the State. On the other side, the turning-point in the struggle between Christian and Saracen in Spain only came in 1212, and the struggle of the two powers for ascendancy was only ended by the conquest of Granada in 1492. The period of the Church's privileged position is thus reduced to less than three hundred years.

The more general accusation against Catholics is that, in their hysterical fear of Communism, they have failed to appreciate that the struggle is fourfold and that the forces of Capitalism and Fascism are equally reprehensible from the point of view of Catholic teaching; they are said to have allied themselves with the rich and powerful against the poor, allowing their religion to be used as an instrument for oppressing the latter; the Church in recent times, it is claimed, has had nothing to say on the subject of private property and the right to strike. The Church is said to be 'apparently ready to make any possible terms with literally any individual or party against that enemy' (Communism), and the taunting question is asked, 'By what heroic action, by what splendid word, has the Church ever in this century demonstrated her positive, as opposed to her negative, social teaching?'

The Pope's attitude towards Communism is well known, but it must be pointed out that this attitude is not based on any desire for material security or fear of the deprivation of wealth. It is due to the materialist and avowedly anti-Christian nature of Communism and to the fact that its

materialist and anti-religious theory is given the most appalling expression in practice. It is the cause on a widespread scale of something much worse than any material suffering—the apostasy of many and the loss of souls. Neither Fascism nor Capitalism leads directly to these results, and particularly not on so wide a scale, and, though both are materialist and contradictory to religious principles, they often even inconsistently permit the free exercise of religion; Communism inevitably seeks to destroy it. It is true that the evils arising out of a Capitalist system give rise to Communism among those who suffer from them and that many adopt Communism by way of reaction to Fascism, but when the battle is at the height we do not turn to attack those who are sincerely opposed, along with ourselves, to one who is recognised as the common enemy. Whenever we are able, during a lull in the fighting, to point out the faults of our allies, we do so, and, when we have conquered the common enemy, we shall be prepared if necessary to do battle for justice' sake with those who claimed to be allies.

That Communism is regarded by the Pope as the greatest enemy there is no doubt, and there is no need to quote here his views on that subject; the justification of his attitude has already been given. It remains to show that the Pope's opposition to Communism does not result in neglect of other problems, social and political, nor in unconditional alliance with anyone who shares his hatred of that power.

A hasty glance through the encyclicals and published addresses of Pope Pius XI. will reveal the fact that they present a solid mass of positive social teaching, and that the negative aspect and the attack on Communism receive comparatively brief treatment. His first encyclical outlined the remedies to be adopted for the restoration of the international order after the troubles left by the war, in 1929 he issued a long instruction on the Christian Education of Youth and, twelve months later, explained at length in the encyclical *Casti Connubii* the Church's positive teaching on Matrimony. *Quadragesimo Anno* is a most complete expression of social teaching, condemning errors but giving the fullest explanation of all aspects of social rights and duties. His letter concerning Catholic Action, issued on June 29, 1931, and addressed to the whole Catholic world, is indeed mainly negative, but it

is a condemnation, not of Communism, but of the action of that very Fascist State to which he is said to be subservient. This was followed, after a few months, by a fierce attack on those responsible for the economic crisis, for the increase of unemployment and for the piling up of armaments, against those rich and powerful ones, again, towards whom the Church is said to be cowardly subservient. His condemnation of the Soviet campaign against God was contained in a very short letter, which appealed for peaceful intervention, for reparation and prayer, and spoke of 'Our beloved Russian people,' most of whom had belonged to a schismatic Church.

It will be valuable to call attention to some aspects of his teaching on other matters than Communism:

On private property:

First, let it be made clear beyond all doubt that neither Leo XIII., nor those theologians who have taught under the guidance and direction of the Church, have ever denied or called in question the twofold aspect of ownership, which is individual or social according as it regards individuals or concerns the common good. Their unanimous contention has always been that the right to own private property has been given to man by nature, or rather by the Creator Himself, not only in order that individuals may be able to provide for their own needs and those of their families, but also that by means of it, the goods which the Creator has destined for the human race may truly serve this purpose. . . . There is a double danger to be avoided: 'individualism' and 'collectivism.'

Most helpful . . . are the efforts of those who . . . seek to define the boundaries imposed by the requirements of social life upon the right of ownership itself or upon its use.

A man's superfluous income is not left entirely to his own discretion. . . . The grave obligations of charity, beneficence, and liberality which rest upon the wealthy, are constantly insisted upon in telling words by Holy Scripture and the Fathers of the Church.

The immense number of propertyless wage-earners on the one hand, and the superabundant riches of the fortunate few on the other, is an unanswerable argument that the earthly goods so abundantly produced in this age of industrialism are far from rightly distributed and equitably shared among the various classes of men. [*Quadragesimo Anno*, May 15, 1931.]

On the uplifting of the worker:

The uplifting of the proletariat . . . calls for more emphatic assertion and more insistent repetition on the present occasion.

Every effort must be made that at least in future a just share only of

the fruits of production be permitted to accumulate in the hands of the wealthy, and that an ample sufficiency be supplied to the working men.

In labour . . . there is a social as well as a personal or individual aspect to be considered. [*Ibid.*]

On the results of Capitalism:

Free competition is dead; economic dictatorship has taken its place. Unbridled ambition for domination has succeeded the desire for gain; the whole economic life has become hard, cruel and relentless in a ghastly measure. . . . The State, which should be the supreme arbiter, ruling in kingly fashion far above all party contention, intent only upon justice and the common good, has become instead a slave, bound over to the service of human passion and greed. As regards the relations of peoples among themselves, a double stream has issued forth from this one fountain-head: on the one hand, economic Nationalism or even economic Imperialism; on the other, a not less noxious and detestable Internationalism or international Imperialism in financial affairs, which holds that where a man's fortune is, there is his country. [*Ibid.*]

On Fascism:

It is an unjustifiable pretension . . . to come and teach the Church and her Head what is sufficient and what must be sufficient for the education and Christian formation of souls and for promoting . . . the application of the principles of the Faith in social life. To this unjustifiable presumption is added very clear evidence of the absolute incompetence of the pretenders and their complete ignorance of the matters under discussion.

A conception of the State which makes the rising generations belong to it entirely, without any exception, from the tenderest years up to adult life, cannot be reconciled by a Catholic either with Catholic doctrine or with the natural rights of the family.

What is to be thought about the formula of the oath, which even little boys and girls are obliged to take, that they will execute orders without discussion from an authority which, as we have seen and experienced, can give orders against all truth and justice and in disregard of the rights of the Church and its souls? . . . Such an oath, as it stands, is unlawful. [*Non Abbiamo Bisogno*, June 29, 1931.]

He has frequently expressed his sympathy with suffering Catholics in Germany and repeatedly condemned the Nazi pagan conception of the State. At the opening of the recent Press Exhibition he called attention to the persecution of the Church in Germany which prevented even Catholic newspapers from being shown in Rome. It is sufficiently clear that the Church's head is fully aware of all the evils of our time and has not hesitated to express his views. There is the

'splendid word'; if necessary, it will be followed by the heroic action. There is, indeed, ample evidence of heroic action on the part of the Church's members, even on the part of those archbishops and bishops who, it is said, 'go in perpetual fear of a "scandal".'

In Russia Catholic and Orthodox archbishops and bishops have been martyred and allowed to die, through forced labour and evil prison conditions, for no other reason than their attention to the duties of their state. With them have suffered large numbers of priests. There are also bishops and priests travelling about the country as beggars, reduced to the strictest poverty, and leading genuinely heroic lives in order to bring the ministrations of religion to the people. One of those who endured that life for a long period, by deliberate choice, was the cultured Bishop D'Herbigny, author of learned treatises on Dogmatic Theology and president of the Pontifical Commission for Russia. And who can deny the courage of the German hierarchy, returning again and again to the defence of Christianity threatened by Nazi paganism? For this same cause many of the German clergy have been imprisoned and taken into concentration camps; and those who have been most active in promoting better social conditions have been the first to be suspected of activity against the new State. In other places the clergy have not been called upon to make the same heroic sacrifices, but it cannot be denied that they have been energetic in condemning other evils than Communism and in seeking to promote a better social order. The Dutch bishops recently issued a severe condemnation of National-Socialism, the French bishops have spoken boldly on the international and social order, on the question of peace and the better distribution of the world's goods. Members of our own English hierarchy have called attention again and again to the pressing needs of our time. Apart from many less famous priests, one may quote the names of Fr. Martindale, the Jesuit, and Fr. Vincent McNabb, the Dominican, as examples of priests who are untiring in their attack on all the materialism of our times, in their work for the poor and oppressed, and in their efforts to build up a social order from which the evils of Communism, Fascism and Capitalism are alike banished. If concrete examples are required, they may be seen in Fr. Martindale's Poplar settlement and in his work

among those seamen whose existence is ignored by those on the upper deck, or in Fr. McNabb's frequent castigations of slum conditions and in his positive work in the Catholic land movement.

Our 'third-rate capitalist Press, pettily parochial,' frequently publishes articles on every aspect of social theory and activity, and is not infrequently criticised by British Fascists for its opposition to or lack of sympathy for their views. One, admittedly less popular but highly important, paper, which is wholly devoted to the criticism of the evils of Capitalism and to the publication of positive doctrines on the social and economic order, is *G. K.'s Weekly*, started by a world-famous Catholic and carried on by his best and equally famous friend, Hilaire Belloc. Even more satisfactory on these subjects is the foreign Catholic Press, of which *Sept*, already mentioned, is perhaps the best example.

Instructed by this Press, obeying the precepts and following the example of their bishops and priests, the Catholic laity have carried out the Church's social mission to an extent which certainly equals, and perhaps surpasses, that of any previous age. The great progress of the Catholic Social movement in Germany, now severely hampered by the National-Socialist legislation, the activities in France and Belgium of the J.O.C., a movement devoted directly to the Christianisation of the working masses, indirectly to the eradication of the evils of the present social and economic system by the establishment of a positive Catholic order, the building up of a Christian State by Dollfuss in Austria and Salazar in Portugal are facts which should be known to anyone who claims to be informed about current affairs. And if one seeks for an example of heroism, did not Dollfuss die in defence of a country menaced, not by Communism, but by National-Socialism? Perhaps the defence of the Alcazar, so nobly recorded in a poem in that very issue of *The Nineteenth Century*, would not yet be accepted as a heroic gesture in defence of positive Catholic social teaching. Some of us are convinced that it will be revealed as such in the passage of time.

Nor are our English Catholic laity very far behind their Continental brethren in promoting the social principles of the Church. We have an organisation called the Catholic Social

Guild, whose object is to instruct Catholics, especially those of the working class, in social principles in order that they may act upon them and influence others. The Guild co-operates also with non-Catholic societies, for the same excellent purpose. Something like heroism is shown in the provision made by local branches of the Guild to send individuals up to Oxford to the Catholic Workers' College to receive further instruction in positive social doctrine. For this it is necessary that unemployed and ill-paid workers should provide subscriptions and donations which they can ill afford, that writers and lecturers of the first rank should give their services gratuitously or for a fee which scarcely pays expenses.

In face of this vast effort of the Catholic Church, rising often to heroism and sometimes to martyrdom, only the utterly incredulous could find it 'hard to believe that this is the same institution which bred a Hildebrand, an Innocent, a Bernard, a Francis, a Thomas Aquinas, even a Leo XIII.,' only the incurably hopeless could expect 'the final victory of materialism' or the conquest of civilisation 'by the "bourgeois," that mean and greedy mediocrity,' and only those who have abandoned all charity could accuse us of cowardly subservience to the lords of this world.

EDWARD QUINN.

AN IRISHMAN IN SPAIN[1]

By Peadar O'Donnell

I was at Sitges, some thirty odd miles from Barcelona, when the army officers rose up against the Popular Front Government. I do not know at what time in the morning the news reached our village. There did not appear to be anything unusual afoot when I walked across the beach around nine o'clock to have a lazy row in a punt in the bay. I landed when other members of our holiday party crossed the strand on the way to church, and no word of anything new caught my ears even then. Nor did there seem anything unusual in the size of the congregation; the church was crowded to the door. Spanish Catholics do not regard the church on entrance as we do in Ireland. It is a sociable sort of place to them, and they talk as freely as in a café. Children have a busy time. They are sent running up to kiss Aunt Isabelle here and to salute Uncle Francisco there, and they must hold court round grandmother and answer her questions while the proud parents smile encouragement as they arrange the world with their neighbours. All this, I was told, is an echo down the corridors of history, for there was a time when people bought and sold their wares within the cathedral. God is a neighbourly sort of a body in Spain, who does not demand any great ceremony except at *fiesta* time.

I met a Scotsman on the pier below the church; I had got to know him in Barcelona, where we had mutual friends. He told me he heard that there was some trouble there. Such a rumour might not ordinarily have meant much in Spain; but I had been in Barcelona on the Friday before, and met men who told me that since Tuesday they had sat up nightly doing sentinel for the city, so that a Fascist rising

[1] From *I was in Spain Then*, a book to be published by Methuens early in the New Year.

might not catch the people asleep. On my way back to the hotel I was drawn towards a throng of people under a loud-speaker, and the first news of the rising to reach my ears was startling enough:

Will all those prepared to give blood transfusions to wounded report to the following places? . . .

All chemist shops are to be opened immediately, and the staffs will attend to receive the wounded. . . .

All windows are to be thrown open. Shuttered windows will be fired into.

And you never saw a village so hushed. Tension tightened down on talk, so that groups could only search their way into association by glances. I sought out an Italian—he was a refugee from his own country—whom I had got to know rather well, and to whom the rising would not have been so much a surprise, for he had been with me in Barcelona on the Friday before. When I finally tracked him down he was in the midst of a group of refugees to whom the rising brought special danger. The Italian was positive that a Fascist Government in Spain would deport him to Italy, and his rage was a peculiarly sharp, personal affair against people who threatened to do the like of that to him; and he cursed his luck that this had not found him in Barcelona. Many Barcelona workers would hold together and make their way to the French border, he argued.

As we talked, eddies of rumours swirled round us, coming from those untraceable sources on which fevered minds draw. The army had risen. The fleet was bombarding Barcelona. The foreign legion had landed. The Government had betrayed the people; the rising had been betrayed to the Government, and the fighting was merely the resistance of the officers to arrest. The trade unions had called on the people to rise and help the Government to overpower the army officers. The workers had already won in Barcelona.

There were other refugees, too, whose first impulse was escape. We talked of their problem, and argued that all a man needed to get through a frontier were patience and a dash of daring. All he had to do was to dodge arrest here in this village, and there was still the whole wide world for him to wander in. Besides, what of those watchers sitting up night after night in Barcelona waiting for the rising?

Clearly a fight was still in progress in Barcelona. What was the temper of our village? And what of the villages around? Might not the countryside be on the move soon to support the Government?

We moved into the midst of the village population, packed into the streets around the fishermen's café. There could be no doubt where the popular sympathy lay; they were fiercely on the side of the Government. Men's eyes could not fail to stray to the church perched on a rocky eminence above. Yesterday it was beautifully situated, commanding a grand view; to-day it just commanded. Whoever held the church held the vantage point of the village. And a little distance behind the church stood the barracks of the local police force. Suddenly a man's voice crashed from a window. It was strange to me that in this situation the spokesman through whom the developing excitement found voice did not feel called on to make any review of the situation. It was as though the milling talk of the groups, worked out to a conviction, merely chose a voice to give an order: 'All men with guns go home and get them and come back here.' Men rushed off helter-skelter. Those with nowhere to go just cheered. Men who had already anticipated this order held aloft the weapons hitherto carried unobtrusively in the crowd. Clear voices of women belled through the confusion.

And now the armament of the village rushed into view; and such armament!—old pin-fires, murderous bull-dogs, splendid shot-guns, swords and brand new rifles. A group of workmen arrived in a car—men standing on the footboard holding their weapons aloft, youths riding on the bonnet. This first car-load got an ovation. It was more than a group of men: it was an idea; and it filled my own soul with laughter. It is always exciting to see widely separate peoples behave in exactly similar ways in similar circumstances; and in our struggle in Ireland we, too, had ridden joyously like this in 'borrowed' motors. Laughing groups dashed off in every direction: 'Take the motor cars from the rich.' If the middle class only knew it, they were lucky at that moment to have cars to lose, for the cars would probably save many of their lives. A new ruling class sweeping confusedly into power must assure itself that it has arrived. Better take cars

than lives! The whole business had the weird familiarity of a dream.

What pandemonium! The village became a bedlam of car sirens and screeching brakes. Fists flashed in the air to the thunderous '*salud*.' The passion of the village, freed of its darkness, flared into a joyous uproar. The ferreting out of cars became a competition. Those owners who had escaped the first swoop tried desperately to safeguard their motors. It was the act of madmen. To balk men in search of a car might easily cost a man already known as an opponent his life. I saw tragedy averted by a hair's breadth. A woman just managed to make raiders believe that her husband did not know that men seizing cars had any authority to do it, and, furthermore, that it was she herself who had concealed the car. She told them where it was, and stood very still in the doorway until the gate closed behind them. I wondered what the background was, for clearly it was not a car that was the issue here, but escape. It was the first time I glimpsed the Italian's problem in another setting.

There was scarcely a shadow of direction at this stage. Every group that could think of a house to raid, whether for arms or motor cars, went off and raided; and raiders followed one another at the gallop to houses that had already been visited. The fishermen were up and at it like the rest, and old warriors of nets and sails rested their shot-guns against their boats while they did odd jobs with the gear. And the women made the devil's own noise, fussing around, taking food to men that had really nothing to do but go home and eat; but women play up like that when men play at soldiers, and even when it is not play.

As the raids had been everybody's affair, all naturally gathered together when there were no more cars to seize. The car campaign had been brought to complete victory. But the situation so far as arms were concerned was not nearly so clear. For here rumours entered. Somewhere around there were secret dumps of arms which escaped the search. Perhaps in the chapel; perhaps in the convent. In this house; in that house. And one here and there was excited enough to spring up on a car and say his say—or her say—out loud. The crowd found itself hearing its own suspicious thoughts voiced from this corner or that. And people took it for

granted that those who spoke could also answer questions. Was this true? Was that true? Had the Moors really landed? Had a battle really been fought on the outskirts of the town? And all the time car brakes yelled.

And now derelict cars began to come in, and they got such cheers as their swankier sisters could no longer evoke. And laughter arose; and when men laugh they seek ease. People remembered that they had legs that needed to rest, so they strayed towards the cafés. But those who had spoken remained behind and spoke more to one another, and then sat in a hall and had paper printed and stamps made and became the Government of the village.

Back in our hotel there was naturally a good deal of uneasiness. Members of our party whose leave was very much to time-table were worried whether this would mean that there would be no trains. And our landlord was down and out: he was the most collapsed man you could see. Even his voice was gone; he would speak in whispers if you let him. One forgot out there, amid all the uproar, that some men cowered in terror from its fierce joy.

At first I thought it might be the blow to the tourist traffic that had him down. In 1922 I heard a woman weep over a young man killed in a political clash and end up by producing the telegram cancelling a tourist booking, which was the true cause of her sorrow. A fish-buyer in 1916 moaned the roof down over the rising in Dublin, and then explained that it would probably hold up his shipment of periwinkles. But this was different. It was terror, real terror, and in a young man too.

Human intelligence is a flimsy affair. Any touch of scare is fatal to it. The human mind is almost as unprotected as a naked candle; and men are the most pitiable of all scared animals. Fear breaks in through unexpected doors. You can say you are not afraid of this, nor that, but suddenly you come face to face with something—less terrible, really—which you do fear. You may be even able to say quite truthfully that you are not afraid to die, and know that it is neither an intellectual pose, nor hysteria. And yet . . . New rulers violently arising . . . New ideas . . .

And in the crowd old memories. When an old tyranny falls—and to some persons all authority must be tyranny—

old bruises sting like new welts. In any halt in revolutionary advance local history gets mauled by the grab of village memory and yields much that is hateful. For in Catholic villages there is a muttering world long held back by the whip, not soothed into quiet, and easily uncovered. I saw the world strip its old bruises now, saw the new ideas which should have lit up a new to-morrow darken with the venom of old conflicts.

Priests do weird things in Catholic countries. In a provincial town in Ireland a missionary and four other priests broke into a garage where young Republicans were holding a conference and cuffed three of them to the church where a mission was in progress, walking them up the aisle in full view of the congregation with as much arrogance as ever Roman conqueror paraded captives; and, not content with that, the missionary boasted from the altar that he had smashed this particular Republican group in the parish. It is such mad acts that set the villagers muttering that the priest must go. Besides, he would be the one best able to gather evidence later. By midnight I believed the church was safe for that first night, but its safety rested on the power of those who would keep clouds off a cause; the men with faith had not the same reason to go to its defence. I went to the window early next morning. The church was still there.

The proprietor announced that the hotel staff was gone and the guests must fend for themselves. I got hold of our waiter to find out if any news had come through. He told me that the trade union leaders, Communist leaders, and others called on the people to rise in support of the Government. Thus the isolation manifested in the ferment of strikes and criticism of the Government was bridged by the radio. The men of our villages would send out the biggest column they could arm towards Saragossa. He would be with the column, for he was lucky enough to have a rifle. . . .

Young men with shot-guns and revolvers walked into our hotel and told the proprietor how many men he would have to feed daily. They also found out from him how many unoccupied rooms were available, and he was told that he would probably be asked to billet people each evening. Anybody coming either for food or bed would carry an order from the village council. Our landlord was the very spirit of

accommodation. By midday a lorry-load of men from an outside village came into the hotel to dine. They were full of news. Barcelona was the battle-ground. The whole countryside was ready to move to Barcelona if called on. But of course they had to put their own villages in order first. Yes, there had been fighting in some of the villages. Nobody could travel the road without a permit. Everywhere between here and Barcelona the people had risen in support of the Government.

My wife is a rare spirit in difficulties; she rises to them with a laugh. She was ready now to set out with me for Barcelona to see what was to be seen and to travel in a lorry with armed workers. I started off for the workers' hall to get a permit. And then came disaster to our plan for that day. The promenade was noticeably empty, and there was not the same orchestration of sirens on the street. Many people were standing still gazing fixedly towards the chapel. But nothing was happening there that I could see. And then suddenly the great massing of people on the strand and on the promenade in front of the fishermen's café came into view between the trees. We reached the outskirts of the crowd and inquired eagerly. But there was no need for reply, for just then men came out of the church door dragging church furniture after them. The sacking of the church had begun. Not a word from the crowd. Not a murmur. Not a movement. There was an air of unreality about it all. Daylight. The silence. The fishing boats. A crowd of normal workaday people.

My wife plucked my arm. We walked back clear of the crowd. For the moment she was quite crushed. She had been so joyously, wholeheartedly in sympathy with the uprising in the village, and now this had come to take the joy out of it all. She would not look on. Nor would she travel with people who would do the like of this. I left her at the door of the hotel and walked back. I made my way easily through the silent crowd and crossed a strip of strand in front of one of the boats. On an upturned box a middle-aged fisherman sat mending a net, pausing now and then to take in the scene before him. Priests' vestments came flying through the air. The monstrance crashed on a flagstone. I was sorry now any word had been said against burning, for

burning would have been better than this. Certainly not more than twenty people were at work—all men; and two of them were of the foreign band I had encountered the evening before. Statues came flying through the air, and little bursts of laughter broke out on and off. St. Patrick got a cheer, for his statue landed snugly into some shavings in a box. The confessional-boxes were flung bodily on to the strand. And still nobody stirred.

A few children ventured near the *débris*. A boy of ten picked up a vestment. It was a signal—the children of the village swept on to the strand and dressed themselves in any bit of vestment they could see. One raised the monstrance and started a procession. Gales of laughter swept the crowd. The assembled village began moving again along the strand and promenade. I found that my wife had come back. We walked along the strand. A punt was gripped by the nose on the beach and we pushed her off. Children were lighting a bonfire now. I pulled out into the bay. I was glad to have seen what I had seen and anxious to examine myself in relation to it, for I could not say where I stand on religious issues if I set out to examine them; few men could. I sometimes say that I am a Catholic in the same way that Tone was a Protestant; it is there, but it is not a condition that I can identify apart from my general convictions. But there is a tenderness in me for what is tender in people. I have shared religion on islands where life is bare and hard, and I have seen it survive in the wreckages that drift around casual lodging-houses in industrial countries; and I believe I would always help to defend any man against interference with his religious belief and against having religion imposed upon him. And I knew now beyond a shadow of a doubt that if I were on the village committee I should have insisted that we fight a section of our friends if necessary to prevent a scene like this.

My wife and I talked it out. We recalled home scenes. In Ireland in 1922 priests had made a greater mockery than that by the children on the strand; and it was unthinkable that a Catholic village stood aside and watched a score of unarmed men sack their church unless something had separated them from its life. What should have happened to the first priest who locked the chapel door against one of

our dead in Ireland in 1922? Were the people of Roscommon right in barricading the church against the bishop when he penalised Father O'Flanaghan for being on the Republican side?

And there in a punt in a bay in the Mediterranean we worked our way through clouds that I knew must carry untold confusion among the Irish people. And in the quiet we rowed back. And I walked to the hall to seek a permit to take the road to Barcelona.

PEADAR O'DONNELL.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

THEIR COST AND DISTRIBUTION

By B. M. HEADICAR

DURING the last fifteen years or so attention has frequently been called, from various quarters, to the difficulty of obtaining access to important official documents, and to the greatly increased cost of these to the purchaser in recent times. Representations from societies such as the Royal Statistical Society and the Library Association had little effect on the Treasury, and any small concessions made have been at the expense of previous privileges. My remarks on this subject in an address at Balliol College in September to the annual conference of the Association of Special Libraries and Information Bureaux have received a certain amount of attention in the Press, and the present moment seems opportune for again putting forward the desirability of a change of attitude on the part of those responsible for the preparation and circulation of Government publications, the indispensable sources of information for all that concerns our national life and development—political, economic and social.

The matter of pricing these publications is governed by the rule of the Stationery Office that the cost of printing and distribution must be recovered from sales, while the actual work of compiling the various reports, etc., is a national charge and has no effect on the sale price of a publication. The number of copies likely to be sold is estimated before publication of a document, and the anticipated revenue is averaged out for each copy. It must be remembered that Command Papers, whatever their cost of production, must be issued in sufficient numbers to meet the needs of members of the Houses of Parliament. Sir Frederick Atterbury, in his evidence to the Select Committee on Publications and

Debates Reports, 1915, said, 'The service of the Government of the country requires that certain information which has been collected by the State shall be made public,' and that 'the cost of composition is an absolute necessity.' This means that a definite number of copies being compulsory for a particular purpose, the composition must necessarily be a charge on that purpose, and libraries, institutions and individuals should only be charged for the cost of the paper, the machining and the binding of the extra copies needed to supply them. As an instance, let us take the 'Report of the Industrial Assurance Committee, 1933.' This consists of 118 pages, and the cost of printing and distributing it was £115—roughly, £1 per page. An additional 1000 copies would probably cost somewhere around £5, and this sum represents, roughly, the non-compulsory expenditure on this publication. A charge of twopence per copy would therefore be adequate to cover cost, but the official retail price is two *shillings* per copy. In other words, the would-be purchaser is expected to cover not only the cost of his individual copy but also that of the copies which *must* be printed for State purposes. The Treasury should be compelled to revert to its former practice, and price Government publications in accordance with the spirit of the resolution approved by the House of Commons in 1836. That resolution was as follows :

> That the Parliamentary Papers and Reports printed for the use of the House should be rendered accessible to the public by purchase at the lowest price they can be furnished, and that a sufficient number of extra copies shall be printed for that purpose.

It may be argued that these reports are available in the public and other libraries, and that, therefore, the individual does not need to spend money on them. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Libraries have to purchase these publications, the 'free list' having been abolished in 1924, except for the copyright libraries and a few special institutions, and although, after repeated representations, the Treasury granted a subsidy of 50 per cent. to rate-supported and university libraries, very many libraries found the tremendously increased charges for Government publications prohibitive. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury, in reply to a question in the House on December 11, 1924, reiterated his view that the concession

of the 50 per cent. subsidy, granted by his predecessor, represented 'a full recognition of any claim which the ratepayers of any area may have upon the general body of taxpayers in this matter.' The concession of this subsidy, however, is not a tremendous act of generosity, when it is remembered that the considerable free list had been abolished and that ordinary sale agents received a liberal discount from the Stationery Office.

The effect of the increase of prices is shown by the following figures. In 1913 the subscription to parliamentary publications of both Houses was £17, in 1924 it was £38, and at the present time it is £28. The position is even worse than it appears at first sight, for the transference of a large number of the most serviceable and more expensive publications from the 'parliamentary' to the 'non-parliamentary' list resulted in only 1056 documents being received in 1924 for £38, against the 1521 documents received in 1913 for £17. This is not all, for not only was the number of documents supplied considerably lower with the increased subscription, but many of the documents were very much reduced in size. The Chief Registrar's 'Report on Trade Unions for 1913' cost 1*s.* 2*d.*, that for 1921 cost 5*s.* 6*d.*, but it contained only one-third the number of pages comprised in the earlier issue—an actual increase of about 1300 per cent.! The other side of the picture shows that the subscription for non-parliamentary publications increased from £53 in 1913 to £203 in 1924, but the number of documents supplied increased from 1680 to 2450.

The practice of making the evidence of a particular committee a non-parliamentary publication, whilst the report of the committee is issued as a parliamentary paper, works against the public every time, because the basis of pricing non-parliamentary documents is different, and they are not included, as used to be the case, within the subscription for parliamentary publications. Outstanding instances are the Cave Committee's 'Report on the Trade Board Acts' (Cmd. 1645), 1922, and the Cohen Committee's 'Report on Industrial Assurance' (Cmd. 4376), 1933. This latter was priced at 2*s.*, but the Minutes of Evidence, by far the more important part of the publication, cost £2 10*s.* The Cave Report was published at 2*s.*, but the Minutes of Evidence volumes were

'non-parliamentary' publications and cost 30*s*. In both these instances it is absolutely impossible for the serious student to do without the minutes if the reports themselves are to be understood. In fact, repeated reference is made from the reports to the evidence in each case. In the proceedings of the Select Committee on Publications and Debate Reports, 1923, it was stated that had the Lausanne Report (Cmd. 1814) been issued as a parliamentary paper its price would have been 10*s*., whereas, as a non-parliamentary paper, it was sold at 30*s*. It may be assumed, I think, that in the Cave and Cohen cases quoted above the basis of pricing the evidence produced similar results. The number of volumes covered by the subscription of £17 in 1913 was 82; in 1934–35 the number of volumes was 28 for £28.

It is extremely interesting to study the case of the 'Annual Statement of Navigation and Shipping.' In 1911 its price was 3*s*., in 1927 it was 15*s*., and three years later it was suddenly dropped from 15*s*. to 4*s*. for the 1930 issue. It might appear at first sight that the Stationery Office had seen the error of its ways and made up its mind to go back almost to pre-war charges, but there is a snag in it. The volumes at 15*s*. and the succeeding ones at 4*s*. contained almost exactly the same number of pages (76 to 78), but the 1911 volume at 3*s*. contained 364 pages—nearly five times as many. This example will give some idea as to the way in which the purchaser has been penalised: higher prices, greatly increased subscriptions, and much less for the money.

Again, take the case of the 'Annual Statement of Trade and Navigation,' an absolutely vital work, not only for all engaged in commerce, but for every student of economics. The 1911 figures were issued in three parts, totalling 1426 pages, for a total cost of 15*s*. The 1933 issue was in four parts, totalling 2011 pages, and the price of the whole was £4 6*s*., an increase in size of about 25 per cent., and an increase in the price of nearly 600 per cent. I believe it is argued by the Stationery Office that the much increased cost of these annual publications has no effect on their sales. They have always been essential to certain people, who have naturally to continue to procure them—so runs the explanation. That this is emphatically not the case is proved by the Committee on Publications and Debates Reports, 1923, who stated that

increased prices resulted in a reduction of sales, and this very publication—'Annual Statement of Trade'—when turned into a Stationery Office publication instead of a parliamentary paper was so adversely affected by the increased charge that the sales 'fell off by 50 per cent.'

There is evidence also that, whatever the basis of pricing may be, it is weighted heavily against the purchaser. For instance, the Government issued the 'Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act, 1923' (73 pages), at 2*s*. The National Association of Fishery Boards reprinted this Act in type of the same size as the official edition, added a comprehensive analytical index of 45 pages, and published the volume of 117 pages, printed on better paper, and stitched in a paper cover, at 1*s*. 6*d*. per copy—just more than cost price.

Let us compare the prices of our own Stationery Office's publications with some recently issued documents from the United States Government Printing Office. I have selected these quite at random, and it is possible that there are even greater discrepancies to be found. 'Hearings of the Committee on Ways and Means on the Stabilization of the Bituminous Coal Mining Industry,' 661 pages (many illustrations and tables), all for 35 cents—roughly, 1*s*. 6*d*. Compare that with the recently issued 'Report of the Department of Overseas Trade on Germany,' at 5*s*. This is a most valuable volume, and probably the best account extant of things as they are—political, social, economic—in present-day Germany. Dear as the volume is (compared with that for 1920, which cost *fourpence*), this is one of those cases where the actual cost of printing, etc., should be a secondary consideration. This Report should be a compulsory text-book in all secondary schools and colleges, and published at such a price as would allow every teacher and most of the pupils to purchase a copy. It is curious to note that the 1934 Report on Germany cost only 3*s*. 6*d*.

It seems impossible to believe that the authorities are anxious always for the widest circulation of information on certain subjects. The Cave and Cohen Committees are cases in point. The evidence submitted to these Committees was not always palatable to those in authority or their friends in the industrial and financial world, and the day-to-day issue of the evidence and memoranda submitted, at a very high

price, was an effective preventive of a large circulation. The proceedings of the Commission on the Private Manufacture of Armaments is another instance of this practice. The cost of the first twenty days' evidence alone amounted to £3 17*s.*; a preposterous total obviously limits the purchase to a very few institutions.

The matter might be a little less serious if the Press paid more attention to the dissemination in an impartial way of the evidence. Very few papers gave substantial space to the proceedings of the Commission, and invariably those parts were selected for publication which told in favour of the paper's own views. This does not apply to journals of one party only. It is a tragic fact that newspapers nowadays are not usually content with a fair report of any political topic. Events are twisted and turned at the pleasure of the proprietors and things which they do not like are omitted or abbreviated, whilst those which fit them are given undue emphasis. Let any reader compare the reports of Parliament on any day in, say, three different papers, and he would almost have to believe that each paper was reporting a different day's proceedings. Discuss a current topic with a friend and, if he expresses any opinion at all, you will recognise it as the gist of the leading article in his favourite paper. Rarely does he think for himself. And, after all, the newspaper is almost his only source of information. The original documents are not only frequently outside his knowledge, but almost certainly beyond the power of his purse. Even the Parliamentary Debates will cost him 6*d.* a day, if he is sufficiently interested to know more about what is going on in the House likely to affect him. The answers to questions in the House are frequently of the greatest importance to the individual, but very rarely are they given in full in any newspaper, and the parts left out are not always the least important.

I was interested to see an advertisement, after I had begun to write this article, that the price of the new issue of the *Chronological Table and Index to the Statutes*, in two volumes, had been reduced from £3 16*s.* to £1 5*s.* This happens to be one of the works which I mentioned in my address at Balliol as being an essential work for libraries, but the prohibitive cost was the reason for its non-inclusion in all but a few libraries. I do not suggest that what I said had anything to

do with the reduction in price: I would far rather like to believe that it is a sign of a change of mood in those responsible. In 1924–25 the Library Association appointed a Special Committee on Government Publications, of which I was a member, the function of the Committee being mainly to try to get the Treasury to modify its attitude regarding the free distribution of Government publications, which in 1924 was suddenly stopped. Correspondence, petitions, and delegations eventually extracted a concession in the shape of the subsidy of 50 per cent. which I mentioned earlier in this paper. It was, and is still, the contention of the Library Association that it is absolutely essential, if the people are to be well informed, that easy access to all Government publications should be provided; that the general public will not have adequate facilities for consulting these publications until a number of depository libraries is established throughout the country; and urges the recognition of about twenty large public libraries in selected geographical areas as depository libraries where all Government publications could be freely consulted by the public *immediately* after publication.

This seems to be an entirely reasonable proposal, especially when compared with the recommendation in the Third Interim Report of the Adult Education Committee in 1919, namely, 'that public libraries should be able to obtain any Government document whatever free of charge on application.' The net result was that on July 17, 1925, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury stated that he was considerably impressed by the representations made, but that, as a Committee appointed by the President of the Board of Education was considering the general position of the public libraries in this country, he would postpone his decision until he had had an opportunity to consider any proposals which that Committee might make regarding the development of our library system by loans from libraries to others outside their own rating areas. This Committee (Public Libraries Committee) in its Report (Cmd. 2868, 1927) stated that it had considered this statement by the Financial Secretary and put forward various conclusions. The underlying principle is that the information which has been collected is intended 'for the guidance and instruction of the people of this country,

and that unless it is made readily accessible the money spent on its production has been largely wasted.' It is bad policy to restrict the dissemination of the information in the attempt to cover the whole of the expense, the main items in which have already been incurred, by the sale of copies. They are produced, not as commercial speculations, like books issued from an ordinary publishing house, but to instruct the people of the country on matters believed to be of public importance, and wide distribution should be the first consideration. It is sometimes forgotten that the purchasers of works issued by an ordinary publisher do not also pay for the upkeep of the publisher's establishment, as is the case with His Majesty's Stationery Office. The general body of taxpayers are responsible for all the expenditure incurred by the Stationery Office, and the argument that these official publications would cost just as much if they were printed and issued by an ordinary publishing firm is based on a false foundation. The recommendations of the Public Libraries Committee were definite and are worth quoting in full:

(i.) That Government publications be sold at such prices as may be judged likely to secure for them a wide circulation, *the cost of production being only a secondary consideration.* [The italics are my own.]

(ii.) That free grants of Government publications be made to a select list of public libraries, on the understanding that these libraries will serve as centres of supply for surrounding areas.

(iii.) That, in addition, any public library be allowed to requisition a free copy of any Government publication within a year of publication, subject to the discretion of the Stationery Office to prevent abuse of this privilege.

These recommendations cannot be considered unreasonable. The proposed distribution, it is pointed out, is not altogether a free gift from the taxpayer to the ratepayer. The depository libraries would be responsible for the housing, binding, cataloguing and circulation of the publications. The arrangement suggested would almost certainly lead to increased sales, which would result from the publicity given to these publications by their display on library shelves, and to which readers have direct access. The Committee also emphasised a point I have made above, that the public have the greatest difficulty in finding out what has been published by the Stationery Office, through lack of sufficient Press

advertising and the retarded appearance of the monthly lists. It is pointed out that at the date of the Report no fewer than 418 institutions in the United States received free copies of all or part of their Government's publications, while any public library (now about 700) may requisition such publications as it desires. I believe it to be a fact that there are more libraries in this country receiving publications of the United States free of charge than are receiving Government publications issued here. It is argued by the Treasury that, even if free distribution were made, many libraries could not take advantage of it because their shelves are already too congested. This seems to me an exceedingly feeble excuse. Even if it were a fact, which is disputable, that some libraries would have to refuse free copies, it hardly justifies the total abolition of free distribution to the vast majority of libraries which would leap at the possibility. It is some years now since the Financial Secretary to the Treasury stated that he would postpone his decision until the Committee's proposals had been published, and it is nine years since the latter were made public, but no further action in the matter has yet been taken.

Surely this is the moment for a combined agitation by everyone interested to bring the question again to the Treasury and to demand the promised decision, nine years overdue. In the most favourable circumstances of distribution, few libraries would find it possible to get anything like all the older publications they might requisition. The earlier Censuses of Population volumes, the more recent Census of Production Reports, the Earnings and Hours Enquiry (a most essential collection), many of the Reports of the Registrar-General, and heaps of others have been out of print for a long time, and are practically unobtainable second-hand. except at long intervals and greatly enhanced prices. This is an impossible position, which could be so easily rectified. With such means as the Replika and other photographic printing processes available, any of these publications could be reprinted at only one-sixth their original cost. Libraries all over the world have been clamouring for these things for years, and the cost of production would readily be recovered, even assuming that it is necessary it should be.

Again, all parliamentary publications are issued in paper

wrappers, whatever the bulk of the document may be. This may not be inconvenient to those very few people who take the whole of them and bind them regularly each session in volumes according to the annual index, but for every one purchasing the whole, there must be thousands of individuals and libraries who take only a selection. Without rebinding, these documents are utterly unsuited for loan purposes or constant use, and it is a much more costly matter to bind single volumes in suitable material than to uniformly bind a large number. There is inconsistency in the Stationery Office on this problem. If one looks at the documents on show in the Kingsway Sale Room, quite a number of small works, without any considerable public appeal, may be seen in stiff boards or cloth bindings, and it would be interesting to know what particular points decide the issue. There is an exceedingly interesting, well-produced and important volume on *Weeds*, issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, price 5*s*., or bound in cloth 6*s*. There are illustrations in colour and the volume is good value for the price, but it ought not to cost an extra 1*s*. for the binding. In my own very considerable experience, the cost of binding a large number of such publications rarely exceeds 6*d*. a volume, and frequently is only about 4½*d*. But again, I insist that this work has the utmost importance for every farm labourer and gardener in the country. The eradication of weeds from grass or arable lands is one of the most persistent problems in agriculture, and this volume should be sold, irrespective of the cost of production, at a price which would allow its possession by everyone directly concerned in the difficulty.

People are supposed to know the laws which affect them; but new Acts come into operation, and their text is sold at such a price in many cases that most people prefer to remain in ignorance and trust to luck to keep within the law. What a help it would be to thousands of tenants and small house-owners if they could realise how they stood in the light of the law by the expenditure of a few coppers, instead of having to act blindly at the behest of the landlord or spend large sums on solicitors! Even such Acts as govern insurance (health, unemployment, etc.), and which affect millions of people, are priced at such a figure that the ordinary individual cannot attempt to get copies for himself. I am aware, of course,

that many of these Acts are compiled in such distinctly legal phraseology that most people would not understand them if they had copies, but that does not affect the argument.

This leads to another point, which I acknowledge is not directly concerned with the object of this paper, and it is the fact that I can always grasp the meaning of an Act of the United States much more readily than I can that of an Act issued in this country. The former seems to have used language intended to be understood by everybody, while the latter seems to have been drawn up in a phraseology which is intended to necessitate professional legal assistance. Do not assume that I believe everything American to be the best. I have simply chosen my examples throughout from the United States because, being in our own language, they are best fitted for the purpose I had in mind.

To summarise my conclusions. Government publications are needlessly costly; the largest possible circulation of them is most desirable and essential if they are to function as information carriers for the public as a whole; the cost of production should be a secondary consideration; provision should be made for a certain number of bound copies; free distribution on a generous scale is demanded; much greater publicity is essential, and any attempt to hide the existence of certain documents or to hinder their circulation by issuing them in a most expensive form should be severely deprecated; schools and colleges should be given special facilities for acquiring at a low cost such publications as may be considered desirable as text-books, particularly those which have an important bearing on the historical, political, and economic position of the world to-day.

I hope I have made it clear that in recent years the purchaser has been severely handicapped, circulation has declined, and as a result the community is badly informed and dependent far too much on what it reads in propagandist journals or on what it is told by interested parties. I end with a quotation from the *New Statesman* of December 6, 1924: 'Publicity is vital to the modern community; and the necessary conditions of it are the prompt appearance and the cheapness of the official sources of information.'

B. M. Headicar.

POVERTY AND NUTRITION

By Professor A. L. Bowley

The questions of the amount and cost of the food needed for health and efficiency have recently come into prominence from many quarters. The completion of the *New Survey of London Life and Labour* showed the position of the London working classes from some points of view. The British Medical Research Committee in 1933 estimated the food requirements of adults and children in the light of modern knowledge. In 1935 at the meeting of the British Association, and in a recently published book,[1] Sir John Orr has discussed 'the Adequacy of Diet in Relation to Income.' Dr. M'Gonigle has analysed the position in detail for a special group of families.[2] The allowance for children has been increased this year in Unemployment Insurance benefit. The International Labour Office and a Committee of the League of Nations have reported on Nutrition.[3, 4] The 'Means Test' has been discussed in the House of Commons. The general result has been a mixture of scientific investigation, philanthropic and political propaganda, confusion of terms and chaotic statistics. In these circumstances it is important to separate out the very different problems involved, to attempt to give exact meanings to the semi-technical terms employed, and to distinguish what is statistically known from what is guessed.

Needs

There are at least three standards used in the publications. Booth, followed by Rowntree, worked out a definition of

[1] *Food, Health and Income*, by John Boyd Orr. (Macmillan & Co., 1936.)

[2] *Poverty and Public Health*, by G. C. M. M'Gonigle, M.D., and J. Kirby, M.R.S.I. (Victor Gollancz, 1936.)

[3] *Workers' Nutrition and Social Policy*. (International Labour Office, 1936.)

[4] *Interim Report of the Mixed Committee on the Problem of Nutrition*: League of N[illegible] ([illegible] Unwin 1936.)

'poverty' on a basis of minimum food requirements—the one by observation of the poorer families, the other on the science of nutrition so far as it had been developed in the year 1900. In order to preserve strict comparability, this minimum, which was numerically the same on Rowntree's working as on Booth's, was used in the *New Survey of London*. It served to give a datum by which change could be measured, and it corresponded to the idea of poverty—to be distinguished from destitution—a generation ago. In more recent times the general standard of living has risen, and, while there is still a considerable amount of poverty in the old sense, the ideal is no longer to aim at a bare minimum, but at the satisfaction of what Rowntree termed 'the Human needs of Labour.'

In the same period physiological research has shown that the older measurements of nutritional needs were imperfect. As regards the supply of energy from food (calories) and the amount of protein that should be contained there has been little change; but it has been found that protection from disease and the less evident substances necessary for healthy bodily development are only to be obtained from particular kinds of food containing vitamins and mineral salts. So far as this depends on a wise selection of accessible foods and not on specially expensive kinds, this does not affect the minimum. But, in fact, not only is protein more expensive than carbohydrates, which may assuage hunger but do not give the nourishment needed, but the vitamins and salts are mainly to be found in milk, fresh vegetables and fruit, which are relatively expensive. There is a very important difference between the effects of the revised scale on the minimum for adults and that for children. As regards the former, the cost of the minimum is almost unaffected; the ordinary mixed diet assumed contained all that was necessary, with modifications that did not increase the cost. On both scales lack of income resulted in an injurious deficiency of protein, and it is now seen that at the same time vitamins would be absent; but that is only relevant for deficient incomes. For children, on the other hand, it is found that the old scale based on calories leads to an underestimate of cost; milk, in particular, is the only easily accessible food which contains the right constituents for healthy growth of young children,

and milk is much dearer than bread or sugar for the same supply of calories and protein. The effect on cost is shown in a footnote.[5] The cost of the foods necessary for the physiological minimum must therefore be raised for families where there are children below, say, fourteen years old.

Sir John Orr and other writers have introduced the term 'optimum diet.' This only differs in emphasis from that already described; the emphasis is on the foods that are actually bought, rather than on the cost of the cheapest way of obtaining the necessary ingredients in the right proportions. Actual budgets suggest that it is only when the sum spent is greater than the theoretical minimum that the more expensive foods are sufficiently used. At present prices, in cases where food can be economically purchased through stores catering for the working class and there are no local difficulties, the minimum cost of adequate food may be put at 10*s*. or 11*s*. for a man in ordinary work, together with his wife, and at sums ranging from 5*s*. 6*d*. for a child of fourteen years down to 2*s*. 6*d*. for a child one year old. The exact sums vary perceptibly with the change of prices and from place to place. Since these sums assume perfect housekeeping and accessibility to good markets, it is only reasonable to add an arbitrary percentage, say 10 per cent.

The scale allowance under the new regulations of the Unemployment Assistance Board for a family consisting of man, wife and three children whose average age is seven years is about 25*s*. 6*d*., after the allowance for rent is deducted. The minimum above named is about 21*s*., or with the arbitrary 10 per cent. addition 23*s*. The margin is about sufficient for fuel, but leaves nothing for clothes or other expenses.

[5] *Standards of Minimum Food Cost*

	London Survey.	B.M.A. Committee.	U.A.B. Allowance.
Male over 16 years . .	5*s* 11*d*.	5*s*. 6*d*.	24*s*. (both)
Female over 16 years . .	5*s*. 0*d*.	4*s*. 7*d*.	
Boy 14 to 16 years . .	5*s*. 0*d*.	5*s*. 6*d*.	6*s*.
Girl 14 to 16 years . .	4*s*. 9*d*.	4*s*. 7*d*.	6*s*.
Child 5 to 14 years . .	2*s*. 11*d*.	3*s*. 3*d*. to 5*s*.	3*s*. 6*d*. to 4*s*. 6*d*.
" 0 to 5 years . . .	2*s*. 0*d*.	2*s*. 6*d*. to 3*s*. 3*d*.	3*s*.

The London and B.M.A. figures have been roughly adjusted to the prices of July, 1936.

The U.A.B. allowance includes one quarter of the total for rent, and must meet [illegible] ly for [illegible].

The incidence of pressure varies with the constitution of the family. For a man and wife only, the allowance is 18*s*. after reduction for rent; the food minimum plus the 10 per cent. is 11*s*. or 12*s*., and the margin for fuel, clothing and other expenses is 7*s*. or 6*s*. The revised unemployment benefits are 26*s*. for man and wife and 3*s*. for each child; allowing 9*s*. for rent, we see that the scale is very slightly more favourable than the Unemployment Assistance Board's when there are no children, but falls below it for large families. The situation is, however, not the same in the two cases. A man still entitled to insurance has been in work and been able to accumulate some reserve of clothing, household necessaries, etc., and with the prospect of work in the future can probably obtain credit. Also the benefit is not reduced when there are other resources. It must, of course, be remembered that it was never the intention of insurance as such to provide for all needs—that would require a considerably higher rate of contributions—but rather to supplement resources. When, on the other hand, a family is driven to apply for assistance, unemployment has usually continued for a long period and the prospect of work may be remote. The whole week's expenses must be met out of the allowance, or from other help.

Both unemployment benefit and the allowance are normally less than the earnings of unskilled labour. We may, then, next examine the relation between wages and needs. For a family of man, wife and three children, as before, the expense of food, rent, compulsory insurance, fuel and light may be put at about 38*s*. 6*d*. For low incomes the amount for clothing, funeral insurance, and other customary expenses may be provisionally placed at about 10*s*. If the wage is perceptibly less than 50*s*. (in a town), there will almost certainly be pressure, which will probably be met by a reduction of the foods now regarded as of special importance for children. (The minimum used for reckoning the poverty line in London at present prices would be 40*s*.; the difference is due to the use of the old scale for children's food and a much smaller allowance for sundries, which were restricted to necessaries.) Regularly employed unskilled town labour is paid at rates varying from 40*s*. to 50*s*. or more in large towns, and the money is sufficient on this basis for families containing

one to four dependent children, according to the rate. Wages of skilled labour are usually more than sufficient to meet needs on this reckoning.

On these general figures it appears that income is *a priori* insufficient in some classes for ordinary necessary and conventional expenditure and the foods now believed to be adequate. The classes are unskilled labour in regular work where there are, say, more than two dependent children, or when there is unemployment at all prolonged, and families with children dependent on the Unemployment Assistance Board. Where there are no dependent children the cases of insufficiency are exceptional. The analysis above does not include agriculture, nor broken families where there is no regular earner, nor cases of illness, nor old age; it only relates to town workmen's families in normal conditions.

Resources

Before considering the rather alarmist statements in recent publications, which depend to a large extent on the observation of special groups or localities, it is well to point out that the income of the great majority of the urban working class when fully employed surpasses the old minimum standard with a margin. In the various comprehensive town surveys made from 1923 to 1931 it was found that 89 to 97 per cent. of working-class families had sufficient income at full earnings for this minimum. Of the families below the standard the great majority failed because of illness, orphanhood or old age. Lowness of wage rates was the cause in only a quite small minority in which large families depended on unskilled wages. There is no exact statement possible on the number for whom the margin was insufficient for the more expensive diet for children or the more liberal allowance for sundry expenses. As regards the former, it has been worked out that in London a recalculation of the poverty line with an additional 2*s*. a week a head for children raised the percentage of families below the line from 5·7 to 7·3; for children alone the percentage was naturally raised more, from about 6½ to 12½.[6] On the more general view, it was found that 70 per cent. had a margin of £1 or more weekly above the old

[6] *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1936, part ii., pp. 364 *et seq.*

poverty line, and another 14 per cent. a margin of from 10*s.* to £1.[7] If the middle and richer classes are included in the total, of course the percentages in poverty are decreased.

Thus the families where means are insufficient are to be found to a relatively small extent among unskilled wage-earners at work, and principally among the unemployed whose want of work has been prolonged. As a suggestion of the possible order of magnitude of this number, it may be stated that in July of this year 690,000 insured men in Great Britain had been unemployed for more than three months, and about the same number were applying for assistance from the Board. About three-quarters of this group were in the divisions that contain the 'distressed areas.' From what has been said above, it is clear that we ought not to assume that in all or even in the majority of these cases the allowance was insufficient. None of the figures given allow for any help from the Poor Law authorities, who mitigate the wants especially of the old, or for free milk or meals, or for any unofficial help. The difficulty of lack of resources is acute in some districts, but only affects a relatively small proportion of the whole population. The problem of supplying the lack for this limited number is very different from that suggested by a careless reading of Sir John Orr's statistics.

Even in this perspective the extent of malnutrition is very serious, especially among children. The proportion of children in a condition of poverty is considerably greater than that of adults, partly because the larger families are among the poor, though this is no longer an important factor, mainly because the children bring the needs above the wages. Again, since the figures given above all refer to an instantaneous view, we may be certain that a much larger proportion of families have been in want at some date in their history, and especially when the third or fourth child was born. The difficult period is obviously from this date till the children begin to support themselves. No statistics are available to show how many children have at some time during their years of growth been subjected to poverty conditions.

Dr. M'Gonigle's studies show that in Stockton, at least,

[7] *New S*[illegible] *Life* [illegible], vol. vi [illegible] 110.

some degree of malnutrition before the age of five is prevalent, and part of it is traceable to malnutrition of the expectant and nursing mother. To what extent this is due to lack of income and what to injudicious expenditure it is impossible to say; but it is quite evident that where wages are especially low, or where there has been prolonged unemployment, the lack of income is the primary cause. It is not my intention to discuss whether the practical remedy is to be found in the provision of milk for mothers and children, in the raising of the unemployment allowances, or by pressure for an increased minimum wage; but it may be remarked that the first method most definitely brings the cure to the point where it is wanted. The general improvement in health during the past fifty years, the fall in the death rate, and especially in the infant mortality rate, and the rather favourable reports of medical officers on the general health of the majority of school-children are encouraging in showing, not only that progress has been made, but as indicating that further progress is possible, and that the difficulties are not too vast to be met.

Expenditure

Sir John Orr approaches the questions from a different point of view. Instead of asking whether means are sufficient for needs, he studies actual expenditure, and tries to discover whether in fact the food purchased satisfies his optimal standard. It has been suggested above that means are sufficient in a much larger proportion of families than the 50 per cent. who are held to reach the optimum. Part of the money available above the minimum standard is allotted to conventional necessaries which are met before diet is improved; but it is evident that among a considerable proportion any deficiency in food is due to ignorance of the proper constituents, or to preference for expenditure on other objects. Whatever may be the number of families whose diet is not optimal, the remedy over a large region is better allocation of means, which may be reached as knowledge is more widespread; and actual poverty is only one of the factors.

We have now to consider Sir John Orr's estimates. They appear to have been accepted as established on scientific

lines and as possessing at least reasonable precision; it has been said that 'the facts are not in dispute.' Actually they depend on rough approximations based on meagre and uncertain data, and the process of generalisation breaks logical and statistical canons. This is not the place to offer detailed criticism, but the process may be briefly described.

Six collections of working-class and other budgets of dates from 1932 to 1935 were available. Only 1152 separate budgets gave detail of income as well as food. It was assumed that sufficient accuracy would be obtained by counting the necessary money cost of food as equal at all ages; accordingly the amounts of food purchased were divided by the number of actual persons in the family, and then compared with the average requirements of the population per head. It appears that the needs were not compared with purchases in each family separately, but only the average was used. There is no means of passing from the behaviour at the average to the incidence on the individual, and the actual proportion in defect is quite unknown. It was found that in the lower income groups the number of children was greater than in the upper, and, since all scales agree that the cost is less for children than for adults, we have an under-estimate, of an unknown amount, of the purchases as compared with the standard in the lower grades. On this basis it is found that the *averages* of the budgets in all grades except the lowest are sufficient in calories and fat, with an excess of protein. On the other hand, the three lower grades are deficient in vitamins A and C, and at least the bottom two grades in calcium, phosphorus and iron. It is then assumed that *all* families falling within these grades are under- or mal-nourished, and *all* in the upper grades are sufficiently fed.

Next there is an estimate of the proportions of the population that fall within the grades. The lowest grade is of families where the income per head (each person, adult or child, being counted as one) is less than 10*s.* weekly; the other grades go respectively to the limits 15*s.*, 20*s.*, 30*s.*, 45*s.*, and over 45*s.* The best statistical work in the book is in the estimates of the numbers within these limits. It is based on a special examination of a sample of the 1931 Population Census, together with fairly well-established estim[illegible]tes of [illegible] and is prob[illegible]bly sufficient for the very

guarded result to which it leads—namely, that the percentages in the grades in round numbers are 10 each for the lowest and highest, and 20 for each of the four intermediate grades. Thus, very roughly, half the population falls into the grades where the income per head is less than 20*s.* and the budgets considered to be relevant show deficiency of vitamins and minerals.

It should be evident from this account that we obtain no real knowledge of the numbers who are malnourished. We have only a framework which might conceivably be filled in when an adequate number of budgets have been obtained and individually analysed. This may be possible in two years' time, if the proposed inquiry into the cost of living, for which the preliminaries are now under discussion, leads to returns adequate for the purpose. The data for some countries, as summarised in the Report of the International Labour Office (*Workers' Nutrition and Social Policy*), are more complete than for Great Britain. But the summaries, and indeed the original publications, at least for the most part, only deal with averages in different income groups. It is not known what proportion in each group is well or badly fed, since an average cannot show this; nor is it known what proportions of the populations fall in the separate income groups. So, in spite of the elaborate statistical backing, all we really know is that wages or other resources are in certain classes in certain countries insufficient for what is believed to be an adequate diet, and that national consumption of some foods is insufficient for complete nourishment of all members of the populations. The rest of the evidence is vaguely indicative of classes where there is want, and in some cases suggests that they are of considerable magnitude. In brief, there is an *a priori* case for the judgment that there is great room for improvement in diet, but no valid estimate of its extent.

The methods of Dr. M'Gonigle and Sir John Orr are unfortunately being imitated. In a preliminary Report to the National Conference of Labour Women at Swansea last May, the results of a budget inquiry were presented. In these there was subtracted from total family income all actual expenditure other than on food, and the residue was assigned to food. There are, as is well known, some expenses that

must have priority, of which the most important is rent, others which can only be postponed for a short time, and others which, though not strictly necessary, are met at the expense of food. Also, it is important to show, as Dr. M'Gonigle does, the amount actually spent on food, without reference to the method of expenditure of the rest of the income. But without detail we do not know whether rent is excessive, whether clothing is insufficient, or whether the allotment of income is the best. In Dr. M'Gonigle's figures the rent paid by unemployed persons is the principal trouble.

In the same Report the needs of all persons are counted equal; the 'amount available for food' is divided by the number of persons. The families are then classed according to the amount per head per week available for food. This is an improvement on Sir John Orr's treatment, in that every budget is taken separately. Where the quotient is less than, say, 4*s*., the sum is insufficient whatever the family constitution, so that a minimum estimate of want can be obtained. But the same data more scientifically treated are capable of giving more precise results.

In conclusion, it may be added that the physiological quantitative basis of the need for calories, proteins, and especially of vitamins and salts, is admittedly insufficiently established. The whole numerical basis of the prevalence of malnutrition and its relation to poverty is open to very serious criticism. Nevertheless, there is abundant medical evidence that malnutrition, slight or serious, is widespread, and that there are classes of the population here and abroad whose unaided resources are too small for adequate expenditure on food. There is no need to wait for perfect statistics before tackling the problems. The facts that in this country at least the standard of living has improved, except where unemployment is prolonged and acute, that knowledge of the nature of food has increased, and that it has been possible to mitigate hardships by regulated insurance and assistance, do not afford reasons for relaxing efforts, but are an encouragement to persevere. The problems of want are now of manageable dimensions.

A. L. Bowley.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

By ARTHUR HENDERSON, M.P. (Standing Counsel to the Labour Party)

CRITICISM of increasing volume and importance has in recent years been directed against the Workmen's Compensation legislation in this country. Possibly too much had been hoped from these Acts. Contrary to the wishes of their sponsors, they have proved a happy hunting-ground for lawyers; a mass of precedents has been accumulated, often contradictory, which tends to submerge beneath legal issues what ought to be the predominant factor—namely, the provision of relief to the injured workman or to his dependants.

The total number of cases under the Workmen's Compensation Acts taken into court in Great Britain in 1934 was 5948, as compared with an average of 6098 for the ten years 1924 to 1933. Excluding, however, cases dealing with allowances already granted and cases settled out of court, only 2514 original claims for compensation were directly settled by the court during the year, and of these 74·4 per cent. were in favour of the applicant. In addition, there were 23,561 cases in which memoranda of agreements and informal arbitrations were registered in the courts. Under the powers conferred upon county courts of refusing to record the memorandum of a lump-sum agreement when the sum agreed is inadequate only 250 were referred to the judge by the registrar, and of these 95 were recorded when the sum originally agreed had been increased.

An impartial examination of these figures cannot but suggest that reform might well aim at economy by drastically curtailing the province of litigation in deciding compensation claims. There is no doubt that this was one aim of the framers of the existing legislation, but it is a sad comment on the success of their efforts that hardly any enactment has

been more subject to extensive—and expensive—interpretation than the famous first clause:

> If in any employment personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman his employer shall, subject as hereinafter mentioned, be liable to pay compensation. . . .

Almost every word has been the subject of litigation, carried, in some cases, to the House of Lords itself; and the word 'workman' has to-day attached to it an interpretative case law of incredible dimensions. Indeed, even a cursory reading of the history of employers' liability shows that exclusion of liability has received disproportionate attention as compared with compensation for accidents, and their prevention in the future. At common law the employer had one more defence against his workman than he had against a stranger. His workman could plead that his injury was due to the personal negligence of his employer or to the defectiveness of tools supplied him, but the employer could reply with the defence that the workman had voluntarily accepted the risk (*volenti non fit injuria*), or had contributed to his injury by his own negligence ('contributory negligence'), or, if the accident proved fatal, that an action for personal injury dies with the individual (*actio personalis moritur cum persona*). But, in addition, if the injury were caused by the negligence of a fellow-workman, the employer could call in aid the defence known as the 'doctrine of common employment,' first defined in *Priestly* v. *Fowler* (1837). In this case, where a workman was injured by the overloading of a cart by a fellow-workman, the court held that the defendant was not liable, since the plaintiff must be held implicitly to have contracted to accept as part of the risk incidental to his calling the possible negligence of fellow-employees, for whose actions, therefore, the common employer could not fairly be considered liable.

It was well said of this doctrine that 'Lord Abinger planted it, Baron Alderson watered it, and the Devil gave it increase.' Its practical effect was that the workman injured in the actual performance of his duty was in a worse position as respects compensation for injury than the chance passer-by. The doctrine of common employment was, in practice, no better in ethics than it was in law. Many jurists of eminence, including Sir Frederick Pollock, have since expressed the

master responsible for his servants' damage within the scope of the employment) should have been applied in *Priestly* v. *Fowler*. But the most pernicious effect of the doctrine was that it destroyed all real responsibility of the largest employers even for their own negligence. By 1840 the modern joint-stock companies operating mines, canals, railways, cotton mills, etc., employing thousands of workpeople were rapidly increasing the scope of their activities. Gross carelessness might be displayed by these bodies in the choice of managers, machinery, or mode of working, sufficient to hazard the lives of the workers, yet because of the doctrine of common employment these great companies escaped liability for compensation to injured workmen on the plea that the negligence was due to their fellow-worker, the foreman or manager, to whose orders they had to conform. Although there can be no longer any doubt that the doctrine of common employment is as spurious in law as it certainly is in ethics, it yet receives parliamentary support, for a Bill to abolish this unjust doctrine was recently rejected in the House of Commons.

Even when, after a decade of agitation, the ministerial mountain in labour brought forth a mouse in the shape of the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, its remedial efficacy was largely nullified by permitting the device known as 'contracting out.' This practice naturally became widespread after the decision in *Griffiths* v. *The Earl of Dudley* (1882), which decided that any workman must be deemed to have 'contracted out' who continued in his employers' service after receiving notice that he must accept a claim on a benefit club in lieu of his rights under the Employers' Liability Act. Thus, while the doctrine of common employment was considerably modified by imposing on the employer liability for accidents resulting in injury or death by defects of machinery or plant due to negligence of the employer, or accidents caused by the negligence of fellow-workmen in the position of superintendent, manager, or foreman, or from obedience to an improper order or rule, in effect the workman surrendered his rights under the Act by contracting with his employer not to claim compensation under it. A special clause, inserted for the benefit of railway servants, made the employer responsible for the negligence of any person in charge of railway signals, points or engin

It was at first thought by trade unionists that by the Workmen's Compensation Acts, 1906–1925, which prohibited 'contracting out,' Parliament had taken a great step forward towards their ideal of compelling employers to devote closer attention to the prevention of accidents. The result has been very different from these early hopes. Compensation to the injured workman or his family has been permitted to obscure the vital question of safety to the workman. The average man, like the average employer, thinks that, provided the requirements of the Acts as respects compensation are met by adequate insurance or otherwise, the employer has done all that can reasonably be expected of him. The relief of liability by insurance has undoubtedly diminished the effect of the Acts in stimulating employers to renewed and persistent efforts for maximum safety in the workshops. A familiar parallel exists in the sphere of road accidents, which have increased as a consequence of the comparative immunity conferred by insurance on motorists from the results of negligence on the roads. In the realm of industry it is to be expected that boards of directors and other centres of the managerial function, who neither see accidents happen, nor know the victims personally, should pay less attention to safety devices and other means of preventing accidents than they certainly would if their liability had not been shouldered by an insurance company. In fact, insurance has, to some extent, defeated legislation which was designed to prevent accidents by making them costly to employers.

But there is also a secondary effect of insurance which is equally contrary to the interests of the community. While insurance makes accidents less costly to individual employers, the fact that it may promote comparative indifference to safety precautions tends greatly to increase the overhead cost of accidents to industry as a whole. No reasonable person can doubt that if the modern system of insurance had not existed to deaden the vital urgency of safety for the workers in industry there would by 1936 have been far fewer accidents in mine, factory and workshop. There has, it is true, been since 1924 a 20 per cent. reduction in the accident rate per million persons employed within the scope of the Factory Acts, but the number of fatal and serious accidents

843 fatal and 149,696 non-fatal accidents—in 1935 show how far we have to go before we can view the position with satisfaction. The total number of accidents to workmen is of course far larger: compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Acts was paid in 1934 in respect of 2229 fatal and 401,459 non-fatal accidents. Insurance companies do not, like assurance companies, offer any reduction of premiums to employers who take effective measures to prevent accidents. The employer who adopts an attitude of total indifference to accident prevention pays the same premium as the most zealously humanitarian employer insured. Even the insurance companies themselves have no genuine interest in the diminution of injury by accident, because, in most cases, their premiums are mutually adjusted according to the amount paid out on claims, and the larger this total becomes, the larger the amount available for management and dividends. Board of Trade returns show that the income of the companies from premiums for the year 1934 in connexion with employers' liability insurance in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, after making the necessary adjustments in respect of unexpired risks, was £4,807,645. Of this sum £3,065,348, or 63·76 per cent., was expended in payment of compensation *including all legal and medical expenses incurred in settling claims*. No less than 35·27 per cent., or £1,691,661, went in commission (9·36 per cent.) and management expenses (25·91 per cent.), leaving £46,636 (0·97 per cent.) for profits. Statistics for the ten years 1924–1933 reveal that of every £1 of premium the amount paid in compensation, *including legal and medical charges*, was 11*s*. 3½*d*., whilst about 8*s*. 8½*d*. went to the insurance companies for commission, management, and profit. Legal and medical expenses are understood to be about 5 per cent., or 1*s*. in the £1, leaving just over 10*s*. in the £1 for the injured man. In this connexion it may be interesting to note that in many other countries where there are exclusively *State* schemes of insurance the cost of administration is approximately 15 per cent. of premium income, which compares with 37½ per cent. allowed in this country for a service not including medical treatment, accident prevention, or rehabilitation.

As respects the men themselves the Acts present grave

injured workman to financial aid during incapacity wholly apart from any question of negligence of a fellow-worker or employer, the Workmen's Compensation Acts were a distinct advance upon the Employers' Liability Act and the provisions of the common law. Yet the present system falls far short of perfection. The first and dominant reaction of an injured workman is to restore his health as speedily as possible. Yet at this difficult stage his mental outlook is diverted by the present procedure to anxiety as to whether, unless he risks expensive litigation, he may not be deprived of his legal rights. Frequently the injured workman is certified fit for work several months before any law-suit arising therefrom reaches trial, and in the meantime it is not unusual for him to stand idle lest he may prejudice his claim. In other words, he may during this period be needlessly lost to industry under a cloud of anxiety which is apt to leave a legacy of mental depression behind it. Even when compensation has been settled, the competitive system compels the continuance of costs at their lowest level and the employment of the most capable workers only. Employers, in these circumstances, habitually and inevitably exclude men from work who have not fully recovered. The result is that nine out of ten injured workmen are under the haunting dread that their places will be filled during incapacity.

With regard to cases of more or less permanent incapacity, much criticism has been directed against the provision under the Acts by which the employer, but not the workman, can compel the acceptance of a lump sum where weekly payments of compensation have continued for more than six months. In the case of permanent incapacity there is a fixed scale, but if incapacity is merely partial compensation is fixed, failing agreement, by the county court judge or other arbitrator. In *fact*, though not in *law*, it is the insurance company which moves the employer to compel acceptance of the lump sum. The agents in some cases incite workmen to take a favourable view of inadequate compensation by dangling before them the prospects of a lump sum, which conveys to them the semblance of a small fortune. Frequently, of course, by ill-advised speculation or investment the whole sum is lost and the worker remains permanently at a disadvantage,

Some of these problems have doubtless been reviewed by the distinguished Committees now sitting on matters relating to workmen's compensation under his Honour Judge Stewart and Sir H. Rolleston respectively. One complaint frequently encountered, by those best qualified by personal contact with injured workmen to testify on such matters, is that many cases are settled for lump sums of small amount and deliberately left unrecorded in the county court, so that neither the registrar nor judge may have an opportunity of investigating the fairness of the settlement. There are cases, for example, where a lump sum of proper amount in the case of a right-handed man has been accepted, in the absence of skilled advice, by a left-handed man with injury to that limb, and has proved grossly inadequate to the actual loss suffered by the accident. In view of the very interested part played by the insurance world in workmen's compensation in this country, it is much to be preferred that there should be no exceptions to the recording of such agreements so that every workman, with or without legal advice, can be sure that his agreement will receive at one stage the impartial and experienced review of the county court.

This is not the place to review at length the subject of industrial disease as an aspect of workmen's compensation. Much of it is not accident, even in the wide sense of the Compensation Acts, as it is neither 'fortuitous nor unexpected,' since contact with the incidents of certain trades, such as silica in the dry grinding industry, results with positive certainty in avertible disease to the worker. This of late years has, happily, been recognised, and much useful work has been done to avoid the evils of certain industrial diseases, such as silicosis and asbestosis. So far as inhalants are concerned the use of the exhaust fan and similar devices has undoubtedly mitigated their ill-effects on the workman's health. Dangerous machinery is in the same category, and can be minimised as a source of accident by adequate safeguarding, precautions, unfortunately, for long resisted in quarters where quantity production is placed before the workers' well-being. It is to be hoped that the Factories Bill promised for next session will show a material advance in the establishment of further safeguards for the prevention of accidents. With regard to mines, an industry too often

involving a heavy toll in human life, it may be said quite generally that recent inquiries have revealed the vital importance of ventilation, anti-dust precautions, and possibly improved miners' lamps as preventive factors. The whole subject of accidents in mines is being reviewed by a capable Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Hugh Cecil.

There is thus a number of avenues from which we may shortly expect important contributions to the work of preventing accidents in industry, and when they see the light of day it is certainly not fantastic to foresee a strident and insistent demand for wise reform in the matter of compensation which has been so long overdue.

It was in view of these grave disadvantages in the present system that the trade union movement framed a Workmen's Compensation Bill on the lines of successful State schemes in other parts of the world. The Bill provided for the creation of a State insurance fund to which all employers would be obliged to contribute and out of which fund all payments in respect of workmen's compensation would be paid. It sought to establish a national board which would be charged with the responsibility of administering the fund, including the determination of all claims in respect of workmen's compensation, thus removing workmen's compensation cases from the purview of the law courts and, incidentally, terminating the profitable activities of insurance companies in the sphere of workmen's compensation. Provision was also made for the prevention of accidents, research work, and the rehabilitation of injured workers. The Bill, unfortunately, did not meet in the House of Commons with the sympathy it deserved, having regard to the grave evils mentioned above. It should have received at least a second reading. Matters are, however, now moving so plainly towards a demand from sections of all parties for reform in workmen's compensation that it is difficult to see how any Administration can successfully resist the universal desire for progress.

Arthur Henderson.

GERMANY AND THE BALKANS

By C. F. Melville

Everything points to Germany becoming the dominant influence in Central and South-Eastern Europe. I expressed this view in the *Nineteenth Century and After*,[1] after a visit to the Danubian regions, some six months ago. Having just returned from another journey in those parts, I see no reason to modify that view. The march of events has changed some of the detail, but the main outlines of the picture remain the same: it is one of the ever-growing strength of Germany and the consequent attraction to herself of an increasing number of the countries of Eastern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe.

The Germans themselves, with their characteristic partiality for such phrases, explain it by the 'dynamic of events.' My own view, which I have expressed before in these pages, and which I would like to reiterate, is that it is largely a question of the 'psychology of success!' To the eyes of Eastern Europe, Germany looks—and therefore is—successful. And nothing succeeds like success! That was the case when I last visited Central Europe. It is the case to-day. But in the meantime another factor of prime importance has had to be reckoned with. This is the close interweaving of nationalistic and ideological antagonisms (symbolised by the way in which European Powers have taken sides—on the Right or the Left—in the Spanish Civil War). The result has been the division of Europe into crusading *blocs*. Right *versus* Left. Fascism and Nazism *versus* Sovietism, and, in between, the parliamentary democracies, not quite knowing where they stand. Political philosophy and political expediency interact within the larger ideological conflict. Does it really matter, from the stand-

[1] 'Danger on the Danube,' June 1936.

point of practical politics, where the one ends and the other begins? The result in any case is the same. And in the sphere of practical politics the result in the present instance is the cementing of German-Italian friendship, with Germany as the stronger member of the partnership.

The seeds of the German-Italian Entente were sown by Italy's reaction to the attitude of the Sanctionist Powers during the Italo-Abyssinian War and the subsequent refusal of those Powers to recognise the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. Italy, financially exhausted by her African campaign, and unable to spare either the money or the energy for the maintenance of a leading position in Central Europe, was obliged to cede something of that position to Germany. An arrangement was come to between Rome and Berlin over Austria—the Austro-German Agreement of July 11 of this year—in which the short-term tactical success was Signor Mussolini's and the long-term strategic success was Herr Hitler's. But the soil in which these seeds of Italo-German friendship bore full fruit was that of the ideological conflict between Right and Left in Europe. This general Italo-German co-operation made it necessary for the two countries to adjust their differences in Austria and the Danube by a delicate system of balance. Each having need of the other in the wider European sphere, a scaling down, at least temporarily, of their Danubian rivalry was necessary.

The Berlin - Vienna - Budapest - Rome alignment now definitely exists. So long as Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini can maintain this *mariage de convenance*—for it is neither more nor less—the expansionist movements of Germany and Italy can be kept parallel and prevented from intersecting. That this is the case was confirmed by the Conference of the Pact of Rome Powers—Italy, Austria and Hungary, with Germany in the background—in Vienna on November 11. It is likely to remain so unless the move towards an Anglo-Italian *detente* in the Mediterranean, which is now taking place, should result in diverting Signor Mussolini from Berlin to London and Paris.

The German-Italian partnership has resulted in a strengthening of Germany's position in Central and South-Eastern Europe. There have been, it is true, certain setbacks, these being those changes in detail to which I referred earlier

in this article. They do not represent any permanent reorientation. Difficulties over the clearing agreements, for instance, have taken some of the brilliance from the German economic drive in the Balkans, with consequent repercussions on the political side. Likewise, the highly successful visit of King Edward to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey this summer definitely resulted in those countries realising that London no less than Berlin exists on the political map. But it would seem that the effect created by the Royal visits was not followed up. The Foreign Office apparently does not wish to encourage hopes on the part of the Eastern Mediterranean Powers of the materialisation of a Mediterranean pact, however much the Admiralty may have looked with favour upon such a prospect. In the meantime, Dr. Schacht is credited with further plans for oiling those parts of the German economic machinery in the Balkans which recently got somewhat out of gear. Likewise, the German-Italian Agreement can be seen at work in this part of Europe, if Signor Mussolini's recent startling speech at Milan is any indication.

In this speech the Duce simultaneously championed anew Hungarian treaty revisionism and made friendly overtures to Yugoslavia. This caused alarm both in Prague and in Budapest. In the Roumanian capital it was an especially bitter pill as, since King Carol got rid of the Francophil and Russophil M. Titulesco, the new Roumanian Government had been carefully veering in the direction of Berlin and Rome. In Yugoslavia, where the Magyar minority is much smaller than it is in either Czechoslovakia or in Roumania, and where trading relations with Italy, interrupted by the sanctions period, have now been resumed, the reception of the Milan speech was more cordial. The whole affair has naturally prompted political observers to ask the question: are Germany and Italy making a concerted effort to drive a wedge into the Little Entente?

With regard to the Little Entente, concerning which recently there has been a spate of rumour, I am able to give the true facts, as I was present at the last Little Entente Conference at Bratislava, and subsequently spoke with most of the leading statesmen of the group. At Bratislava certain agreements were made, which have been carried a stage

further by the recent visit of King Carol to Prague, whereby it was agreed that while the three allies should pursue a common policy on questions of common interest, each should enjoy a certain freedom of action in regard to other questions upon which the three States have different interests, and that, moreover, each should be free to seek friends outside without binding the others. This meant that Czechoslovakia should continue her alliance with Russia without any obligations devolving in the matter upon either Yugoslavia or Roumania; that Yugoslavia should continue her amicable relations with Germany; and that Roumania could, if she wished, be friendly with Germany or Italy or both. At the same time, while there was introduced a greater elasticity in the relations of the three countries in regard to extra-Danubian questions, on matters of purely Danubian and Balkan interest there was a corresponding tightening-up. Thus the Yugoslav-Roumanian agreement whereby Roumania will supply Yugoslavia with petrol in the raw, to be refined in Yugoslavia, in exchange for Yugoslav copper, for purposes of Yugoslav army mechanisation, together with the project for a new bridge over the Danube to shorten strategic connexions between Belgrade and Bucharest, constitute a closer drawing together of these two States in the Balkans. Similarly, the more recent agreement between Roumania and Czechoslovakia, for the supply of Czechoslovak war material and equipment to the Roumanian army, constitutes a similar drawing together of these two States on the Danube.

On the negative side—*i.e.*, opposition to a Hapsburg restoration in Austria and to Hungarian treaty revisionism—complete accord exists between the three States. On such questions as the Czech-Russian alliance, Germany, and certain aspects of the Austrian question, each State agrees to differ without prejudice to their basic common interests. It could be said, therefore, that although the Little Entente may not be unanimous, rumours of its pending break-up on fundamentals are without truth. This does not, of course, preclude the efforts of interested Powers to try and disintegrate the Little Entente. Indeed, such a disintegration must necessarily be one of the aims of German and Italian expansionism. The most notable advance of German interests on the Danube has been made in Austria. The instrument was the Austro-

German Agreement of July 11. It admittedly brought a breathing space to Austria, and it gave the Austrian Government what it wanted, the recognition of Austria's sovereign status. Thus both Herr von Schuschnigg and Signor Mussolini had reason for self-congratulation. But it also meant that Austria came definitely into the German orbit. In this sense it must be reiterated that, taking the long view, the principal success was Germany's.

The greatest personal triumph in this affair, however, was Herr von Papen's. He showed great political subtlety in the way he engineered the July agreement. For it was not only that he converted Herr von Schuschnigg. He actually converted Herr Hitler—at least, more or less. The German Reichswehr chiefs, of course, never needed any conversion. Neither, for that matter, did the more conservative elements in Berlin, the 'regulars' of the Wilhelmstrasse, Dr. Schacht, and others of pre-Nazi origin in Germany. Herr von Papen's great achievement was in winning over most of the Nazi chiefs, men like General Goering and Deputy Führer Hess, to his thesis that attempts at forcing a brutal *Anschluss* on Austria would but strengthen the resistance of Austrian particularism, whereas an 'independent' Austria, acting in close harmony with the Reich as a 'second German State,' would be a strong reinforcement of Germanism in Central and South-Eastern Europe, to say nothing of the opportunities which it would afford for German penetration and infiltration.

In Vienna von Papen held out prospects of a stronger Austria, with a shelving rather than a burial of the monarchical question, and with a stressing of the Catholic aspect of the question. To those countries, such as Yugoslavia, which most feared the idea of a Hapsburg restoration, Herr von Papen was able to suggest that Hapsburgism had been killed by the agreement.

The masses in Austria welcome the agreement. 'That's over, thank goodness,' they say in effect, grateful that the worst days of Austro-German tension are now no more. Paradoxically enough, however, the political groups are by no means all in favour. The extreme Nazis (Nazis of the streets, as they are called) are, however, bitterly disappointed. Hitler, they say, has let them down. Many of the more

violent amongst them are now passing to the Communists, just as in the weeks immediately following the suppression of the Socialists by the Dollfuss Government many of the more extreme Socialists and Communists passed to the Nazis. The intellectuals in the Nazi movement, although they do not like the situation, accept it as an expediency. Herr Hitler, they say, has his reasons and must be obeyed. Those of Social-Democratic persuasion do not like the agreement, as they regard it as an alliance between one form of Fascism and another. The Heimwehr are not enchanted either, but since their suppression as a body, and the fall of their leader, Prince Starhemberg, from political eminence, their point of view is no longer as important as it used to be. The clericals and the Church dignitaries are divided. Some accept it as the necessary ending of a quarrel which, as between two German peoples, was unnatural. Also a number amongst them, including some members of the hierarchy, feel that some kind of reconciliation with German nationalism was necessary to prevent young Austrians leaving the Catholic Church and becoming Protestant. Others amongst the clericals, and also amongst the hierarchy, have their doubts about the agreement, fearing German Nazi penetration. Those people, of whom there are many amongst the official classes, who may be described (to use the new term now politically fashionable in Austria) as 'pronounced nationals,' welcome the agreement. The Legitimists, of course, are anxious, in spite of Herr von Schuschnigg's pro-Hapsburg assurances to the *Vaterlandische Front*. Perhaps most important of all is the fact that the large and indeterminate section of the population, which, without being actually Nazi, was nevertheless inclined towards the Nazis from the negative motive of dislike of undue Italian influence behind the *régime*, is pleased by the turn of events.

Thus Herr von Schuschnigg, by making his *régime* more German and less Italian in colour, is now better able to preserve 'Austrianism' from the German Nazi onslaught. This is only superficially a paradox. In Austria it is a simple truism. Herr von Schuschnigg has proved himself to be both subtle and strong. He is now in a stronger position than ever before. The army is pleased with his suppression of the para-military formations—the private 'armies' such

as the Heimwehr—and it stands solidly behind him. At the same time, while all this means a strengthening of 'Austrianism' internally, it also means a more marked German orientation in Austrian policy externally.

Perhaps the best indication of the new direction of Austrian policy is afforded by the presence in the Vienna Cabinet of General Glaise von Horstenau. He is not a Nazi; but he is truly a 'pronounced national.' His past record and his present outlook are symbolical of the atmosphere of comradeship between the German and Austrian armies during the war.

Austria will continue to exist. She has proved herself 'viable' politically, economically and culturally. But inevitably she will be in the German grouping. Herr von Schuschnigg assured me in Vienna that Austria does not desire to participate in the creation of *blocs*. I believe him to be perfectly sincere in this. Austria certainly does not harbour any aggressive intentions. And she will doubtless be able, by a process of compromise and balance, to prevent herself from being dragged too violently in the wake of either German or Italian ambitions. At the same time it must be recognised that, as far as the main lines of European politics are concerned, Austria will inevitably conduct her policy in the full consciousness—to quote the text of the July agreement—that she is a German State. There are also ideological reasons. The present Austrian *régime*, although not definitely Fascist or Totalitarian, is nevertheless Authoritarian, and, therefore, strongly anti-Bolshevist. This provides yet another reason why Austria must necessarily have certain common interests with Rome and Berlin, and more especially with the latter.

There are, of course, elements in the Cabinet and in the army which still favour the policy of Danubian co-operation, especially as between Austria and Czechoslovakia, along the lines initiated earlier this year by Herr von Schuschnigg and Dr. Hodja, the Czechoslovak Premier. But both Vienna and Prague now realise that for such a scheme to succeed the adherence of Germany and Italy is essential.

This brings me to a consideration of the Czechoslovak situation. In the first place, let it be said that there is no truth in the highly coloured stories of Czechoslovakia being an

outpost of Russian Bolshevism in Western Europe and a base for the establishment of Soviet military aerodromes for an attack on Germany. Owing to her exposed position, both geographically and strategically, Czechoslovakia is not unnaturally much preoccupied about her security. For, in spite of continued verbal homage to Geneva, she realises, as all Europe now does, that the League is a broken reed as a protector of the weak against the strong. Hence her reliance upon her alliances with France, Russia, and her partners in the Little Entente. As far as a possible war with Germany is concerned, she would now seem to place most trust in the Russian alliance. French military aid in the case of a war starting elsewhere than in the West is not an absolute certainty, and the Little Entente alliance, while it would be effective in the case of, say, a Hungarian attack, might not work in the case of a war between Czechoslovakia and Germany. The whole network of Czechoslovakia's alliances is defensive. The notion that Czechoslovakia is a party to a Russian threat to Germany is therefore an entirely mistaken one. On the other hand, the actual military value of the Russian alliance, either to Czechoslovakia or to France, is open to question. Personally, I share the opinion of those who believe that Russia is more concerned for her own interests than for those of her Western allies, and that, therefore, it is unlikely that a vast Red air fleet or a tremendous Red army would come rushing to their assistance in the hour of need. In the long run there is no guarantee that the present ideological conflict which caused Berlin and Moscow to lead rival crusades one against the other will last for ever. More fantastic things could happen than that one day the two may become friends again. This, obviously, is not at all likely for some time to come. But as an eventual development it is not entirely impossible. For already it is a fact that the Reichswehr chiefs on the one hand and War Commissar Vorishilov and some of his Red army generals on the other sigh for the good old days of the Russo-German *Abmachungen*. If Russia and Germany come together again both France and Czechoslovakia would be left in the lurch. On the other hand, the partisans in Western Europe of alliances with Germany to combat Russian Communism would in that case also suffer a shock.

I have dealt fully with this question of the Russian alliance, because it figures prominently not only in Czechoslovak-German relations but also in the differences between the Prague Government and the *Sudetendeutsch* groups. For while the Government or the German Reich makes it clear to Prague that Germany would be willing to come to bilateral settlement with Czechoslovakia provided that country gives up its alliance with Russia, the *Sudetendeutsche Heimatfront Partei* of Herr Konrad Henlein, working on instructions from Germany, agitates for a new orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy away from Moscow and in the direction of Berlin.

Herr Rutha, Herr Henlein's lieutenant, with whom I discussed the matter some little time ago, told me that his party had a three-fold demand: (1) economic reforms in the *Sudete*; (2) the setting up of a federal system, within which there would be local autonomies for the Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, etc.; and (3) a German instead of a Russian orientation in foreign policy.

Having discussed the matter with M. Hodja, the Prime Minister, and M. Krofta, the Foreign Minister, I suggest that Prague's reaction to Germany's offer is that Czechoslovakia would be willing to come to a settlement with Germany provided it could be fitted in with her existing treaties with other countries and with her obligations to th League of Nations. The Czech attitude to the demands c Herr Henlein's party is that the Government is working ou schemes for improving the economic lot of the *Sudeten* Germans, and especially for the relief of those who hav suffered most heavily from the industrial depression; tha the federal idea is not workable because it would not be possible to draw lines of demarcation between the closely intermingled Czech and German populations; and that foreign policy is a matter for the entire community, and not for the dictation of a national minority which, in view of racia and party affinities with the Third Reich, demands a chang in Czechoslovak foreign policy in the interests of Germany.

And here one comes to the question which, in the view of Prague, is the crux of the matter. The meeting of *Sudeten* German grievances has admittedly been delayed, but it is claimed that the delay is mainly due to the difficulties created

by the Nazi German theory of *Deutsches Volkes Gemeinschaft*. It is because of this that President Benesh has declared that a complete settlement of differences between the Czechs and the *Sudeten* Germans must necessarily follow rather than precede a return of confidence. Although Czechoslovak foreign policy is at present based mainly on the treaties with France, Russia, and the partners in the Little Entente, Prague is not insensible to the necessity for Danubian co-operation. Hence the efforts of the Prime Minister, M. Hodja, to bring about a practical scheme of economic collaboration and political *detente* between the Little Entente States (Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia) and the Pact of Rome group—Italy, Austria and Hungary; and also Germany.

M. Hodja made an attempt this year when he first launched the Hodja plan (in many ways a variant on the former Benesh plan). Good progress was made with Austria. Matters did not go much further than this, however, for a number of reasons, including more especially Hungarian treaty revisionism on the one hand and Yugoslav suspicions of Hapsburgist tendencies in Austria on the other. Matters were further delayed by the Austro-German agreement of July.

Since then, however, things have been on the move again. When I saw M. Hodja in Prague he outlined to me his plans for Danubian co-operation, plans which, at the Little Entente Conference at Bratislava, were passed to the Economic Council of that organisation for further study. He expressed the hope that if Germany could be induced to agree, agreement with the others would not be too difficult. The full operation of this plan would necessarily have to follow an agreement in the West amongst the Locarno Powers, as a Franco-German settlement would make a German-Czechoslovak settlement easy enough. In the meantime he did not propose to sit with folded arms waiting upon events. He felt that as much preliminary ground as possible should be covered so that the machinery could be put in motion as soon as a Western agreement had been brought about.

And now a word as to Germany's intentions in regard to Czechoslovakia. I do not believe that Germany plans to attack Czechoslovakia or to wrest the *Sudete* from her by force. The idea of a German military campaign against

Czechoslovakia is probably as much a delusion as is the other fantastic notion that Czechoslovakia, in company with Russia, harbours aggressive intentions towards Germany. But it is clear that Germany wants to detach Czechoslovakia from the Russian partnership and to bring her within the German orbit, and, having done this, to obtain for the *Sudeten* Germans concessions of a far-reaching character which, without any territorial changes, would result in their virtual incorporation in the great Germanic family. For if Germany could accomplish this it would enable her, together with her agreement with Austria, to establish herself firmly in the Danubian regions, and thus to create a German-controlled *Mitteleuropa*, which, in turn, would become the spring-board for a further German expansionist movement in Hungary and the Balkans.

Hungary, under the *régime* of the late General Gömböes, inclined more towards Berlin and less towards Rome than was the case during the Bethlen *régime*, which was orientated definitely towards Rome. The new Hungarian Government will, it is believed, follow the main lines of the Gömböes policy. But signs are not wanting, judging from the Duce's Milan speech and its sequel at the Vienna Conference, that Italy is again exerting herself to maintain an influential position in Budapest. At the time of my earlier visit to the Danube this year I had remarked a tendency on the part of Hungary, due to pressure from Berlin, to make no reference to revision as against Yugoslavia and stress the need for it in the case of Czechoslovakia. Apparently Rome is now taking a similar line to Berlin. This would appear to be the only explanation of those passages in the Duce's Milan speech which were meant to be pleasant music both for Budapest and for Belgrade. For the rest, the new Hungarian Government has expressed the desire for better economic relations with Hungary's Danubian neighbours, which would seem to augur well for the various schemes for Danubian economic collaboration to which I have already referred, and which Signor Mussolini, too, is now believed to be willing to sponsor. On the other hand, the Budapest Government has reiterated its revisionism claims, an echo of which appeared in the Milan speech, and this would seem to militate against the prospects of Danubian co-operation. For if revisionism is to be a prior condition, it is difficult to see how the Little

Entente could come closely into line with Hungary, even in the economic sphere.

Roumania, as I have explained, since the disappearance from the political arena of M. Titulesco, has grown cold towards Moscow and more affable towards Rome and Berlin. Internally, as the growth of the Roumanian Fascist and anti-Semitic movements clearly show, German influence is making itself felt too. But of course the uncertainties aroused in the Roumanian mind by the ambiguities of the Milan speech may, for the moment, slow down the tendency to get closer to Berlin and Rome.

Yugoslavia is, of course, the most powerful and important State in the Balkans, for she is at the same time a Central European and a Mediterranean Power. Like Roumania, she has been tightening up her politico-military relations with the Little Entente and Balkan Pact groups, whilst at the same time preserving her freedom in regard to her relations with other Powers.

Owing to Italy's anti-Yugoslav policy, Signor Mussolini is regarded with a certain amount of suspicion in Belgrade. This was particularly the case at the time of Italy's ascendancy in Vienna, which caused Belgrade and Berlin to find a certain common ground in regard to the Austrian question. The Yugoslav-German friendship was also helped by commercial considerations. Yet another factor was the waning influence of France, especially at the time of M. Laval's Italophil policy. Franco-Yugoslav relations have since improved, but not to an extent which would be likely to draw Yugoslavia into an anti-German policy. This is not so much a matter of pro-Germanism as a realistic conception of Yugoslav self-interest.

The recent lining up of Germany and Italy had, during the time of my last visit to Belgrade, damped down some of the philo-German feeling, and this was also influenced by the difficulties which had arisen in regard to the German-Yugoslav trade agreement, to which I have already referred. Since then, however, has come Signor Mussolini's olive branch to Yugoslavia, and this may perhaps militate against fears of ulterior motives in the German-Italian Entente. M. Stoyadinovitch, the Yugoslav Premier and Foreign Minister, told me plainly that Yugoslavia does not wish to be

drawn into either of the two rival European *blocs*, either of the Fascist or the Popular Front variety. If she had to make a choice of *blocs*—which she hopes will never be the case—she would prefer to enter a grouping led by Britain. But as a grouping under British leadership is not likely to materialise, Yugoslavia does not see any point in not being on normal friendly relations with Germany in the meantime. Yugoslavia's dislike of being drawn into either of the present rival *blocs* in Europe is only surpassed by her even greater dislike of any kind of European consortium of Great Powers—such as the Four-Power Pact—which might try to dictate to the smaller European States. M. Stoyadinovitch adopts a cautious attitude towards Moscow. This does not imply any dislike of Russia *qua* Russia. For the Yugoslavs still entertain a regard for the 'mother of the Slavs.' It refers specifically to the Bolshevist *régime*. The Premier made it clear to me that he saw no reason for any hurry in changing Yugoslavia's present policy of not according diplomatic recognition to the Soviets. It would be the reverse of practical, he said, to invite complications.

Yugoslavia entertains very friendly sentiments towards Britain. She feels that she has certain common interests with us, especially in the Mediterranean. The affectionate relations existing between the Prince Regent, Prince Paul, and the British Royal House are, of course, also an important factor. Considerable importance, therefore, is attached to the exchange of views between Prince Paul and the British Government which took place in London last month. This, following upon the visit of Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, points to the desire of Downing Street to encourage the various Continental Governments which share with the British Government the desire to adopt a neutral attitude towards the dispute between the rival Fascist and anti-Fascist *blocs* in Europe.

On the whole, Yugoslavia's foreign policy can best be described as one of enlightened self-interest. She looks at European affairs from a practical point of view. She is in a good position to do so, now that instead of having to seek the friendship of Great Powers, the latter are inclined to seek her friendship. There is no doubt that she is in the position to play a stabilising *rôle* in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

This practical foreign policy bears the stamp of M. Stoyadinovitch. It is the same with his internal policy. He is likely to go a long way towards solving the Serbo-Croat question. For his method is not to seek rapid and spectacular 'paper solutions,' but to work slowly, by means of concrete achievements, towards a *modus vivendi*, from which, in the course of time, a lasting settlement will doubtless emerge.

In conclusion, I am brought back to the thesis with which this article opened. Within the wider struggle for power in Europe—a struggle in which rival nationalisms and opposing political philosophies are closely interwoven—the various countries of the Continent are seeking to determine their position and to provide for their security. Their efforts, to an increasing degree, are governed by the fact of Germany's increasing strength and the possibilities of a German predominance from the Baltic to the Balkans. A fair summary of the attitude of the majority of the Danubian States would be this : that in their eyes there are two realities in Europe—one actual and the other potential. The former is Germany's present strength ; the latter is Britain's rearmament.

As to whether the British anti-*bloc* policy, or the German policy of expansion, will ultimately prevail throughout Central and South-Eastern Europe will depend, in the long run, upon the comparative strength of Germany and Britain. At the moment the former is the more potent factor, because it is the more actual. Hence my contention that at present, and probably for some time to come, Germany will be the predominant factor in Danubian and Balkan Europe. But Britain's potentialities are being borne in mind. And Britain may yet have the last word. But this must necessarily depend upon the capacity of the British Government—which so far has not been in evidence—to couple material strength with consistency of political purpose. Germany's influence is mainly due to the possession by Herr Hitler's Government of this capacity.

C. F. Melville.

GHOSTS

By C. E. Lawrence

Assuredly the earliest ghost was born of a dream, nourishec by ignorance and brought to strength through fear. But nc only one such dream encouraged the pervasive visitor. I was the many dreams that followed, wherein lost personalitie reappeared and renewed themselves, which tended to mak their influence permanent in the darkened, timorous o bereaved hearts of a mankind that always has known itsel ignorantly lost among the mysteries. And among those encompassing mysteries many things—even all things—ar possible. As Hamlet said to his faithful Horatio, in word over-quoted but incontestably true: 'There are more thing in Heaven and Earth'—and all that!

The idea of ghosts is everywhere about us. They hav entered the commonplace familiarities of speech; are said tc 'walk' on treasury-days in the theatre, probably because toc often on those occasions the weekly salary earned was a untouchable as they. To have the 'ghost of a chance' suggests the next thing to having no hope whatever. But in spite of the doubts so expressed, they are—they *are*; and yet, are they? 'There are more things'—yes, we know that; but a good many nothings also have been invented and made much of, in spite of all the prudence of your philosophy!

Also, we know how easy it is to be deceived by appearances. In the right mood and hour the imagination, when i has not been discouraged by too rational an upbringing, i ready to leap to the supernatural. How often may not the half-caught vision of a white owl flitting at twilight silently along the hedgerows have suggested a passing spirit, the shadow of one revisiting a scene of old labours and happiness? Anc that being so, what must have been the ecstasy, or the fear, of Eve (always more observant than Adam) when in the brilliant

freshness of her newly-created world she saw the thronged trees dark with shadows from out of which at any moment might have come an angel—one would like to hope also an elf—or one of those surprising creatures of natural reality, mammoths or humming-birds, that were her daily new discovery? Endless possibilities waited to charm her curiosity and wonder in that privileged Eden. Though never ghosts; for, equally with her man (and that bumptious Mrs. Something of Superiority Road), she had no ancestry. And there were no dead, until Cain brought that sorrow to the earth, though doubtless afterwards, in the harshness of the wilderness, she sometimes thought that she heard Abel's cry—or was it the grieving wind? Possibly in that way, also, ghosts were born.

One thing, at least, we may take as certain. That it is essential to every ghost at some time, in its own convenient season, to be visible to mortal eyes. It may be that its influence often is only felt through a dread inherited or brought with the telling; but ghostship implies, at least, an occasional visibility, otherwise it could not be a ghost. We must, however, guard against proceeding too rapidly in this exploration of a province of unbounded scope and universal concern that disdains the points of the compass, the ways of the wind, settled thoroughfares, exact portraiture, and all else that denotes any sort of static or established conditions. Much must be assumed, which is all to the good, for generally the inquiry that does not begin with some interesting or challenging measure of doubt is hardly worth the pursuing.

We cannot *know* that there are ghosts. The evidence, so to call it, is too diverse and evasive to justify any clear conclusion on a subject most transient and sometimes superattenuate. They are, in truth, not only unknown, but also are unknowable. Yet we can easily assume that there are such; especially as the personalities of some of the women and men we have known in life were so impressive that it seems impossible—simply impossible—for them to have become dissolved, like mist in a morning's sunshine, through the mere intervention of bodily death. Survivals of the kind? Need the personality go because its material envelope is removed? Surely not! But that is the farthest we need to venture. Whether they would take the forms in which human

fears or superstitions often have clothed them is another question. But let us in a spirit neither irreverent nor yet over-reverent search and gather what we may. It can only be of interest to examine such evidence as human insight or credulity has presented about the shadows that walk; and if in the course of this inquiry our travelling takes us to nowhere in particular, or merely rounds the circle, we yet may find enjoyment on the way.

It seems that ghostly apparitions generally have assumed forms that were well-suited to the order of mind that looked for them. To the ugly-hearted they were ugly; to the fearful terrific; to the humorous grotesque. But open-mouthed credulity appears willing to welcome anything abnormal, and it may be that any one of such spectres may have all the aforesaid characteristics of ugliness, terror and the grotesque, with others added unto them.

Let us begin with the absurd, with such crude bizarreries as in the Grimms' folk-tale were used to overcome the obstinate rigidity of the boy who could not shiver or shake—such preposterous terrors, suddenly and unexpectedly experienced, as would bring the crude-minded to shocks of loud mirth or noisy fright, beginning with the grinning yokel's turnip-head with the light of a candle inside it, and going on to such eccentric vagaries as that of Monk Lewis's 'Alonzo the Brave,' who appeared at the marriage-feast of his Fair (and false) Imogine:

> His visor was closed and gigantic his height,
> His armour was sable to view;
> All pleasure and laughter were hushed at his sight;
> The dogs, as they eyed him, drew back in affright;
> The lights in the chamber burned blue!

The spectre, at the call of the bride who had deserted him for 'a baron all covered with jewels and gold,' unclosed his visor, whereupon a skeleton's head was exposed!

> All present then uttered a terrified shout,
> All turned with disgust from the scene;
> The worms they crept in, and the worms they crept out,
> And sported his eyes and his temples about . . .

And so it goes on, in a long-drawn comically-horrific story,

until the ghastly apparition taxed his fiancée for her infidelity, and

> Thus saying, his arms round the lady he wound,
>   While loudly she shrieked in dismay;
> Then sunk with his prey through the wide-yawning ground,
> Nor ever again was Fair Imogine found,
>   Or the spectre that bore her away.

Which, perhaps, was as well.

That, of course, was just a made-up story—'I don't believe there's no sich a person!' said Betsy Prig—a sham Gothic ballad written to gratify the eagerness of an age which rejoiced in such over-coloured romances as Beckford's *Vathek*, Mrs. Radcliffe's *Mysteries of Udolpho*, and Maturin's *Melmoth the Wanderer*, and was as easy to invent as the ghost stories of a later period, which their tellers, bound by that time in the fetters of rationalism, had at the end to explain and justify; as with the Ingoldsby 'Spectre of Tappington,' which, suspected of stealing the trousers of a guest at a manor-house, resolved itself into a paltry affair of sleep-walking. Rudyard Kipling's 'Phantom "ricksha",' the sounds of which were due to scurrying rats, is of the same type. And so with other supposed wraiths, spooks and bogeys that haunted ancient corridors and Christmas numbers, until, after their many years of hard service, they had grown so hackneyed and shop-soiled that not even the most eager or ingenuous child, or curate, or stockbroker, could get a thrill out of them.

So that, though not forgetting the counsel given to Horatio, we may be positive that the merely grotesque may be ruled out from whatever of the true ghost world there is. There is no farce or sense of humour about that, but always and in every respect an unsurrendering dignity. Dickens obviously enjoyed composing the jangling details of his Marley's Ghost as seen by Ebenezer Scrooge—in everyday clothes to the tassled boots, with his pigtail and the chain he carried and dragged after him of cash-boxes, keys, padlocks, ledgers, deeds, and heavy purses wrought in steel, with, most amusing of the incidentals, owing to the ghost's transparency, the buttons at the back of his coat showing through. Dickens must have laughed aloud—good Christmas laughter—as he

personality of their wearers, must, however, be dealt with later. For they matter.

Marley, of course, was no ghost, but, like the Ingoldsby spectre, a fictional invention; as is every grotesque ghost. The only difference between the headless horseman of popular fright and the visitors that appeared to Scrooge and the untrousered guest of Tappington is that the last were the playthings of wilful imagination, while the incomplete cavalier was the offspring of mere ignorant popular credulity. And that continues. Many believe that the spirit of Anne Boleyn walks still in Hampton Court 'with 'er 'ead tooked underneath 'er arm'; while until recently the good folk down Westerham-way listened at midnight on every 5th of November for the legendary hoof-beats of the Guy Fawkes conspirators galloping, as they hoped, to safety. There is no sound of horses now in that eerie hour, but the last time those hoof-beats were listened for, the noise was heard of a car; and was it a ghostly car? Can it be, Horatio, that the progress of mechanism is affecting even the processes of the spirit world?

Human beings, indeed, seem able to swallow anything if —in the words of Charles Lamb, though otherwise applied— they have the mind for it. And not even scholarship is immune. When so solid a man as Dr. Johnson could believe in the Cock Lane ghost, how can the little-learned be blamed for doing as he did? The Doctor protested to Boswell afterwards with a noisy indignation that his sole concern had been in the detection of the fraud; but that very indignation, as Bozzy suggests, may be taken as evidence that the Great Cham had really been caught into believing. A few years ago the inner walls of a house in Hertfordshire were subject to mysterious drenchings of water, and several good folk, wise, semi-wise and stupid, were avid to discover the ghost that worked the wonder. It turned out to be the freak of a servant-maid, possibly a descendant of the girl who had caused the tappings of Cock Lane; and let us hope that in both cases, until the frauds were exposed, the culprits thoroughly enjoyed their fun.

Such supposititious apparitions, whether the freaks of super-romantic fancy or of crude joking, are not evidence in this inquiry; but it would be a mistake to rule out all imagina-

tive essays in the psychical, if only because the minds of the poets and of the greater writers in prose found a ghostly element to be serviceable in their works, and thereby often imparted to them a powerful and terrifying effect. It is, indeed, but a visionary flight, though of an incommensurate distance, from such impassioned inventions to the broodings of primitive minds as detailed in Sir James Frazer's studies on *The Fear of the Dead*, wherein departed spirits are represented as haunting their former environment, and requiring ceremonies of propitiation to prevent their working evil in petty revenge or spite.

The ghosts that appear in great poetry give grateful occupation for thought, as they bring one into communion with the finest hearts and minds in the processes of inspiration. And the ghosts so presented are various indeed—from Dante's Beatrice and Virgil, who guided the poet through regions post-mortem, to Shakespeare's murdered King at Elsinore, from whom undoubtedly, and not from his mother, Hamlet inherited his excellent gifts for speaking declamatory verse. Dante gives the truth of Virgil's supernature through a swift, unexpected touch, showing how, unlike the living poet in the gloom of the Inferno (' no light, but rather darkness visible '), he did not cast a shadow. It was an example of the vision that sees the essentials, so easily overlooked by a lesser apprehension, and in which the *Divine Comedy*, as in all great works of imaginative genius, is radiant.

The Shakespearean ghosts are the best of their extraordinary period to choose for consideration, as the poet had his supernatural faiths and fears, as well as an irresistible urge to play with the spiritual as it had been organised by mediæval religion, superstition and witchcraft; while his apparitions have an added reality because of his inward feeling that perhaps—perhaps—they were true. But, of course, with him as with us, it all was unformed and vague—a chapter caught from the regions of Chaos and old Night. That he accepted as possible the influence of some separate intelligence inspiring the mind and subtly informing it is shown in his eighty-sixth sonnet, of which I quote the whole, because to shear away the lines not necessary to our purpose is to remove so little that all the beautiful structure may as well be left intact.

Was it the proud full sail of his great verse
Bound for the prize of all too precious you
That did my ripe thoughts in my brain inhearse,
Making their tomb the womb wherein they grew?
Was it his spirit, by spirits taught to write
Above a mortal pitch, that struck me dead?
No, neither he, nor his compeers by night
Giving him aid, my verse astonishéd.
He, nor that affable familiar ghost
Which nightly gulls him with intelligence,
As victors of my silence cannot boast;
I was not sick of any fear from thence;
  But when your countenance fill'd up his line,
  Then lack'd I matter; that enfeebled mine.

It may be that 'that affable familiar ghost' was merely a working of the subconscious mind, but in this essay we are entitled to accept the word in its ordinary meaning. For, after all, is any affable ghost really more extraordinary than the subtle workings of the sub-conscious mind?

A leading purpose of ghosts in visiting the Elizabethan stage was to point the trend or moral of the dramatic action—in effect, to fulfil the function of the chorus in Greek tragedy. This was especially so with the ghosts that appeared to the agitated Richard III. on the eve of Bosworth Field. They were his wife; his nephews, the young princes; his brother Clarence; Henry VI. and Prince Edward, that Henry's son; the treacherous Buckingham and Lords Rivers, Grey, Vaughan and Hastings—all by-products of the melodrama of the age of Elizabeth and royal James, though greatly lacking in historical truthfulness. With the reticence, or, as is more likely, the want of confidence, of modern stage-producers, such manifestations often are blue-pencilled out, or 'explained away' with artful lights. How have they sometimes treated Shakespeare's ghosts in these later realistic days? We have seen Banquo's apparition represented by a hesitating spot of light reflected in the back of a chair—a most unconvincing visitor from the region of death. At the other extreme there was the Ghost of Hamlet's Father, as played by Stephen Phillips in Sir Frank Benson's first season in London early in 1890, with such a flood of white limelight poured upon him that when in his exit he moved behind the stone battlements his brightness still could be discerned

through them—an unexpectedly penetrative quality in a ghost. But, unless it was Mozart's penal statue of the Commendatore in *Don Giovanni* with his doomful irony, no more purposeful ghost than that of Hamlet's Father has walked theatrical boards. He revealed an energy on the earth, and under it, so restless, and was so wilful for revenge that, although the blood of anger no longer coursed in his veins, the substituted ichor of his spiritual state had unexpected qualities of obstinate determination. He is, indeed, one of the most significant of Shakespeare's *dramatis personæ*, because through him the poet made his boldest attempt to read the impenetrable mysteries of death.

We recur to the question of the clothes that ghosts have worn; and this is of some importance because it rather queers the wonder. It is not unbelievable that the personalities of those who once were vital may survive the disintegrations of bodily death; but it is difficult to credit the idea of their habiliments sharing the privilege. The spirit of man—yes; but hardly the subliminal self of a pair of braces! Yet the semblance of reality is required, and unless they wear their shrouds, which would add to the gruesomeness, they would have to appear naked; in which event, as we are reminded by Diogenes Teufelsdröckh, it might be difficult for them to preserve the dignity that even the headless cavalier when he walks the corridors by all accounts does not surrender. Hamlet's Father was impressive in grey, unburnished armour; Henry James's sinister daylight ghosts, in *The Turn of the Screw*, wore the dull habiliments of our everyday; Kipling's pathetic wraiths in *They* were rightly clothed as children are—and so with every ghost story; while in the accounts of spectral apparitions that appear, not with the licence of fiction, but in what is called real life, never has one been inappropriately garmented. They have even worn plumed hats, ruffs, capes and rapiers, but never, I believe, a silk top-hat.

The first essential to writers of ghost stories is that in all details they are consistent. If their shadows must be adorned, then it must be with due appropriateness. And the 'properties,' to use a theatrical term, should be suitable. Sir James Barrie, of all people, has a lapse of the kind in *Mary Rose*, where the Australian soldier-son leaves a heavy, sharp-pointed knife stuck in a wooden box, as a keepsake for his

wraith-mother. As a touch of filial sentiment that will pass; but it raises problems. Material things are apt to fit awkwardly in immaterial pockets.

One is entitled to assert the unromantic possibility that every accredited ghost, as seen by an honest individual, appears only in the inward visions of that person's mind. The brain has its tricks, and so may enable the invisible sometimes to be discerned. It is said that very gross drunkards, who have lost their self-respect, see horrid creatures crawling, crawling, crawling, up and up the wall; so may not cleanly-excited persons in their kindly infatuations sometimes behold loved ones who no longer are there? As I did once. Almost my only friend in the worst crisis of my life, and whom I loved not only because of his faith in me, suddenly died. His death brought a shock. For days the thought of him went with me everywhere. Then he appeared to me. I awoke on an early morning to see him standing at the foot of my bed, and his eyes were red. Unmistakably it was he. But the element of doubt, which is a positive part of me, insisted; and I looked with critical inquiry—to discover that my apparition was the rising sun peering redly through an ornamental window. Had I not been naturally sceptical, and therefore had not looked with precision, I must have believed it was his ghost. And probably in such ways the majority of spectres have appeared to the impressionable. Incidentally, also, it helps to explain the mystery of the clothing.

I say 'majority,' as I have no wish to band myself with the absolute sceptics; for there is no escaping from the truth as expressed by the Prince of Denmark on the illimitations of the universe and the very narrow bounds of our philosophy. And *Credo*—I do believe in the sensitiveness of houses to the temper, the happiness or unhappiness of those who for years had lived in them. But haunted? I am not so sure of that, and it is very difficult to discover the truth. I have heard footsteps descending a wooden staircase where no person could be walking. That cause was easily discovered—again a rat jumping down wooden stair by wooden stair. As that explanation was almost grossly simple, so may most of the mysterious noises that fall on strained ears and nerves in a wakeful night-time have easily-discovered natural causes; but who will not sometimes feel that the cracking wainscot,

:he creaking stairs, the sighs that speak of a wandering sadness, are not the messages of those who cling to their former homes and cannot otherwise communicate with the successors, warm in them now ? Yet in their shyness houses are reticent. They try to keep their secrets to themselves, and hug their memories of the loved occupants gone—or still invisibly there. So that when certain curious persons associated with the British Broadcasting Corporation spent hours recently in a .aid-to-be-haunted house in Kent, and with thermometers, sound-recorders and other instruments endeavoured to secure evidence of spiritual phenomena therein, of course there was none—at least, for their discovery. It was an affront to the ghost world. What self-respecting spirit would consent to ts reactions being broadcast for the satisfaction of inquisitive ears ? Such a thing was not 'done' in the days of Queen Victoria, or of Her Majesty Anne.

But we are venturing hazardously into uncharted—but oh, uch fascinating—seas and had better anchor not too far from he shore of reality, which, as we have seen, has its high omance and the strangest possibilities almost in sight, yet, vith all that nearness, just too far away for us to be sure of hem. It is that very uncertainty—alluring, unsatisfying—which has beckoned to the curious and, Will-o'-the-Wisp-'ke, often has brought misleading and illness to minds working on weaknesses congenital. Sometimes it has made men nad.

The mystery is manifold, but too often the sinister has ccompanied the marvellous and the awe-inspiring. Who of · has the discernment truly to weigh the values of the nfluences, vital shadows, that may appear, or are only felt, or re but a mockery of credulity ? The spiritual majesty of the criptural account of the summoning forth of the dead rophet Samuel through the conjurations of the witch of Endor to soothe the despairs of Saul, as of the appearance to dysseus, visiting Hades, of the ghost of his mother, Anticlea —'Thrice I sprang towards her and was minded to embrace er ; thrice she flitted from my hands as a shadow or even as dream, and sharp grief arose ever at my heart'—belongs to ne solemn and austere magnificence of the subject ; while at ne other extreme are the honest trickeries of mechanism which, as with the aid of mirrors produced for amusement

fifty years ago at the Polytechnic a Dr. Pepper's Ghost, or a little earlier than that, on travelling showmen's stages, the spirit of Maria Martin murdered in the Red Barn, just to horrify the uncultured pleasantly. But all that, whether in its majesty or the commonplace, was innocent, and in the later occasions might be mirthful, offered to simpletons now so sophisticated that they would have laughed to see the terror of Tom Jones's schoolmaster-companion, Partridge, when he saw the Ghost of Hamlet's Father—our unrelenting old friend!—for the first time. The sinister element cannot be omitted from any inquiry of this kind, as far too many have been the charlatans who, through the ages, with impudence, ingenuity and make-believe, have traded cruelly on ignorance.

But away with the tricksters who would sell their own ghosts for sixpence, each one veritably post-obit, if they could! In our simple fashion, while journeying thus round to the point from whereabouts we started, we have seen enough to suspect that, with all its vagueness and the doubts so loudly cast, the mystery may, at least, have 'something in it'; and are permitted to believe that the supernatural, when seen aright, is not any more wonderful than the natural, but only perhaps more difficult to apprehend.

The reality of the ghost world cannot be confidently tested, but through its very spirituality it may convince. For presences may be closely about us, even now, of which we can have no evidence whatever; but yet we may get to know that truly they are there—are here—occupying some fourth dimensional plane. We do not yet know the fulness of our own sense faculties. Each of us, even to himself, is as much a mystery as any ghost. To touch, to taste, to hear, to see, to smell—all those forms of apprehension are definite. But there is more than them in the shadow-compass of our psychology. We know that with persons newly met we sometimes feel at once a sympathy or an antipathy which no speech could altogether express; and, as with two human beings, so may there be a similar liking or antipathy felt between the personalities of the living and those who—but *dead* is not the word.

There we have strayed from the ghosts of this playtime inquiry into realms which certainly were not within the range of Horatio's philosophy. Yet of this we may feel passably sure. Ghosts may be, but we cannot prove it; and it is useless

to summon them from the vasty deep for the reason, as Hotspur derisively told the imaginative Glendower—'but will they come when you do call for them?' While if they do come, there is no certainty of their being quite where we think or suspect them to be. In any case, it is so incalculable as to be a hopeless quest, for they belong to a dimension beyond our intervention, in conditions that are timeless, while on their plane the centuries may be not successive but simultaneous and the historically incongruous massed immaterially together. So let us call up, summon with all due ceremonies, the ghost of Alexander the Great, and—who knows?—anyone may or may not respond; for the silence of the spiritual to the inquiries of man has ever been profound. Yet the unresponsiveness, be it noted, may be due to nothing but the circumstance that the spirit summoned, whether of Alexander, Cæsar, Ptolemy or Nebuchadnezzar, did not know English. We have heard of a Spiritualist's Julius who had no Latin. Therefore, better to leave well alone, and if we feel they are with us, not to fuss them with our curious little questions, but think of them with all the sympathy possible, for it may help them, and no courtesy of that kind is wasted—ever.

In Maeterlinck's *Blue Bird* the old grandfather declared that he and those who were with him lived only when they were remembered. Poor comfort—that—for the dead! It is so easy to forget. . . . Yet personalities do survive the fading of the body and live on triumphantly to be loved ardently by generations born years after they had laughed and sung and made their happy impressions on the minds and hearts of their contemporaries. Mozart, Elia, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Goldsmith . . . Are they not dead? And are they not deathless? Are not their spirits familiar, their personalities known to us, better, perhaps, even than those of some of our closest relatives? So that if, out of the immeasurable regions of death, those lovely spirits in such ways visit us, why may not also their brothers and sisters of the shadow world who in their times loved and wrought, albeit not with the unforgettableness of those whose names and works live warmly in our hearts? And in that reality of immateriality free of earthly restraints and limitations, may they not, all of them, be even as actual as ourselves, and, therefore, sometimes

BOOKS RECEIVED

Arthur James Balfour, by his niece, Blanche Dugdale (2 vols., 36*s.*: Hutchinson).

There used to be circulating amongst publishers a biographical supplement to the tables of prohibited matrimony in the Prayer-book to the effect that:

> A man may not write his grandmother's Life nor his father's nor his uncle's, etc.

And, no less, a widow or a niece may not write the Life of husband or uncle. The reason is obvious. The consanguinity might easily enter into the ink. Many a good biography has been spoilt by the natural tenderness towards a relation and the determined care taken in concealing skeletons. Mrs. Dugdale has naturally much more to reveal than to hide about Arthur Balfour, and her conscientious picture of her uncle is as satisfying as that which Mrs. Creighton wrote of her husband, the Bishop of London. It is as remote from a literary job or a political polemic as could well be imagined. It is an accumulation of memories and anecdotes, which act as the mortar between the slab-like letters and documents out of which the Lives of statesmen are invariably built. There are passages written on the model of Boswell and more effective and life-like than the occasional Boswellian touches with which Lord Morley lightened the portentous Life of Gladstone. There is an inevitable atmosphere of eulogy, and the hero gives an impression that he could seldom be wrong. There are chapters of abiding interest. The history of the Irish administration by this country, or of bimetallism or of the Education Acts, cannot be completed without Arthur Balfour's share being raised from the state of controversy to the more settled levels of History.

With those leading promontories in his life rounded, with the Irish Secretaryship and the Premiership cleared, with

his philosophical and social gifts given their attractive prominence, a perfect life could have been lived and biography could have been written. He himself could hardly have asked more of Destiny. But, amazingly, he lived to become one of the discoveries of the war, to return to office, of which his own party had, on the whole, been glad to relieve him, to hold the Secretaryships of the Admiralty and the Foreign Office, to become the Elder Statesman of Europe and to exert an enormous influence on the relations of England and the United States, and finally upon the Treaty of Versailles. Only Arthur Balfour and Lloyd George survived the war with added prestige. How far the Peace Treaties can survive only History can show. But that is the great uncertainty which clouds the work of all who were plenipotentiaries for their countries indeed, but not, alas, for final peace.

The political career was complete, and Mrs. Dugdale opens it with a perfect vignette. Balfour looked into Hatfield during the General Election of 1880.

> But Hatfield was not deserted. As Balfour drove up to the house he saw standing on the steps of its majestic north front, closing the long vista of the avenue, a solitary figure gazing towards him. It was Lord Beaconsfield. . . . For a fraction of a second's time the two stood together and alone in the doorway of the mighty House. The little episode dissolved almost as soon as it took shape. Nevertheless it stamped itself on the elusive memory of the younger man.

These are the seconds in history that neither the Lytton Stracheys nor the Macaulays are willing to lose. There was another when Balfour staked a life devoted to philosophy against a political career by the result of his election. Politics won and he found himself in the House cautiously addressing empty benches on Indian currency during the dinner hour! He found himself in the Fourth Party consorting with the brilliant Lord Randolph, and before long stinging Gladstone to fury by using the word 'infamy' of the Kilmainham Treaty.

When the 'Government of Caretakers' took over office Balfour was President of the Board of Trade, and, while the guest of the Duke of Westminster, he was made the medium of some overtures by Gladstone, who arrived from Hawarden and wished to settle the Irish question in concert with Salisbury. In reporting the proposal to 'Uncle Robert,' Balfour

observed that 'Morley is a Home Ruler by conviction: Chamberlain and Dilke are anti-Parnellites partly by calculation and partly by temper. Chamberlain, the most vindictive of men, finds it (at present) impossible to forgive the Irish Party for the way in which they have treated him.'

The Home Rule crash led to strange bedfellows and to 'the beginning of that relationship between Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain which was to prove to the uttermost the political genius, the forbearance and the power of mutual understanding of these most diverse characters.' This alliance was to prove the political romance of the Life as though Destiny had thrown two opposites into the *rôle* of Jonathan and David. In the end Chamberlain's schemes wrecked Balfour's Ministry, and his forbearance was the more needed as he realised from the beginning that Chamberlain was 'the most vindictive of men.' He was the reverse of Lord Hartington, 'the slippery Whig whom it is so difficult to differ from and so impossible to act with.' The fate of the Home Rule Bill is well known, but it is amusing to imagine the present Provost of Eton as a schoolboy waiting till early morning at the post office at Hatfield to bring the news with a whoop of triumph to Lord Salisbury. Balfour in consequence had to take up the 'Whiteboys' burden and administer an Ireland distracted between societies of revolt and certain landlords, whose criminal obstinacy did infinite harm to themselves, their fellow-landlords and the English cause. Mrs. Dugdale has a rapier in pickle for Lord Clanricarde, 'whose indifference to seeing public money spent on preserving the lives of his agents did not diminish with time.' Balfour's plan of campaign was to shoot when necessary, as at Mitchelstown, and at other times to bury Home Rule with kindness. He raised funds against a potato failure, with the result that, 'Thanks be to Mary and to all the Saints and to Bloody Balfour, ould Ireland will be saved yet,' as remarked an old crone.

He had his solution, but it was not that which prevailed in the end, although he had the satisfaction of seeing the terrible gladiator Parnell speared behind and disappear. It is fascinating to observe that the tempter O'Shea approached Balfour two days after he had petitioned for divorce against Parnell, but he only received a few acid drops in return from

Balfour refusing 'to comment on the distressing family matters to which your communication refers. . . . I sincerely trust that no aggravation of inevitable suffering may be brought about by the unwarrantable introduction of political and party feeling into private affairs, etc.' Balfour's assumed sympathy with the villain of the piece raises a grim laugh even at this distance of time.

Balfour and Carson made each other in the Irish field, and both were in at the death of the Blatant Beast, as the Irish Party must have seemed to them, but, when asked in 1928 what he thought, Balfour claimed all he could: 'What was the Ireland the Free State took over? It was the Ireland that we made though the Liberals went back on our policy.' So far as Balfour was responsible for George Wyndham, he was responsible for a permanent strand in the prosperity of Ireland and Ireland's forgiveness toward England.

Balfour's letters are always a real delight. He meets Herbert Spencer, 'a cross between a village schoolmaster and a farmer. I dined in the evening with the Duchess of Manchester. I mentioned incidentally that I had seen Spencer. She had never heard of him. I said he was a philosopher. She asked if I cared for philosophy. This gave me pleasure.' Balfour also cared for bimetallism, which gave him his first chance to initiate some thread of alliance with the Free Silverites in America. It was a thousand pities his wonderful studied argument for silver was not allowed by Lord Salisbury to be sent to America. It would have given Balfour his first foothold in a country to which he was afterwards sent in England's direst need during the war. To the far-sighted it was always a question whether England should make her world-alliance with America or Germany, or with both. Balfour's thought was Transatlantic, while Chamberlain's was Teutonic. There are more of History's mighty 'ifs' in this Life than in any other of recent publication; and if Chamberlain had not been hasty, an Anglo-German alliance might have dominated Europe from the 'nineties. Salisbury's comment shows his mastery of foreign affairs: 'The one object of the German Emperor since he has been on the throne has been to get us into a war with France. I never can make up my mind whether this is part of Chamberlain's object or not. . . . But France certainly acts as if she meant

to drive us into a German alliance, which I look to with some dismay, for Germany will blackmail us heavily.' So wrote an Elder Statesman indeed.

The real achievement of these volumes is that Balfour can no longer be reckoned an enigma or elusive. There are a number of political questions we should have liked light upon. What was Balfour's final opinion on the Irish and Boer settlements, which were made after his party had used war and coercion against both those small peoples? Not that his Irish administration was not a very remarkable one and that it combined iron with syrup in a manner which would have pacified Ireland in the eighteenth century. But having stood by the Tory Party in their war against the Boers, and having disparaged the Liberal or pro-Boer solution of giving back the Boers their freedom, what would have been Balfour's solution? Would it have been twenty years of resolute government such as he and Salisbury proposed for Ireland? These are not questions of controversy, but of information, and of these History must eventually satisfy herself.

In both Ireland and South Africa, Balfour had to follow on Chamberlain's tracks. Chamberlain was one of the most accomplished of party wreckers. His idea was to use the Tory powder to fire off his Tariff Reform. He believed passionately in a Unity of Tariff for the Empire, while Balfour was for the Unity of the Party at home. In spite of a speech, which Winston once ventured to describe as the 'Sheffield Shuffle,' Balfour kept the peace with exquisite versatility. Only the expositor of bimetallism and the simultaneous employment of two metal currencies could have kept two such strong schools of thought as Free Trade and Protection side by side in the Tory ranks, but 'he was presently to reap some reward for the skill and patience all those years. For it was a united party that he led into the General Election of January 1910.'

The Lloyd George budget carrying the end of the landed classes, the veto of the Lords and a Home Rule depending on the Irish support for the Liberal budget made exciting sessions. The 'die hards' in the Lords were determined to hold up the budget and let Asquith swamp the House with new peers. It is interesting that Balfour, though leading the Opposition, never knew that the King had actually promised

to do so. With Balfour's advice to his party to surrender dates the decline of his leadership. His Memorandum on the subject was suppressed in which he said that 'all military metaphors, which liken the action of the fighting Peers to Leonidas at Thermopylæ, seem to me purely for music-hall consumption.' But it might be added that whichever party in England can write the ballads of the music-hall can win a general election.

With the war Balfour came into Imperial and world importance. It is impossible to discuss, or even yet to estimate, his manifold touches or interferences with world affairs, but in a century he will be more justly discussed. His overwhelming rejection and contempt for Kitchener is already historical. He realised Kitchener's weak spot, his reluctance to take responsibility. Others were to have the responsibility while Kitchener had the advertisement and the glory. Balfour's own weak point lay in a non-ability to court or take account of popular feeling or to make allowances for revulsions of sentiment, as shown in his grim communication of the results of the Battle of Jutland to the nation. He wrung more groans and tears out of the British than all the propaganda of Germany together. Mrs. Dugdale draws the only consolation that 'confidence in British war reports was henceforth unshakeable at home and abroad'!

His great and most important achievements were in the fields of the United States and Palestine, in each of which he had a tremendous effect which, during the war period at least, brought the Empire both credit and influence. In both the hand of Time has begun to unravel conditions which so many were glad to hail as of the millennium. The United States swung into line with the Empire chiefly owing to an opportune letter from Zimmermann, which was as useful as one from Zinovief in later years. Whenever the Empire is in difficulty, it has been observed that foreign gentlemen, whose names generally begin with a Z, write indiscreet letters which save the situation like the sudden magic of a genius summoned by Aladdin's lamp.

Balfour was sent to America under conditions of great secrecy, which were only broken when it was discovered that Balfour had given his autograph to the lift-boy in the hotel at Dumfries! Balfour was in good spirits, and when

offered an indiarubber suit said he would prefer to drown in his night shirt! Then came his conversion to Zionism, chiefly through the imagination of Sir Mark Sykes. Of this mighty conception launched under British guidance, he did not live to see the throes which have since convulsed the Arab world, but after his triumphant visit to found the Hebrew University in Palestine he was made to realise Arab hostility the moment he passed under the French mandate at Damascus. 'Near the end of his days he said that on the whole he felt that what he had been able to do for the Jews had been the thing he looked back upon as the most worth his doing.'

This is a great biography, but the questions it has raised and the hints it has offered make a third volume essential one day. There must have been so much omitted. But for the time all historical readers will be delighted with this worthy of England in a splendid sense standing in his well-carved niche. All the details help. He hated Hegel and loved Handel. He loved Eton and could estimate Harrow. He wrote a defence of religious doubt, but he read family prayers. He read William Morris and disliked Donne. It will be a long time before this material can be rewritten in the light of History. For the present generation it has been done as well as it could be, and other statesmen are advised to train and cherish their literary nieces in order to save themselves from both the flatterer and the detractor.

SHANE LESLIE.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

'*Soleo enim in aliena castra transire, non tanquam transfuga, sea tanquam explorator.*' With these words of Seneca in my mind I gladly accepted an invitation to Dublin to attend the first meeting of the 126th session of the Trinity College Historical Society, of which Edmund Burke was a founder. The night boat from Liverpool carried fewer passengers in the third class than in the saloons, and there was no lack of comfortable beds (2*s.* each) for those who could afford to pay this sum, in addition to the modest fare (10*s.*). The company below was, as always, interesting and varied. Half a dozen men, who sat together, were returning from contract work for the fifth year in succession on Lincolnshire farms. They had been making good money since June—a minimum of £2 and often £3 a week after paying all expenses—and were on their way home to Galway and Connemara to look after their bits of land. They were loud in their praise of the English, who were 'as good to Irishmen as Irishmen to each other.'

The compliment evoked from the only Englishman present, as intended, a Guinness all round, but also a protest from one young Irishman from Co. Clare. He was set on joining the Navy: he was passed fit, but, since 'some dirty swine' had murdered Admiral Somerville, no one without relatives who had served in the Fighting Forces was admitted unless he could bring a reference from a retired officer. He had papers which bore out what he said. He had tried in many quarters. They all said 'We want to live a bit longer,' and would sign nothing, nor even answer letters by post. He longed to serve: he was born to the sea. It was unjust and inhuman that the fears of others should decide his fate. He had no use for politicians: he wanted to be free to serve what he called the 'old' country.

Encouraged by his frankness, another took up the tale. The English had done the dirty on Irish war pensioners. There was in his village a war widow with an epileptic son. When he was twenty-one his allowance was stopped, but she kept him at home. She died when he was twenty-three and he was sent to the union: had he been given a pension, he could have stayed with his uncle. He was a decent chap: the union was just a prison. Had his mother died before he was twenty-one, he would have got a pension. The English Treasury pared and scraped every pensioner, interpreting every regulation against them; it was worse for the Irish than for the English, for there were fewer voluntary charities to fall back on in Ireland.

I could not deny the charge: I knew of similar cases in England. Much of the unpopularity of the Army is due to the grievances of ex-soldiers and their dependants, who are not receiving, in border-line cases, the treatment Parliament and the taxpayers intended. Our war charities, numbering many hundreds, overlapping, often expensively administered, need unifying by Act of Parliament, and centralising as a preliminary to some intelligent delegation of functions.

Two days in Dublin passed quickly: it is a city with great architectural and scholastic traditions. The Marsh Library, with its fine series of old Prayer-books, delighted me. The University Library was a glorious blend of ancient and modern. The Heralds' College, *auspicium melioris aevi*, housed in a Danish tower, with tabards and seals, old and new, suggested many thoughts, not all of them depressing. In the two Protestant cathedrals were memorials to many a man whom Westminster Abbey and St. Paul's would have been delighted to honour, but who, in Milton's words, lies here

and, so sepulchered, in such pomp dost lie
that kings, for such a tomb, would wish to die.

I spent some time in the Dail. The procedure is suspiciously like our own: the long array of questions to, and often evasive replies of, Ministers, the complaints that private members' time is being filched by the Government—it all seemed very familiar.

I had the honour of an interview with Mr. de Valera in his room adjoining the Chamber. He looked well; his

sight appeared good: he was as affable as other dictators I have met, and as certain of himself and of popular support. The only reply he could make to an unreasonable Cabinet in Westminster was patiently to pursue the course he had set for himself, in the hope that we should some day see the light. Time was on his side: even in Northern Ireland opinion in favour of Union was growing; if England were to cease to subsidise Northern Ireland, it would grow faster. Irish industry was growing slowly, but he readily agreed that the migration of Irishmen, mostly to England (300,000 in fifteen years is my estimate, based on the Registrar-General's figures), whilst less than the former migration to all countries, is a loss which is not counterbalanced by their remittances. But free movement, if only to Britain, is a great safety-valve.

He spoke of many things which I will not attempt to record here: they are to be found in his recent speeches. I left with the impression that Mr. de Valera himself is three-quarters of the Irish problem: the rest is represented in equal moieties by the British and Irish peoples.

The debate in the Great Hall at Trinity College was attended by men only: the Auditor of the Historical Society led off worthily and with dignity. The most notable contributions in the subsequent discussion were by Peadar O'Donnell, well known abroad as author of *The Islanders*, and Sean O'Phaolain, another Irish writer of eminence, but with a very different political outlook.

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I was not less fortunate in my company on the return journey to Liverpool. A Cockney Jewish tailor on his way to Whitechapel, a Scottish commercial traveller from Newcastle, and a spruce young English accountant, left our ranks early, for the sea was choppy. The survivors, to whom sandwiches and bread and butter were the best aid to gaiety, included three young men on their way to earn a living—on the land, if possible. They had almost no money, and no idea where to go or what to do, but were self-reliant and proud of their ability to work hard at any task. 'Keep out of Liverpool, and the big cities,' said an old hand; 'that's where the bad Irish get to, and they'll bleed you or drag you down. Go to the small country towns; that's where men

who can work are welcome. Take a job, however bad, for six months, to get your card stamped and a character for steadiness, and start looking round for something better before next harvest.'

Another passenger, the oldest, was a man of the Royal Munsters, with stories of India and France and Silesia. He was a navvy by trade, and had just buried his sister. The telegram had reached him near London a few days ago. He threw up his job and went home to give her a worthy funeral. It had cost him £30, with two motor cars and a hearse and seven miles to go to the cemetery. She was his only surviving relative. All that was on his mind now was whether he had paid for enough masses for the repose of her soul. He was hoping to get back on his old job in Acton.

The youngest was a Dublin boy, cheerful and penniless. His father had paid 10*s.* for his ticket. He would join the 'English' Army, as his cousin had done: he heard that they needed recruits. Was he big enough for the Irish Guards? They had a fine uniform. Why did not other regiments dress better? There was a Kerryman, too, son of a petty officer, from the wildest part of the west coast, more at home in a canoe than a ship, who hoped to join the Navy. He wanted to be a stoker, but was not sure that he had had enough schooling. He had been lobster fishing all the summer: the season had been bad. French poachers had cleared the best grounds and there was none to stop them.

Another was a youth from Connemara—the younger son of a very small holder. He had been on the land all his life and wanted to get a job on a farm. He could plough and reap and sow, lift beet and handle pigs. We discussed his prospects at length, and I gave him a letter to a farmer.

The old soldier encouraged them all in turn. The Navy was good: so was the Army; and he should know. They should not lose heart if they did not get a job at once. They should not whine and say they were down and out, but stand up to life and keep their eye on the foremen and gangers, who had more power than any clerks in the office.

I visited the recruiting offices in Liverpool of the three services, in three different streets. The general appearance of the Army Recruiting Office, without and within, would not have done credit to a dispensary for sick animals, with its

blowsy posters, its mean approach up a dark stairway, and the poverty-stricken appearance of the furnishings. An Army blanket covered a W.D. trestle-table; more old blankets covered the truckle-beds on which recruits must lie for medical examination. The walls were black with the grime of decades. The other two offices were a little but not much better. Separatism is the strongest instinct of the services, but I cannot doubt that if Sir Thomas Inskip could arrange for joint recruiting offices, and for a single medical examination for all three services, in offices which would themselves reflect the *joie de vivre* and self-respect of the services themselves, he would get more recruits and save money. They do these things differently in America.

I had business in Liverpool, and I stayed to hear what happened to my four young friends. Two were accepted for the Army; one, who proved to be colour-blind, failed for the Navy. He wanted to be a stoker: he could tell colours in the ordinary way, as I proved, but the test was too much for him. I suppose it is essential for every stoker to be able to distinguish all colours perfectly, but it seems hard that no place can be found for born sailors who only become aware of this defect when tested. Might they not sometimes learn if trained for a time?

The other failed for the Navy because of bad teeth—the main ground of rejection for all services. How far is this a necessary condition? Is it irremediable by dental care after enlistment? Food in the Army and Navy is not as tough as it was forty years ago, and the average man's teeth are worse. A heavy responsibility rests on those who have steadily obstructed the inclusion of full dental treatment as a statutory benefit under the National Health Insurance scheme. We spend more on drugs under the Acts than on dentists; and far more on doctors than on dentists. Yet every middle-class householder reckons to spend more on dentists than on drugs and doctors combined, unless it is a question of an operation, and holds it to be money well spent.

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One of the rejected pleaded with me to find him a job. He had never gone farther afield than the nearest market town. Liverpool frightened him: it was all so big and

unfriendly. 'I always hope that one day I shall own a bit of land in my village, and it all belongs to somebody, but no one could or would want to own this'; and he pointed to the black, forbidding masses of office buildings.

I took him with me. At Crewe I offered him Peadar O'Donnell's *The Islanders* [1]; he turned a page or two idly and then began to read steadily, not raising his eyes from the book. As we neared Euston I asked him how he liked it. 'That man knows,' he said solemnly; 'father should be reading it.' It was an eloquent review.

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'Back to the land' is an old cry: the need for small-holdings is another. The deciding, though not the only, factor is wages.

The following are extracts from a letter which reached me last month from an under-stockman, aged twenty-four, with a wife and three fine children, whose passion for the land induced him to leave house-painting for farming five years ago. He is employed by one of the richest men in England on a model farm.

> I don't ask for anything for myself, but for my wife and kids. I would do anything, no matter what it was. They deserve something better than this existence. If I could set up with an acre of ground and start pig and poultry breeding, I could make a living, pay back what I was lent to start it with, and show a good profit at the end of a year or two. But miracles like that don't happen these days, and I shall have to carry on in the same old rut. This 'back to the land' talk is all very well, but farmers expect labourers to work for 33*s.* to 35*s.* a week when they can get 1*s.* 3*d.* an hour building, and earn anything from £3 to £4 a week and also get from Saturday dinner-time till Monday morning free.

'I am better off than some,' the letter continued.

> I get 35*s.* 8*d.* for a sixty-eight hour week; I get three pints of milk for the children, and pay no rent. But I live three miles from the shops, and they charge extra for delivery. My wife has a bicycle, but can't leave the children. I am up at 5 and back at 5 with two hours for meals, but there is no overtime pay when the cows calve or the pigs are farrowing, nor anything for harvesting. It's an all-in wage and I shall never get any more as long as I live. Yet I see men on £6 a week striking for more, and others saying

[1] Traveller's Library, 2*s.*

milk's too dear. I'm a stone lighter now than I was when I went on to this farm: as I milk the cows I say to myself, 'How much of this milk is going to make 25 per cent. profit for the big dairies or going to be drunk by the children of men with three times my pay?'

I offer no comment: the solution is being sought, and has perhaps been found, in some parts of Europe. When shall we have the courage to insist on a decent wage for the decent men without whom the countryside, on which we so easily wax sentimental, would soon be a waste of weeds, as, in some places, it has already become? The fertility of the counties of South Wales and of the north-east and north-west coast is less than it was a hundred years ago; bracken is gaining everywhere on the grass land and on fields once under the plough.

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The vindication of General Gough by Mr. Lloyd George in the penultimate volume of his war memoirs follows closely the lines of two articles by Mr. W. S. Sparrow entitled 'The Truth about the Fifth Army' which appeared in the pages of this Review in November and December 1919. In them, without spraying the acid of a vitriolic tongue over friend and foe alike, the writer made it clear that Gough knew from first to last what his army could achieve, when and where it could stand, and when and where it must fall back to evade disaster. A lesser man would not have had the strength to maintain the position so long as he did, or perhaps to seize the right moment to withdraw. Only a great man could have retained as he did the confidence of his own men at a moment when mean-spirited non-combatants in England, and others who should have known better, were preparing to make him a scapegoat. 'Much untruth,' Mr. Sparrow concludes, 'was spoken; but falsehood is only a fog—it comes, it goes, while great deeds have a truth which is transferred from fathers to their sons. Our Fifth Army has its own Valhalla in our history.'

* * * * *

In April last I summarised in these columns a discussion with Professor Pastor on current developments in Europe. The course of events has closely followed his anticipations.

He returned recently from Spain, and we again met to discuss the tragic sequence of events in the Iberian peninsula. His first question was—'How would you like a Bolshevist Spain, and how would it affect England and France? How would you like a Largo Caballero in Downing Street?' He rightly judged from my silence that I preferred not to discuss such an eventuality, and he allowed me to turn the tables by asking him questions. I recalled his broadcast in October 1934, when the situation in Asturias, a prelude to the horrors of to-day, rehearsed by Anarchists, Communists and Socialists, but never performed, was at its worst. He summed it up over the wireless in these words:

> All men of good will in Spain, with the exception of the Socialists, have rallied to the Presidential policy. The tragedy of the whole situation . . . is due to a large extent to the folly and political incompetence of that party—the Socialists—to which high-minded and intellectually honest men belong, some of them my good friends.
>
> They refuse to see reason and, faced with a situation in which they could have played an invaluable part of a critical, even destructive but always parliamentary opposition, chose the way where 'fair is foul and foul is fair,' and have made themselves responsible for disorder and bloodshed, which could easily have been avoided if the parties of the Left had added to their enthusiasm some political common sense and moral maturity.

It was a courageous utterance, not well received at the time, but not less true. He has laboured long for better understanding between Spain and Britain with a success which is insufficiently recognised, sacrificing his personal and financial interests to the hopes of closer union, political and commercial and cultural, of the two most western and most Christian countries of Western Europe. What adds weight to his anti-Communist *Einstellung* is the fact that he has always been intimately associated, and has deeply sympathised with, every movement for social reform in Spain, and has often publicly denounced the injustice and shortsightedness of the Conservative classes in Spain, whose lack of vision and good will is to some extent responsible for the extremity of Spain to-day.

'What is Franco's policy?' I asked. He handed me documents some of which I reproduce below, observing that Franco was no Fascist, but a leader; no Socialist, but a soldier to whom social justice came first.

The first ran as follows:

DECLARATION TO THE GENERALS AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS BY GENERAL FRANCO AT BURGOS ON ASSUMING SUPREME POWER ON OCTOBER 1, 1936

You may be proud of your work. You have in these moments handed over to me a united Spain, when you found it in pieces. You arose with different garrisons, displaying the fine flag of Spanish tradition, rooted in the spirit of the people; which stands for a race which does not wish to die and for a civilisation on the verge of destruction by the Red hordes of Moscow.

In rising against them you are not only defending the nation but civilisation itself, fighting with the spirit of soldiers, of Castille, a spirit which was beginning to wilt. Now after two months of struggle with victory, honour and organisation on our side you hand over Spain to me.

I can, at this solemn moment, say but this, with the certainty of a soldier and the loyalty of a man. You have put Spain in my hands. They will be firm, and my pulse will be steady. I shall seek to raise Spain to a position worthy of her history which she occupied in past times.

You have handed over to me all executive power. I will do my duty or die as did those brave men, Phalangists and Carlists, soldiers and the heroic cadets of Toledo, who proclaimed the glory of Spain to the world. Thus, and to this end, you are all with me. This Junta will continue to work with me for the greatness of Spain; it will remain at my side in order to make a great Spain united by high ideals—a Spain for true Spaniards. Long live Spain!

A few minutes later he made the following declaration to the assembled crowd:

Just as, from a distance of 400 kilometres, we said to the defenders of the Alcazar 'We will reach and rescue you,' and did so, so we now say to you 'No Spaniard shall lack fuel, no workman bread: those who have more shall give to those who have less.' This social justice, which can be brought about only in a spirit of love, we shall seek to ensure by persuasion, but we have a hand sufficiently hard to impose it.

We demand of you, in return, the sacrifices you are already making for Spain, for not everything can be done by *arrivistes*; the workman, the soldier, the employer and employee also have their duties to perform, so that Spain may again illuminate the world which was lit up by the heroic defenders of Toledo.

A few days later, on October 30, General Franco made the following declaration to the representative of *La Nación* of Buenos Aires, the 'Thunderer' of South America, which enjoys an international reputation.

He then spoke of the future of Spain and predicted in the near future a resurrection of Spain without precedent since the sixteenth century. The new Spain would look to the future, but with her feet rooted in tradition and in the past. The new Spain would be the daughter of the great Spain of the past, and not of the new revolutionary Spain of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In moving and sincere words he reaffirmed the solidarity of Spain with the Spains across the seas.

The concluding document is a letter addressed to the universities of the north, written by Miguel de Unamuno, ex-Rector of Salamanca, whom Professor Pastor invited to England in the spring, when he delivered his introspective monologues to crowded audiences at Oxford and London. To translate it would be to spoil a beautiful piece of Latin:

UNIVERSITATIS SALMANTINAE AD EXTERAS ACADEMIAS ET STUDIORUM UNIVERSITATES LITTERAE DE CIVILI BELLO HISPANICO

Cum rebus publicis implicari a suo spirituali opere alienum aequo austeroque iudicio Salmantina Studiorum Universitas habeat, interdum tamen ad vocem suam supra hominum contentiones tollendam, ut iustitiae impleat officium, a saeculari doctrinae laude adigi se sentit.

Itaque terribilem spectans armorum conflictionem in Hispaniae terris coortam, dum adversus orientale commentum, quod omnia certe perimeret, occidentalis noster et christianus vitae cultus, Europae mirus aedificator, pro viribus defenditur, in tanta rerum hominumque civilis belli strage, ipsa eorum immani asperitate facta quaedam eminere summo dolore deprehendit, quibus permota Universitas, triste munus exsequens, viriliter coram excultis populis ea se improbare et exsecrari proclamat.

Ea sunt: crudelitatis facinora non necessaria—complurium cum laicorum tum ecclesiasticorum hominum caedes—; item excidia inutilia—igniferarum glandium coniectio in sancta hispanae gentis monumenta, qualia templum B. M. V. de Columna et coenobium cui 'La Rábida' nomen; in valetudinaria etiam ac puerorum scholas; denique, obstinato consilio, in urbes non munitas—; quae quidem omnia sunt laesae intelligentiae scelera patrata inspicientibus

vel consentientibus illis, qui rei publicae gerendae partes de iure—ut aiunt—adhuc apud Exteros agunt.

Atqui consulto solum ista hic memorantur,—praetermissis, nostrae honestatis et patrii pudoris gratia, innumeris criminibus et direptionibus, quae communis dementiae quidam veluti fluctus obruens hispanici soli partem secum traxit—; ex ipsa enim talium flagitiorum commissione colligitur eam saevitiam deletricem non necessariam atque inanem aut praescriptam esse aut reprimi non posse ab illis Status moderatoribus dictis, qui, praeterea, nec uno verbo reprehensionis aut satisfactionis vel minimum humanum sensum aut correctionis consilium protulerunt.

Haec igitur omnia veridica summa exposita, perhumana maerentis animi communicatione, ad exteros clarissimos in doctrina et in magisterio collegas, comiter simul advocata necessitudine pro servanda humana ratione vitae, deferre voluimus.

Salmanticae, VI-kal. Oct. MCMXXXVI.

Rector

MICHAEL DE UNAMUNO:

None of these documents were printed in full in any newspaper: few have been printed at all.

'Whatever mistake,' concluded Professor Pastor, 'the National Party, guided by Franco, will make, let us remember that it is at present a most heterogeneous conglomeration, ranging from the ultra-Catholic Carlists to Liberal sympathisers, and including many who perhaps have joined it originally for unworthy motives. All these variegated groups are to-day united by a genuine love of their country. Perhaps their sins will be forgiven for this excess of love which my eyes have seen, for I believe it to be a manifestation of that spirit that Europe so sorely needs, of which the unconquerable spirit of the cadets of Toledo will remain as a symbol. There is a kind of spiritual radiance about these heroic gestures which is like sunlight between the leaden clouds. A new Europe can be born from faith and love only; never from legislation sponsored by spectacled experts from afar. These have their uses, and, indeed, their place in Spain is empty at the moment; but they must be tools, and not the guiding hand. Four times already the fate of Europe has been fought in Spain or by Spaniards: the Peninsula was the battlefield between Rome and Carthage, between Cross and Crescent, and of the victory of West over East. Spain

was the spearhead of the counter-Reformation, and Spa broke Napoleon, the spirit of the French Revolution.

'This present struggle may prove in retrospect to be c more battle of the West against the East—one more crusa of the individual against the Moloch of regimented hord But one must not talk about Russia; so much nonsense both sides has been poured forth, and the attempt to exami this question with precision has already defeated one Inte national Committee.'

At our side, as we spoke, lay the daily papers, reporti the agony which has gripped Spain and which has horrifi the world. It is not desirable to take sides: it is v necessary to remind ourselves that because General Franc foes are supported by Russia, and by sympathisers with Russ it does not follow that he is or will be an ally of Italy Germany. We can, if we have the courage to do so, ensu that Spain is as independent in future as she was in the Gre War. We, and France, should make this the primary obj of our joint endeavours. It is the belief of those who knc General Franco best that he would readily lend himself such a policy and that, with our aid, he might succeed.

ARNOLD WILSON.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 *&* 12 *Orange Str Leicester Square, W.C.2.*